Being hospitalized is traumatic enough. No one wants anything more to go wrong certainly least of all patients. Clinicians, other hospital staff, and management also share powerful incentives to strive for the best possible outcomes of care. For health care professionals, many of whom likely entered their fields motivated by humanistic goals of reducing suffering and doing good, moral imperatives add to very practical inducements: happy patients return, recommend them to family and friends, and do not file lawsuits. Hospital managers, also wary of legal actions and regulatory investigations, wish to avoid embarrassing headlines in local newspapers and to fulfill their mission of community service. Nonetheless, these compelling and multifaceted motivations have not yet sufficed to eliminate or significantly reduce iatrogenic inpatient complications. Despite landmark studies that raised public consciousness about unacceptable levels of adverse events in the United States,1 hospital patients continue to confront threats from poor quality services. Maybe financial forces could finally induce hospitals to address this persistent risk by conducting aggressive quality improvement programs to reduce complications of inpatient care. As described in this issue of Medical Care, the underlying premise of the proposals of McNair et al involves aligning incentives structuring an inpatient hospital prospective payment system (PPS) that will financially reward hospitals and physicians for reducing in-hospital complications, thereby improving patient outcomes. Using administrative data files from the State of Victoria in Australia, McNair et al have deftly manipulated their analytic database containing more than 1 .2 million hospital discharges to produce a new scheme for assigning per case payment weights. Victoria currently sets hospital PPS payment levels using Australian-refined diagnosis related groups (AR-DRGs). After stripping off all diagnoses flagged as occurring after hospital admission and thus considered complications of care along with other diagnoses viewed as prima facie indicators of in-hospital complications (including prolonged ventilator use without a tetraplegia diagnosis), the researchers reran the AR-DRG grouper algorithm. With the newly assigned groupings, now unaffected by putative inpatient complications, they recomputed PPS payment weights using total cost figures from the 132 Victoria public acute care hospitals. These budget neutral cost weights, they assert, could support a PPS that would still compensate the total Victoria public hospital system for the costs of inpatient complications but would financially benefit individual hospitals that manage (such as through quality improvement interventions) to reduce their complication rates. Despite the theoretical attractions of this approach and the clever manipulations of the administrative database, something about the proposal leaves me uneasy. Yes, I know I have slipped into the first person, singular pronoun not the omniscient voice of the all-knowing, all-wise editorial writer. But as a serial manipulator of administrative data myself, I recognize others who indulge in this pursuit. Although McNair et al offer intriguing ideas and hopeful speculation, they provide no evidence that their approach will achieve its ultimate aim of reducing inpatient complications. Retaining the first person conceit, I therefore respond in kind, offering primarily my opinion organized around 6 brief arguments to explain my unease.
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