ABSTRACT In recent years, the concept of authoritarianism has risen to prominence in the community of legal scholars studying non-democratic regimes. China’s legality is also described as authoritarian. However, what does it mean to label China as having a system of authoritarian law? The concept of authoritarianism, and by extension, authoritarian legality, is yet underexamined. This article discusses how China, as a single-party state, differs from other authoritarian regimes in developing its own brand of authoritarian legality that I describe as legal gradationalism. China's authoritarian legality is characterized by a rejection of judicial independence and the mixing of law and quasi-law instruments. Drawing from Shucheng Wang's Law as an Instrument, I propose that a gradationalist approach to Chinese legality allows us to more fully understand the behaviour of Chinese courts and the intriguing dynamics between the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and the local courts.