Ballistic Missile Defense Research Articles

Solar-blind ultraviolet detection based on TiO2 nanoparticles decorated graphene field-effect transistors

Abstract Sensitive solar-blind ultraviolet (UV) photodetectors are important to various military and civilian applications, such as flame sensors, missile interception, biological analysis, and UV radiation monitoring below the ozone hole. In this paper, a solar-blind UV photodetector based on a buried-gate graphene field-effect transistor (GFET) decorated with titanium dioxide (TiO2) nanoparticles (NPs) was demonstrated. Under the illumination of a 325-nm laser (spot size ~2 μm) with a total power of 0.35 μW, a photoresponsivity as high as 118.3 A/W was obtained, at the conditions of zero gate bias and a source-drain bias voltage of 0.2 V. This photoresponsivity is over 600 times higher than that of a recently reported solar-blind UV photodetector based on graphene/vertical Ga2O3 nanowire array heterojunction (0.185 A/W). Experiments showed that the photoresponsivity of the TiO2 NPs decorated GFET photodetectors can be further enhanced by increasing the source-drain bias voltage or properly tuning the gate bias voltage. Furthermore, the photoresponse time of the TiO2 NPs decorated GFET photodetectors can also be tuned by the source-drain bias and gate bias. This study paves a simple and feasible way to fabricate highly sensitive, cost-efficient, and integrable solar-blind UV photodetectors.

Optimal Control of Endoatmospheric Launch Vehicle Systems: Geometric and Computational Issues

In this paper, we develop a geometric analysis and a numerical algorithm, based on indirect methods, to solve optimal guidance of endoatmospheric launch vehicle systems under mixed control-state constraints. Two main difficulties are addressed. First, we tackle the presence of Euler singularities by introducing a representation of the configuration manifold in appropriate local charts. In these local coordinates, not only the problem is free from Euler singularities but also it can be recast as an optimal control problem with only pure control constraints. The second issue concerns the initialization of the shooting method. We introduce a strategy that combines indirect methods with homotopies, thus providing high accuracy. We illustrate the efficiency of our approach by numerical simulations on missile interception problems under challenging scenarios.

The US Anti-Missile Potential in Asia-Pacific

The USA considers missile potentials of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as the main sources of threats to their national security. In the early 2000s following the withdrawal from the Soviet-American ABM Treaty the US began to deploy a global ballistic missile defense system to protect their “homeland, US forces abroad and its allies” from potential and real threats. The set of basic elements of a multi-layer ballistic missile defense is generally the same, its architecture is always adapted to the local conditions of the regions of deployment and specific tasks. Their common designation is the ability to work as subsystems within an integrated, global in scope antiballistic missile defense system controlled by the United States. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is actively engaging its regional allies Australia, South Korea and Japan in a joint effort to build-up ABM capabilities while simultaneously increasing its military-strategic presence in the region. Moscow strongly opposes the program considering it as potential threat to the effectiveness of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and undermining strategic stability and considers emergence the ballistic missile subsystems in Europe and the Asian-Pacific Region as a direct threat to its security. US ABM policy provokes the accelerated development by China and the DPRK of ballistic missile delivery systems, encourages Russia to create new weapon systems that are guaranteed to be able to overcome any existing and future missile defense.

Integrated missile guidance and control using optimization-based predictive control

This paper focuses on the design and implementation of optimization-based predictive control for the problem of missile interception. Due to the inherent nonlinearities of the missile–target dynamics or even constraints, it is usually difficult to design a high-accuracy and high-efficiency control algorithm. A nonlinear receding horizon pseudospectral control (RHPC) scheme is constructed and applied to generate the optimal control command. The problem of state estimation, in the presence of measurement noise, is solved by implementing a moving horizon estimation (MHE) algorithm. Since the RHPC and MHE algorithms solve the online open-loop optimal control problem at each sampling instant, the computational cost associated with them can be high. In order to decrease the computational demand due to the optimization process, a recently proposed nonlinear programming sensitivity-based algorithm is used and embedded in the optimization framework. Numerical simulations and analysis are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed control scheme.

