Austrian Business Cycle Theory Research Articles

Entrepreneurial ignition of the business cycle: The corporate finance of malinvestment

This paper provides an extension of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) framework by integrating corporate capital structure, the monetary policy transmission channel, and capital budgeting analyses. In this manner, the paper presents the business cycle as being exogenously set up by central bank authorities, but endogenously set off by commercial banks and enterprises making use of central bank-distorted market signals. The cyclical boom is modeled as a gradual process where both latitudinal and longitudinal investment expansions are possible with either internal or external finance. Bank credit creation, although a necessary condition for igniting the boom, is diversely transmitted to the economy because of heterogeneity in entrepreneurial misjudgment, corporate capital structure strategies, and the class of projects available to the enterprises.

A Scientific Macroeconomic Model Derived from Fundamental Equation of Economics

The poor performance of macroeconomic models during the great recession of 2008 has forced many economists to re-examine macroeconomic theories, and search for creditable alternatives to the popular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. This paper derives a new macroeconomic model from recently published Fundamental Equation of Economics (FEOE) and applies the new model to answer a general question what causes economic crises. The macro model known as the indeterministic balance sheet plus (IBS+) model proposed in this paper for the first time turns out to be a special breed of accounting models. Different accounting models are more or less same in the way of handling empirical accounting data and flow of funds, and different in the way of forecasting the future. The IBS+ macroeconomic model takes the indeterministic view of the future balance sheets with the emphasis on probabilistic causalities, tail risks, economic reality described by balance sheet accounting, truthfully capturing the sectorial flow of funds and dynamics of economics, universally applicability, and a rock solid scientific theoretical foundation. The IBS+ model is very different from the popular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and agent-based computational economic (ACE) models. Through a side by side comparison, we prove that IBS+ model is superior to DSGE or ACE models in many ways. This paper concludes that DSGE models are probably intellectual dead ends, and economists should stop investing heavily with DSGE models and instead should replace DSGE models with IBS+ models. Economic crises have plagued humanity since the dawn of capitalism. Despite intense studies over last several hundred years, the questions about causes, forecasting, and prevention of economic crises remains unsolved. This paper proposes a classification of causes of economic crises using IBS+ models to analyze balance sheets of key economic sectors. Applying this classification to examine recent economic crises, we conclude that most economic crises are caused by mismanagement of balance sheets by key economic players. This paper suggests that economic crises are largely caused by inevitable misbehavior of humanity and not caused by any fundamental flaw of capitalism. Just like improving the individual health and personal hygiene is the key to prevent epidemic diseases in societies, the key to prevent future economic crises is to promoting financial disciplines and strengthening risk management of key players in economics. Because some economic crises can be caused by natural and man-made factors beyond the scope of economics like earthquakes and wars, the frequency of economic crises can be minimized by proper risk management practices but economic crises can never be completely eliminated. Historically, treating mismanagement of balance sheets as main causes of economic crises is a generalization of Austrian business cycle theory, Fisher’s debt deflation theory, and Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis.

The Optimal Interpretation of Austrian Business Cycle Theory

Abstract Since Hayek’s pioneering work in the 1930s, the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) has been presented as a disequilibrium theory populated by less-than-perfectly rational agents. In contrast, we maintain that (1) the Austrian business cycle theory is consistent with rational expectations and (2) the post-boom adjustment process can be understood in an equilibrium framework. Hence, we offer a new interpretation of the existing theory. In doing so, we also address concerns raised with Garrison’s (2001) diagrammatic approach, wherein the economy moves beyond the production possibilities frontier. Our interpretation might accurately be described as a monetary disequilibrium approach grounded in an implicit general equilibrium framework with positive costs of reallocation.

Single-Family Housing May Have Been a False Culprit

The dominant account of the Great Recession in the United States’ economy links the economic decline to the preceding boom in the sector of single-family housing and related financial markets. Even the existing explanations of the crisis in terms of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) have focused on this part of the U.S. economy. In this paper, we will argue that 1-4-family housing construction projects do not seem to be the right phenomenon to focus on, especially for the purposes of ABCT. Instead, we provide evidence that long-term private construction projects are prima facie a better candidate for at least a partial explanation of the boom and bust of the 2000s. We also propose a potential connection between the failure of long-term construction projects and the crisis in the subprime mortgage market.

