Autonomous Weapons Systems Research Articles

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

One major area of concern in relation to the use of autonomous weapon systems is that it involves humans giving some, if not all, control over a weapon system to a form of computer. This idea relates to the concerns that a computer’s ability to autonomously operate weapon systems puts the control of these systems beyond the bounds of the armed forces. This article examines the role that the concept of meaningful human control plays in the ongoing discourse, describes current perspectives of what meaningful human control entails, and reviews its value in the context of the analysis of AWS presented in this article. Within this article, as is the case in the wider debate, the term meaningful human control is used to describe a quality that is perceived to be essential for a given attack to be considered to be compliant with international humanitarian law rules. It does not denote a specific class of weapon systems that permit or require a minimum level of human control; rather, it infers that a weapon that is used in an attack that is legally compliant with international humanitarian law rules would essentially incorporate a meaningful level of human control.

War Crimes Involving Autonomous Weapons

Abstract This article identifies and evaluates key international legal aspects concerning three notions that have figured in debates on war crimes involving an autonomous weapon system (AWS): responsibility, liability and accountability. It focuses on the general contours of the existing international law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law (IHL), and related fields, concepts and institutions. Regarding responsibility, this article examines, on one hand, the international responsibility of a state for an internationally wrongful act related to a breach of a rule of IHL involving an AWS that may form the basis of a war crime and, on the other hand, individual criminal responsibility for a war crime involving an AWS. As for liability, this article outlines three international legal concepts of state liability potentially related to a war crime involving an AWS. Finally, this article sets out an, at least, legally adjacent concept of accountability that involves an explanation of the conduct related to a war crime involving an AWS and imposing political, legal, social or other consequences where such an explanation is absent or insufficient.

Controlling lethal autonomous weapons systems: A typology of the position of states

This paper seeks to understand the potential for robust global control of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The paper seeks to uncover the predominant views and trends in global decision-making about such weapons systems by way of observing the positions and preferences of States inhabiting the international system as a realistic modality of a more probable normative outcome. Through a thorough examination of publicly available positions of United Nations (UN) Member States, it establishes a typology of varying positions maintained by States and reveals the argumentative rationale for the major positions advanced. This typology results to be far from unified and is composed of the following categories: (1) States that support the prohibition of LAWS; (2) States that support the prohibition of LAWS, but do not support calls for an international ban treaty; (3) States that do not support (or oppose) the prohibition of LAWS; (4) States with “flexible” positions over the LAWS: oppose use or use under certain circumstances, but not the development and production; (5) States that expressed support for multilateral talks, but have not expressed a position on the prohibition or not of LAWS; and (6) States that have called for a legally binding instrument (or legal regulation) on LAWS (inclusive of both prohibitions and regulations). Regulation and human control emerge as factors that have significant value in the equation.

A Weapon is No Subordinate

Abstract The doctrine of superior responsibility is occasionally presented as a potential solution to the ‘responsibility gap’ allegedly created when the employment of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) results in violations of international humanitarian law, which would amount to war crimes. This article analyses several challenges to the applicability of the doctrine of superior responsibility in these circumstances. In fact, superior responsibility is premised on the existence of a superior–subordinate relationship between individuals. The type of control required for this relationship to exist is different from the kind of control exercised over weapons, including AWS. Additionally, the doctrine requires the commission of an underlying crime in all its elements by a punishable subordinate. Nonetheless, superior responsibility remains a useful framework to demarcate the scope of the supervisory duties of the superior in relation to the prevention of war crimes. Understanding the limitations of this doctrine will be important in guiding the discussions concerning the level of human control that should be retained over AWS.

Crimes without Humanity?

