Auction Items Research Articles

Mechanism and Hints Behind the Anchoring Effect in Sales, Auction, and Willingness to Pay

The anchoring effect, a cognitive bias, has substantial implications in various fields, including behavioural economics. It influences individuals' assessments and choices by anchoring them to specific initial values and causing insufficient adjustments. This article explores the anchoring effect's mechanisms and its impact on B2B sales, auctions, and willingness to pay. It also offers guidance for business owners, price-setters, and auctioneers to leverage the anchoring effect to their advantage. In B2B sales, results indicate that when salespeople are informed of higher reference discounts, they tend to offer significantly higher discounts to new customers, which leads to conservatism and cause a systematic distortion in various economic contexts. This demonstrates the positive impact of reference discounts on pricing decisions, driven by a tendency to avoid risk. Auction item sequences influencing bidding outcomes. Auctions featuring more valuable items first yield higher revenues, as buyers anchor their expectations to the initial prices. Sellers can strategically position items to maximize profits, particularly when the initial auction prices are set lower than market expectations. Studies also reveal that Lower anchoring prices may decrease willingness to pay (WTP) while higher initial reference points can lead to higher WTP. Additionally, the use of "up to" in advertising discounts can positively affect WTP due to an asymmetry effect.

Deep reinforcement learning models in auction item price prediction: an optimisation study of a cross-interval quotation strategy.

In the contemporary digitalization landscape and technological advancement, the auction industry undergoes a metamorphosis, assuming a pivotal role as a transactional paradigm. Functioning as a mechanism for pricing commodities or services, the procedural intricacies and efficiency of auctions directly influence market dynamics and participant engagement. Harnessing the advancing capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, the auction sector proactively integrates AI methodologies to augment efficacy and enrich user interactions. This study delves into the intricacies of the price prediction challenge within the auction domain, introducing a sophisticated RL-GRU framework for price interval analysis. The framework commences by adeptly conducting quantitative feature extraction of commodities through GRU, subsequently orchestrating dynamic interactions within the model's environment via reinforcement learning techniques. Ultimately, it accomplishes the task of interval division and recognition of auction commodity prices through a discerning classification module. Demonstrating precision exceeding 90% across publicly available and internally curated datasets within five intervals and exhibiting superior performance within eight intervals, this framework contributes valuable technical insights for future endeavours in auction price interval prediction challenges.

Juridical Review of the Auction of Collateral Items Due to Default

Based on the research results, it can be concluded that collateral objects that are not bound by mortgage rights can basically still be used as collateral in a loan agreement or credit guarantee. However, in practice, if there is a default, the execution of the collateral object is difficult because it has to go through litigation or a court suit which takes a long process and harms the creditor in the end. So that the collateral object should be tied to the guarantee institution to provide strong executorial confiscation powers. Likewise with acts of default committed in this case carried out by creditors who are late in fulfilling their obligations to pay debts as agreed. However, in this case the District Court which decided the case exceeded the limits of its authority.

Analysis of the Implementation of the Auction Policy for the Execution of Tax Confiscated Goods at the Bekasi City State Property and Auction Services Office

The Tax Execution Auction is an auction conducted by the DGT to carry out the execution of confiscated property of a Taxpayer, the property auctioned and the proceeds become a supporting sector for state financial revenues. This study aimed to identify and analyze the implementation of the Tax Execution Auction policy. This study used the Van Meter and Van Horn theory to explore the results of the study. This study applied a descriptive qualitative method, where researchers collect data through interviews, documentation, and observation. The research location was at the service office of state property and auction Bekasi. The results of this research stated that the implementation of the Tax Execution Auction policy can be said to have not been carried out properly because there are still many obstacles. The obstacles that hinder the implementation of the policy, i.e., the absence of documents or incomplete documents from confiscated auction items and resistance from asset owners and lack of information for the public.

