Bank-based Economy Research Articles

Finance and Growth in a Bank-Based Economy: Is it Quantity or Quality that Matters?

With this paper we seek to contribute to the literature on the relation between finance and growth. We argue that most studies in the field fail to measure the quality of financial intermediation but rather resort to using proxies on the size of financial systems. Moreover, cross-country comparisons suffer from the disadvantage that systematic differences between markedly different economies may drive the result that finance matters. To circumvent these two problems we examine the importance of the quality of banks' financial intermediation in the regions of one economy only : Germany. To approximate the quality of financial intermediation we use cost effciency estimates derived with stochastic frontier analysis. We find that the quantity of supplied credit is indeed insignificant when a measure of intermediation quality is included. In turn, the efficiency of intermediation is robust, also after excluding banks likely to operate in multiple regions and distinguishing between different banking pillars active in Germany.

Finance and Growth in a Bank-Based Economy: Is it Quantity or Quality that Matters?

With this paper we seek to contribute to the literature on the relation between finance and growth. We argue that most studies in the field fail to measure the quality of financial intermediation but rather resort to using proxies on the size of financial systems. Moreover, cross-country comparisons may suffer from the disadvantage that systematic differences between markedly different economies could drive the result that finance matters. Therefore, we suggest an alternative to measure the quality of banks' financial intermediation and focus on the regions of one economy only: Germany. To approximate the quality of financial intermediation we use bank efficiency estimates estimated at the firm-level. We find that the quantity of supplied credit is indeed insignificant when a measure of intermediation quality is included. In turn, the efficiency of intermediation is robust, also after excluding banks likely to operate in multiple regions and distinguishing between different banking pillars active in Germany.

Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product-market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely-held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.

The Determinants of Corporate Debt Ownership Structure: Evidence from Market-based and Bank-based Economies

This paper offers a comparative analysis of the determinants of the corporate debt ownership structure in a bank-oriented economy (Germany) and market-oriented economy (the UK). Using GMM estimators, we control for the problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, normality, simultaneity and measurement errors that are common in firm-level panel data. The results show that the firms in both countries adjust their debt ownership structure towards their target levels - British firms being the swiftest. The findings confirm the validity of the liquidation and renegotiation hypothesis and the flotation cost hypothesis in both countries. However, the moral hazard and adverse selection hypothesis receives strong support in the UK but not in Germany. Moreover, the role of control factors (market related variables) in determining the choice of the lender is country dependent. Therefore, the debt ownership structure of a firm is influenced by both the firm-specific factors and the financial systems and corporate governance traditions in which the firm operates.

The market for corporate control in a bank-based economy: a governance device?

This study examines whether changes in ultimate firm ownership (control) play a disciplinary role in a bank-based economy. We focus on Germany as the prototype of a bank-based system. We find that poor performance makes a change in control more likely; this suggests a disciplinary role. Tight shareholder control acts as a substitute for control changes, strong creditor control as a complement. Following a change in control, management turnover increases, but not as a consequence of poor performance, and performance does not improve significantly. These findings are inconsistent with a disciplinary role of the market for corporate control in bank-based Germany.