Autonomy Of Biology Research Articles

A grand unified theory for the unification of physics, life, information and cognition (mind).

The modern scientific world view was built on the incommensurability between cognition (mind) and physics (matter) and later life and physics (the autonomy of biology). Fuelled by Boltzmann's view of the second law of thermodynamics as a 'law of disorder', the idea of 'two opposing rivers', the river of physics 'flowing down' to disorder and the river of life and mind 'flowing up' to higher states of order became a cornerstone of contemporary thinking. The deleterious result of this paradigmatic separation of physics, life and mind has been to considerably incapacitate each by bracketing many of the deepest problems of science, including the very nature of life itself and its cognitive capabilities, outside the theoretical reach of contemporary science. An expanded view of physics, notably the addition of the fourth law of thermodynamics (LMEP), or the law of maximum entropy production, coupled with first law time-translation symmetry, and the self-referencing circularity of the relational ontology of autocatakinetic systems, provides the basis for a grand unified theory unifying physics, life, information and cognition (mind). This dissolves the dysfunctional myth of the two rivers, and solves the previously insoluble problems at the foundations of modern science associated with it. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thermodynamics 2.0: Bridging the natural and social sciences (Part 1)'.

Functional Biology and Evolutionary Biology: A Different View of the Origin of Living Things

The distinction proposed by Ernst Mayr and François Jacob between functional biology and evolutionary biology is a fundamental key for a clear and conclusive treatment of two problems that, recurrently, are placed in the field of the Philosophy of Biology: that which concerns the possible character teleological of biological explanations and that relative to the autonomy of Biology in relation to Physics and Chemistry. Without supporting an alternative solution for any of these problems, we present that opposition showing its relevance for the treatment of such issues. Our idea is that they should not be raised without specifying which of the two domains of life sciences we are referring to.

The Disappearance of Form? Some Methodological Considerations on a Lost Conceptual Dimension in Biology

The Disappearance of Form? Some Methodological Considerations on a Lost Conceptual Dimension in Biology

Cassirer and Goldstein on Abstraction and the Autonomy of Biology

This article examines the mutual influence between Ernst Cassirer and his cousin, the neurologist Kurt Goldstein. For both Cassirer and Goldstein, views on the nature of human cognition were fundamental to their understanding of scientific knowledge, and these were informed by both philosophical theorizing and empirical research on pathologies of the nervous system. Following Cassirer, and in agreement with the physicalism of the Vienna Circle, Goldstein held that the physical sciences had progressed by arriving at abstract, mathematical representations to take the place of qualitative characterizations of observable reality. In tension with physicalism, Goldstein was not sanguine about the fruitfulness of the abstractive approach in biology. He proposed that biology must adhere to its own sui generis methods of observation and experimentation in order to obtain knowledge of the “natures” of living organisms. I argue that there is a parallel with Cassirer’s assertion of the differences between physical and cultural sciences, underwritten by the deployment of varying symbolic functions. I also propose that the neurological writings of Goldstein are an important backdrop to Cassirer’s positive evaluation of abstract thought, in contrast to the pessimism regarding a worldview dominated by scientific abstractions expressed by philosophers such as Bergson, Whitehead, and Husserl.

Wieloraka realizacja warunków doboru i jej konsekwencje

Tekst analizuje problem wielorakiej realizacji warunków doboru naturalnego: zmienności, reprodukcji i dziedziczności, przy czym główny nacisk położony zostaje na trzecią z wymienionych cech. Głównym celem prowadzonych analiz jest chęć pokazania, że możliwość wielorakiej realizacji doboru istniałaby nawet wówczas, gdyby pominąć argumenty z zakresu astrobiologii i sztucznego życia i skupić się wyłącznie na analizie genetyki znanych nam form życia. Tekst omawia również konsekwencje powyższej konkluzji, wskazując jak teza o wielorakiej realizacji warunków doboru wpływa na rozważania o takich zagadnieniach, jak: redukcjonizm w biologii, definiowanie życia, badania dotyczące epigenetyki oraz autonomia biologii. Zaznaczone zostaje także jej znaczenie dla badań nad poziomami selekcji i wielkimi przełomami ewolucji (major transitions in evolution).