Expansionary Monetary Policy at the Federal Reserve in the 1920s

This paper analyzes the two main divergent interpretations of Federal Reserve monetary policy in the 1920s, the expansionary view described by Rothbard (2008a [1963]) and earlier “Austrian” writers, and the contractionary view most notably held by Friedman and Schwartz (1993 [1963]) and later monetary historians. This paper argues in line with the former that the Federal Reserve engaged in expansionary monetary policy during the 1920s, as opposed to the gold sterilization view of the latter. The main rationale for this argument is that the increase in the money supply was driven by the increase in the money multiplier and total bank reserves, both of which were caused primarily by Fed policy (i.e., a decrease in reserve requirements and an increase in controlled reserves, respectively). Showing that this expansion did in fact occur provides the first step in supporting an Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) interpretation of the 1920s, namely that the Federal Reserve created a credit fueled boom that led to the Great Depression, although this is not pursued in the paper.

The Depression of 1873-79: An Austrian Perspective

This paper analyzes the period 1867-79 in American economic history from an perspective. The post-Civil War boom, the Panic of 1873, and the subsequent downturn are investigated in light of Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) and its structure of production framework. This paper shows how recent legislation allowed for monetary inflation and a boom to develop that inevitably turned into a bust. However, since the federal government pursued a policy of relative laissez faire, the economy successfully recovered. Consequently, there was no prolonged depression in the 1870s.

A Discussion of the Main Tenets of Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The aim of this paper is to critically assess Austrian Business Cycle (ABC) theory. Its foundation was laid in Theory of Money and Credit (1912) by Ludwig von Mises, which F. A. Hayek elaborated in more detail later on in his Prices and Production (1935). We argue that assumed coordination between consumers and producers, that is, the case, in which the time preference of consumers and investment plans of producers would be in unison, does not guarantee that the structure of production will be in equilibrium; even in an economy with a constant money supply, i.e. an economy with one hundred per cent reserve banking. We show there may be real factors that might prevent the structure of production from being in equilibrium even though the time preference of consumers might have been in unison, in some point in time, with investment plans of producers. Finally, we shall argue the Hayek's condition, which states that increases in the money supply have to increase at "a constantly increasing rate", does not hold if one should take into account the technological progress.

Delamination and Separation of Aluminum-Polyethylene-Paper Packing Material

The conventional version of Austrian business cycle theory focuses on a temporary imbalance between natural and monetary rates of interest. When, because of the role of monetary authorities in defining the monetary rate, the two values are in a situation of imbalance, the resulting expansion stage is followed by a recession. On the other hand, if instead the expansive phase arises without any interference by monetary authorities but through re-adaptation of the productive structure to a modified structure of temporal preferences, a period of sustainable growth begins that will not be followed by a crisis. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate, on the other hand, that because of profit-expectations and the combined action of Schumpeterian elements (imitations-speculations and the ‘creation of money’ by banks), even a so-called ‘sustainable’ boom will be affected by a liquidation and settling crisis. What distinguishes the latter situation from the conventional case of imbalance between monetary and natural rates is not the onset or otherwise of a crisis but, rather, its intensity and duration. We will define as natural an economic cycle characterised by a stage of expansion considered to be ‘sustainable’ in the Austrian theory but followed by an inevitable readjustment crisis.

The Natural Cycle: WHY Economic Fluctuations are Inevitable. A Schumpeterian Extension of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The conventional version of Austrian business cycle theory focuses on a temporary imbalance between natural and monetary rates of interest. When, because of the role of monetary authorities in defining the monetary rate, the two values are in a situation of imbalance, the resulting expansion stage is followed by a recession. On the other hand, if instead the expansive phase arises without any interference by monetary authorities but through re-adaptation of the productive structure to a modified structure of temporal preferences, a period of sustainable growth begins that will not be followed by a crisis. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate, on the other hand, that because of profit-expectations and the combined action of Schumpeterian elements (imitations-speculations and the ‘creation of money' by banks), even a so-called ‘sustainable' boom will be affected by a liquidation and settling crisis. What distinguishes the latter situation from the conventional case of imbalance between monetary and natural rates is not the onset or otherwise of a crisis but, rather, its intensity and duration. We will define as natural an economic cycle characterised by a stage of expansion considered to be ‘sustainable' in the Austrian theory but followed by an inevitable readjustment crisis.

