Ballot Position Effects Research Articles

Impact of information shortcuts on preferential voting: Gender and ballot position effects in Luxembourg and Switzerland

AbstractFree party lists provide voters with greater freedom of choice than other electoral systems, allowing them to select candidates within and between parties. Given that free party lists are cognitively highly demanding, voters have incentives to use shortcuts to discriminate between candidates. This study uses multilevel linear regression models to analyze the effect of candidates' gender and ballot position on preference voting in Luxembourg and Switzerland. Our results show that both candidates' gender and ballot position have a significant effect on their preference voting share and provide evidence on how they interact in intraparty competition. Candidates' ballot position has an inverse J‐shaped effect on their preference vote share. This effect varies with candidates' gender in both countries but works in different directions. Our findings have important implications for electoral system design, outlining the potential consequences of alphabetical and party‐ordered lists for candidates' chances and for electoral gender quotas' effectiveness under intraparty preference voting procedures.

Ballot position and election results: New evidence from a natural experiment

It is well-known that candidates listed first on the ballot paper tend to receive more votes than other candidates. However, experimental studies that confirm this truism mostly stem from first-past-the-post systems. Do we also find ballot position effects in PR systems where voters may vote for a party instead of a specific candidate? We investigate a natural experiment in Danish national elections involving more than 9,000 candidates on almost 100 different ballot papers. Our findings show that ballot positions, indeed, have a causal effect on election results in PR systems. Since Danish national elections constitute a least-likely case, our findings indicate that ballot position effects are much more empirically relevant than suggested by existing research.

Coping with complexity: Ballot position effects in the Finnish open-list proportional representation system

Many studies show that the order of candidates’ names on the ballot has an effect on voting. Less informed and indifferent voters may simplify the voting process by using the ballot position of candidates as a voting cue. By studying six parliamentary elections in Finland, this study first demonstrates that the relationship between ballot position and preference votes follows a reversed J-shaped curve. Candidates listed early on the ballot win the most preference votes, while candidates listed near the end have an advantage over those listed in the middle. Furthermore, the ballot position effect grows stronger with the complexity of the electoral environment. The ballot position effect increases as the number of candidates on the party list increases, the candidates-to-seats ratio increases and the number of incumbents on the list decreases.

Ballot position effects in open-list PR systems: the moderating impact of postal voting

Various studies demonstrate that candidates at the top of the party list have a strong advantage in preferential voting systems, particularly under open-list PR. Such ballot position effects can be explained by voters’ tendency to rely on easily available information shortcuts when selecting a candidate. In this paper, we argue that the strength of ballot position effects depends on the context of how voters cast their vote. Specifically, we argue that postal voters are less likely to rely on the ballot position cue compared to voters who vote on election day for two reasons. First, postal voters might be more politically interested. Second, postal voters have more time to assess additional information about the candidates. The hypothesis is tested by analyzing newly collected data from two open-list PR elections in the German federal state of Hamburg. The results confirm the theoretical expectations: Ballot position effects are substantively weaker among postal voters. Additional analyses suggest that differences in the political interest between postal voters and election day voters are unlikely to fully explain these results. These findings advance our understanding of ballot position effects and voters’ use of information shortcuts more generally.

Does high on the ballot means highly competent? Explaining the ballot position effect in list-PR systems

Previous research provides solid evidence for the existence of a ballot position effect. The cognitive mechanisms behind this effect are, however, undertheorized and understudied. We develop and test here ‘voter perception effects’ as a possible explanation. Following this reasoning, the list position in a list-PR system functions as a heuristic cue for the competence of candidates: candidates selected for a high list position are perceived as more competent by voters, even when controlling for other candidate characteristics. Our results, based on an experimental design, show that head of lists are indeed perceived as more competent than middle of list candidates. This is related to both advantages for the first position and to disadvantages related to a middle of list position.

Cue-Taking, Satisficing, or Both? Quasi-experimental Evidence for Ballot Position Effects

Ballot position effects have been documented across a variety of political and electoral systems. In general, knowledge of the underlying mechanisms is limited. There is also little research on such effects in preferential-list PR systems, in which parties typically present ranked lists and thus signaling is important. This study addresses both gaps. Theoretically, we formalize four models of voter decision-making: pure appeal-based utility maximization, implying no position effects; rank-taking, where voters take cues from ballot position per se; satisficing, where choice is a function of appeal, but voters consider the options in the order of their appearance; and a hybrid “satisficing-with-rank-taking” variant. From these, we derive differential observable implications. Empirically, we exploit a quasi-experiment, created by the mixed-member electoral system that is used in the state of Bavaria, Germany. Particular electoral rules induce variation in both the observed rank and the set of competitors, and allow for estimating effects at all ranks. We find clear evidence for substantial position effects, which are strongest near the top, but discernible even for the 15th list position. In addition, a candidate’s vote increases when the average appeal of higher-placed (but not that of lower-placed) competitors is lower. Overall, the evidence is most compatible with the hybrid satisficing-with-rank-taking model. Ballot position thus affects both judgment and choice of candidates.