Missile–Target–Defender Problem with Incomplete a Priori Information

On the plane, the missile–target–defender problem is considered, in which a mobile target with a minimum turn radius evades from a constant speed and rectilinearly moving missile or torpedo. For the missile interception, the target uses a defending missile (mobile false target, decoy, strike UAV or AUV). The problem is complicated by the fact that at the instant of launch of the defending missile, the target knows only the bearing of the missile and its speed, while the information about the distance to the missile and its velocity vector is not available. In this work, the optimal program is constructed for the trajectory of the defending missile, which intercepts all the dangerous (from the point of view of the target) directions of possible missile motion.

Outer Space and Strategic Stability in South Asia

ABSTRACTSince the nuclearization of South Asia, in 1998, the relationship between two nuclear armed neighbors—India and Pakistan—is often explained and discussed in a Cold War context. Uneasy with the changed geostrategic realities of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, India is adopting limited conventional war strategies against Pakistan, pursuing Ballistic Missile Defense, and possibly adopting a first-strike strategy that shifts from India’s declared no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons. This study analyzes how Indian space-based capabilities augment its Ballistic Missile Defense program and its aspirations of a first-strike based on preemption. Subsequently, the article draws linkages between Indian space-based capabilities, including anti-satellite weapons, and impacts on strategic stability in South Asia.

How the next nuclear arms race will be different from the last one

ABSTRACTAll the world’s nuclear-armed states (except for North Korea) have begun modernizing and upgrading their arsenals, leading many observers to predict that the world is entering a new nuclear arms race. While that outcome is not yet inevitable, it is likely, and if it happens, the new nuclear arms race will be different and more dangerous than the one we remember. More nuclear-armed countries in total, and three competing great powers rather than two, will make the competition more complex. Meanwhile, new non-nuclear weapon technologies – such as ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, and precision-strike missile technology – will make nuclear deterrence relationships that were once somewhat stable less so.

Adaptive Weapon-to-Target Assignment Model Based on the Real-Time Prediction of Hit Probability

Weapon-to-target assignment (WTA), which minimizes the damage to our forces by launching interceptor missiles (weapons) against ballistic missiles of the enemy (targets), is a critical decision-making problem of ballistic missile defense missions. The primary objective is to launch an interceptor with a high hit probability for each target. The existing research on WTA assumes that the hit probability is known before an engagement regardless of whether the probability varies during the engagement. However, the hit probability in actual engagement situations is a time-dependent variable that changes in accordance with the flight states of the target and interceptor that are unknown in advance. Therefore, a rolling horizon-based decision approach is necessary. In this research, we propose an adaptive WTA (AWTA) model that makes WTA decisions at each radar scanning time based on the hit probability predicted using radar information about the engagement situation-for each target, an interceptor with a hit probability higher than a threshold is launched, thereby maximizing the total hit result. A machine learning model is suggested to learn the probabilistic relationship between the flight states and hit results, and this model is embedded in the solution procedure of the AWTA model. The performance of the AWTA model is evaluated via a simulation-based experiment, and the results confirm that the proposed AWTA model is appropriate for real-time engagement situations.

Влияние систем ПРО на стратегическую стабильность и перспективы ядерного разоружения

For many decades, in terms of strategic stability, ballistic missile defense systems developed and deployed by the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States have been seen as potentially destabilizing. However, although significant technological progress has been achieved in creating ballistic missile interception systems and global information network, over 60 years of experience in the development and flight testing have confirmed the impossibility of protecting the countries’ territory from massive nuclear strikes. It is possible to intercept only a single missile or an extremely small number of them. An objective analysis of the state and effectiveness of existing and potential future characteristics of missile defense systems suggests that their impact on the nuclear deterrence capability of Russia and the United States is virtually absent and does not hinder the negotiation processes aimed at limiting strategic offensive arms. That being said, missile defense systems have a potential to significantly affect regional stability and, depending on the situation, have both stabilizing and destabilizing effect on the military and political landscape. It is therefore incumbent upon the UN Security Council and other international organizations to continuously monitor regional stability in order to be able to react promptly and prevent negative development of the situation. Acknowledgements. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation (project № 18-18-00463).

