1. Continuing Dutch Flow. My idea, in Section 2 of Bayes and Beyond, was not to give a new proof of a Dutch Book theorem but rather to present a new reading of an existing theorem-proved, e.g., as in Howson and Urbach-framed in such terms that challenges to the premises based on considerations of preference or utility could be bypassed as irrelevant. The aim was to forge a reading such that systematic substitution of flow terms for the usual betting terms would result in unproblematic premises and Dutch Book theorems more directly expressing Howson and Urbach's insight, namely that an incoherent belief system-one violating the probability axioms-can be revealed to be defective in the sense of containing a logical inconsistency. Thus, the defectiveness is clearly epistemic, and there is no need to bring in considerations of prudential or decision-theoretic rationality. (Of course, one may well bring in such considerations if one wants to answer such questions as When should we 'reject' an inconsistent belief system? But clearly that is a distinct question at a different level from the one explicitly addressed by Dutch Flow arguments, viz. For what epistemic reason should degrees of belief conform to the probability axioms?) The inconsistency involved in violating a probability axiom takes the canonical form of judgments that a set of belief-tests-say a finite set, in the simplest case-consists of only or fairtests when indeed they are provably not all neutral, where 'neutral' was defined to mean having zero expected flow, i.e., xPr(h) = yPr(-,h) as explained in Section 2. This notion of neutral belief-test is to be substituted for