Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Research Articles

New approach to practical leakage-resilient public-key cryptography

AbstractWe present a new approach to construct several leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, including leakage-resilient public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols. To this end, we introduce a new primitive called leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange (LR-NIKE) protocol. We introduce an appropriate security model for LR-NIKE protocols in the bounded memory leakage (BML) settings. We then show a secure construction of the LR-NIKE protocol in the BML setting that achieves an optimal leakage rate, i.e., 1 – o(1). Our construction of LR-NIKE requires a minimal use of a leak-free hardware component. We argue that the use of such a leak-free hardware component seems to be unavoidable in any construction of an LR-NIKE protocol, even in the BML setting. Finally, we show how to construct the aforementioned leakage-resilient primitives from such an LR-NIKE protocol as summarized below. All these primitives also achieve the same (optimal) leakage rate as the underlying LR-NIKE protocol. We show how to construct a leakage-resilient (LR) IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme in the BML model generically from a bounded LR-NIKE (BLR-NIKE) protocol. Our construction of LR-IND-CCA-2 secure PKE differs significantly from the state-of-the-art constructions of these primitives, which mainly use hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resilience. Moreover, our transformation preserves the leakage-rate of the underlying BLR-NIKE protocol. We introduce a new leakage model for AKE protocols, in the BML setting, and present a leakage-resilient AKE protocol construction from the LR-NIKE protocol. We introduce the first-ever leakage model for LLKE protocols in the BML setting and the first construction of such a leakage-resilient LLKE from the LR-NIKE protocol.

TAKE-IoT

The goal of this work is to develop a key exchange solution for IPsec protocol, adapted to the restricted nature of the Internet of Things (IoT) components. With the emergence of IP-enabled wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the landscape of IoT is rapidly changing. Nevertheless, this technology has exacerbated the conventional security issues in WSNs, such as the key exchange problem. Therefore, Tiny Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for IoT (TAKE-IoT) is proposed to solve this problem. The proposed TAKE-IoT is a secure, yet efficient, protocol that responds to several security requirements and withstands various types of known attacks. Moreover, TAKE-IoT aims to reduce computation costs using lightweight operations for the key generation. The proposed protocol is validated using the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) tool. Hence, results show that TAKE-IoT can reach a proper level of security without sacrificing its efficiency in the context of IoT.

LAKE-IoD: Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for the Internet of Drone Environment

A drone is an unmanned aerial vehicle, which is deployed in a particular Fly Zone (FZ), and used to collect crucial information from its surrounding environment to be transmitted to the server for further processing. Generally, a Mobile User (MU) is required to access the real-time information collected by the drone stationed in a specific FZ securely. Therefore, to ensure secure and reliable communications an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol is imperative to the Internet of Drone (IoD) environment. An AKE scheme ensures only authentic MU to access IoD network resources. Upon successful authentication, MU and drone can set up a secret session key for secure communication in the future. This paper presents a novel Lightweight AKE Protocol for IoD Environment (LAKE-IoD), which first ensures the authenticity of MU and also renders session key establishment mechanism between MU and drone with the help of a server. LAKE-IoD is an AKE protocol, which is based on an authenticated encryption scheme AEGIS, hash function, and bit-wise XOR operation. Meticulous formal security verification by employing a software tool known as Scyther and informal security analysis demonstrates that LAKE-IoD is protected against different well-known active and passive security attacks. Additionally, Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic is applied to verify the logical completeness of LAKE-IoD. Furthermore, a comparison of LAKE-IoD with the related schemes shows that LAKE-IoD incurs less communication, computational and storage overhead.

Post Quantum Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Ring Learning with Errors Problem

Post Quantum Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Ring Learning with Errors Problem

ReHand: Secure Region-Based Fast Handover With User Anonymity for Small Cell Networks in Mobile Communications

Due to the fact that the higher density of mobile devices is expected, the fifth generation (5G) mobile networks introduce small cell networks (SCNs) to prevent exhausting radio resources. SCNs improve radio spectrum utilization by deploying more base stations (BSs) in the networks. Even though authenticated key exchange (AKE) is still essential to ensure entity authentication and confidentiality in mobile communications. Besides, user anonymity is required to guarantee the footprints of mobile communications being concealed. However, AKE with user anonymity may increase the latency of communications dramatically in total due to several times more frequency in SCNs. The increase of latency will be more serious when an AKE protocol supports user anonymity, where traceability and revocability to users are necessary. Thus, this paper presents a secure region-based handover scheme (ReHand) with user anonymity and fast revocation for SCNs. ReHand greatly reduces the communication latency when user equipments (UEs) roam between small cells within the region of a macro BS, i.e., eNB, and the computation costs due to the employment of symmetry-based cryptographic operations. Compared to the three related prior arts, ReHand dramatically reduces the latency from 82.92% to 99.99% by region-based secure handover. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates the security of ReHand by theoretically formal proofs.

