Bank Branching Research Articles

Finance and Efficiency: Do Bank Branching Regulations Matter?

We use portfolio theory to quantify the efficiency of state-level sectoral patterns of production in the United States. On the basis of observed growth in sectoral value-added output, we calculate for each state the efficient frontier for investments in the real economy. We study how rapidly different states converge to this benchmark allocation, depending on access to finance. We find that convergence is faster - in terms of distance to the efficient frontier and improving Sharpe ratios - following intra- and (particularly) interstate liberalization of bank branching restrictions. This effect arises primarily from convergence in the volatility of state output growth, rather than in its average. The realized industry shares of output also converge faster to their efficient counterparts following liberalization, particularly for industries that are characterized by young, small and external finance dependent firms. Convergence is also faster for states that have a larger share of constrained industries and greater distance from the efficient frontier before liberalization. These effects are robust to industries integrating across states and to the endogeneity of liberalization dates. Overall, our results suggest that financial development has important consequences for efficiency and specialization (or diversification) of investments, in a manner that depends crucially on the variance-covariance properties of investment returns, rather than on their average only.

Evaluating the real effect of bank branching deregulation: Comparing contiguous counties across US state borders

This paper proposes a new methodology to evaluate the economic effect of state-specific policy changes, using bank-branching deregulations in the US as an example. The new method compares economic performance of pairs of contiguous counties separated by state borders, where on one side restrictions on statewide branching were removed relatively earlier, to create a natural “regression discontinuity” setup. The study uses a total of 285 pairs of contiguous counties along 38 segments of such regulation change borders to estimate treatment effects for 23 separate deregulation events taking place between 1975 and 1990. To distinguish real treatment effects from those created by data-snooping and spatial correlations, fictitious placebo deregulations are randomized (permutated) on another 32 segments of non-event borders to establish empirically a statistical table of critical values for the estimator. The method determines that statistically significant growth accelerations can be established at a > 90% confidence level in five (and none prior to 1985) out of the 23 deregulation events examined. “Hinterland counties” within the still-regulated states, but farther away from the state borders, are used as a second control group to consider and reject the possibility that cross-border spillover of deregulation effects may invalidate the empirical design.

Financial Development and Pathways of Growth: State Branching and Deposit Insurance Laws in the United States, 1900–1940

Abstract This paper studies the effect of state‐level banking regulation on financial development and on components of state‐level growth in the United States from 1900 to 1940. We use these banking laws to assess the findings of a large recent literature that has argued that financial development contributes to economic growth. We contend that the institutional mechanism leading to financial development is important in determining its consequences and that some types of financial development can even retard economic growth. For the United States from 1900 to 1940, we argue that the financial expansion induced by expanded bank branching accelerated the mechanization of agriculture and spurred growth in manufacturing. In contrast, financial expansions induced by state deposit insurance had negative consequences for both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.

Welfare Effects of Financial Integration

This paper compares four forms of inter-regional financial risk sharing: (i) segmentation, (ii) integration trough the secured interbank market, (ii) integration trough the unsecured interbank market, (iv) integration of retail markets. The secured interbank market is an optimal risk-sharing device when banks report liquidity needs truthfully. It allows diversification without the risk of cross-regional financial contagion. However, free-riding on the liquidity provision in this market restrains the achievable risk-sharing as the number of integrated regions increases. In too large an area this moral hazard problem becomes so severe that either unsecured interbank lending or, ultimately, the penetration of retail markets is preferable. Even though this deeper financial integration entails the risk of contagion it may be beneficial for large economic areas, because it can implement an efficient sharing of idiosyncratic regional shocks. Therefore, the enlargement of a monetary union, for example, extending the common interbank market might increase the benefits of also integrating retail banking markets through cross-border transactions or bank mergers. We discuss these results in the context of the ongoing debate on European financial integration and the removal of bank branching restrictions in the United States during the 1990s, and we derive implications for the relationship between financial integration and financial stability. Last we illustrate the scope for cross-regional risk sharing with data on non-performing loans for the European Union, Switzerland and the United States.

To Conform or To Perform? Mimetic Behaviour, Legitimacy‐Based Groups and Performance Consequences*

abstract The study of interorganizational imitation has been an important strand in the recent literature on institutional theory. This paper offers new insights for our understanding of mimetic isomorphism and its reliance on legitimacy: we suggest that legitimacy‐based reference groups guide firms in their mimetic behaviour, that firms undertake imitation even against their own ex ante information, and that legitimacy‐based imitation contributes negatively to firms' profitability. We examine Portuguese bank branching decisions between 1988 and 1996 and find that banks imitate their legitimacy‐based groups, and not only towards ex ante (firm‐specific) attractive locations, but also towards unattractive locations; we also find that mimetic branching produces a negative effect on profitability. We conclude that these results show the importance of legitimacy pressures on organization decisions and the tension between the pressure to conform and the pressure to perform.