Rywalizacja w ramach listy wyborczej jako konsekwencja systemu list półotwartych w wyborach do Sejmu RP

Competition between candidates from the same party against each other as a consequence of the open-list PR system in elections to the Polish Sejm lower houseAlthough a open-list PR system guarantees the voter the possibility of nominating a specific candidate from the list, which, according to voters, should represent his political option, it is often said that voters do not exercise that power, and that for the election results the most important is candidate’s ballot positionHo­wever, we know that the personal votes have a real impact on the electoral success. The question is what prompts voters to vote for a particular candidateThe purpose of this article is to analyze the results of the elections to the Polish Sejm from 2015 in terms of the ballot position effect, the intervention effect of the personal votes on the electoral success and effect of one of the determinants of the individual candidate’s success — locality/local ties of candidate.

Ballot Order Effects and Party Responses: Evidence from Lotteries in Colombia

Ballot positions affect the electoral performance of parties. Existing theories for this effect focus on voter-specific behavioral explanations. We present evidence on an additional unexplored mechanism: parties adjust their behavior to account for their position on the ballot. This adjustment matters for how we interpret existing results. First, we use local lotteries of ballot positions across two elections and 1974 races in Colombia. We find evidence for a ballot position effect of 6.6 percent on vote share, and 8.8 percent on seat share. Second, we show that parties raise and spend more money on their campaigns if they are at top spot on the ballot. Finally, we show that campaign spending is correlated with higher vote shares. Our results suggest that existing work may be overstating the contribution of the voter behavioral mechanism on ballot order effects, and should account for strategic adjustments of campaigns by parties.

Ballot position and election results: Evidence from a natural experiment

Candidates listed first on the ballot paper regularly receive more votes than other candidates, but what role does ballot layout play in this connection? Experimental studies from first-past-the-post systems show that the ballot position effect is causal as the order of names functions as a cue to voters. Does this also hold for PR systems where voters may vote for a party instead of a specific candidate? We identify a natural experiment in Danish local and regional elections involving more than 10,000 candidates on 103 different ballot papers using ballot layout to study ballot position effects. We find indeed, the ballot position/layout has a causal effect on election results in PR systems. Our findings indicate that the empirical domain of ballot position and layout effects is much wider than suggested by previous research.

Voting for locals: Voters’ information processing strategies in open-list PR systems

While most of the literature on information shortcuts in open-list PR systems focuses on the importance of ballot position effects, the influence of a candidate’s localness has widely been ignored by existing studies. In this paper, I address this research gap and argue that voting patterns in open-list PR systems are more versatile than existing research would suggest. By analyzing a special characteristic of the open-list PR system employed in the parliamentary elections of Hamburg, it is shown that a large portion of voters chooses to vote for local candidates irrespective of the ballot position of the candidate. The paper further controls for factors conditioning the effect and finds that it remains strong even after taking them into consideration. The results have important implications for the representativeness of open-list PR systems, ballot paper design, as well as for our understanding of voters’ decision making process.

Jak głosują wyborcy w warunkach preferencyjnych list wyborczych: przypadek Polski

The paper presents some consequences of using semi-open lists, including the preferential vote mechanism, in parliamentary elections in Poland. The Authors discuss whose role in assigning parliamentary seats is greater: that of party organizations’ leaders, who decide on the order of candidates on electoral lists, or that of citizens who cast preferential votes. The paper focuses in the elections in the years 2001–2011, in which, according to poll data, party voting dominated over personal voting. The results of parliamentary elections in Poland show that ballot position effects are persistently present and that people tend to vote for list leaders in their constituencies. However, a simulation of a closed-list mechanism shows that in 2001–2011, ca 20 per cent of parliamentary seats were assigned as a result of the interventionist impact of the preferential vote on the candidate lists established by parties. The ability to vote for a specific candidate is rather important for Poles. The Authors also point out that the candidates from the top of party lists may obtain such good results because voters resort to simple reasoning and vote for those from the top of a list, irrespective of the nature of the list itself. (However, the effect does not seem to be very significant).

Ballot Position Effects Under Compulsory and Optional Preferential-List PR Electoral Systems

How do voters in preferential-list proportional representation (PLPR) systems make their candidate choices after selecting their party? We study this question in Poland and the Czech Republic, which use PLPR with different rules to elect the lower house of their national parliaments. In Poland, the system obligates voters to select one candidate from their preferred party, while in the Czech Republic voters have the option of casting up to four preference votes for candidates on the party list. Drawing on the ballot cues literature, we test for ballot position and rank effects in candidate preference vote shares. Further, we exploit the difference in voting rules to test whether ballot position effects are stronger in Poland where voters must cast a preference vote compared to the Czech Republic where preference voting is optional. We find that while being listed first or last has a disproportionately positive effect on preference vote shares compared to what would be expected based on ballot ranking in both countries, the ballot position and rank effects are much more powerful in Poland than the Czech Republic.