Multi-agent planning and coordination for automated aircraft ground handling

Inspired by the vision of fully autonomous airside operations at Schiphol airport, this study aims to contribute to the short-term goal of automated aircraft ground handling. In this research, we design and evaluate a multi-agent system for planning of automated ground handling. There are two main components in the system: task allocation optimization and multi-agent path planning. To allocate tasks to ground support equipment (GSE) vehicles, an auction mechanism inspired by temporal sequential single item (TeSSI) auction is proposed. Ground handling tasks scheduling for GSE vehicles is modeled as several single-vehicle pickup and delivery optimization problems (SPDP), and the values of the objective functions are used to generate bids for GSE vehicle agents in the auction. Prioritized safe interval path planning for large agents (LA-SIPP) is used to plan collision-free paths for GSE vehicle agents in the model to execute tasks. The aim is to increase the success rates of allocating tasks and finding collision free paths without causing flight delays, given the limited resources such as a small number of available GSE vehicles, time windows constraints and conflicting interests of different agents. Due to the results, even for the instances with frequent flights and the most limited resources, the success rates of allocation and path planning were higher than 81% and 98%, respectively. Furthermore, periodic task allocation and path planning of the ground handling tasks for flights in three aircraft stands during a planning time window of the day, as well as replanning in case of disruptions were performed in a short CPU time. There is a lack of research dealing with the complete process of ground handling, since existing studies concerning the automation of ground handling operations involve fleet assignment or task scheduling models without an integration of detailed path planning. Our main contribution is to present a framework that combines task allocation and path planning for automation of ground handling operations and provides solutions using a multi-agent perspective.

Analisis Yuridis Dampak Pasca Pandemi Covid-19 Terhadap Lelang Eksekusi Hak Tanggungan Dari Perbankan Pada KPKNL Medan

The purpose of this writing is to analyze the auction mechanism for executing mortgages from banks, the role of the KPKNL in carrying out the execution of mortgages and the obstacles faced by the KPKNL in carrying out the auction. The research method used is normative juridical. The research data comes from secondary data which comes from primary legal materials, secondary legal materials and tertiary legal materials which are then analyzed qualitatively. The results of the first study, that the execution auction of mortgage rights is carried out by creditors by submitting an application for execution of mortgage rights to the head of the local District Court where the collateral object is located. If the Debtor does not fulfill his obligations for a maximum of 8 (eight) days both for repayment and discharge or if he is summoned properly, cannot appear, then the chairman of the court by his position gives an order by letter, to confiscate the object of collateral right to be sold through auction general for payment. Second, the role of the KPKNL, as a government agency in executing the Mortgage Auction, as a supervisor so that auction items are not misused, as a selection agency for Mortgage auction participants, as a guard for the stability of Mortgage auction implementation, as an intermediary between buyers and sellers of auctioned goods. Third, in the implementation of the auction, some of the obstacles faced by the State Property and Auction Service Office are internal constraints and external constraints.

Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding

The literature on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of simple auctions employs a no-overbidding assumption but has completely overlooked the no-underbidding phenomenon, which is evident in empirical studies on variants of the second price auction. In this work, we provide a theoretical foundation for the no-underbidding phenomenon. We study the PoA of simultaneous 2nd price auctions (S2PA) under a new natural condition of no underbidding, meaning that agents never bid on items less than their marginal values. We establish improved (mostly tight) bounds on the PoA of S2PA under no-underbidding for different valuation classes, in both full-information and incomplete information settings. Specifically, we show that the PoA is at least 1/2 for general monotone valuations, which extends to Bayesian PoA with arbitrary correlated distributions. We also establish a tight PoA bound of 2/3 for S2PA with XOS valuations, under no-overbidding and no-underbidding, which extends to Bayesian PoA with independent distributions.

The Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Forecasting of Auction Data: Empirical Evidence from eBay