An Empirical Analysis of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek developed a unique theory of the business cycle. In their view, an unsustainable boom ensues when the rate of interest prevailing in the market falls below the natural rate. The boom is characterized not only by an increase in aggregate production but also by a distortion of the structure of production. Similarly, the recession that follows is characterized by a decline in aggregate production as the structure of production is repaired. Hence, the Austrian account of macroeconomic fluctuation stresses the misallocation and reallocation of resources in addition to the overproduction and underproduction of more conventional business cycle theories. In a recent article, Lester and Wolff (Review of Austrian Economics 26(4):433–461, 2013) attempt to consider the empirical relevance of the Austrian view. We argue that the authors’ use of the federal funds rate as an indicator of monetary policy is inappropriate in that it fails to distinguish a low market interest rate from a market interest rate that is low relative to the natural rate. Using an estimate of the natural rate provided by Selgin et al. (2011), we attempt to improve upon their analysis.

Expectation in Austrian business cycle theory: Market share matters

One of the most important objections to the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory is the rational expectations critique. The debate between supporters and critics of the Mises-Hayek theory has not paid sufficient attention to the problem of differences in expectations and the market share in the allocation of production factors. I represent financially the effects that occur under the Austrian business cycle theory in the market of production factors as well as how economic imbalances occur when a central bank follows an expansionary policy and entrepreneurs have different expectations.

Roundaboutness Is Not a Mysterious Concept: A Financial Application to Capital Theory

We apply the EVA terminology to the concepts of roundaboutness and average period of production in capital theory. By doing this we show that these terms have a clear and well understood financial interpretation. A financial application to capital theory helps to clarify obscure and controversial economic terms. We then extend our financial interpretation of roundaboutness and average period of production to the Austrian business cycle theory and show how this approach can be used to shed light on the subprime crisis.

Merger Waves and the Austrian Business Cycle Theory

Following standard Austrian School theory, in this paper I identify merger waves as parts of Austrian type business cycles. As indicated by Mises, Rothbard and Hayek, when loan rates are reduced below their natural level through bank credit expansion this falsifies the monetary calculation of capitalist-entrepreneurs. As a result, new investments are initiated that calculation showed were not profitable before the interest rate reduction. On the other hand, the fall in interest rates falsifies households’ appraisals of their income and wealth, which turns them overly optimistic and causes them to over-consume, save less and go into debt. As a consequence of these developments the economy does not have enough resources for the completion of the new projects and businesses must increasingly withdraw the resources from other companies. I conclude that the increase in investment activity and the accompanying “resource crunch” cause a merger wave that helps prolong the boom phase of the cycle. The merger wave ends when the credit expansion is not sufficient to sustain the economic boom (which usually occurs when central banks finally let interest rates rise again and an overextended financial system tightens credit standards) and the bust phase begins. On the other hand, if the newly created fiduciary media does not enter the economy through the loan market to finance business investment, there should be no pronounced and sustained increase in merger activity followed by an economic bust.

An Empirical Examination of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis: From Market Process to Austrian Business Cycle

Abstract Minsky proposed classifying firms in three categories: (1) hedge finance units which borrow no more than they are able to service in interest and principal out of operating cash flows, (2) speculative finance units which are overleveraged to the point where they can service interest on their debt out of operating cash flows, but cannot repay the principal, and thus must continually roll over their existing debt, and (3) Ponzi finance units, whose operating cash flows are inadequate even to service interest on their debt. In Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (FIH) protracted prosperity leads endogenously to firms overleveraging themselves and transforming a market dominated by hedge finance into one dominated by speculative and Ponzi finance. Since Ponzi finance units are forced to sell off assets to service their existing interest payments, once the market is sufficiently dominated by Ponzi finance units, this creates an oversupply of assets offered for sale, and the resulting debt deflation causes a financial crisis and drastic shortage of liquidity. It appears this crisis state can be brought about by a deceptively low critical mass of Ponzi and speculative finance units. This paper uses a large 2002–2009 quarterly data set of all publicly traded North American firms and foreign firms traded on North American exchanges, a total of 8,905 stocks. Financial ratios are used to classify these firms in each quarter according to Minsky’s FIH categories. Market value is used to weight the categories, and average betas are computed as measures of volatility. Results provide dramatic support for the FIH. The FIH is then reinterpreted in terms of Austrian business cycle (ABC) theory, which depends on inflationary credit expansion to drive the unsustainable prosperity. According to Minsky’s FIH, unsustainable prosperity emerges endogenously as long periods of economic expansion make borrowers and lenders alike more willing to engage in investment activities for which they fail to see the inherent risk. It becomes clear that this process is amplified and exacerbated by credit expansion. Minsky’s FIH helps flesh out some of the missing dynamics of the malinvestment liquidation phase of ABC theory, and the two views turn out to be surprisingly complementary.

