570 SEER, 79, 3, 200I Machonic and Milan Tucek), Slovakia (John A. Gould and Sofia Szomolanyi), Hungary (Rudolf Tokes), Poland (Bogdan Mach and Wlodzimierz Weslowski), East Germany (Christian Wezel), and Serbia (Mladen Lazic); five chapters deal with economic elite change in Croatia (Dusko Sekulic and Zeljka Sporer), Hungary (Lengyel and Attila Bartha), amongst the Russian oil elite (David Lane), Bulgaria (Dobrinka Kostova) and comparatively in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Akos R6na-Tas and J6sef Borocz). However, although the case study chapters generally confirm that the nature of elite configurations and elite circulation matter and are very worthwhile studies in their own right, they do not fully validate the theoretical framework of the first chapter. Higley and Lengyel's framework is used sparingly in the case study chapters. Only one chapter, the contribution by Gould and Szomolanyi on Slovakia comes close to using the Higley and Lengyel framework. The chapter on Serbia uses terms that are broadly comparable, but most of the other chapters simply, and not unreasonably, take circulation of elites to equate with progress away from state socialism. The uneven coverage also does not help to demonstrate the utility of the framework since complementary analysis of economic and political elites is provided for too few cases. Moreover, even where both a country's political and economic elite is covered, the terms of analysis are generally different so that lesson-drawing is complicated. Finally, although the marriage of elite theory and transitology is interesting, its development here is not sufficient to overcome the problems that beset transitological analysis such as that produced by Linz and Stepan. The problem of Linz and Stepan's work was that it was difficult to see how their classification of regimes added to analysis by explaining variance. The same is true of Higley and Lengyel's model. To put it at its simplest, if both Russia and Hungary were both post-totalitarian (as in Linz and Stepan's analysis) since they had unified elites (as in Higley and Lengyel's analysis), how do xve account for different outcomes? Elite configuration, just like the Linz and Stepan classification of regime types, explains nothing on its own. Higley and Lengyel recognise this by introducing institutional variance as a factor in both the collapse of state socialism and post-socialist development, but this in itself begs two questions: what caused and causes this variance and what is the dependent and independent variable, elite configuration/regime type or institutional design? Elite theory is not yet an answer to all of the problems that transitology has run into when confronted by post-communism. This is an interesting book that has many fine chapters and contains some interesting ideas, but it is not as path-breaking as the preface would lead us to believe. Department of Government andSociety NEIL ROBINSON UniversityofLimerick Garnett, Sherman W., and Levgold, Robert (eds). Belarusat theCrossroads. Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, Washington,D.C., I999. vi + I99 pp. Map. Notes. $12.95 (paperback). THERE arefew good books on modern Belarus,and this is undoubtedlyone of the best. Its focus is mainly on geopolitics, but there is also a consistent REVIEWS 57I emphasis on the link between foreign and domestic politics, as in Belarus so much depends on how President Lukashenka himself interprets the geopolitical. The authors' starting point is that so 'much of Western opinion' about Belarus'restson analyticallythin ice' (p. I75). As a consequence, the country now 'occupiesthe worstof two worlds'(p. I31): it is eithercompletely ignored or assumedto be on its way back to Russia. All too often, despite its strategic location at so many 'crossroads' and interlocking regional 'subdivisions', Belarus 'falls through the cracks' (p. i) and fails to receive the attention it warrants. The authors do not dispute that this is in no small part because President Lukashenka has been 'increasingly viewed as a "bad actor", capriciousand authoritarian'(p. 137), but they arguethat Belarus'splace and position merit a reassessment.'By the accident of geography', they contend, 'Belarus'srole in Europe cannot be reduced to the bad example it setsamong states making the post-Soviet transition. Its location makes its role broader and more basic' (p. 5). Despite tragicomic episodes such...