Problem definition: Dynamic forecasting models in auctions have fallen short on two dimensions: (i) the lack of an equilibrium model for final bids and (ii) the lack of a winner’s curse (i.e., a tendency to overpay conditional on winning the auction) adjustment to allow bidders to account for a common value component in the auction item. In this paper, we develop a methodology to accurately predict equilibrium stage bids from the initial bidding dynamics and quantify the impact of the winner’s curse. This methodology allows us to conduct policy simulations to optimize auction design parameters. Methodology/Results: Dynamic auctions typically have a stage of high exploratory activity, followed by an inactivity period, and then an equilibrium stage of last-minute bids with sharp jumps. With a Kalman filter approach, we use exploratory stage bids to predict an auction item’s valuation distribution. We feed this prediction into an equilibrium model and apply item-specific adjustments for winner’s curse, bidder heterogeneity, and inactivity period. We use the resulting equilibrium model to predict the equilibrium stage bids. Our methodology improves the forecast of equilibrium stage bids by 11.33%, on average, compared with a state-of-the-art benchmark. This improvement is even higher (18.99%) for common value auctions. We also find that (i) significantly more (respectively, fewer) bidders internalize the winner’s curse in common value (respectively, private value) auctions; (ii) bidders in common value auctions decrease their bids by 6.03% because of the winner’s curse; and (iii) the inactivity period has a lesser impact on the equilibrium stage bids in private value auctions. Managerial implications: Our proposed methodology is intended to facilitate the need in academia and practice for real-time bid predictions that encompass different levels of the common value component in auctions. Using our methodology, auction platforms can support their choice of minimum bid increment policies and decide how to allocate resources across different auctions to mitigate the adverse effects of the winner’s curse. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1165 .

An Improved Intelligent Auction Mechanism for Emergency Material Delivery

Emergency material delivery is vital to disaster emergency rescue. Herein, the framework of the emergency material delivery system (EMDS) with the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as the vehicle is proposed, and the problem is modeled into a multi-trip time-dependent dynamic vehicle routing problem with split-delivery (MTTDDVRP-SD) in combination with the rescue reality, which provides decision support for planning disaster relief material. Due to the universality of dynamic interference in the process of material delivery, an optimization algorithm based on the traditional intelligent auction mechanism is proposed to avoid system performance degradation or even collapse. The algorithm adds pre-authorization and sequential auction mechanisms to the traditional auction mechanism, where the pre-authorization mechanism improves the capability performance of the system when there is no interference during the rescue process and the sequential auction mechanism improves the resilience performance of the system when it faces interferences. Finally, considering three types of interference comprehensively, which includes new task generations, task unexpected changes and UAV’s number decreases, the proposed algorithm is compared with DTAP (DTA based on sequential single item auctions) and CBBA-PR (consensus-based bundle algorithms-partial replanning) algorithms under different dynamic interference intensity scenarios for simulation experimental from two perspectives of the capability performance and resilience performance. The results of Friedman’s test with 99% confidence interval indicate that the proposed algorithm can effectively improve the capability performance and resilience performance of EMDS.

Bid outcome processing in Vickrey auctions: An ERP study.

Online retailers often sell products using a socially competitive second-price sealed-bid auction known as a Vickrey auction (VA), an incentivized demand-revealing mechanism used to elicit players' subjective values. The VA presents a situation of risky decision-making, which typically implements value processing and a loss aversion mechanism. Neural outcome processing of VA bids are not known; this study explores this for the first time using EEG. Twenty-eight healthy participants bid on household items against an anonymous, computerized opponent. Bid outcome event-related potentials were predicted to differentiate between three conditions: outbid (no-win), large margin win (bargain), and small margin win (snatch). Individual loss aversion values were evaluated in a separate behavioral experiment offering gains or losses of variable amounts but equal chances against an assured gain. Processing outcomes of VA bids were associated with a feedback-related negativity (FRN) potential with a spatial maximum at the vertex (251-271 ms), where bargain win trials resulted in greater FRN amplitudes than snatch win trials. Additionally, a P300 potential was sensitive to win versus no-win outcomes and to retail price. Individual loss aversion level did not correlate with the strength of FRN or P300. Results show that outcome processing in a VA is associated with FRN that differentiates between relatively advantageous and less advantageous gains, and a P300 that distinguishes between the more and less expensive auction items. Our findings pave the way to an objective exploration of economic decision-making and purchasing behavior involving a widely popular auction.

