Survival Of Authoritarian Regimes Research Articles

Authoritarian Elections: State of Literature and Research Problems

The article provides an overview of current research on elections in authoritarian political regimes. For this purpose, a number of significant papers on this issue have been selected, published in peer-reviewed academic journals with a high impact-factor. The assessment of the significance of the works was made primarily on the basis of their citation indicators according to Scopus and Google Scholar. It is stated that despite the rapid growth in the number of works on authoritarian elections over the past two decades, it is still far from building a comprehensive theory in this area. The review focuses on the question of how elections affect the survival of authoritarian regimes. In this regard, conflicting positions are presented in the literature. On the one hand, elections are seen as instruments for stabilization of authoritarian rule, on the other hand — as sources of instability, and on the third — as levers of democratization.

The Impact of Western Sanctions on Putin's War

AbstractIn response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the West imposed a package of unprecedented sanctions that has failed to generate meaningful domestic backlash against Putin's war. Leveraging extant research on the survival of authoritarian regimes under economic sanctions, I show that their devastating economic costs notwithstanding, sanctions are unlikely to destabilize Putin's regime or pressure him to withdraw his troops from Ukraine. The key to explaining this outcome is to zero in on the incentive structure of the groups of individuals that make up Putin's inner circle.

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

The question of loyalty in autocratic regimes has drawn a sustained scholarly interest, especially as autocratic leaders need to secure the support of their militaries to survive in office and to minimize the risk of a coup. Among the commonly employed mechanisms in this regard is the extension of extra-budgetary financial rewards, including “Military-Owned Businesses (MOBs)”. Nevertheless, under the increasingly significant threat of an uprising from below, military defection remains the key for the success of the revolution. The question then becomes: under what conditions would a military defect from an autocratic ruling alliance? This paper presents one novel answer to this question, which is: militaries are “defection-proofed” in the face of mass uprisings when they develop financial dependency on the regime. This hypothesis is tested comparatively against the cases of mass protests in China (1989), Indonesia (1998), Thailand (2006), and Iran (2009).

Plagues of Egypt – the COVID-19 crisis and the role of securitization dilemmas in the authoritarian regime survival strategies in Egypt and Turkey

The research looks into the authoritarian regime survival strategies in Egyptand Turkey during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, it examines howthe autocratic rulers in both countries dealt with the securitization dilemmacaused by the coronavirus outbreak. It applies securitization theory and theconcept of selective securitization to argue that although both Abdel Fattahel-Sisi’s and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule were at some point expected to beshaken by the pandemic, the COVID-19 securitization dilemmas had animportant role in helping to prolong the autocratic directions of theirrespective countries. Additionally, the article demonstrates that thesecuritization of the COVID-19 pandemic in Egypt and Turkey follows acertain political pattern where every crisis constitutes an opportunity forexpanding the regimes’ powers at the expense of citizens’ rights.

The Durability of Client Regimes

ABSTRACTConventional wisdom holds that great power patrons prop up client dictatorships. But this is generally assumed rather than systematically analyzed. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the relationship between foreign sponsorship and authoritarian regime survival, using an original data set of all autocratic client regimes in the postwar period. The results demonstrate that patronage from Western powers—the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—is not associated with client regime survival. Rather, it’s only Soviet sponsorship that reduced the risk of regime collapse. The author explains this variation by considering the effects of foreign sponsorship on the likelihood of military coups d’état. He argues that the Soviet Union directly aided its clients by imposing a series of highly effective coup prevention strategies. By contrast, the US and its allies didn’t provide such aid, leaving regimes vulnerable to military overthrow.

The Evolution of Legitimation, Cooptation and Repression in Authoritarian Regimes: Singapore and Ethiopia in Comparative Perspective

Following a dramatic shift in the geopolitical environment after the Cold War, the world ushered in a new age of democratic expansion. This third wave of democratization, described by Samuel P. Huntington as a global trend that saw countries undergo some form of democratic transition, heralded new democratic governments in regions such as Eastern Europe, hitherto stalwart bastions of socialist dictatorship. But were these political developments a wave, or just a ripple? Did this period truly mark a global and decisive shift toward more egalitarian and democratic governance? Critics suggest that it does not, pointing to the survival of authoritarian regimes in other regions of the world, such as in South-East Asia and Africa. For these regimes, the twin pressures of democratization and globalization may have necessitated a choice between maintenance of retrograde dictatorship and democratic transition, but their desire to remain in power only provided sufficient incentive to disguise authoritarianism behind the facade of democracy. This study thus seeks to decipher the design and dynamics of contemporary authoritarian regimes as contributing factors for their longevity. It delves into the changing nature of the measures of legitimation, co-optation, and repression that the regimes in Singapore and Ethiopia have adopted to placate their critics, citizens, and challengers. It seeks not just to describe why these autocratic states repress, but crucially, also how they do so against the backdrop of calls for democratization.