A Physical Biology, the Electron Neutrino Mass, and the role of Quantum Mechanics in Nature

In science we need to remove physics and earth science from the fundamental natural sciences and treat Biology as a fundamental natural (physical) science. Attempts to keep Biology autonomous because it is holistic, from the physical sciences, are just disguised anthropocentrism. Physical sciences have holistic features also. The autonomy of Biology is at odds with a holistic, integrated science and is preventing progress in science. For example, every cell needs a ‘global’ communication system to keep order and stability with rapid information transfer across cellular scales. We have yet to figure out how this is achieved. Over the last 30 years, we have understood that quantum mechanics is about information, mostly. However, we do not have a clear understanding of the physical significance of quantum mechanics in nature. Also, the view that quantum mechanics is restricted to the atomic and molecular scale is mistaken and a direct result of the mass of the electron being so big. In 1988 the mass of the electron neutrino was predicted to lie between 0.5 and 0.05 eV/c2 and to have a key role in Biology. This would allow quantum mechanical processes on a cellular and intercellular scale and provide a possible basis for a ‘global’ information system in the cell and an understanding of the information role of quantum mechanics in nature. Recent non-results, on the electron neutrino mass, from the KATRIN experiment are pushing the upper limit of the electron neutrino mass to less than 0.5 eV/c2 making the prediction of 30 years ago more likely.

Dual Causality and the Autonomy of Biology.

Ernst Mayr's concept of dual causality in biology with the two forms of causes (proximate and ultimate) continues to provide an essential foundation for the philosophy of biology. They are equivalent to functional (=proximate) and evolutionary (=ultimate) causes with both required for full biological explanations. The natural sciences can be classified into nomological, historical nomological and historical dual causality, the last including only biology. Because evolutionary causality is unique to biology and must be included for all complete biological explanations, biology is autonomous from the physical sciences.

Autonomy and Fear of Synthetic Biology: How Can Patients' Autonomy Be Enhanced in the Field of Synthetic Biology? A Qualitative Study with Stable Patients.

We analyzed stable patients' views regarding synthetic biology in general, the medical application of synthetic biology, and their potential participation in trials of synthetic biology in particular. The aim of the study was to find out whether patients' views and preferences change after receiving more detailed information about synthetic biology and its clinical applications. The qualitative study was carried out with a purposive sample of 36 stable patients, who suffered from diabetes or gout. Interviews were transcribed verbatim, translated and fully anonymized. Thematic analysis was applied in order to examine stable patients' attitudes towards synthetic biology, its medical application, and their participation in trials. When patients were asked about synthetic biology in general, most of them were anxious that something uncontrollable could be created. After a concrete example of possible future treatment options, patients started to see synthetic biology in a more positive way. Our study constitutes an important first empirical insight into stable patients' views on synthetic biology and into the kind of fears triggered by the term "synthetic biology." Our results show that clear and concrete information can change patients' initial negative feelings towards synthetic biology. Information should thus be transmitted with great accuracy and transparency in order to reduce irrational fears of patients and to minimize the risk that researchers present facts too positively for the purposes of persuading patients to participate in clinical trials. Potential participants need to be adequately informed in order to be able to autonomously decide whether to participate in human subject research involving synthetic biology.

Why Rosenberg and Kaplan's attempt to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism concerning biology is unsatisfactory

A. Rosenberg and D. Kaplan argue that their account of the Principle of Natural Selection (PNS), as a law of physical systems (including those systems studied by biology) underived from familiar physical laws, provides the precisely explanatory autonomy of biology sought after by antireductionists, without violating the principles of reductive physicalism. I argue, however, that the possibility of the PNS being an underived law of physical systems may be neutral to the explanatory autonomy of biology. In fact, if wedded with reductive physicalism (the possibility considered by these authors), it may yield only a very limited explanatory autonomy of biology, no stronger than the quasi-autonomy generally ascribed to it by reductionists. In the physicalist world, the PNS is operational and thus discoverable at the higher ontological levels (those concerning living cells, individuals, groups, populations and species), because the operation of a law concerning higher-level systems is grounded in its operation at the lower levels (atoms and molecules). Consequently, in terms of the explanatory criterion, a generalization discovered by biologists may be established as a law only if its status is confirmed in the form of its applicability to molecular and other systems studied by chemistry and physics. Otherwise, there is a danger that it could be a 'just so story.' The authors' narrow understanding both of antireductionism and biological laws as reducible to those concerning molecular systems provides only an illusory vindication of the explanatory autonomy: in the case of the PNS, although biologists happened to be the first to utilize it, their research concerning cells, individuals, populations and species could not possibly have established it as a law. This results, at best, in the inter-theoretic irreducibility of molecular biology as a discipline of physical science. I argue that a substantial explanatory autonomy of biology concerns the causal powers of biological systems at multiple levels, where the PNS, or any other biological law, is a basic law of nature in that it is concerned with the entities whose causal power is irreducible to that of the lower-level entities. Thus, only if confirmable at the levels higher than the molecular, could the generalizations discovered by biologists reflect such autonomy.