Abstract The development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and, more generally, the role of artificial intelligence in warfare, may come to pose unprecedented challenges to criminal law, including by making it harder to link harm to individuals who can be held responsible, due to the pivotal role of the concepts of actus reus, mens rea and causation in that domain. In this context, the notion of meaningful human control has been proposed to address some of the challenges of ensuring accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law. One possibility might be to link — conceptually, or even legally — meaningful human control with the ‘control theory’ propounded at the International Criminal Court to assign criminal responsibility. Under this theory, the ascription of criminal responsibility to an individual as a direct perpetrator requires an assessment of whether they enjoy an effective ability to decide on the commission of a crime. This article elaborates on some of the issues posed by this approach, proceeding then to consider the most ‘extreme’ instance of AWS, i.e. the deployment of swarms of drones operating autonomously and coordinating their behaviour in a decentralized manner.

Leveraging autonomous weapon systems: realism and humanitarianism in modern warfare

Autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are considered particularly dangerous because they could make war somewhat independent of humans. Should that be the case-some argue-there would be neither rules nor empathy or compassion on the battlefield, and we would no longer know who was responsible for the crimes committed. For these reasons, a vast movement committed to banning such weapons emerged. Sharing the goal of greater compliance with the humanitarian law and-at the same time-embracing a realist conception of relations between groups and states, in this article we argue in favor of the idea that the technological development of AWS, in particular the possibility of observing and directing any warfare action remotely, opens new opportunities for the regulation of military actions. We also claim that a ban of such weapons is likely to be not only ineffective but also factually unrealistic; so, we propose to encourage research on AWS with the goal of embedding in them strict constraints of use. The idea is that the process will be triggering more humane conflicts in compliance with international law. To this extent, we suggest the establishment of ‘war juries’ composed of representative citizens, who would monitor all military actions of their country and decide how and when to limit them.

Encoding the Enemy: The Politics Within and Around Ethical Algorithmic War

ABSTRACT This article develops a critique of the politics of algorithmic war and autonomous weapons systems. While much of the existing debate is focused on whether algorithmic weapons technologies can satisfy the ethics and laws of war, we argue that more focus should instead be placed on the politics within and around these systems. The theoretical contributions of Elke Schwarz, Louise Amoore, and Carl Schmitt are employed to critique the implied neutrality of ethical war algorithms and excavate the place of the friend/enemy distinction within them. Ronald Arkin's influential work on Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (2009) and the more recent DARPA-funded work of the Allen Institute for AI, which has led to the release of Ask Delphi, are discussed as examples of these issues. We conclude by calling for a radicalisation of the existing debate over algorithmic war and AWS in order to create space for anti-militarist and pacifist voices and to avoid reification of the ethical war discourse.

Autonomised harming

AbstractThis paper sketches elements of a theory of the ethics of autonomised harming: the phenomenon of delegating decisions about whether and whom to harm to artificial intelligence (AI) in self-driving cars and autonomous weapon systems. First, the paper elucidates the challenge of integrating non-human, artificial agents, which lack rights and duties, into our moral framework which relies on precisely these notions to determine the permissibility of harming. Second, the paper examines how potential differences between human agents and non-human, artificial agents might bear on the permissibility of delegating life-and death decisions to AI systems. Third, and finally, the paper explores a series of resulting complexities. These include the challenge of weighing autonomous systems’ promise to reduce harm against the intrinsic value of rectificatory justice as well as the peculiar possibility that delegating harmful acts to AI might render ordinarily impermissible acts permissible. By illuminating what happens when we extend normative theory beyond its traditional boundaries, this discussion offers a starting point for assessing the moral permissibility of delegating consequential decisions to non-human, artificial agents.

Imagining Meaningful Human Control: Autonomous Weapons and the (De-) Legitimisation of Future Warfare

ABSTRACT The concept of meaningful human control has taken centre stage in the debate on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). While the precise meaning of the concept remains contested, convergence is emerging of the notion that humans should keep control over the use of force. In this paper, I investigate how political actors make sense of meaningful human control as a response to increasing use of autonomous function in weapons and how these processes intersect with imaginations of future warfare. I argue that these diverse visions of human control contribute to either the legitimisation or the delegitimisation of certain types of AWS and ways of conducting future warfare. The paper analyses the international debate about autonomous weapons systems at the United Nations and shows how the relevant actors imagine meaningful human control as a response to AWS meaningful human control. This also influences what options for political regulation are made thinkable and viable.