Acquire Auction Items With Intrinsic Value

Acquire Auction Items With Intrinsic Value

Implementasi Hukum Terhadap Pembatalan Lelang Eksekusi Hak Tanggungan

The purpose of this research is to assess how the implementation of the cancellation of the auction of the execution of dependent rights on a piece of land in Sukadamai Village of Natar District of South Lampung Regency based on Decision Number: 39/ Pdt.Bth / 2019 / PN. Kla? and what are the factors inhibiting the implementation of the cancellation of the auction of the execution of dependent rights on a piece of land in Sukadamai Village of Natar District of South Lampung Regency based on Decision Number: 39/Pdt.Bth/2019/Pn.Kla.? Research methods use normative and empirical juridical approaches. The types of data used are secondary data and primary data. Data collection through library research and field research. The data analysis used is qualitative juridical. The results of the study showed that the auction can be canceled if the auction process is not in accordance with the correct procedure, this can only be canceled by a court ruling with permanent legal force (provisional). The provisions are in accordance with the sound in Article 24 of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 106 / PMK.06 / 2013. The legal consequences arising against the auction object is the return of the auction object to its original status, namely as a guarantee object held by the holder of the Dependent Rights certificate. The right of the winner of the auction to the auction item that has been won by him will be lost and the item will return to its original status to the auction seller.

Bundling Decisions for Selling Multiple Items in Online Auctions

Fueled by the widespread use of the internet, more and more ordinary people have now become merchandise sellers who sell their own possessions, such as antique collections and limited souvenirs, to buyers who are interested in such goods via online auctions. This study examines the decision making related to the bidding strategies used in online auctions by both sellers and buyers. When selling goods for which there is a limited supply, sellers consider whether to sell the single homogenous items in multiple, simultaneous auctions or all the items in a single auction. Moreover, when selling heterogeneous but associated goods, sellers may decide to bundle the items for sale or not with an aim of increasing the potential buyers’ willingness to make a purchase. We investigate the effects that various factors related to the bidding strategies used in online auctions, such as the base price and duration of the auction determined by the seller and the bidding price decided by the buyer, have on the seller’s profit, and the utilities of both parties are considered to derive the equilibrium solutions. This study contributes to the literature by proposing an online auction framework that focuses more on individual sellers selling a limited quantity of items with an aim to establish a favorable online auction for both sellers and buyers and earn more profits for sellers. The results show that the base prices and direct purchase prices should be unestablished to achieve the most attractive characteristics of online auctions, which would encourage more buyers to freely place bids. As a result, the bidding items would have more chances to be eventually obtained by the buyer who places the highest bid, which, thus, maximizes the seller’s profit.

A Study on the Factors Forming Real Estate Value of Auction Items in Logistics Warehouse - Focused on Gyeonggi Area -

A Study on the Factors Forming Real Estate Value of Auction Items in Logistics Warehouse - Focused on Gyeonggi Area -

Improve the Way You Market Auction Items

Special Events GaloreVolume 21, Issue 10 p. 6-6 Special Event Auctions Improve the Way You Market Auction Items First published: 06 September 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/speg.31654Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume21, Issue10October 2021Pages 6-6 RelatedInformation

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values

We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model of interdependent values (IDV). It is well-known that in multi-item settings with private values, correlated values can lead to bad PoA, which can be polynomially large in the number of agents~n. In the more general model of IDV, we show that the PoA can be polynomially large even in single-item settings. On the positive side, we identify a natural condition on information dispersion in the market, which enables good PoA guarantees. Under this condition, we show that for single-item settings, the PoA of standard mechanisms degrades gracefully. For settings with multiple items we show a separation between two domains: If there are more buyers, we devise a new simultaneous item auction with good PoA, under limited information asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first positive PoA result for correlated values in multi-item settings. The main technical difficulty in establishing this result is that the standard tool for establishing PoA results --- the smoothness framework --- is unsuitable for IDV settings, and so we must introduce new techniques to address the unique challenges imposed by such settings. In the domain of more items, we establish impossibility results even for surprisingly simple scenarios.