Some future trends and implications for systems and software engineering processes

AbstractIn response to the increasing criticality of software within systems and the increasing demands being put onto 21st century systems, systems and software engineering processes will evolve significantly over the next two decades. This paper identifies eight relatively surprise‐free trends—the increasing interaction of software engineering and systems engineering; increased emphasis on users and end value; increased emphasis on systems and software dependability; increasingly rapid change; increasing global connectivity and need for systems to interoperate; increasingly complex systems of systems; increasing needs for COTS, reuse, and legacy systems and software integration; and computational plenty. It also identifies two “wild card” trends: increasing software autonomy and combinations of biology and computing. It then discusses the likely influences of these trends on systems and software engineering processes between now and 2025, and presents an emerging scalable spiral process model for coping with the resulting challenges and opportunities of developing 21st century software‐intensive systems and systems of systems. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 9: 1–19, 2006

What makes biology unique?: considerations on the autonomy of a scientific discipline

Introduction 1. Science and sciences 2. The autonomy of biology 3. Teleology 4. Analysis or reductionism 5. Darwin's influence on modern thought 6. Darwin's five theories of evolution 7. Maturation of Darwinism 8. Selection 9. Do Thomas Kuhn's scientific revolutions take place? 10. Another look at the species problem 11. The origin of human 12. Are we alone in this vast universe?

The autonomy of functional biology: a reply to Rosenberg

Rosenberg has recently argued that explanations supplied by (what he calls) “functional biology” are mere promissory notes for macromolecular adaptive explanations. Rosenberg's arguments currently constitute one of the most substantial challenges to the autonomy, irreducibility, and indispensability of the explanations supplied by functional biology. My responses to Rosenberg's arguments will generate a novel account of the autonomy of functional biology. This account will turn on the relations between counterfactuals, scientific explanations, and natural laws. Crucially, in their treatment of the laws' relation to counterfactuals, Rosenberg's arguments beg the question against the autonomy of functional biology. This relation is considerably more subtle than is suggested by familiar slogans such as “Laws support counterfactuals; accidents don't.”

Zwischen der „Physik des Organischen” und der „Organisierung der Physik”: Überlegungen zu Gegenstand und Methode der Biologie

Between Physics of Organism and Organismic Physics: Object and Method of Biology. In the history of biological theory one can observe an oscillation between two tendencies of thinking, namely the biologistic and the physicalistic point of view. Both aim at a general or unified theory of nature that is relevant for scientific research as well as for philosophical reflection. In terms of a pluralistic approach these two ways of theory-formation must be rejected. Biology e.g. as a specific natural science, characterized by its mid-position between ‘nomothetic’ and ‘idiographic’ thinking (Windelband), is much more than a subordinate branch of physical knowledge. This very autonomy of biology does not only result from a special methodology or from a specific theoretical framework. On the contrary, the methodological and functional autonomy of biology is due to the very features of the phenomena investigated. These features include multitude, individuality and wholeness.

Memoirs of a Scientist-HistorianA Skeptical Biochemist. Joseph S. FrutonEighty years. Joseph S. Fruton

