The value of a person’s life is not reducible to the satisfaction of one’s desires or interests, including the interest in living longer.  A person who takes pleasure in beach vacations each summer may look forward to another stay at the shore next year, but this is not the kind of interest that gives her a reason to continue living.  Assuming she has lived a normal life, one beach vacation more or less will not affect the value of her life, even in the slightest degree. Similarly, we wouldn’t say of a person who has lived a full life that his life would have been more valuable if he hadn’t suffered that wretched toothache several decades ago. The value of a person’s life is not simply a function of the good and bad experiences it contains. More controversially, neither is it simply an aggregate of a person’s accomplishments. Discovering another great self-portrait by Rembrandt (who created nearly 100 of them, so far as we know) would not affect to any degree our assessment of his greatness as an artist.  Rather, the value of a human life is determined by what adds meaning to life, what – and not simply how much – she achieves, or how well she lived up to her ideals.  If this is right, then for most people who live to a reasonable age, living longer will not add value to their lives. The social value of longevity is a question of whether a society in which the median age is higher or human life over time is packaged in fewer individuals is better than a society in which the median age is lower and the same amount of life is packaged in more individuals living shorter lives.  I see no reason for thinking the former society is better and hence no justification for nations like the United States or Great Britain to spend health care resources on promoting longevity of its citizens by adding to the normal lifespan.
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