Attitudes of military personnel towards unmanned ground vehicles (UGV): a study of in-depth interview

The increasing potential of unmanned systems promises massive changes in military tactics and enormous enhancements to army arsenals. However, these developments also raise many concerns for societies as the use of force could potentially be delegated to autonomous weapons systems (AWS) that could operate without meaningful involvement of the military chain of command. This paper [Article adapts from a collaborative research report of Estonian research group nr R-012 on the iMUGS (Integrated Modular Unmanned Ground System) project, funded by the EDIDP (European Defence Industrial Development Programme).] reports the findings of interviews with military personnel (n = 18), which were conducted to gauge their perceptions and attitudes towards UGVs and the transformation to autonomous weapons. The findings indicate that the patriotic mentality to fight for freedom is perceived as inconceivable for an AI because unmanned platforms can hardly ever be equipped with patriotical algorithms. However, participants agreed that AI-driven machines should be perceived as decision-making instruments at best, with the caveat that any discretion to use lethal force should not be delegated to the machine.

Autonomous Weapon Systems: Attributing the Corporate Accountability

Background: The use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in armed conflict has been rapidly expanding. Consequently, the development of AWS worries legal scholars. If AWS were to operate without ‘meaningful human control’, the violation of international law and human rights would be unpreventable. Methods: This paper indicates that the most important problem arising from the use of AWS is the attribution responsibility for the violation of corporate actors. Nevertheless, it is ambiguous who is legally responsible for these international crimes, thus creating an accountability gap. The main problem regarding corporate responsibility that covers the process of employing AWS is determining who exercises causal control over a chain of acts leading to the crime’s commission. The paper proposes a more optimistic view of artificial intelligence, raising two challenges for corporate responsibility. First, the paper maps the framework of the use of AWS regarding corporate actors. Second, the article identifies the problem of accountability by presenting some possible scenarios linked to the AWS context as a solution to this problem. Results and Conclusions: The results have exposed ambiguity in international law and the absence of essential laws regarding the attribution of responsibility for AWS and the punishment of the perpetrator – international law needs to be improved and regulated.

Examining Lethal Autonomous Weapons through the Lens of International Humanitarian Law

Technological growth and advancement, coupled with the advent and expansion of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, has brought about the invention of products that facilitate and enhance human life. Artificial intelligence and Machine Learning have permeated virtually all sectors of the world and have received both positive and negative feedbacks. Undoubtedly, the human race is yet to keep up with the accelerating expansion of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Artificial Intelligence being a subset of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is packed with enormous benefits which shall be accrued to participating states, and one of these benefits is the Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) otherwise known as Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) or “killer robots”. Since the inception of LAWs, researchers, lawyers, IT experts, and scientists have opposed its adoption, urging the international community to impose strict laws on states utilising it. The invention of AI programmed weapons is not the subject matter of contention, rather, the ground for opposition is the “autonomy” granted to the weapons. These machines can function without human oversight and are programmed to be unpredictable. International Humanitarian Law opposes the use of weapons that pose threats to the civilian population, of which LAWs is inevitably a part of. LAWs defile ethical and legal positions. These weapons are so accurate and swift that they can destroy hundreds of humans in a couple of minutes and countries in possession of these machines could use them without recourse to the victims. This research work investigates the threats and risks posed by Lethal Autonomous Weapons to the Society. It analyses International law provisions in respect to LAWs and feasible measure to curb the use of LAWs across the globe.

