Autonomy In China Research Articles

Fiscal Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao China

Previous articleNext article No AccessStudiesFiscal Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao ChinaJames TongJames Tong Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 22Jul., 1989 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2158844 Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 19Citations are reported from Crossref Journal History This article was published in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs (1979-1995), which is continued by The China Journal (1995-present). Copyright Australian Journal of Chinese AffairsPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Qin Pang The Chinese State’s Decentralized Response Towards the Confucian Revival and Its Institutional Base, (May 2018): 95–124.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8312-9_3Qingjie Zeng Control, Discretion and Bargaining: the Politics of Provincial Leader Rotation in China, Chinese Political Science Review 1, no.44 (Oct 2016): 623–644.https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0045-8Ross Wilson Does Governance Cause Growth? Evidence from China, World Development 79 (Mar 2016): 138–151.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.015Ka Ho Mok, Xiao Han The rise of transnational higher education and changing educational governance in China, International Journal of Comparative Education and Development 18, no.11 (Feb 2016): 19–39.https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCED-10-2015-0007Yang Su, Ye Qi, Zhouyan Xiao, Yu Wei Contributing institutional factors of rural environmental pollution in the process of modernization in China —In the perspective of the efficiency of environmental management system, Frontiers of Environmental Science & Engineering in China 3, no.11 (Nov 2008): 75–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11783-008-0075-zHenry Wai-chung Yeung, Weidong Liu Globalizing China: The Rise of Mainland Firms in the Global Economy, Eurasian Geography and Economics 49, no.11 (May 2013): 57–86.https://doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.49.1.57Qingshan Tan Growth Disparity in China: Provincial causes, Journal of Contemporary China 11, no.3333 (Nov 2002): 735–759.https://doi.org/10.1080/1067056022000008896Andrew Wedeman Budgets, Extra-budgets, and Small Treasuries: Illegal monies and local autonomy in China, Journal of Contemporary China 9, no.2525 (Nov 2000): 489–511.https://doi.org/10.1080/713675947Shaun Breslin Decentralisation, Globalisation and China's Partial Re-engagement with the Global Economy, New Political Economy 5, no.22 (Aug 2010): 205–226.https://doi.org/10.1080/713687771Shaun Breslin Decentralisation, Globalisation and the "Creation" of Trans-National Economic Regions in the People's Republic of China, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2000).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.182785Andrew Wedeman Agency and fiscal dependence in central‐provincial relations in China, Journal of Contemporary China 8, no.2020 (Mar 1999): 103–122.https://doi.org/10.1080/10670569908724338Yasheng Huang Central-local relations in china during the reform era: The economic and institutional dimensions, World Development 24, no.44 (Apr 1996): 655–672.https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(95)00160-EJae Ho Chung Studies of Central–Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal, The China Quarterly 142 (Feb 2009): 487–508.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000035025Eric W.K. Tsang Threats and opportunities faced by private businesses in China, Journal of Business Venturing 9, no.66 (Nov 1994): 451–468.https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-9026(94)90016-7Gaye Christoffersen Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning, The China Quarterly 133 (Feb 2009): 130–151.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000018221Jean C. Oi Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China, World Politics 45, no.11 (Jun 2011): 99–126.https://doi.org/10.2307/2010520Christine P.W. Wong Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization, Modern China 18, no.22 (Aug 2016): 197–226.https://doi.org/10.1177/009770049201800204Christine P. W. Wong Central–Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China, The China Quarterly 128 (Feb 2009): 691–715.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000004318Susan L. Shirk “Playing to the Provinces:” Deng Xiaoping's political strategy of economic reform, Studies in Comparative Communism 23, no.3-43-4 (Sep 1990): 227–258.https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(90)90010-J

The Ohio-Hubei Agreement: Clues to Chinese Negotiating Practices

The commercial, cultural and educational agreement between the State of Ohio and Hubei province has become a major element in Hubei's efforts to modernize its industrial and agricultural sectors. At the same time, the agreement also provides evidence of increasing provincial autonomy in China's economic development. This latter fact is seen in the negotiating practices adopted by provincial officials before and after the agreement was reached.

Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case

This article explores the extent to which Shanghai City, and its subordinate units, have been politically independent of higher authorities in the Chinese government. Evidence from the ‘fifties and early’ sixties suggests increasing managerial and cultural independence at the city level. Evidence from the early Cultural Revolution however suggests conceptual problems in the connection of usual notions of “autonomy” with substantive issue areas, and in their connection with local and central patterns of factions. The slow reconstruction of a local Party hierarchy in Shanghai was paralleled by a decentralization of some commercial and industrial decisions. Shanghai's role as a model in Party rebuilding increased the fully national role of the city's top leadership. Analysis of autonomy, power, or dependence in administrative units is affected when strong local leaders acquire national ambitions. Suggestions are made about the characteristics of an organization these words might describe.