Taking his inspiration from Robert Boyle (The Sceptical Chymist [1661]) and Joseph Needham (The Sceptical Biologist [1929]), Joseph Fruton, in A Skeptical Biochemist, engages in a critical conversation with scientists, philosophers, sociologists, and historians of the biochemical sciences since 1800. He speaks as one who, for over half a century, actively participated in the burgeoning field of protein chemistry and is also a widely read scholar of the history and philosophy of the sciences. In four major chapters Fruton deals with the methodology, the history and philosophy, the historiography, and the language of the biochemical sciences. He uses the term biochemical sciences not in a strictly disciplinary sense, but to describe all those efforts that are situated at the intersection of chemistry and biology. In his perceptive discussion of the scientific method as it applies to the biochemical sciences (Ch. 2), Fruton defends Baconian inductivism by taking issue with Claude Bernard, Justus von Liebig, and Popperian positivism. He stresses the importance of experimentation, observation, and craftsmanship in practice and warns against the search for simplicity through numerical and geometrical representations. In the third and most voluminous chapter of the book, Fruton sketches the interplay of chemical and biological sciences since 1800, showing mastery over a wide range of topics. His analysis ranges from earlier studies on respiration, metabolic conversion of foodstuffs, vision, muscular contraction, and microbial fermentation to later developments in cytology, embryology, microbiology, and, after 1950, molecular biology and evolutionary theory. Focusing on philosophical controversies such as the debate between proponents of mechanism and vitalism and the ongoing debate about reductionism and the autonomy of biology that has accompanied chemical descriptions of the phenomena of life, Fruton emphasizes that biological practice and theorizing have always been limited by the available

Back to Roy Wood Sellars: Why His Evolutionary Naturalism Is Still Worthwhile

Back to Roy Wood Sellars: Why His Evolutionary Naturalism Is Still Worthwhile POUWEL SLURINK 1. INTRODUCTION ATTHE MOMENT,naturalism is fashionable as never before. Several of the most prominent living philosophers--e.g., Quine, Churchland, Ruse--call themselves naturalists. However, it is not always that clear what really is meant by naturalism, apart from a philosophy in which science plays a large role. This lack of clarity stems in part from the uncertainty about what is meant by "science"--physics, biology, or both of them. But partly it also stems from different interpretations of the impact of scientific models on philosophical reflections. In this article I propose a return to the writings of the "evolutionary naturalist" Roy Wood Sellars (July 9, 188o, Seaforth, Ontario-September 5, 1973, Ann Arbor, Michigan). He was the father of Wilfrid Sellars, but I think that the philosophy of Sellars pbre is a better starting-point for "a reading programme" for modern naturalists than the philosophy of Sellarsfi/s, in spite of the claim of the latter that "Critical Realism and Evolutionary Naturalism .., and all that they imply, are part of my paternal inheritance."' Although it may be true that much of the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars is rooted in the philosophy of his father, we miss the illuminating evolutionary considerations characteristic of his father's philosophy in most of his work, and we can see a tendency to expect too much from linguistic analyses alone (instead of the more typically naturalistic way of expecting solutions from new perspectives offered by new knowledge). Beyond that, Wilfred Sellars, with his attack on "the Myth of the Given" and his dichotomy between the manifest and the scientific '"PhysicalRealism,"in PhilosophicalPerspectives(Springfield,IL: CharlesThomas, 1967),185. [425] 4~6 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 image, although in fact he was only criticizing logical positivism and extending some arguments of his father, probably had the effect of suggesting the hopelessness of realism and naturalism.9 With his painstakingly detailed linguistic analyses of problems, he probably helped to initiate "the linguistic turn" in philosophy and thereby strengthened a movement that kept naturalism in check for at least one generation. Most of the time, however, his analyses are either completely compatible with his father's philosophy, or try to carry it further in specific domains and discussions.3 Given the fact that both father and son tried to take "both science and man seriously,"4 the differences in their work can be explained partly by the completely different philosophical scene in which they were operating. It seems to me, however, that the elder Sellars was more fully alive to the importance of evolution than Wilfrid Sellars . The work of Sellars p~reis the best starting-point for anyone interested in finding a balanced and reasonable version of naturalism in which the epistemological questions raised by the counterintuitive nature of physics, or by the mysterious relations between mind and body and mind and nature, are partly solved by evolutionary considerations about the nature of knowledge and consciousness. In my examination of Roy Wood Sellars's philosophy I will concentrate on three important interrelated problems that any "adequate naturalism" will have to solve and for whose solution he has some very useful suggestions. They are, first, the problem of realism in epistemology (sections 2 and 3); second, the problem of "levels of organization" in ontology, which sometimes turn up in modern debates in the discussion about "natural kinds," "depth realism"~ or about the autonomy of biology (section 4); and, third, the status of subjective experience in the philosophy of mind (section 5). For Roy Wood Sellars the solutions to these problems are closely interrelated. For him naturalism meant an "interpretative synthesis" in which scientific and philosophical insights are integrated into an "organized whole" (EN, i).6 Naturalism was See "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" and "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," both in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). See, e.g., "The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem" in Philosophical Perspectives, and also his very illuminating article, "The Double-Knowledge Approach to the Mind-Body Problem," New Scholasticism XLV (1971): 269--89...