The riegle-neal act and local banking market concentration

The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 greatly transformed the American banking system by allowing the widespread establishment of interstate bank branching networks. This paper examines possible effects on local banking market concentration that resulted from the provision in the Riegle-Neal Act that allowed states to opt-in to the establishment of de novo interstate branches. Regression analysis using data from more than seven hundred cities does not provide any evidence that allowing the establishment of de novo interstate branches caused increases in local banking market concentration. These results may help alleviate some concerns that passage of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act currently pending in Congress will result in lessened competition in local banking markets.

The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching

Retail banking markets have traditionally been viewed as locally limited. However, recent studies have found evidence that large multimarket banking organizations tend to offer uniform interest rates for retail deposit accounts throughout the area that they serve, at least within a given state. This uniform pricing phenomenon raises questions about the continued relevance of the concept of local banking markets for both research and antitrust purposes. We address this issue by employing a model designed to explain the pricing behavior of single-market banks that face competition from multimarket banks. Empirical results are found to be consistent with the many implications of the model. We find that even with multimarket banks present in the market, local market concentration influences the pricing behavior of single-market banks; however, this relationship weakens as the market share of multimarket banks grows. We also find that, on average, multimarket banks offer lower deposit interest rates than do single-market banks operating in the same market, and, in most cases, greater multimarket bank presence is associated with lower deposit interest rates offered by single-market banks.

Did branch banking restrictions increase bank failures? Evidence from Virginia and West Virginia in the late 1920s

This paper investigates the role of bank branching restrictions in explaining the likelihood of state bank failure during 1925–1929 by comparing the experiences of Virginia (which allowed bank branching) and West Virginia (which did not). The results indicate that branching restrictions were associated with a higher incidence of bank failures, even after controlling for banks’ financial health, market structure, regulatory environments, and economic conditions in the markets in which the banks operated. The relationship between the lower incidence of bank failures and branching appears to come from the fact that branching allowed banks to exploit cost advantages by becoming larger and better diversified institutions, and by extending their depository base. The results are consistent with the notion that bank branching restrictions were an important cause of the bank failure experience of the late 1920s.

Did state bank branching deregulation produce large growth effects?

Previous research claiming large growth effects of deregulation of state bank branching laws is biased by contemporaneous correlation between the regressors and the error term of the regression model. Robustness tests indicate that the growth effect of branching reform is much smaller than initially estimated.

The Competitive Implications of Multimarket Bank Branching

The Competitive Implications of Multimarket Bank Branching

The Competitive Implications of Multimarket Bank Branching

Regulators and research economists typically view retail banking markets as locally limited, spanning an area that can often be approximated by a metropolitan area or a rural county. Banks are assumed to set retail prices based on the conditions of supply and demand prevailing within these local market areas. However, recent studies have found evidence that large, multimarket banking organizations tend to offer uniform interest rates for retail deposit accounts of a particular type throughout the area that they serve, at least within a given state. This uniform pricing phenomenon raises questions about the continued relevance of the concept of local banking markets for both research and antitrust purposes. We address this issue by developing and empirically testing a model to determine the effects of the presence of multimarket banks in a local geographic market on the deposit interest rates offered by single-market banks serving that same local market.

Diversification in interstate banking: the search for related performance profiles between acquiring and acquired banking firms expanding across state lines

Notes increasing consolidation of the banking industry in the USA, Western Europe and Japan; and presents a study of 1980‐1994 acquisitions of US banks by large interstate banking firms. Considers possible motives for cross‐border expansion, reviews relevant research and compares the performance of target banks with their local competitors and their buyers; and buyers’ performance with their competitors. Finds that most buyers are located in rich, densely populated states and most targets in states which have traditionally restricted bank branching activity; that buyers and targets have very different performance profiles (although some differences gradually reduce after acquisition); and that local market influences have a greater effect than common ownership. Concludes that targets are selected for their location and expected future performance, with possible diversification benefits.

