Australian Quarantine Research Articles

A new genus and species of Scirtothrips genus-group (Thysanoptera: Thripidae) from Kenya, intercepted by Australian quarantine

The thrips species described here has been taken repetitively in recent years by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service on fresh leaves imported from Kenya. The leaves involved are of Catha edulis (Celastraceae), a plant that is used as a mild stimulant, particularly in countries near the Horn of Africa between Kenya and the Yemen. The leaves are either chewed fresh or made into a beverage, and the plant is commonly known as “khat” or “qat”. Leaves of this plant imported into Australia have been found commonly to bear larvae and pupae, and more rarely adults, of an interesting species of Thripinae. Although clearly a member of the Scirtothrips genus-group (Masumoto & Okajima, 2007), the species represents a previously undescribed genus. The host range of this species is at present unknown, however Dr Subramanian Sevgan of ICIPE, Kenya, kindly e-mailed photomicrographs of this thrips (19 May 2009) and confirmed that the species had been collected from Catha edulis in that country. Although possibly host specific, this new species must continue to be considered a potential hazard by Australian quarantine, because so many species of Scirtothrips are highly polyphagous and pestiferous. Moreover, on the same imported leaves larvae and adults of a Scirtothrips species also have been taken several times, but this species remains unidentifiable due to the absence of any modern information on the African fauna of Scirtothrips. This article describes the new genus and species, with comparisons to related taxa. Nomenclatural details of all taxa mentioned here are given in the web-available world catalogue of Thysanoptera (Mound, 2009). The new names reflect the Kenyan origin of the specimens studied, and the contribution of Katarina Graljuk who first intercepted the species in Australia, and who with her colleagues at the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service help prevent invasive organisms from entering and harming Australian agriculture and ecosystems.

Puccinia hemerocallidis

<i>Puccinia hemerocallidis</i>

“Quarantine Matters!”: Quotidian Relationships around Quarantine in Australia's Northern Borderlands

This paper investigates practices of border formation through an analysis of Australia's quarantine processes. We use the work of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), through the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (NAQS), to interrogate the ways in which borders are made and remade in daily life. By exploring quotidian practices of quarantine we argue that borders are the sites of complex and fluid relationships that are constantly being renegotiated as multiple active agents cohabit, contest, belong, and exclude. We find that quarantine borders are constantly being (re)made by forces outside NAQS's control, including through the practices of Yolngu Indigenous land-management staff and rangers, individual local residents, and diverse non-humans. Borders are revealed as active spaces produced in multiple locations at multiple scales. They are underpinned by diverse ontologies and are always more-than-human. This challenges the overly simplified view evoked within AQIS's public awareness material and the prevailing national discourse of defence, invasion, and fear. Through attention to quotidian practices of border making, different ways of understanding borderland geographies emerge.

An innovative, flexible and workable business continuity plan: Case study of the Australian Customs Service Cargo BCP

Before being released, all cargo crossing Australian borders must be reported, riskassessed for prohibited goods and revenue matters, and cleared by the Australian Customs Service and Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service. These functions are normally handled by a sophisticated IT system — the Integrated Cargo System — and through industry IT systems provided by software developers. The business continuity plan (BCP) is designed to meet the loss of normal processes across the total cargo reporting process. This includes the partial or full loss of the Customs IT system and/or industry IT systems plus any failure of internet and communication lines. It also provides an avenue for ‘Urgent Customs Clearance’ and other ad-hoc reporting transactions. The BCP was developed following the disastrous implementation of the Integrated Cargo System in 2005 and the failure of the previous BCP, resulting in significant loss of public and government confidence in the Customs service. Since its implementation in December 2006, the new BCP has on all occasions successfully facilitated the reporting and clearance of legitimate cargo until normal services have been restored. Australian industry is very happy with the flexibility and workability of the BCP and with the additional support material available.

Assessing biosecurity risks from imported materials

Biosecurity Australia is responsible for assessing and providing policy advice on the sanitary (animal health) and phytosanitary (plant health) risks arising from imports of people, animals and plants, and other goods and materials entering Australia. Biosecurity Australia meets this responsibility by undertaking import risk analyses (IRAs) to establish policy and by conducting reviews of existing policy as necessary. If Biosecurity Australia assesses the risk of a proposed import as acceptable (with or without risk management measures), it makes a recommendation to the Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine, who makes a determination. The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) implements this policy determination, by issuing an import permit and ensuring that any recommended risk management measures are undertaken.

Proposed changes to the Australian Standard for microbiological safety in laboratories (AS/NZS 2243.3)

The Australian/New Zealand Standard for safety in microbiological laboratories and containment facilities, AS/NZS 2243.3:20021, is currently undergoing revision. This update reflects requirements for the safe handling of microorganisms in all four containment levels of laboratories and containment facilities (PC1-4); it also covers the requirements for animal, plant and invertebrate containment facilities. The committee has endeavoured to ensure harmonisation with publications by the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR) and Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) to facilitate implementation by laboratory managers and scientists.

