Earlier empirical studies indicate that contract costs associated with loan monitoring influence bank loan pricing and that all lenders may not be equally efficient monitors. We examine whether differential monitoring costs lead foreign banks to price loans to U.S. firms differently from their U.S. counterparts. In particular, we hypothesize that due to relatively lax regulations governing the operations of foreign banks in the U.S. prior to the passage of the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, such banks were required to invest less resources in loan monitoring and were thus less efficient, or more costly, monitors. If the regulations introduced through FDICIA were effective then these foreign banks would be forced to improve their monitoring functions which would, in turn, reduce the rates charged on foreign loans. We test these hypotheses regarding the influence of regulations and lender identity by examining the differential lending behavior of American and Japanese banks to U.S. companies, since Japanese banks comprise the major foreign banking presence in the U.S.