Lawyer-client Relationship Research Articles

Estate Planning Malpractice: Is Strict Privity Here to Stay?

Under Maryland case law, a plaintiff in an estate planning malpractice action must be in strict privity with the attorney who drafted the will. To date, Maryland has not extended the third-party beneficiary exception to the estate planning arena.Legatees specifically identified in a will by name or class are generally precluded from bringing a cause of action against the attorney for the attorney's alleged negligence, because in Maryland in order to recover for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must:show: (1) the attorney's employment; (2) his neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) loss to the client proximately caused by that neglect of duty. See Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730,739 (citing Flanherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116,128 (1985); see also Bradley Fogel, Attorney v. Client - Privity, Malpractice, and the Lack of Respect for the Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 261,267 (2001).Maryland is in the minority of states that still adhere to the strict privity rule in the context of estate planning. Most other jurisdictions have relaxed the privity barrier in order to allow a legitimately aggrieved beneficiary to have a means of recourse against an attorney who planned the distribution of the decedent's estate in a negligent manner. Other jurisdictions following strict privity, have carved out the third-party beneficiary exception in the estate-planning context-where the attorney's negligence was facially demonstrated on the will itself. See Hamilton v. Needham, 519 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1988).

Corporate lawyer–client relationships: bankers, lawyers, clients and enduring connections

ABSTRACTFormal representations of lawyer–client relations are often characterised by their regulative aspects, including codes of ethics and practice. In this article I look inside the relationship by returning to the sociology of Georg Simmel, who closely examined the basic units of sociality, especially dyads and triads. Using examples drawn from empirical research on corporate lawyers and clients and banks, I open up the lawyer/client dyad and show that in most cases the practices of lawyers and banks add noise and interference to the relationship. The reason is that in many situations the basic unit of analysis for lawyer–client relationships should be the triad rather than the dyad. Whereas dyads are fundamentally stable, triads are the reverse, as they allow for alliances and defections creating permanent uncertainty. I take a number of examples where clients suffered in the alliances formed between their lawyers and the banks, leaving them on the periphery. It is time to recast the lawyer–client relationship as one fraught with ambiguity and instability, which raises questions about the nature of professionalism.

The Long Good-Bye: After the Innocence Movement, Does the Attorney-Client Relationship Ever End?

The Long Good-Bye: After the Innocence Movement, Does the Attorney-Client Relationship Ever End?

The lawyer as fiduciary: Defining private law duties in public law relations

No one doubts that lawyers have fiduciary duties. Yet the justification for and scope of those duties is surprisingly unclear. Case law grounds fiduciary duties in the fiduciary’s exercise of discretionary authority. But discretionary authority is only an occasional – and sometimes ethically problematic – aspect of the lawyer’s role, not its defining feature. Further, case law has been neither clear nor consistent in defining the specific obligations that attach to the lawyer’s duty of fiduciary loyalty. Academic literature on fiduciary duties provides only a partial and somewhat unsatisfactory explanation for the lawyer’s fiduciary status when viewed in light of the normative foundations of the lawyer’s role and case law. Academic literature on the lawyer’s role is, however, also unsatisfactory insofar as, while it explains the lawyer’s duty of loyalty, it does not provide any means for analysing how breaches of that duty ought to be categorized in private law. The article attempts to reduce the confusion over the meaning and extent of the lawyer’s fiduciary obligations. It argues that the content of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties should be informed by the normative structure of fiduciary obligations and by the normative structure of the lawyer–client relationship. The lawyer–client relationship operates at the intersection of private obligation and public duty, and the scope and force of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties reflect that intersection. When understood in this way, the principle underlying the lawyer’s fiduciary status continues to emphasize discretion. It focuses, however, not on the lawyer’s exercise of discretion but rather on the lawyer’s provision of the advice and advocacy necessary for the client’s exercise of discretion. Analysed in light of these founding principles, lawyers ought to be held liable for fiduciary breach in three circumstances: (1) where they violate obligations to clients as a consequence of a conflict of interest or duty; (2) where they undercut the very nature of the representation they undertook to provide; and (3) where, through failing to provide information or providing the client with misinformation, they undermine the client’s ability to make decisions.