When There's No Easy Way Out: Electoral Law Reform and Ballot Position Effects in the 2011 Hamburg State Elections

The new electoral law in the state of Hamburg, which was first used in the 2011 elections for the state parliament, abolished the optional overall list vote in the electoral districts and thus forced voters to cast preference votes for individual candidates. Supporters of the new electoral law assume that voters will inform themselves better about the candidates. This assumption contrasts with the voters' tendency to choose their favourite option based on the little information which is provided on the ballot paper. We show that the new electoral law has missed its target and that voters rely heavily on the ballot paper cues, resulting in the replication of the behaviour pattern they were used to under the optional list vote and earlier under the closed list. Most importantly the ballot position has the largest effect on being elected to the parliament.

Electoral contexts that assist voter coordination: Ballot position effects in Poland

Hypothetically, in the open list PR system, all contestants, independently of their ballot position, have the same chance of winning a mandate. In practice, candidates placed at the top of the ballot enjoy a large surplus of votes. Their success can be explained by the primacy effect, in which the first ballot position acts as a focal point. The analysis of 6187 candidates running for the Polish Sejm in 2007 finds not only significant gains for top candidates, but that proximity to the upper end of the ballot likewise matters. It correspondingly discovers a weak benefit for candidates placed last on the list. Other sources of candidate advantage such as incumbency, capital city effect, age and gender are also investigated.

Voter Reactions to a Preferential Ballot: The 2007 Scottish Local Elections

The Single Transferable Vote (STV) has featured prominently in debates on electoral reform in Britain but until now there has been little hard evidence on how British voters might react to this electoral system. This has changed with the introduction of STV for the 2007 Scottish local government elections, which represented the first use of the system in a public election in mainland Britain in living memory. Election data collected from Scottish councils are used to examine how voters responded. After providing an overview of the elections, four issues are considered – rejected ballots, preference usage, the patterns of transfers and ballot position effects. Two main themes emerge from the analysis: voters had little difficulty in understanding and engaging with STV and in their use of lower preferences party loyalties remained important.

Gender and Party Duopoly in a Small State: Ballot Position Effects under the Single Transferable Vote in Malta, 1947–2008

Research on preference voting systems seems to indicate that where voters are allowed to choose among a party's candidates, the order in which candidates are listed on the ballot has an effect on the number of nominative votes they receive. This study of the 16 Maltese elections of 1947–2008 shows that being listed first on the ballot is a distinct electoral advantage. The analysis implies that complex voting systems are particularly vulnerable to position effects, even when there is a high degree of intra-party competition in small-size electoral districts. It also suggests that policy makers should pay more attention to ballot format design in order to mitigate order effects, even in a small country like Malta.

The importance of being first: Effects of candidates' list positions in the 2003 Bavarian state election

Normative theories of democracy do not pay much attention to technicalities of voting, implicitly assuming that these do not influence voting behaviour and election outcomes significantly. However, it is not clear whether this is actually the case. In this article we analyse whether one such technical detail matters for voting behaviour: the ballot position. Based on previous research in the field, we discuss ballot position effects and deduce hypotheses concerning list position effects in the 2003 Bavarian state election. In the empirical analysis, it turns out that ballot positions had a considerable influence on voting behaviour in this election, especially, the top position on party lists rendered a large bonus of votes. Obviously, technicalities matter.

Determinanten van voorkeurstemproporties bij (sub-)lokale verkiezingen : De Antwerpse districtsraadsverkiezingen van 8 oktober 2000

In this paper we look for the factors determining the relative share of preferential votes of individual candidates. We focus on the district council elections in Antwerp that were held in October 2000. The unique aspect of this elections is that they are without precedent and because of this there are strictly speaking no incumbency-effects. Unlike other research that is based only on administrative data, we use survey data for 612 candidates. In this way we enlarge the explanatory potential of our models. Hence, we were able for instance to check the extent to which membership of voluntary associations expands the individual vote share. We fi d that social capital does matter but surprisingly this effect disappears as soon as ballot position effects are taken into account.

A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect

This article suggests a theory of ballot position effect based on the amount of information present in the electorate while accounting for several alternative hypotheses. The more information that voters have, all other factors held constant, the less a role ballot position will play. Additionally, the role of electoral institutions in mitigating or magnifying the effect is considered. The theories are tested with precinct-level data from city council elections held in Peoria, Illinois, from 1983 through 1999. Position effect is found to account for a bonus of 0.7% to 5.2% of the precinct-level vote share per position on the ballot. The level of aggregate information and the institutional setting explain a significant share of ballot position effect, even while examined in the presence of alternative explanations such as incumbency, endorsement, campaign expenditure, gender, and race.

Ballot Layout Effects in the 1995 Elections of the Brussels' Government

Analysing data for the 1995 Regional Elections in Brussels weshow how the layout of the ballot affects voting behaviour asreflected by the candidates' preferential votes. We discusshow this special case of Ballot Position Effects can bereconciled with existing models of (expressive) voting.