Three-dimensional nonlinear gravity assisted aiming point guidance

A novel three dimensional aiming point guidance law is presented in this paper, which eliminates the need for gravity compensation, resulting in engagements occurring with zero acceleration commands, in turn leading to smaller overall control effort and an excellent zero effort miss behavior. The conditions necessary for collision in the presence of gravity are derived using model-based prediction and computationally efficient shooting method. This is followed by employing differential-geometric guidance philosophy for achieving collision with the target. The efficacy of the proposed guidance law is then verified using simulation studies for terminal phase ballistic missile interception, and is compared with proportional navigation, aiming point guidance and compensated-weave guidance. Results indicate that the proposed guidance law ensured collision with desired level of accuracy and outperformed the aforementioned guidance laws used for comparison, in terms of miss distance, zero effort miss behavior and control effort.

The Peculiarities of the National Missile Defense

The view of both Moscow and Washington on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for a long time rested on the principle, formulated in the late 1960s, which held that anti-missile systems for defense of the territories were destabilizing, therefore limiting them would strengthen strategic stability. Since that time the USSR and then Russia always adhered to this principle, while the US at times rejected it (i.e. the SDI program of the 1980s) and by now has finally given it up altogether. Meanwhile , the majority of the independent leading experts assess the chances of the existing US missile defense to tangibly affect Russia’s nuclear strike capability as extremely low. However, the US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 seriously undermined political trust between Moscow and Washington. The unwillingness of the US to provide Russia with a legally binding commitment not to direct its BMD system against it (including technical constraints) contributes to the problem. In addition, the US missile defense system is being built as an open-ended system with no future restrictions on its expansion and improvement. Russia has responded to the creation of the US national missile defense system with the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces and initiation of its own Air-Space Defense (ASD) system. The difference of the concepts of the BMD system development in the United States and the ASD system in Russia lies in that the US system is intended to defend against limited attacks of intercontinental ballistic missiles against the North American continent or of medium-range missiles against the US allies in Europe and the Pacific region. The Russian ASD is a multilayered system designed to protect against a protracted air-space of-fensive by the US/NATO involving high-precision conventional weapons (including future hypersonic and space-based systems) and limited use of nuclear weapons. Although there has been a long break in a meaning ful US-Russian dialogue on missile defense, it is still possible to reach some positive agreements. If the US and Russia resume negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, it might open a window for a compromise on missile defense. Such a compromise can be based on an agreed threshold separating, on the one hand, missile defense systems that can significantly affect strategic stability by in-tercepting a large number of US or Russian ICBMs and SLBMs and, on the other hand – systems that will allow the US and Russia to protect their territories against at-tacks by third states or rogue regimes and would thus strengthen their mutual security. The first class of BMD systems would be subject to restrictions, while the second one would be given a green light. Moreover, in the second case there would reemerge an opportunity of the development of a joint defense systems of the two powers, which was declared in 2002 but never came true.

Modern assumptions of the American ballistic missile defence system against the background of historical concepts and programmes

<i>The issue of missile defence has been present in American policy for over 70 years and is constantly subject to research and the search for new technologies. Nowadays, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as well as the growing threat from the so-called “rogue states” have caused the inevitable development of the missile defence strategy. On the basis of historical programmes and the results of contemporary research, the concept of a Ballistic Missile Defence System was created. The system is based on the principles of indivisibility of the security of the Alliance and NATO solidarity, fair sharing of risk and burdens as well as taking on reasonable challenges. One of the components of the system is the European Phase Adaptive Approach, which was designed to protect American allies and resources in the European region from the growing rocket threat.</i><br><br> <i>This paper analyses the genesis of ballistic missile defence and what its development tendencies are. The article contains a presentation of the essence of the US Ballistic Missile Defence System, as well as its history and suspended programmes. The concept of multilayered defence has been outlined, as have the technical details of the system’s components and its location and operational status.</i>