Healer, Witness, or Double Agent? Reexamining the Ethics of Forensic Psychiatry

In recent years, psychiatrists have become ever more prevalent in American courtrooms. Consequently, the issue of when the usual rules of medical ethics should apply to forensic psychiatric encounters has taken on increased importance and is a continuing topic of discussion among both legal and medical scholars. A number of approaches to the problem of forensic psychiatric ethics have been proposed, but none adequately addresses the issues that arise when a forensic encounter develops therapeutic characteristics. This article looks to the rules governing the lawyer-client relationship as a model for a new approach to forensic psychiatric ethics. This new model focuses on the expectations of the evaluee and the ways in which the evaluating psychiatrist shapes those expectations to determine how and when the rules of medical ethics should apply to forensic psychiatric encounters. This article describes and analyzes three previously proposed approaches to that question and the closely related question of when and how a doctor-patient relationship can form in the context of a forensic psychiatric evaluation. It also explains why each of these prior approaches does not sufficiently address the issues that arise when a forensic encounter takes on therapeutic characteristics. Finally, it proposes a new approach that draws inspiration from the rules governing the lawyer-client relationship.

The Child Protection Clinic: A mixed method evaluation of parent legal representation

Providing parents with low incomes accused of child maltreatment access to quality legal representation is both a social justice issue and potential resource for improving their children's well-being. This mixed methods research evaluates a law school clinic which provides indigent parents with legal representation by law students supervised by experienced attorneys. Thirty-nine individuals knowledgeable about the clinic (12 court professionals, 5 law school faculty, 2 parent mentors, 11 students, and 9 parent clients) participated in in-depth, semi-structured, audiotaped interviews focusing on the quality of parent representation. Interviews were contextualized by extensive participant observation and document reviews. Quantitative analyses of administrative data focused on case outcomes identified by participants as desired during qualitative interviews: family reunification, timely case closure and children's placement with relatives. Outcomes for 19 children whose parents were represented by student attorneys did not differ significantly from those of a propensity score matched comparison group of 19 children whose parents were represented by fully licensed attorneys. Participants described clinic staff as providing strong legal counsel to parents, building positive attorney–client relationships, possessing positive personal characteristics, and providing a needed service to the broader community. Participants also identified areas for improvement including: educating parents around court procedures, and better cross system collaboration between child welfare and legal professionals. The Child Protection Clinic is a promising model for providing quality legal representation to parents involved with child protection in order to support child well-being.

Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process

Despite all of the controversial scholarship that has been published in recent years concerning the modern class action, it is both puzzling and disappointing how little of it has sought to grasp the deep structural precepts underlying the device. All too often, the scholarly debate, not to mention the political debate, has broken down along ideological lines: the political left has reflexively favored the device and the political right has reflexively opposed it. However, virtually all of even the serious scholarly work done on the subject has, for the most part, been superficial, failing to pursue, much less to grasp, the practice’s underlying foundational purposes. The purpose of this Article is to seek to understand those foundational purposes. The Article argues that the DNA of the modern class action fundamentally differs from that of the traditional one-on-one litigation process. The relationship between class attorney and class member, for example, is significantly different from the normal relationship between attorney and client. Recognition of these foundational differences should force us to recognize that the attorney-client relationship in the class action context is more like a guardian-ward relationship than a traditional relationship between client and attorney. This insight does not necessarily mean that the class action is inherently improper. Indeed, in some ways recognition of the guardian model of the modern class action underscores the procedure’s value. But it also underscores the need to recognize the inherently capitalistic nature of that guardian relationship. Where profit incentives for the attorney are in accord with the interests of the class members, the practice should work well. However, all too often, modern class action procedure is plagued by externalities and perverse economic incentives, allowing class attorneys to profit even when class members will benefit virtually not at all. The goal of class action doctrine and rulemaking, then, should be to remove those economic perversions to insure that the capitalistic nature of the process functions effectively.