A Moral Bind? — Autonomous Weapons, Moral Responsibility, and Institutional Reality

In “Accepting Moral Responsibility for the Actions of Autonomous Weapons Systems—a Moral Gambit” (2022), Mariarosaria Taddeo and Alexander Blanchard answer one of the most vexing issues in current ethics of technology: how to close the so-called “responsibility gap”? Their solution is to require that autonomous weapons systems (AWSs) may only be used if there is some human being who accepts the ex ante responsibility for those actions of the AWS that could not have been predicted or intended (in such cases, the human being takes what the authors call the “moral gambit”). The authors then propose several institutional safeguards to implement in order to ensure that the moral gambit is taken in a fair and just way. This paper explores this suggestion in the context of the institutional settings within which AWSs are most likely to be deployed. It raises some concerns as to the feasibility of Taddeo and Blanchard’s proposal, in light of the recent empirical work on the incentive structures likely to exist within militaries. It then presents a potential problem that may arise in case the accountability mechanisms are successfully implemented.

Future Warfare and Responsibility Management in the AI-based Military Decision-making Process

The application of artificial intelligence (AI) technology for military use is growing fast. As a result, autonomous weapon systems have been able to erode humans’ decision-making power. Once such weapons have been deployed, humans will not be able to change or abort their targets. Although autonomous weapons have a significant decision-making power, currently they are not able to make ethical choices. This article focuses on the ethical implications of AI integration in the military decision-making process and how the characteristics of AI systems with machine learning (ML) capabilities might interact with human decision-making protocols. The authors suggest that in the future, such machines might be able to make ethical decisions that resemble those made by humans. A detailed and precise classification of AI systems, based on strict technical, ethical, and cultural parameters would be critical to identify which weapon is suitable and the most ethical for a given mission.

Warfare and Machines: An In-depth Study of Autonomous Weapons in the Context of International Humanitarian Law

This research article looks at the ramifications of autonomous weapon systems within the context of international humanitarian law. The author discusses the most recent breakthroughs in autonomous weapons, their features, and the benefits to the parties that use them. The study investigates how autonomous weapons comply with treaty law, focusing on the Geneva Conventions, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. The study also examines how customary international law concepts be applied to autonomous weapons. To provide policymakers and other relevant authorities the clarity on the subject, the author has also offered some recommendations in the concluding section. In addition to analyzing the legal framework surrounding autonomous weapon systems, this research article delves into the ethical considerations associated with their deployment. The author explores the potential consequences of autonomous weapons on human rights, accountability, and the moral implications of delegating lethal decision-making to machines. By scrutinizing the intersection of international humanitarian law and ethical considerations, the article aims to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted challenges posed by autonomous weapon systems. The concluding section not only offers recommendations for legal compliance but also emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach that integrates ethical considerations into the regulatory landscape governing these advanced technologies. This holistic perspective aims to guide policymakers and relevant authorities in formulating balanced and responsible policies concerning the development and use of autonomous weapon systems.

The democratic offset: Contestation, deliberation, and participation regarding military applications of AI

Authoritarian regimes’ unrestricted collection of citizens’ data might constitute an advantage regarding the development of some types of AI, and AI might facilitate authoritarian practices. This feedback loop challenges democracies. In a critical continuation of the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy, I investigate a possible Democratic Offset regarding military applications of AI focussed on contestation, deliberation, and participation. I apply Landemore’s Open Democracy, Hildebrandt’s Agonistic Machine Learning, and Sharp’s Civilian-Based Defence. Discussing value pluralism in AI ethics, I criticise parts of the literature for leaving the fundamental ethical incompatibility of democracies and authoritarian regimes unaddressed. I am focussing on the duty to disobey illegal orders derived from customary international humanitarian law (IHL) and the standard of ‘meaningful human control’, which is central to the partially outdated debate about lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). I criticize the standard of ‘meaningful human control’ following two pathways: First, the ethical and legal principles of just war theory and IHL should be implemented in military applications of AI to submit human commands to more control, in the sense of technological disaffordances. Second, the debate should focus on the societal circumstances for personal responsibility and disobedience to be trained and exerted in deliberation and participation related to military applications of AI, in the sense of societal affordances. In a larger picture, this includes multi-level stakeholder involvement, robust documentation to facilitate auditing, civilian-based defence in decentralized smart cities, and open-source intelligence. This multi-layered approach fosters cognitive diversity, which might constitute a strategic advantage for democracies regarding AI.

