Availability Of Injunctions Research Articles

A Critical Analysis of Arbitration as an Instrument for Resolving Commercial Dispute in Nigeria

This paper is a critical analysis of arbitration as an instrument for resolving commercial dispute in Nigeria. The Nigerian courts considering the precarious situation finds itself in the dispensation of justice moreso in the resolution of commercial disputes. The works examine the concept of arbitration, overview of alternatives dispute resolutions (ADR), the legal and institutional framework for the regulation of arbitration in Nigeria, types of arbitration among others. The work underscored the prospects and future of arbitration in the areas of party autonomy, third party funding, and online arbitration, the availability of injunctions and interim reliefs within the framework of arbitration and the upsurge of arbitral institutions. The paper recommends that for arbitration to be properly harnessed and enhanced all hands must be on deck – the parties, the courts, counsel all have a role to play.

Taking Technological Infrastructure Seriously: Standards, Intellectual Property and Open Access

This paper introduces an ‘infrastructural approach’ to the problems of de facto and cooperative standard-setting in high technology. It reviews recent case law in the area, and attempts to provide robust economic arguments for the maintenance of ‘open access’ rules over such standards. First, it begins by qualifying such resources as technological ‘infrastructure’ according to the work of Brett Frischmann and Peter Lee. Subsequently, game theoretical tools are applied to the problem of cooperative standard-setting to demonstrate how the ‘quasi-open access’ FRAND commitment can constrain strategic behaviour. A legal analysis — including an examination of recent case law about the availability of injunctions — then follows to demonstrate the optimal ‘negotiation framework’ for the latter commitment to become credible. Finally, the infrastructural approach is expanded to demonstrate how it can elucidate a number of current controversies in high technology markets, where the tension between private ownership and public use of technological infrastructure is at its sharpest.

Taking Technological Infrastructure Seriously: Standards, Intellectual Property and Open Access

This paper introduces an ‘infrastructural approach’ to the problems of de facto and cooperative standard-setting in high technology. It reviews recent case law in the area, and attempts to provide robust economic arguments for the maintenance of ‘open access’ rules over such standards. First, it begins by qualifying such resources as technological ‘infrastructure’ according to the work of Brett Frischmann and Peter Lee. Subsequently, game theoretical tools are applied to the problem of cooperative standard-setting to demonstrate how the ‘quasi-open access’ FRAND commitment can constrain strategic behaviour. A legal analysis—including an examination of recent case law about the availability of injunctions—then follows to demonstrate the optimal ‘negotiation framework’ for the latter commitment to become credible. Finally, the infrastructural approach is expanded to demonstrate how it can elucidate a number of current controversies in high technology markets, where the tension between private ownership and public use of technological infrastructure is at its sharpest.

Considering the Reach of Phelps

As the Court in Quanta recently confirms, patent and copyright owners have limited rights following voluntary transfers of protected goods. Moreover, as discussed at length by the Second Circuit in Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., patent owners' rights have long been similarly affected by involuntary transfers. Platt & Munk finds lack of equivalent copyright rulings remarkable but does not allow lack of direct precedent to stand in the way of finding that involuntary transferees of copyright-protected goods have the same rights as voluntary transferees. This comment considers the Fourth Circuit's opinions in Christopher Phelps & Assoc., LLC v. Galloway. Initiallly, that court went one step further, holding, under the first sale doctrine, an infringer is entitled to sell, or otherwise dispose of any copy that the court does not order destroyed or otherwise disposed of, without further obligation, once he satisfies the judgment that remedied the infringement, even if the copy was originally pirated. Those remarks were undoubtaibly colored by the subject of the dispute, however, Defendant's million-dollar house had been constructed according to unauthorized copies of plans that initially sold for only $20,000. The initial opinion was withdrawn, along with most references to the first-sale doctrine, and more emphasis was placed on eBay's limitations on the availability of injunctions. It is unclear whether the eBay opinion, more than concern about encumbering real estate unrelated to the infringement motivated refusal to enjoin sale or lease of a house as a remedy for unauthorized use of plans used for its construction.

Privacy Remedies and Costs in the UK: Uncertainties in Access and Relief

Due to the global and pervasive nature of the Internet, the increasingly intrusive nature of reporting by tabloids, the high cost of bringing privacy actions, and the difficulty and complexity involved in removing private information from the World Wide Web, privacy costs and remedies are under scrutiny in the United Kingdom. This article examines some of the proposed changes in this area including the availability of injunctions, pre-publication notification, levels of damage awards, opportunities for alternative dispute resolution, conditional fee agreements/success fees, and potential global solutions that may have an impact on the United States. The article argues that due to the nature of privacy claims initiated from information on the Internet, damage fee levels should be increased as well as the use of mediation and conditional fee agreements.

STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS: WHO IS REALLY HOLDING UP (AND WHEN)?

This article analyzes the effect of injunctions on royalty negotiations for standard-essential patents. We develop a model in which Courts grant injunctions only when they have sufficient evidence that the prospective licensee is unwilling, in line with the way we understand Courts operate in Europe. In such a framework the prospective licensee has a powerful strategic tool: the offers that he makes to the patent holder will affect the royalty rate that the Court may adopt as well as the probability of being subject to injunctions (and the liability for litigation costs). We find that despite the availability of injunctions, the holder of a sufficiently weak patent will end up accepting below FRAND rates, in particular when litigation costs are high. We also find that the prospective licensee will sometimes prefer to litigate and the holder of a sufficiently strong patent will always end up in litigation by rejecting offers below FRAND. In particular, this arises when the prospective licensee has little to fear from being found unwilling, namely when the trial takes time (so that the threat of injunctions is less powerful), and when litigation costs are low. Importantly, we thus find that hold up (royalties above the fair rate) as well as reverse hold up (royalties below the fair rate) may arise in equilibrium.

Standard Essential Patents: Who is Really Holding Up (and When)?

This paper analyzes the effect of injunctions on royalty negotiations for standard essential patents. We develop a model in which courts grant injunctions only when they have su fficient evidence that the prospective licensee is unwilling, in line with the way we understand Courts to operate in Europe. In such a framework the prospective licensee has a powerful strategic tool: the offers that he makes to the patent holder will affect the royalty rate that the Court may adopt as well as the probability of being subject to injunctions (and the liability for litigation costs). We find that despite the availability of injunctions, the holder of a su fficiently weak patent will end up accepting below FRAND rates, in particular when litigation cost are high. We also find that the prospective licensee will sometimes prefer to litigate and the holder of a su ciently strong patent will always end up in litigation by rejecting offers below FRAND. This arises in particular when the prospective licensee has little to fear from being found unwilling, namely when the trial takes time (so that the threat of injunctions is less powerful), and when litigation costs are low. Importantly, we thus find that hold up (royalties above the fair rate) as well as reverse hold up (royalties below the fair rate) may arise in equilibrium.

Regulation of Business: Fair Trade Acts: Availability of Injunction against Nonsigner's Inducing Breach of Fair Trade Agreement

Regulation of Business: Fair Trade Acts: Availability of Injunction against Nonsigner's Inducing Breach of Fair Trade Agreement

Availability of Injunction to Employer in Controversy with Non-Complying Union

Availability of Injunction to Employer in Controversy with Non-Complying Union