Clinical Legal Education: Bridging the gap between study and legal practice

<p>For a law student, the academic study of the law and the actual practice of its principles seem worlds apart. With our desk piled high with books, case reports and legislation, the opportunity to experience and reflect upon the human interaction that underpins legal practice is notably lacking. While good lawyer client relationships are vital to successful legal practice, at present, a law student can obtain their law degree without ever interviewing a client or managing a case file. It was with this paradox in mind that during 2000 we embraced the opportunity to be a part of a clinical legal education program run by La Trobe University’s School of Law and Legal Studies.</p>

Advising Students or Practicing Law: The Formation of Implied Attorney‐Client Relationships with Students

Journal of Legal Studies EducationVolume 31, Issue 2 p. 207-232 Article Advising Students or Practicing Law: The Formation of Implied Attorney-Client Relationships with Students Patricia M. Sheridan, Patricia M. Sheridan Assistant Professor of Business Law, Manhattan College, Riverdale, New York.Search for more papers by this author Patricia M. Sheridan, Patricia M. Sheridan Assistant Professor of Business Law, Manhattan College, Riverdale, New York.Search for more papers by this author First published: 23 July 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/jlse.12014 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume31, Issue2Summer 2014Pages 207-232 RelatedInformation

“He did everything he possibly could for me”: medical malpractice claimants’ experiences of lawyer–client relations

Lawyers are obliged to act in the interests of their clients, however, it is not clear how lawyers should do this in practice. Should lawyers follow their clients' instructions without deviation, should they actively manage their clients' expectations, or as many studies suggest, do lawyers place their own interests first? This paper examines how lawyers interact with medical malpractice claimants. It reveals that lawyers take a client-aligned approach, where lawyers acknowledge their client's goals, but do not necessarily do what the client says. We argue that this approach is made necessary by legal and organisational constraints which limit the ability of lawyers to produce the types of outcomes that their clients want.

Lawyers as lawmakers, privilege, and agency

Class action lawyers do not merely represent clients, they also make law, an observation explored by Kobayashi and Ribstein in “Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers.” Kobayashi and Ribstein observe that a class action lawyer's inability to internalize all the benefits of her innovation may lead to underinvestment in lawmaking, which they describe as a public good. But privileged groups may produce public goods, and where production of the good also enhances the probability that a supplier of the good will be compensated for her production, as may be the case in the selection of counsel in class action suits, there can even be overproduction. Under some circumstances, such overproduction is possible even where production is facilitated by freeriding. Moreover, if there is underinvestment in class action lawmaking, a more general, and potentially greater, cause is inherent in the lawyer–client relationship, namely that the lawyer bears the full cost of litigation but must share the benefits, if any, with the client.

Corporate lawyers and their clients: walking the line between law and business

This paper examines the complex and subtle world of lawyer–client relationships. Taking corporate lawyers as our case study, we provide an examination of the strategies and tactics that lawyers use in dealing with their clients. Rather than adopting the binary distinction between professionalism and commercialism on which much past research has been based, we here take a more pragmatic approach. Informed by recent work on relational regulation by Silbey, we embrace a broader framework that incorporates lawyers' relations, organizational contexts and professional proscriptions. Based on analyses of interviews with 106 corporate lawyers working in large law firms, we demonstrate that there is a heterogeneous set of practices that characterizes corporate lawyers' relationships with clients. We observe four ideal types that run along two axes: the extent to which lawyers reference law versus experience to explain their behavior or decisions; and the extent to which lawyers frame their role in terms of individual action or as part of a collectivity. We argue that identifying ideal types allows us to open up the scope of understanding the ways in which lawyers interact with their clients.