Country size and the survival of authoritarian monarchies: developing a new argument

ABSTRACT This article combines the literature on authoritarian regime survival with that on small states to propose a new explanation for the survival and breakdown of authoritarian monarchies. To develop the conjecture that monarchy tends to survive in small countries into a theoretically and empirically sound argument, I follow the process of iterative induction. I first inspect all authoritarian monarchies between 1946 and 2018 and find that countries with monarchic survival have a significantly smaller population size than countries where monarchy broke down. Second, I develop a theoretical explanation for this relation: the feeling of vulnerability, the social proximity, and institutional centralization, which are all typically ascribed to small countries, facilitate the stability of monarchic regimes. I conceptualize this stability with Gerschewski’s model of three pillars of authoritarian stability, co-optation, repression and legitimation; and I argue that smallness enhances each of these three via several channels. Third, to illustrate the plausibility of this explanation I compare two most likely historical cases of monarchies with diverging outcomes: Jordan and Egypt. Fourth, I inspect deviant cases, particularly Bhutan, Maldives and Tonga, to refine and finalize the argument. The main finding is that smallness prevented the violent breakdown of monarchic regimes since 1946.

Institutionalising electoral uncertainty and authoritarian regime survival.

Authoritarian incumbents routinely use democratic emulation as a strategy to extend their tenure in power. Yet, there is also evidence that multiparty competition makes electoral authoritarianism more vulnerable to failure. Proceeding from the assumption that the outcomes of authoritarian electoral openings are inherently uncertain, it is argued in this article that the institutionalisation of elections determines whether electoral authoritarianism promotes stability or vulnerability. By ‘institutionalisation’, it is meant the ability of authoritarian regimes to reduce uncertainty over outcomes as they regularly hold multiparty elections. Using discrete‐time event‐history models for competing risks, the effects of sequences of multiparty elections on patterns of regime survival and failure in 262 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010 are assessed, conditioned on their degree of competitiveness. The findings suggest that the institutionalisation of electoral uncertainty enhances authoritarian regime survival. However, for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes this entails substantial risk. The first three elections substantially increase the probability of democratisation, with the danger subsequently diminishing. This suggests that convoking multiparty competition is a risky game with potentially high rewards for autocrats who manage to institutionalise elections. Yet, only a small number of authoritarian regimes survive as competitive beyond the first few elections, suggesting that truly competitive authoritarianism is hard to institutionalise. The study thus finds that the question of whether elections are dangerous or stabilising for authoritarianism is dependent on differences between the ability of competitive and hegemonic forms of electoral authoritarianism to reduce electoral uncertainty.

Conquering and coercing: Nonviolent anti-regime protests and the pathways to democracy

Recent research finds an association between nonviolent protests and democratic transitions. However, existing scholarship either does not specify the pathways through which nonviolent protests bring about democratization or conduct systematic empirical analyses demonstrating that the specified pathways are operative. This article proposes four pathways through which nonviolent anti-regime protests encourage democratic transitions, emphasizing their ability to directly conquer or indirectly coerce such transitions. Most simply, they can conquer democratic reforms by directly overthrowing authoritarian regimes and installing democracies. They can also coerce democratic reforms through three additional pathways. Nonviolent anti-regime protests can coerce incumbent elites into democratic reforms by threatening the survival of authoritarian regimes. They also increase the likelihood of elite splits, which promote negotiated democratic reforms. Finally, they encourage leadership change within the existing authoritarian regime. Following leadership change, nonviolent movements remain mobilized and are able to coerce democratic concessions from the regime’s new leaders. Our within-regime analyses provide robust empirical support for each pathway. We show that nonviolent anti-regime protests conquer democratic reforms by ousting autocratic regimes and replacing them with democracies. Nonviolent anti-regime protests also coerce elites into democratic reforms by threatening regime and leader survival. These findings highlight the importance of protest goals and tactics and also that nonviolent anti-regime protests have both direct and indirect effects on democratization.

The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China

Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites’ logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate’s chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time.

Internet diffusion and regime type: Temporal patterns in technology adoption

It is often assumed that the Internet would threaten the survival of authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, most country-comparative studies have identified a democracy advantage in Internet diffusion. This paper revisits these technology-centric assumptions by conceptualizing the adoption of the Internet as a dynamic phenomenon with multiple phases that unfold differently depending on the political system. It is argued theoretically, that initially, the Internet diffuses faster in democracies because of inherent innovation advantages. However, authoritarian regimes adopt the Internet at comparable rates when the economic benefits of the technology outweigh the democratization risks. Yearly cross-sectional regressions for the years 1996–2013 show that the relationship between regime type and Internet diffusion varies temporally as authoritarian regimes have caught up considerably. Since 2013, there are no significant differences between democracies and authoritarian regimes anymore and monarchies even outperform democracies.

Domestic politics, regional integration, and human rights: interactions among Myanmar, ASEAN, and EU

This paper tries to explain the evolving relations between the recent domestic political changes in Myanmar and the role of regional integration as they affect human rights in Myanmar. I posit that the two most important causes of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar are the survival of the authoritarian regime and ethnic-religious conflicts. Those causes differ in nature and their political interactions with the ASEAN regional integration. This paper first examines the relationship between authoritarian regime survival and the humanitarian crisis/efforts during the 2008 natural disaster of cyclone Nargis and the resultant flooding. Second, I investigate the political dynamics of the human rights violations of ethnic and religious minorities, especially the Rohingya Muslim minority in the Rakhine State, during Myanmar’s recent democratic transition. This study approaches the aforementioned questions from both the EU and ASEAN perspectives and also deals with these two regional organizations’ interactions regarding Myanmar’s human rights.

Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival in the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring has shaken not only the state and society dimension in the countries of the MENA region but also the power of authoritarian leaders that had been ensured for a long period of time. This paper takes a critical look at the issue of how authoritarian regimes reacted to the new political atmosphere produced by the Arab Spring. More specifically it attempts to identify how geopolitical reasoning influenced the formulation of new strategies designed to promote the survival of authoritarian regimes. It focuses upon the geopolitical reasoning relied upon by Iran and Saudi Arabia, which included creating threat-enemy chains in domestic politics, shifting alliances in regional policy and taking advantage of relations with external actors to gain support for authoritarian rule at home.

Oil, violence and international actors: the case of Libya

The survival of authoritarian regimes has for a long time been associated with the availability of rents derived from oil and gas. In particular, military oil regimes have been able to withstand the challenge of domestic opposition even at difficult times because these regimes could ultimately count on oil and gas revenues. As this article demonstrates, the Qadhafi regime had been particularly adept at surviving by using oil and gas rents. But there is a limit to what these rents can explain: in 2011 however the regime fell after a brief civil war, in which external forces played a central role. The role played by the European and NATO interventions points to the limits of the oil and gas rents. The changed distribution of international resources amongst domestic Libyan actors contributed to the rebels' victory, indicating that international factors should be better incorporated into studies of both authoritarian survival and democratisation.

Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival

How does redistributive policy affect the survival of authoritarian regimes? I argue that redistributive policy in favor of cities, while temporarily reducing urban grievances, in the long-run undermines regime survival by inducing urban concentration. I test the argument using cross-national city population, urban bias, and nondemocratic regime survival data in the post-WWII period. The results show that urban concentration is dangerous for dictators principally by promoting collective action, that urban bias induces urban concentration, and that urban bias represents a Faustian bargain with short-term benefits overwhelmed by long-term costs.

Urban Concentration, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Resilience

How does redistributive policy affect the survival of authoritarian regimes? I argue that redistributive policy in favor of cities, while a temporary measure reducing urban grievances, in the long-run undermines regime survival by inducing urban concentration. I test the argument using cross-national city population, urban bias, and non-democratic regime survival data in the post-WWII period. The results show that urban concentration is dangerous for dictators principally by promoting collective action, that urban bias induces urban concentration, and that urban bias represents a Faustian bargain with short-term benefits overwhelmed by long-term costs.

Book Review: Jeremy L. Wallace, Cities and Stability: Urbanization, Redistribution, and Regime Survival in China

Investigating the mechanism of authoritarian regime survival, Wallace’s book provides us with some great insights into the relationship among China’s rural-urban migration, urbanization and regime survival through a geopolitical perspective. He explicitly argues that it is through short-circuiting “the Faustian Bargain of urban bias” (p.121) that not only has the authoritarian regime in China successfully survived but also prospered in the past three decades.

Varieties of Authoritarianism: The Organization of the Military State and its Effects on Federalism in Argentina and Brazil

While much has been written about democracy and democratization, far less attention has been paid to the institutional organization of authoritarian regimes. Scholars have focused on the causes, economic policies, societal support, intra-elite conflicts, or human-rights violations of authoritarian regimes. More recently, political scientists have also studied the role of elections and legislatures on the survival of authoritarian regimes. However, the very different ways in which authoritarian regimes, and military regimes in particular, organize the government, occupy the state apparatus, and modify the country’s political institutions have largely gone under-theorized. This essay contributes to fill in this void by analyzing how the last military regimes of Argentina (1976–1983) and Brazil (1964–1985) organized power within the state and the legacies of such organization on the institutions of federalism. The essay argues that variation in the organization of the state under the military regimes accounts for the divergent origins of post-developmental decentralization, which in turn explains the contrasting evolution of intergovernmental relations in each country. The article contributes to the recent literature on electoral authoritarian regimes by showing that elections and legislatures matter not only to regime survival but also to policy outcomes.

Democracy and redistribution

When do countries democratize? What facilitates the survival of authoritarian regimes? What determines the occurrence of revolutions, often leading to left-wing dictatorships, such as the Soviet regime? Although a large literature has developed since Aristotle through contemporary political science to answer these questions, we still lack a convincing understanding of the process of political development. Employing analytical tools borrowed from game theory, Carles Boix offers a complete theory of political transitions, in which political regimes ultimately hinge on the nature of economic assets, their distribution among individuals, and the balance of power among different social groups. Backed up by detailed historical work and extensive statistical analysis that goes back to the mid-nineteenth century, this 2003 book explains why democracy emerged in classical Athens. It also discusses the early triumph of democracy in both nineteenth-century agrarian Norway, Switzerland and northeastern America and the failure in countries with a powerful landowning class.