An Empirical Analysis of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek developed a unique theory of the business cycle. In their view, an unsustainable boom ensues when the rate of interest prevailing in the market falls below the natural rate. The boom is characterized not only by an increase in aggregate production but also by a distortion of the structure of production. Similarly, the recession that follows is characterized by a decline in aggregate production as the structure of production is repaired. Hence, the Austrian account of macroeconomic fluctuation stresses the misallocation and reallocation of resources in addition to the overproduction and underproduction of more conventional business cycle theories. In a recent article, Lester and Wolff (2013) attempt to consider the empirical relevance of the Austrian view. We argue that the authors’ use of the Federal Funds Rate as an indicator of monetary policy is inappropriate in that it fails to distinguish a low market interest rate from a market interest rate that is low relative to the natural rate. Using an estimate of the natural rate provided by Selgin et al. (2011), we attempt to improve upon their analysis.

Financial Foundations of Austrian Business Cycle Theory

Abstract In this paper, we study financial foundations of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT). By doing this, we (1) clarify ambiguous and controversial concepts like roundaboutness and average period of production, (2) we show that the ABCT has strong financial foundations (consistent with its microeconomic foundations), and (3) we offer examples of how to use the flexibility of this approach to apply ABCT to different contexts and scenarios.

Risk Structure of Production in Garrison's Model

In Young (2012a), an extension of Garrison’s (2001) graphical exposition of Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) is developed that models the risk structure (as well as the time structure) of production. However, in that extended exposition, there are problems of interpretation involving changes in the area of the “risk triangle.” Despite this, I believe that the arguments for extending ABCT to systematically consider distortions in productive structures beyond the degree of “roundaboutness” are compelling. In this paper, I develop an alternative extension of Garrison’s graphical exposition that incorporates a risk structure. This alternative improves upon Young’s original by (1) having a representation of risk structure that is straightforward and (2) explicitly introducing a risk dimension to the production possibilities. I apply the risk-extended Garrison’s model to the 2007-2009 U.S. recession.

Disaggregate It Further: A Brief Rejoinder to Andrew Young (2011)

Young (2011) proposes a sophisticated approach to confronting the Austrian Business Cycle Theory with evidence. However, this approach is ultimately inconsistent with the central prediction of the theory about the presence of excessively roundabout investment projects turning sour on the eve of the economic bust. The problems of this approach ultimately stem from an excessively aggregative version of the theory.

The View from Vienna: An Analysis of the Renewed Interest in the Mises-Hayek Theory of the Business Cycle

This paper analyses the renewed scholarly interest in the Mises-Hayek, or “Austrian,” theory of the business cycle since the 2008 financial crisis. Understandably, the economics profession has broadened its search for the crises’s explanation beyond the standard DSGE framework. Austrian business cycle theory, with its emphasis on the importance of the monetary system for resource allocation and the linkage of consumer demand with producer supply through the coordination of the economy’s structure of production, offers a fruitful realm for productive intellectual arbitrage in business cycle research. After reviewing the post-crisis literature that engages Austrian business cycle theory, we discuss what is being said that is correct, what is being said that is incorrect, and what is not being said that ought to be said. This last category is most important largely due to the fact that the post-crisis literature engaging Austrian business cycle theory has not addressed advances in the theory made since the days of Mises and Hayek. We also present modern work being done on Austrian business cycle theory and highlight three key areas of contemporary economics where Austrian business cycle theory has the potential to do significant work.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory in Light of the Financial Crisis: The Paradox of Prediction

This article argues that although economic science is not well equipped to make predictions, it is a myth to claim that “no one” saw the financial crisis coming – the economic events that we have experienced were possible to navigate. Section 1 surveys those who saw it coming, demonstrating that the financial crisis was visible and predictable at the time of the peak. Section 2 surveys how the Austrian theory has been treated in the mainstream media, from the period of the “great moderation” through to Summer 2010. Section 3 outlines the “stylised facts” of an Austrian-style “crack up boom” and applies it to the experience of the financial crisis. We conclude with brief commentary on some contemporary debates.