Alan Greenspan: I thought Bosworth's paper was excellent. I am grateful for the presentation and assembling of data that had not previously been properly correlated-for example, the reconciliation of Pay Board wage approvals with the Bureau of Labor Statistics data on union wage settlements. In evaluating the impact of the current controls, I see two important issues: One, to what extent does the evidence indicate that the controls are suppressing underlying pressures for wage and price increases? Two, if they are not, how do we explain an immaculate conception disinflation beginning on August 15, 1971? Undoubtedly, a significant disinflation began with the freeze. Although individual estimates of the precise impact may vary, something significant happened at that point. Nonetheless, the data lead me to conclude that the impact of both the Price Commission and the Pay Board on actual prices and wages has been surprisingly small. First, the overall price situation indicates that, with the exception of a few building materials, few prices would be raised if the controls were removed. For example, recent evidence on the term limit pricing agreements indicates that, whereas the average approved price increase was about 2 percent, only a small proportion of these increases have been put into effect. Thus, it appears that because of weak market conditions, these firms were unable to raise their prices even with Price Commission approval. The wage side is a little more difficult to evaluate. The institution of a general wage standard would be expected to narrow the distribution of wage increases by reducing the larger increases. Some evidence of this is apparent in Table 5 of Bosworth's paper for union wages. But in the manufacturing area 60 percent of the union wage increases were still above 7 percent. In the nonunion area, the very low average increase suggests that the general