Quarantine risks associated with solid wood packaging materials receiving ISPM 15 treatments

Summary Surveys on solid wood packaging material (SWPM) such as crates, dunnage or pallets (pieces) displaying the ISPM 15 stamp under the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures No. 15: Guidelines for Regulating Wood Packaging Material in International Trade (ISPM 15) were conducted by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) during 2005 and 2006 at various locations in Australia. These surveys were to evaluate the quarantine risks and or performance of SWPM receiving ISPM IS treatments and the proportion of untreated SWPM used in air and break-bulk cargo. About 20000 crates, dunnage or pallets (pieces) used in containerised sea cargo were inspected in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. Nine percent of SWPM surveyed exhibited something of quarantine concern; of this bark represented 8.5%, fungi 5.9% and live insects, frass and soil, 3.2%, 2.8% and 1.7% respectively — these categories not being mutually exclusive. Before the introduction of mandatory treatment requirements, a large amount of SWPM entering by less-frequented routes such as air and break-bulk cargo was not ISPM 15-compliant or did not receive any treatment. Ongoing review of the ISPM 15 standard and its existing treatments, as well as auditing regimes for treatment providers, are essential to continue to improve the standard and reduce the risk of pests using SWPM as an entry pathway.

New quarantine criteria for microbiological laboratories

The Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) has developed new systems to enhance quarantine controls and procedures for containment facilities. AQIS engaged stakeholders throughout the development process to ensure the strengthened requirements would impose a minimal burden on industry while maintaining quarantine integrity.

EHPnet: Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service

As part of the Australian government’s Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) provides a host of essential services to help ensure that humans, animal and plant products, and even postal mail going to and from the country are healthy and do not pose a threat to Australia’s unique environment. Its almost 3,000 employees inspect and certify agricultural exports, as well as oversee quarantine controls at Australia’s borders. The AQIS website at http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/ provides an overview of these activities.

Rooting Out Invasive Species: Lessons from Down Under

In a world where heightened airport security is the norm, Australia and New Zealand might seem like a parallel universe. Dogs patrol airport aisles, sniffing not for illegal drugs, but for wayward fruits and vegetables. While the luggage of outgoing passengers may be X-rayed for weapons, incoming visitors have their suitcases scanned for any kind of biological material. You can be required to surrender your shoes, not because they might contain explosives, but because you neglected to clean them off after hiking in some foreign rural area. The security in question is biosecurity—protection against incoming exotic species—and at these checkpoints, no packet of garden seed is too innocent to be seized. Both countries have powerful incentives for such stringent enforcement. Although Australia and New Zealand are highly urbanized societies, their economies feature a significant agricultural sector that is exceptionally vulnerable to the ravages of invasive species. More recently, though, many observers are adding the prospect of human health issues to the toll exacted by exotics. In fact, the gauntlet found at these countries’ international airports is just the most obvious aspect of how seriously local authorities and scientists regard the issue of biosecurity. Government policies and academic institutions regularly adopt a unique focus on the way in which plants and animals cross national boundaries, a perspective that may look downright xenophobic at first glance. Nevertheless, the experience of Australia and New Zealand can provide a valuable example to parts of the world that treat their boundaries in a more casual fashion, at least from a biological point of view. Accomplishments in these countries can offer important lessons to any country that must confront the combined impact of rising volumes of international trade and shifting climate patterns.

Risk assessment for invasive species produces net bioeconomic benefits

International commerce in live organisms presents a policy challenge for trade globalization; sales of live organisms create wealth, but some nonindigenous species cause harm. To reduce damage, some countries have implemented species screening to limit the introduction of damaging species. Adoption of new risk assessment (RA) technologies has been slowed, however, by concerns that RA accuracy remains insufficient to produce positive net economic benefits. This concern arises because only a small proportion of all introduced species escape, spread, and cause harm (i.e., become invasive), so a RA will exclude many noninvasive species (which provide a net economic benefit) for every invasive species correctly identified. Here, we develop a simple cost:benefit bioeconomic framework to quantify the net benefits from applying species prescreening. Because invasive species are rarely eradicated, and their damages must therefore be borne for long periods, we have projected the value of RA over a suitable range of policy time horizons (10-500 years). We apply the model to the Australian plant quarantine program and show that this RA program produces positive net economic benefits over the range of reasonable assumptions. Because we use low estimates of the financial damage caused by invasive species and high estimates of the value of species in the ornamental trade, our results underestimate the net benefit of the Australian plant quarantine program. In addition, because plants have relatively low rates of invasion, applying screening protocols to animals would likely demonstrate even greater benefits.