The Autonomy of Biology: The Position of Biology Among the Sciences

Philosophers of science have claimed that the position of biology among the sciences is the most prominent and controversial issue of the philosophy of biology. Some authors consider biology merely a province of physics and reducible to physics, others uphold the autonomy of biology, while still others have decided that biology lacks the rigor to justify being considered a genuine science. In my own analysis of this problem. I have concluded that the science of biology has all the attributes of a genuine science, as well as a number of other characteristics restricted to biology. These characteristics are listed and discussed. They justify ranking biology as an autonomous science, just as autonomous as physics and many other sciences.

Natural selection and self-organization

The Darwinian concept of natural selection was conceived within a set of Newtonian background assumptions about systems dynamics. Mendelian genetics at first did not sit well with the gradualist assumptions of the Darwinian theory. Eventually, however, Mendelism and Darwinism were fused by reformulating natural selection in statistical terms. This reflected a shift to a more probabilistic set of background assumptions based upon Boltzmannian systems dynamics. Recent developments in molecular genetics and paleontology have put pressure on Darwinism once again. Current work on self-organizing systems may provide a stimulus not only for increased problem solving within the Darwinian tradition, especially with respect to origins of life, developmental genetics, phylogenetic pattern, and energy-flow ecology, but for deeper understanding of the very phenomenon of natural selection itself. Since self-organizational phenomena depend deeply on stochastic processes, self-organizational systems dynamics advance the probability revolution. In our view, natural selection is an emergent phenomenon of physical and chemical selection. These developments suggest that natural selection may be grounded in physical law more deeply than is allowed by advocates of the autonomy of biology, while still making it possible to deny, with autonomists, that evolutionary explanations can be modeled in terms of a deductive relationship between laws and cases. We explore the relationship between, chance, self-organization, and selection as sources of order in biological systems in order to make these points.

Thermodynamics and the conceptual structure of evolutionary theory

Thermodynamics and evolutionary theory have spent most of their shared history in adversarial relationship to one another. The point of this paper is to consider some qualitative ways in which thermodynamics can enrich both the theory and epistemology of evolution. The "autonomy of biology" posture in evolutionary theory hangs on the supposed uniqueness of why-questions in biology. With this posture, and with the general obstruction of constructive dialogue between evolution and the physical sciences it fosters, come the perennial accusations that Darwinism deals in adaptational teleology but not mechanisms. Thermodynamics provides for a two-tiered hierarchy of causation in nature in which the why-question is rendered not only legitimate materialistically, but essential to understanding the evolutionary process in its totality--from the emergence of life to the branching of lineages in speciation.

Darwin Centennial Celebration

Previous articleNext article No AccessDarwin Centennial CelebrationPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Current Anthropology Volume 1Sep., 1959Pre-Issue Sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/200069 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article: The autonomy of biology, (Aug 2004): 21–38.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617188.004

An Introduction to Zoology

THERE are some interesting distinctive features in this new introduction to zoology. Only a few types are studied (all of them Invertebrates); they are discussed so as to illustrate the principles of the science; the morphological aspect is not specially emphasised, but is coordinated with the physiological aspect (which, of course, includes the study of inter-relations and behaviour). From a mapping out of the subdivisions of the science (which admits of much improvement), the author passes to the characteristics of living organisms (where the autonomy of biology seems too easily surrendered to the mechanists), thence to the cell, and to the Protozoa. After an introduction to the Metazoa, which makes the significance of the transition admirably clear and introduces some exceedingly useful original diagrams, the book goes on to Hydra and other Cœlenterates, Unsegmented Worms, the Earthworn and Annelids, the Crayfish and Arthropods, the Honey Bee (which is admirably treated), and bees in general. Then follows a chapter on the history of zoology (entitled “Historical Zoology”), and the book ends with a terse consideration of the factors in evolution and related questions. There is a very useful bibliography, and a glossary.