Consolidation and bank branching patterns

This paper examines the association between consolidation and changes in levels of bank branching as measured by changes in the number of bank branches per capita. Using a specially-constructed data set, we address this issue as well as how this relationship varies with the type of consolidation and initial regulatory, competitive, and market conditions. We find that merges where merging institutions have branch networks which overlap within a ZIP code (within-ZIP merger) are strongly associated with a reduction in offices per capita in that ZIP code. This result is robust across time and holds in both rural and urban areas. The findings also suggest that, contrary to popularly held views, consolidation is not unambiguously negatively associated with changes in the number of banking offices per capita. Neither within-market-but-not-within-ZIP mergers nor out-of-market mergers consistently show such a relationship. We also find that the relationships between within-ZIP and within-market-but-not-within-ZIP mergers and changes in the number of bank offices per capita are more negative in low-income neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. However, because most states now have unrestricted branching and because savings associations are less prevalent and financially healthier than in the past, these findings may not be indicative of future branching patterns.

Cost reductions in electronic payments: The roles of consolidation, economies of scale, and technical change

Unfettered nationwide bank branching raises the issue of whether consolidation of banks’ “back-office” operations, such as their payment processing, reduces operating costs. Whether centralized processing of payments reduces costs depends on the size and range of scale economies, the relative prices of data processing and telecommunication inputs, and changes in technology in addition to the number of sites operated. While consolidating payment operations into fewer sites may reduce average data processing costs, those cost savings may be more than offset by associated increases in telecommunications expenses. To investigate the potential effects of consolidation on future banking operations, we look at the experience of the Federal Reserve in consolidating its Fedwire electronic funds transfer operation over 1979 to 1996. Previous research suggested that scale economies in Fedwire payment processing were minimal and that the observed declines in average Fedwire production costs were largely attributable to technical advance. Our estimates suggest more nearly the opposite. We find that the Fedwire funds transfer operation exhibited large scale economies but little technical advance beyond that already embodied in the technology-adjusted input prices of data processing and telecommunication inputs. We also find that the consolidation of Fedwire into fewer offices contributed around one-fourth of the overall reduction in Fedwire average cost.

What Drives Deregulation? The Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions

This paper investigates private interest, public interest, and political-institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state-level deregulation of bank branching restrictions. Using a hazard model, we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners (large banks and small, bank-dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century. The same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation. While we find some support for each theory, the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results.

Branch Banking and the Geography of Bank Pricing

We show that bank branching tends to mitigate localized market power by broadening the geographic scope of competition among banks, even though branch banking allows banks to differentiate themselves through their choices of branch locations. Banking services at peripheral locations will be priced more competitively when those locales are served by branch networks. We develop a theoretical model in support of this view and offer empirical evidence.

What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions

This paper investigates private-interest, public-interest, and political-institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state-level deregulation of bank branching restrictions. Using a hazard model, we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners (large banks and small, bank-dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century. The same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation. While we find some support for each theory, the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results.

Inter-Regional Credit Markets in Russia

This article explores the extent to which Russia has developed a single, integrated market for credit in the years since liberalization. Average interestrate data from both the retail and wholesale credit markets are assessed as well as recent trends in interregional bank branching activity to evaluate whether politically imposed or transaction-cost-type barriers have prevented the free flow of credits between and among regions. Covered in the presentation are Russia's 11 economic regions, as well as a twelfth (Baltic) region encompassing Kaliningrad Oblast. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: G10, 016, 052, P34. 5 figures, 3 tables, 21 references, appendix.

An Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Geographic Differentials in the Bank Closing Rate in the United States, 1989-1994, Using the Heteroskedastic-Tobit Model

This study empirically examines determinants of geographic (interstate) differentials in the bank failure rate in the United States for the period 1989-1994. The study uses the Heteroskedastic-TOBIT estimation technique because 20 percent of the observations on the dependent variable are zeros and because of the need to correct for heteroskedasticity. The findings indicate that the interstate bank closing rate differential is affected by the cost of deposits, the savings and loan failure rate, the percentage of gross state product deriving from oil and natural gas extraction, the tangible capitaUasset ratio, and state regulations that restrict bank branching.

The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks

This article suggests that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the United States likely was motivated by considerations. Specifically, we argue that these restrictions were instituted for the benefit of the small unit banks that were unable to compete effectively with large, multiunit banks. We analyze this political in two steps. First, we use a model of monopolistic competition between small and large banks to examine gains to the former group from the introduction of branching restrictions and governmentsponsored deposit insurance. We then find strong evidence for the hypothesis by examining the voting record of Congress.