Research on the Security Data Transmission based on Linux

This paper develops system software in application layer based on Linux operating system. Linux operation system in this paper. Different transmission modes are adopted in different parts to improve the transmission efficiency in the network. The data capture encryption method is used for the file data, and the storage transmission method is used for the image data. It designs an identity authentication protocol and key exchange protocol based on digital certificate and digital sign technology, to avoid the sophistication and filch and improve the reliability of the identity authentication and the security of the key exchange. The common algorithms of symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption and information digest are studied by using OpenSSL standard library function to realize data encryption module of the system.

Strongly leakage resilient authenticated key exchange, revisited

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols allow two (or multiple) parties to authenticate each other and agree on a common secret key, which is essential for establishing a secure communication channel over a public network. AKE protocols form a central component in many network security standards such as IPSec, TLS/SSL, and SSH. However, it has been demonstrated that many standardized AKE protocols are vulnerable to side-channel and key leakage attacks. In order to defend against such attacks, leakage resilient (LR-) AKE protocols have been proposed in the literature. Nevertheless, most of the existing LR-AKE protocols only focused on the resistance to long-term key leakage, while in reality leakage of ephemeral secret key (or randomness) can also occur due to various reasons such as the use of poor randomness sources or insecure pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). In this paper, we revisit the strongly leakage resilient AKE protocol (CT-RSA’16) that aimed to resist challenge-dependent leakage on both long-term and ephemeral secret keys. We show that there is a security issue in the design of the protocol and propose an improved version that can fix the problem. In addition, we extend the protocol to a more general framework that can be efficiently instantiated under various assumptions, including hybrid instantiations that can resist key leakage attacks while preserving session key security against future quantum machines.

Anonymity preserving and round effective three-party authentication key exchange protocol based on chaotic maps.

Three-party authentication key exchange (3PAKE) is a protocol that allows two users to set up a common session key with the help of a trusted remote server, which is effective for secret communication between clients in a large-scale network environment. Since chaotic maps have superior characteristics, researchers have recently presented some of the studies that apply it to authentication key exchange and cryptography. Providing user anonymity in the authentication key exchange is one of the important security requirements to protect users' personal secrets. We analyse Lu et al.'s scheme which attempts to provide user anonymity and we prove that his scheme has errors in the key exchange phase and password change phase. We propose a round-effective three-party authentication key exchange (3PAKE) protocol that provides user anonymity and we analyse its security properties based on BAN logic and AVISPA tool.

Unbalancing Pairing-Free Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols for Disaster Scenarios

In disaster scenarios, such as an area after a terrorist attack, security is a significant problem since communications involve information for the rescue officers, such as polices, militaries, emergency medical technicians, and the survivors. Such information is critically important for the rescue organizations; and protecting the privacy of the survivors is required. Normally, authenticated key exchange (AKE) is an underlying approach for security. However, available AKE protocols are either inconvenient or infeasible in disaster areas due to the very nature of disasters. To address the security problem in disaster scenarios, we propose two pairing-free identity-based AKE (ID-AKE) protocols that have unbalanced computational requirements on the two parties. Compared with existing AKE protocols, the proposed protocols have a number of advantages in disaster scenarios: 1) they are more convenient than symmetric cryptography-based AKE protocols since they do not require any preshared secret between the parties; 2) they are more feasible than asymmetric cryptography-based AKE protocols since they do not require any online server; and 3) they are more friendly to battery-powered and computationally limited devices than pairing-based and pairing-free ID-AKE protocols since they do not involve any bilinear pairing (a time-consuming operation), and have lower computational requirement on the limited party. Security of the proposed protocols are analyzed in detail; and prototypes of them are implemented to evaluate the performance. We also illustrate the application of the protocols through a vivid use case in a terrorist attack scenario.

Hash-Based Conditional Privacy Preserving Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol Suitable for Industrial Internet of Things

Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are integral part of Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT), the said networks comprise of elements possessing low power processors. WSNs are used for gathering data in the monitoring region, using which vital information about the sensor and the monitoring region can be attained (placement of the sensor node is critical). Moreover, due to open nature of communication channel and resource constrained environment of nodes the privacy, integrity and confidentiality of the data becomes a big issue as we need to ensure that the said data is only accessed by a valid user in the IIOT environment. Many schemes presented various means to overcome the above issue. However, the existing works do have certain vulnerabilities which make its application in the WSNs constrained. The proposed work presents a scheme for achieving above goals in IIOT environment. Moreover, the proposed scheme presents security vulnerabilities and weaknesses in existing schemes and attempts to overcome these issues; the proposed work provides cryptanalysis of Xiong et al. scheme which is based on ECC, the direct consequence of the cryptanalysis directs to design a solution which can overcome the issues. The proposed work provides a robust hash based conditional privacy preserving authentication and probabilistic key exchange protocol which is lightweight and as a result, puts less computation overheads on the entities involved in the region. The proposed work is secure against many known attacks due to difficulty in guessing the credentials. The main motivation is to develop a lightweight scheme which can help exchange information with efficacy. The security of the proposed work is provided using both formal and informal security analysis where formal analysis comprises of AVISPA and Real-or-Random oracle model simulations whereas informal analysis depicts proofs as of how the proposed work withstands many known attacks. Thus, the proposed work is secure against many malicious attacks directing and championing its application in IIOT environment.