The policy of Poland is at the peak of USA interests

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Poland turned out to be between the two creatures of power. The Federal Republic of Germany initially reluctantly perceived the Polish frontier, which was the subject of lengthy negotiations. Finally, the united Germany recognized the border along the Oder and Neisse in November 1990, and ratified the documents in December 1991. In turn, the Soviet Union, and since December 1991 – Russia – hastened to withdraw its troops from the Polish territory. After negotiations that lasted throughout the year – from September 1990 to October 1991 – a plan for the withdrawal of Russian troops was realised. The last soldier of the former Red Army left the Polish territory on September 18, 1993.In this situation Poland set one long-term, allied relationship with the United States as one of the strategic objectives of its own foreign policy, since only the United States at that time could protect a new democracy from external attacks of former empires. At the same time, we note that the relations of the Allies were called as strategic by the Poles themselves, not the Americans, and secondly, Poland did everything possible and impossible to be called an ally of the United States. Even threatened its membership in the European Union when the Poland supported United States in its military company against Iraq. The Polish calculation was justified: security could only be provided by the United States through membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. The United States "pulled" Poland into both NATO membership and membership of the EU, thus condemning the Poles to almost 80% of the external debt, adding enormous loans.Consequently, with the collapse of the Warsaw Military Bloc, Poland implements two main pillars: the path to NATO membership and the path to EU membership. The pursuit of NATO has always been the number one priority. Since 1989, the Poles see the United States as the main guarantor of their national security. On the other hand, Washington itself was deeply interested in spreading influence on the post-Soviet bloc, looking for support points in it.Poland, which was not only a buffer in the early stages of NATO's expansion to the East, but also an active participant and "leader" of all other "democracies" in the Alliance's security space, proved to bethe backbone. The North Atlantic Alliance, a key component of the United States, has been cementing Polish-American security cooperation for decades. In 2010, on the initiative of Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Strategic Dialogue launched in 2004 was reinstated. Poland was admitted to NATO with the Czech Republic and Hungary in March 1999, while join- ing the European Union was delayed until May 2004. Poland's realization of the European vector of the Eastern policy of the EU, faced with Russia's severe opposition, considered it as an intervention in its sphere of influence, gave Poland the opportunity to strengthen its position in the EU and NATO. The base of missile interceptors should be built up in Poland and with them also other defence systems. Russian-Georgian war in the first half of August 2008 intensified the mentioned process. Poland went to meet the US, increasing its military contingent in Afghanistan...But new US president Obama declared that if he eliminated the threat of Iran's nuclear and missile program, then it would not make sense to continue to build a missile shield in Europe.22 known politicians from Eastern Europe (including four Poles) at 16th of July warning Obama to stop support Russia. As a result a bilateral agreement on the status of forces (so-called SOFA) was signed on December 11, in Warsaw. As a result of Russia's aggression against Ukraine – the United States has actively deployed military cooperation with Poland, providing 12 F-16 fighters from the base in Aviano and 200 personnel in spring 2014. The program also provides long-range missiles JASSM for the Polish F-16. In addition, cyber defence is currently underway. The bilateral dialogue on this issue is being held in regular meetings of the Advisory Group on Strategic Cooperation (SCCG) and the High Level Group on Security (HLDG).Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine dramatically changed the security situation around Poland and Europe at all. The concept introduces the expansion and unification of the European Union's Active Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) anti-missile defence system with American missile defence systems in Europe (radar in Turkey, bases in Romania and Poland, ships with Aegis systems in the Mediterranean).The priorities of Polish foreign policy was declared in March 2012 – in the new strategy of foreign policy. It was the first since 1989 a key document defining vectors of Polish diplomacy too. So "The strategy of Polish foreign policy 2017–2021" confirmed the priorities of the Polish state.

Analysis of the Optimal Frequency Band for a Ballistic Missile Defense Radar System

Analysis of the Optimal Frequency Band for a Ballistic Missile Defense Radar System

Cooperative time-varying formation guidance for leader-following missiles to intercept a maneuvering target with switching topologies

This study investigates the cooperative time-varying formation guidance (CTFG) problem for leader-following missiles to intercept a maneuvering target with switching communication topologies. Multiple missiles are classified into a leader missile and multiple follower missiles. The leader missile intercepts the maneuvering target under the modified proportional navigation guidance law. The follower missiles are expected to form a predefined time-varying formation and track the trajectory of the leader missile. Multiple missiles intercept the maneuvering target simultaneously and then form a many-to-one engagement. A four-step approach to determine the parameters in the CTFG law is given. The convergence of the approach is discussed. A numerical example for multiple missiles intercepting a maneuvering target subjected to switching communication topologies is presented.