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding

We study the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous 2nd price auctions (S2PA) under a new natural condition of no underbidding, meaning that agents never bid on items less than their marginal values. We establish improved (mostly tight) bounds on the PoA of S2PA under no underbidding for different valuation classes (including unit demand, submodular, XOS, subadditive, and general monotone valuations), in both full information and incomplete information settings. To derive our results, we introduce a new parameterized property of auctions, termed (gamma,delta) revenue guaranteed, which implies a PoA of at least gamma/(1+delta). Via extension theorems, this guarantee extends to coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in full information settings, and to Bayesian PoA (BPoA) in settings with incomplete information and arbitrary (correlated) distributions. We then show that S2PA are (1,1) revenue guaranteed with respect to bids satisfying no underbidding. This implies a PoA of at least 1/2 for general monotone valuation, which extends to BPOA with arbitrary correlated distributions. Moreover, we show that (lambda,mu) smoothness combined with (gamma,delta) revenue guaranteed guarantees a PoA of at least (gamma+lambda)/(1+delta+mu). This implies a host of results, such as a tight PoA of 2/3 for S2PA with submodular (or XOS) valuations, under no overbidding and no underbidding. Beyond establishing improved bounds for S2PA, the no underbidding assumption sheds new light on the performance of S2PA relative to simultaneous 1st price auctions.

How to Market Your Auction Items

Special Events GaloreVolume 21, Issue 4 p. 8-8 Fundraising Auctions How to Market Your Auction Items First published: 05 March 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/speg.31561Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume21, Issue4April 2021Pages 8-8 RelatedInformation

A Transaction Trade‐Off Utility Function Approach for Predicting the End‐Price of Online Auctions in IoT

To stimulate large‐scale users to participate in the big data construction of IoT (internet of things), auction mechanisms based on game theory are used to select participants and calculate the corresponding reward in the process of crowdsensing data collection from IoT. In online auctions, bidders bid many times and increase their bid price. All the bidders want to maximize their utility in auctions. An effective incentive mechanism can maximize social welfare in online auctions. It is complicated for auction platforms to calculate social welfare and the utility of each bidder’s bidding items in online auctions. In this paper, a transaction trade‐off utility incentive mechanism is introduced. Based on the transaction trade‐off utility incentive mechanism, it can make the forecasting process consistent with bidding behaviors. Furthermore, an end‐price dynamic forecasting agent is proposed for predicting end prices of online auctions. The agent develops a novel trade‐off methodology for classifying online auctions by using the transaction trade‐off utility function to measure the distance of auction items in KNN. Then, it predicts the end prices of online auctions by regression. The experimental results demonstrate that an online auction process considering the transaction utility is more consistent with the behaviors of bidders, and the proposed prediction algorithm can obtain higher prediction accuracy.

The Winner's Curse in Dynamic Forecasting of Auction Data: Empirical Evidence from eBay

Problem definition: Dynamic forecasting models in auctions have fallen short on two dimensions: (i) the lack of an equilibrium model for final stage bids and (ii) the lack of a winner's curse (i.e., a tendency to overpay conditional on winning the auction) adjustment to allow bidders to account for a common value component in the auction item. In this paper, we develop a methodology to accurately predict final stage bids from the initial bidding dynamics and quantify the impact of the winner's curse. This methodology allows us to conduct policy simulations to optimize auction design parameters. Methodology: Dynamic auctions typically have a stage of high exploratory activity, followed by an inactivity period, and then a final stage of last-minute bids with sharp jumps. With a Kalman filter approach, we use exploratory stage bids to predict an auction item's valuation distribution. We feed this prediction into an equilibrium model and apply item-specific adjustments for winner's curse, bidder heterogeneity, and inactivity period. We use the resulting equilibrium model to predict the final stage bids. Results: Our methodology improves the forecast of final stage bids by 15.84%, on average, compared to a state-of-the-art benchmark. This improvement is even higher (22.44%) for common value auctions. We also find that: (i) significantly more (resp., fewer) bidders internalize the winner's curse in common value (resp., private value) auctions, (ii) bidders in common value (resp., private value) auctions decrease their bids by 6.69% (resp., 3.51%) due to the winner's curse, and (iii) the inactivity period has a lesser impact on the final stage bids in private value auctions. Managerial Implications: Our proposed methodology is intended to facilitate the need in academia and practice for real-time bid predictions that encompass different levels of the common value component in auctions. Using our methodology, auction platforms can support their choice of minimum bid increment policies and decide how to allocate resources across different auctions to mitigate the adverse effects of the winner's curse.