Novel 5G Authentication Protocol to Improve the Resistance Against Active Attacks and Malicious Serving Networks

The security of mobile communication largely depends on the strength of the authentication key exchange protocol. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Group has standardized the 5G AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) protocol for the next generation of mobile communications. It has been recently shown that the current version of this protocol still contains several weaknesses regarding user localization, leakage of activity, active attackers, and in the presence of malicious serving networks, leading to potentially major security leaks. We propose a new version of the 5G AKA protocol to overcome all the currently identified weaknesses in the protocol. In the new protocol, we replace the sequence numbers with random numbers, making it possible to drastically reduce the number of required communication phases and steps in the protocol. The usage of random numbers for the 5G AKA protocol is possible since the current Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIMs) are now capable of performing randomized asymmetric encryption operations. Moreover, the proposed protocol provides two additional security features, i.e., post-compromise security and forward security, not present in the current 5G AKA protocol. Finally, we evaluate the performance, both computation and communication efficiency, of the proposed AKA protocol and show its improvements compared to the current 5G AKA protocol.

Implementation of an eCK-secure Key Exchange Protocol for OpenSSL

Security models have been developed over time to analyze the security of two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. LaMacchia et al. (ProSec 2007) presented a strong security model for AKE protocols, namely the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, addressing wide range of real-world attack scenarios. They constructed a protocol called NAXOS, that is proven-secure in the eCK model. In order to satisfy the eCK security, the NAXOS protocol uses a hash function to combine the long-term secret key and the ephemeral secret key, which is often called as “NAXOS-trick”. However, for the NAXOS-trick-based protocols, the way of leakage modelled in the eCK model leads to an unnatural assumption of leak-free computation of the hash function. Precisely, the eCK model allows the attacker to reveal the ephemeral key while the output of the NAXOS-trick computation remains safe (leak-free). In a recent work of Alawatugoda et al. (IMA Cryptography and Coding 2015), a NAXOS-trick-free eCK-secure AKE protocol is presented, namely protocol P1. In this work, we implement the protocol P1 to be used with the widely-used OpenSSL cryptographic library. OpenSSL implementations are widely used with the real-world security protocol suites, such as Security Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS). As per best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of a eCK-secure key exchange protocol for the OpenSSL library. Thus, we open up the direction to use the recent advancements of cryptography for real-world Internet communication.

A secure biometrics-based authentication key exchange protocol for multi-server TMIS using ECC

Background and objectivesTelecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) enables physicians to efficiently and conveniently make certain diagnoses and medical treatment for patients over the insecure public Internet. To ensure patients securely access to medicinal services, many authentication schemes have been proposed. Although numerous cryptographic authentication schemes for TMIS have been proposed with the aim to ensure data security, user privacy and authentication, various forms of attacks make these schemes impractical. MethodsTo design a truly secure and practical authentication scheme for TMIS, a new biometrics-based authentication key exchange protocol for multi-server TMIS without sharing the system private key with distributed servers is presented in this work. ResultsOur proposed protocol has perfect security features including mutual authentication, user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy and resisting various well-known attacks, and these security feathers are confirmed by the BAN logic and heuristic cryptanalysis, respectively. ConclusionsA secure biometrics-based authentication key exchange protocol for multi-server TMIS is presented in this work, which has perfect security properties including perfect forward secrecy, supporting user anonymity, etc., and can withstand various attacks such as impersonation attack, off-line password guessing attack, etc.. Considering security is the most important factor for an authentication scheme, so our scheme is more suitable for multi-server TMIS.

After-the-Fact Leakage-Resilient Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme is one of the most widely used cryptographic primitives in practice, even in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) environments. In order to resist side-channel attacks, several works have been proposed for defining leakage-resilient (LR) security models and constructing LR-AKE protocols. However, all these LR-AKE schemes employed the traditional X.509 certificate-based public-key infrastructure authentication framework, where the online transmission and verification of the public-key certificate are the major drawbacks. In this paper, we first propose a general framework for constructing identity-based AKE protocols in the bounded after-the-fact LR extended-Canetti–Krawczyk security model, and show a formal proof in the standard model. Our proposed scheme offers a flexible approach to simplify the certificate management. Moreover, our result could be extended to the bounded-retrieval model, yielding the first LR-AKE protocol in this model.