An Asian species of frog (Kaloula pulchra, Microhylidae) intercepted at Perth International Airport, Australia

A live specimen of the microhylid frog Kaloula pulchra was found by cargo handlers at Perth International Airport and handed to a Western Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service officer. The frog was found in or near an air container at the Qantas Cargo area. It is not known from which aircraft, cargo or country the frog originated. This species is not known to have been recorded in Australia, but it has been accidentally imported into New Zealand. A single live specimen was accidentally introduced in cargo containing a garden statue from Vietnam and intercepted at a wharf (Gill et al., 2001). Kaloula pulchra is distributed over a 2,283,959 km2 area from Nepal and north-eastern India through Myanmar and Thailand to southern China, Singapore, Sumatra, Borneo, and Sulawesi (Inger and Lian, 1996). It inhabits a wide range of habitats, including wetlands, riverbanks, forests and residential, agricultural and urban areas (IUCN et al., 2004). Kaloula pulchra meets many of the criteria for a vertebrate pest according to the contemporary Australian Risk Assessment model (see Bomford, 2003). Because of its close association with humans (Frost, 2004) it has already been introduced and established in Singapore, Borneo and Celebes (Inger, 1966; Lim and Lim, 1996; Iskandar, 1998). At present, the Cane Toad Bufo marinus is the only exotic amphibian known to have become established as a feral pest in Australia. The accidental importation of a live K. pulchra into Australia highlights the need for

Discovery of a Widespread Infestation of Aedes albopictus in the Torres Strait, Australia

Aedes albopictus is a container-breeding Stegomyia mosquito that has dispersed widely from its origins in Southeast Asia. Because Ae. albopictus is a known dengue vector and a potential vector of a variety of arboviruses and it can tolerate cooler climates than Aedes aegypti, Australian quarantine and health authorities have strategies to detect and eliminate it from international ports. Following the detection of 42 adult Ae. albopictus in BG-Sentinel traps set on Yorke island in the Torres Strait of Australia in April 2005, extensive surveys were conducted to determine the distribution of Ae. albopictus in the Torres Strait and adjoining Cape York Peninsula. A total of 17 islands and the northern peninsula area of Cape York Peninsula were surveyed by collection of larvae and pupae from flooded containers and human bait collections of adult mosquitoes with aspirators and sweep nets. Aedes albopictus was detected on 10 islands and comprised 100% of the day-biting container-breeding mosquitoes on Yorke and Stephens Islands. No Ae. albopictus were detected in the mainland sites on Cape York. Retrospective genetic analysis of larvae collected in April 2004 and April 2005 on Yorke Island indicated that Ae. albopictus was present in low densities in 2004 and that there were 3 genetically distinct mitochondrial haplotypes on Yorke Island in April 2005. Additionally, on Yorke Island there is evidence that Ae. albopictus is displacing Aedes scutellaris.

“In This Miserable Spot Called Quarantine”: The Healthy and Unhealthy in Nineteenth Century Australian and Pacific Quarantine Stations

By examining sources created by people who were detained or employed at the quarantine stations of Australia and the Western Pacific, this article illuminates aspects of the history of disease control that cannot be observed in other source material. Most research examining the history of maritime quarantine has tended to rely on the records of official and government agencies. As a result, discussion has largely been confined to government policy and larger issues of the political, economic, and social consequences of maritime disease control. This article contributes to the historiography by examining personal sources that show how quarantine policy and practice were experienced from the perspective of its participants. They reveal the experiences of otherwise obscured healthy detainees and illuminate agency among quarantined individuals that cannot be observed without these sources.

An evaluation of National and State policy and procedures for the prevention of the importation of weeds into Australian rangelands

Australia’s rangelands are under pressure from many sources, not the least of which is exotic plants often intentionally introduced as pasture or fodder crops. Before being intentionally introduced into Australia, a plant must pass a weed risk assessment administered by Biosecurity Australia. In addition, there are checks by Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service of shipments and international mail before it is allowed entry into Australia, restricting the unintentional and illegal introduction of plants. However, there are many ways in which plants can bypass these procedures and once inside Australia there is little to prevent these plants moving from state to state. Closing these gaps at the international borders and developing effective policies to deal with interstate movement of plants is essential to reduce the impacts of weeds on biodiversity, pastoral activities and other uses of Australian rangelands. This paper highlights these issues and provides recommendations to correct the problems.