Convolutional neural network for classifying space target of the same shape by using RCS time series

Warhead and decoy classification is one of the most important and difficult technical problems in ballistic missile defence. The conventional methods extract features from the measured data and employ some classification algorithms. However, it is hard to extract all the information embedded in the raw data, and there might be contradictory features lowering the classification ability. A one-dimensional convolutional neural network structure named RCSnet was proposed to classify the warhead and decoy targets of the same shape in midcourse, which directly utilises the radar cross-section (RCS) time series. It was compared with 5 conventional classification algorithms which used 26 selected features on simulation dataset, and it outperformed them in both classification performance and predicting speed. Different training algorithms and networks of the RCSnet structure with different filter numbers were explored for better utilising the RCSnet.

Managing Indian deterrence: pressures on credible minimum deterrence and nuclear policy options

ABSTRACTIndia is developing new nuclear force options in response to what it perceives as a deteriorating strategic environment. New Delhi has historically adhered to the nuclear strategic concept of “credible minimum deterrence,” defined as maintaining a small, survivable nuclear force at low readiness in peacetime, which poses a credible risk of nuclear retaliation to adversaries but does not guarantee it. However, India’s stated commitment to credible minimum deterrence is currently challenged by four specific developments: the gradual weakening of elite support for India’s no-first-use policy; the decision of its defense scientific agency to pressure policy makers by publicly announcing it can field tactical nuclear weapons; the shift of Indian Air Force planning toward potential counterforce strikes; and New Delhi’s unclear intentions concerning ballistic-missile defense. This article concludes that India faces a choice between two distinct nuclear-policy pathways: retaining its adherence to credible minimum deterrence, or permitting increasing ambiguity surrounding its true nuclear doctrine and posture. The article evaluates these nuclear-policy options and concludes that credible minimum deterrence remains more consistent with Indian national-security and foreign-policy goals.

Guidance Laws against Towed Decoy Based on Adaptive Back-stepping Sliding Mode and Anti-saturation Methods

In order to meet the needs of high-precision guidance for missile-guided maneuvering targets in the presence of towed bait interference, this paper proposes a new guidance strategy based on heading angle method and parallel approaching method. Its main idea: a suitable angle is determined by heading angle method which of the missile trajectory is above that of the towing bait. Meanwhile, the accurate interception of missiles to targets is guaranteed by parallel approaching method. Firstly, system models of missile and target with towed decoy are established. Then, considering unknown bounded system disturbances, a controller is given based on sliding mode, back-stepping method. Furthermore, to solve the input saturation problem, an anti-saturation controller is given using adaptive and back-stepping sliding mode methods. Finally, strict proofs of the two controllers are given using Lyapunov stability theory, and simulations are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the two controllers.

Geopolitics of Nuclear Hypertrophy. America, the Bomb and the Temptation of Nuclear Primacy

The United States’ grand strategy has consistently been marked by a distinct tendency toward nuclear hypertrophy. Especially the inherent difficulties in extending deterrence to its allies and friends, compounded by the geopolitical characteristics of the US as an unassailable ‘insular’ fortress off Eurasia, have generated, rather paradoxically, a strong incentive for Washington to pursue a wide margin of nuclear superiority, if not nuclear primacy. This has implied, in turn, the deployment of redundant arsenals, robust counterforce capabilities and even a ballistic missile defence. Significantly, not even the Obama administration, though solemnly committed to nuclear disarmament, abstained from embracing a very ambitious modernisation program of American nuclear forces.

The vicissitudes of Russian missile defense

ABSTRACT The Russian vision of ballistic missile defense has reflected the specifics of the Russian/Soviet political system and decision-making mechanisms, and it is entangled with Moscow’s peculiar perceptions of external military threats, nuclear deterrence, and conventional warfighting. In this article, the author attempts to answer three basic questions about that vision: What is Russia’s long-term aim in regard to missile defense? Does it still want a new agreement with the United States that limits missile defense? And what kind of agreement could it be?