A Provably Secure Anonymous Two-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Cloud Computing

A Provably Secure Anonymous Two-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Cloud Computing

Improved Strongly Deniable Authenticated Key Exchanges for Secure Messaging

Abstract A deniable authenticated key exchange (DAKE) protocol establishes a secure channel without producing cryptographic evidence of communication. A DAKE offers strong deniability if transcripts provide no evidence even if long-term key material is compromised (offline deniability) and no outsider can obtain evidence even when interactively colluding with an insider (online deniability). Unfortunately, existing strongly deniable DAKEs have not been adopted by secure messaging tools due to security and deployability weaknesses. In this work, we propose three new strongly deniable key exchange protocols—DAKEZ, ZDH, and XZDH—that are designed to be used in modern secure messaging applications while eliminating the weaknesses of previous approaches. DAKEZ offers strong deniability in synchronous network environments, while ZDH and XZDH can be used to construct asynchronous secure messaging systems with offline and partial online deniability. DAKEZ and XZDH provide forward secrecy against active adversaries, and all three protocols can provide forward secrecy against future quantum adversaries while remaining classically secure if attacks against quantum-resistant cryptosystems are found. We seek to reduce barriers to adoption by describing our protocols from a practitioner’s perspective, including complete algebraic specifications, cryptographic primitive recommendations, and prototype implementations. We evaluate concrete instantiations of our DAKEs and show that they are the most efficient strongly deniable schemes; with all of our classical security guarantees, our exchanges require only 1 ms of CPU time on a typical desktop computer and at most 464 bytes of data transmission. Our constructions are nearly as efficient as key exchanges with weaker deniability, such as the ones used by the popular OTR and Signal protocols.

2PAKEP: Provably Secure and Efficient Two-Party Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Mobile Environment

With the increasing use of mobile devices, a secure communication and key exchange become the significant security issues in mobile environments. However, because of open network environments, mobile user can be vulnerable to various attacks. Therefore, the numerous authentication and key exchange schemes have been proposed to provide the secure communication and key exchange. Recently, Qi and Chen proposed an efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environments in order to overcome the security weaknesses of the previous authentication and key exchange schemes. However, we demonstrate that Qi and Chen’s scheme is vulnerable to various attacks such as impersonation, offline password guessing, password change, and privileged insider attacks. We also show that Qi and Chen’s scheme does not provide anonymity, efficient password change mechanism, and secure mutual authentication. In this paper, to overcome the outlined abovementioned security vulnerabilities, we propose a secure and efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol, called 2PAKEP, that hides user’s real identity from an adversary using a secret parameter. 2PAKEP also withstands various attacks, guarantees anonymity, and provides efficient password change mechanism and secure mutual authentication. In addition, we prove that 2PAKEP provides the secure mutual authentication using the broadly accepted Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic and the session key security using the formal security analysis under the widely accepted real-or-random model. Moreover, the formal security verification using the popular simulated software tool, Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications, on 2PAKEP shows that the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks are protected. In addition, we also analyze the performance and security and functionality properties of 2PAKEP and compare these with the related existing schemes. Overall, 2PAKEP provides better security and functionality features, and also the communication and computational overheads are comparable with the related schemes. Therefore, 2PAKEP is applicable to mobile environment efficiently.

A Provably Secure Anonymous Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on ECC for Wireless Sensor Networks

In wireless sensor networks, users sometimes need to retrieve real‐time data directly from the sensor nodes. Many authentication protocols are proposed to address the security and privacy aspects of this scenario. However, these protocols still have security loopholes and fail to provide strong user anonymity. In order to overcome these shortcomings, we propose an anonymous authenticated key exchange protocol based on Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC). The novel protocol provides strong user anonymity such that even the gateway node and the sensor nodes do not know the real identity of the user. The security of the proposed protocol is conducted in a well‐defined security model under the CDH assumption. Compared with other related protocols, our protocol is efficient in terms of communication and enjoys stronger security. The only disadvantage is that our protocol consumes more computation resources due to the usage of asymmetric cryptography mechanisms to realize strong anonymity. Consequently, our protocol is suitable for applications which require strong anonymity and high security in wireless sensor networks.

云计算下基于无证书的跨域认证密钥交换协议

云计算下基于无证书的跨域认证密钥交换协议

On the leakage-resilient key exchange

AbstractTypically, secure channels are constructed from an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties based on long-term public keys and establishes secret session keys. In this paper we address the partial leakage of long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol participants due to various side-channel attacks. Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange protocols have been developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret values. This paper combines and extends the advances of security modelling for AKE protocols addressing more granular partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants. Further, we fix some flaws in security proofs of previous leakage-resilient key exchange protocols.