Using national microbiological data to set meaningful performance criteria for slaughter and dressing of animals at Australian export abattoirs

Slaughter establishments in Australia that export meat to the USA are required by the controlling authority, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), to test carcases under the Escherichia coli and Salmonella monitoring (ESAM) program and to use statistical process control techniques to ensure meat is produced hygienically. However, analysing the ESAM database for E. coli using standard statistical techniques proved difficult because of inter-plant variability and because the vast majority of results were below the limits of detection. As well, it is likely that, in slaughter and dressing, higher than normal microbiological counts can often be random events, for which there is neither logical explanation nor obvious management reaction. One approach to statistical process control is to set performance criteria so that a high proportion of establishments are likely to pass, while prompting individual plants to improve the process if they cannot meet the criteria. A spreadsheet-based tool was developed in V isual B asic™ in order to interrogate the ESAM database and to identify those plants with microbiological performance significantly different from the norm. The present paper describes how performance criteria for cattle, sheep, pigs and goats and for sub-categories within a species (e.g. sheep/lambs, cows/bulls) were established.

Responsiveness and Crisis Management in Regulatory Protection and Prevention

Australian Journal of Public AdministrationVolume 64, Issue 2 p. 34-36 Responsiveness and Crisis Management in Regulatory Protection and Prevention Meryl Stanton, Meryl Stanton Executive Director, Australian Quarantine and Inspection ServiceSearch for more papers by this author Meryl Stanton, Meryl Stanton Executive Director, Australian Quarantine and Inspection ServiceSearch for more papers by this author First published: 31 May 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2005.00435.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume64, Issue2June 2005Pages 34-36 RelatedInformation

A World Apart: Geography, Australian Quarantine, and the Mother Country

In many respects the Australian colonies were what one person called "the proud offspring of a grand old mother." Yet when it came to the prevention of imported infectious disease, Britain's Australian colonies were not a chip off the old block. British opposition to the lengthy and costly imposition of quarantine had intensified throughout the nineteenth century, eventuating in the abolition of human quarantine in 1896. The Australian colonies, on the other hand, which had based their first quarantine regulations on British law and remained constantly aware of changing medical trends in the mother country, gradually expanded the breadth and capabilities of their maritime quarantine as the century progressed. Although other European powers and British colonies progressively adopted systems of medical inspection more in line with British port prophylaxis and away from quarantine, the Australian colonies invested increasing amounts of time and money into more elaborate quarantine stations and regulations. In this article I examine some of the basic features of coastal disease prevention in the Australian colonies and how they differed from British controls. Australia's distance from Britain was emphasized in the quarantine debates geographically as well as in policy. I argue that the often controversial differences in quarantine policy were for the most part a product of Australia's geographical location. The natural prophylactic of Australia's remoteness was not a reason to minimize quarantine in the colonies but rather served to increase it; whereas, it was argued that "the geographical position of England deprived it of the advantages...derived from a comprehensive quarantine system." I discuss this seeming anomaly in light of other arguments that have claimed that the close proximity of a state to the acknowledged origin of a disease was likely to increase its eagerness to quarantine.

Border screening for SARS in Australia: what has been learnt?

To assess the effectiveness of the Australian border entry screening program to detect arriving travellers with symptoms of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Descriptive study of outcomes of screening at Australian airports and seaports between 5 April 2003 and 16 June 2003. To determine the number of international travellers who were symptomatic on arrival in Australia but missed by screening, data were obtained on the number of arrivals screened and the number with symptoms (from the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service [AQIS]), as well as the number of people investigated for SARS (from the Australian SARS Case Register). There were 1.84 million arrivals into Australia during the study period, and 794 were referred for screening to AQIS staff. Of these, the findings in four travellers were consistent with the World Health Organization case definition for SARS, and they were referred by the Chief Quarantine Officers to designated hospitals for further investigation. None of these people was confirmed to have SARS. One person reported as a probable SARS case acknowledged being symptomatic on arrival, but had been missed by border screening. The low identification rate was attributed to the low prevalence of SARS, the use of exit screening by affected countries, and the subjective measures used in the screening process. With current knowledge about SARS, border screening should focus on educating incoming travellers, especially groups at high risk of transmitting the disease (the elderly and those with underlying chronic illnesses). Objective screening measures should be used during SARS outbreaks to prevent importation of the disease.

Fifteen Years of Managing Ballast Water to Minimise the Biological Threat to Australia’s Marine Environment – Past, Present and Future

Following the identification of non-indigenous toxic marine dinoflagellates in the port of Hobart in the late 1980s, ship’s ballast water has been recognised by the Australian Government and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a pollutant of major environmental consequence. As a result a variety of Voluntary and Mandatory Guidelines and Regulations have been implemented in various countries in an attempt to minimise the likelihood of the spread of harmful organisms and their effects on the environment, economy and human health. Voluntary ballast water quarantine guidelines were first introduced into Australia in 1990 by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), and in July 2001 AQIS implemented mandatory Ballast Water Management regulations that require all international vessels to manage their ballast and not discharge high-risk water in Australian ports. At the international level, IMO initiated a process to develop and implement a set of regulations and standards in a Ballas...