Artificial Intelligence in Weapon Systems: The Overview

Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) has revolutionized modern weapon systems, offering increased speed, accuracy, and efficiency in military operations. However, the use of AI-based weapon systems raises significant ethical, legal, and operational challenges which needs to be fulfilled in development of AI based weapon system. This System have a vast history from guided missiles to autonomous weapon system, which makes its background more innovative. Also, these systems must comply with the principles and rules of IHL to ensure that they are used in a responsible and safe manner and do not cause unnecessary harm to civilians or civilian objects. The involvement of humans in the decision-making process is essential, there are limitations to this involvement that must be addressed through effective human-machine interfaces and other technological solutions It has a unended technological overview which consists of combination of machine learning algorithms, big data analytics, and advanced sensor technologies. Autonomous operation is a key feature of AI-based weapon systems, posing important questions regarding accountability and the risk of unintended consequences. The design of such systems must ensure they adhere to international laws and norms, as well as being reliable and safe. Machine learning algorithms and advanced sensor technologies, such as electro-optical and infrared sensors, are critical components of these systems, allowing them to analyse data and track targets precisely.

Public perceptions of autonomous lethal weapons systems

AbstractThis study attempts to bridge the gap in empirical and philosophical research on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), through a survey of attitudes using experimental methods. “LAWS” refer to “fully autonomous weapons” that can set attack targets without human involvement and are lethal. Based on previous research, we conducted a randomized controlled experiment to create, present, and collect responses to scenarios describing military operations and outcomes that are likely to express awareness of the ethical issues raised by LAWS. First, our hypothesis that LAWS are less likely to be used was rejected, and the opposite trend was observed. Second, the hypothesis that civilian casualties rather than combatant casualties would influence LAWS use was strongly and significantly confirmed. Third, the hypothesis that remote weapons are more likely to be used than LAWS was rejected. Fourth, there was some support for the hypothesis that LAWS are more likely to be used in homeland defense. Fifth, the hypothesis that male and younger individuals are more willing to use LAWS was strongly and significantly confirmed for male, but not on the basis of age. This study highlights the need for further discussion based on these findings.

Practice-based and public-deliberative normativity: retaining human control over the use of force

The debate about lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) characterises them as future problems in need of pre-emptive regulation, for example, through codifying meaningful human control. But autonomous technologies are already part of weapons and have shaped how states think about human control. To understand this normative space, I proceed in two steps: first, I theorise how practices of designing, of training personnel for, and of operating weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies have shaped normativity/normality on human control at sites unseen. Second, I trace how this normativity/normality interacts with public deliberations at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS by theorising potential dynamics of interaction. I find that the normativity/normality emerging from practices performed in relation to weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies assigns humans a reduced role in specific use of force decisions and understands this diminished decision-making capacity as ‘appropriate’ and ‘normal’. In the public-deliberative process, stakeholders have interacted with this normativity by ignoring it, engaging in distancing or positively acknowledging it – rather than scrutinising it. These arguments move beyond prioritising public deliberation in norm research towards exploring practices performed at sites outside of the public eye as productive of normativity. I theorise this process via international practice theories, critical security studies and Science and Technology scholarship to draw out how practices shape normativity, presenting ideas of oughtness and justice, and normality, making something appear normal via collective, repeated performances.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA

Recent breakthroughs in machine learning and artificial intelligence (A.I.) have prompted breathless speculation about their national security applications. Yet most of that work has focused narrowly on their implications for autonomous weapons systems, rather than on the broader security environment. Apart from Michael Horowitz and a handful of others, few scholars have sketched out how A.I. might affect core questions of international relations and foreign policy. One key challenge stands out: What influence will A.I. have on security dilemmas between great powers? With the two leading producers of A.I., the United States and China, already eyeing each other warily, the question is far from an idle one. If we are to maintain a stable international order, we need to better understand how artificial intelligence may exacerbate the security dilemma and what to do about it.