Making the Client's Peace: “Privatizing” Peace? Global Law Firms Offering Pro Bono Services in Post-Conflict Settings

Lawyers of global law firms have begun to take on complex pro bono representations for clients in peace and constitution-building settings. These lawyers, who often cooperate across different offices of a global law firm, are not acting based on an external mandate but pursuant to an attorney-client relationship. The client is the source of authority and the owner of the process; yet, global law firms that serve pro bono clients are also a form of profit-making transnational corporation. In their day-today business they represent the interests of paying clients. This article will discuss whether and how such constellations can lead to power, infrastructure, and knowledge asymmetries between law firms and their often weak pro bono clients in post-conflict settings. Accordingly, it raises and discusses the following questions: Are the legal profession’s domestic codes of conduct strong enough to guarantee good professional conduct by global law firms when providing pro bono services in post-conflict settings with weak or temporarily absent local legal profession institutions? Is it desirable to create a transnational code of conduct for lawyers, law firms, and other institutions for providing pro bono legal services in such fragile peace and constitution building settings? By addressing these questions, this article also approaches pro bono services of global law firms as an example of how interests of the private sphere of lawyer-client relations and the public sphere of peace and constitution building merge, and how the legal profession’s codes of conduct regulate global law firms and their legal professionals’ conduct as global agents of “privatized” peace and constitution building efforts.

Bride and Prejudice: How U.S. Immigration Law Discriminates Against Spousal Visa Holders

Bride and Prejudice: How U.S. Immigration Law Discriminates Against Spousal Visa Holders

"He Got in My Face So I Shot Him": How Defendants' Language Impairments Impair Attorney-Client Relationships

† Clinical Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; Director, Public Defender Project; Faculty, National Criminal Defense College, Macon, Georgia. J.D., George Washington University. Valuable input, advice, and technical assistance were generously provided by: Professor Allison Christians, McGill University Faculty of Law; Professor Pamela Snow, School of Psychology and Psychiatry, Monash University (Aus.); Joseph Beitchman, M.D., Professor of Child Psychiatry, University of Toronto; Sally Miles, Ph.D., CCC-SLP, Madison, Wisconsin; Rachel Fregien, CCC-SLP, Mendota Mental Health Institute, Madison, Wisconsin; Arthur Gosselin, Special Education Teacher, Milwaukee Public Schools; the participants at the University of Wisconsin Law School Clinical Faculty Workshop; and Meredith Ross, Clinical Professor Emerita, University of Wisconsin Law School. Research assistance was provided by Erin Vermillion, Sara Jordan, and Kaitlin Lamb. Last, but certainly not least, are the eleven practicing lawyers we call Attorneys A to K who made time to talk with us, and provided remarkable insights and commentary. †† Director/CEO, Mendota Mental Health Institute, Madison, Wis.; Director, Mendota Juvenile Treatment Center, Madison, Wis. Ph.D. (Psychology), University of Wisconsin Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School. Adjunct Professor of Law, Adjunct Professor of Psychology, University of Wisconsin.

Effective Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: The Ethics and Skills of Advocacy

Lawyers, who represent children in abuse and neglect proceedings, face ambiguities in the role they are to assume and the manner in which they must confront ethical issues that arise during the course of representation. Lawyers often represent children as guardians ad litem and make recommendations to the court about the children’s best interests, without necessarily giving weight to the children’s opinions. In doing so, lawyers tend to bypass the ethical and professional rules that govern the lawyer-client relationship and are unable to effectively advocate for the child client’s legal rights. Preconceptions about children’s lack of capacity have led to a paternalistic approach to the representation of children. Our legal system assumes that children, in general, are incapable of rational decision-making. The common presumption is that children do not know what is in their best interests and that they often desire outcomes that conflict with what would be in their best interests. This may be true under some circumstances, but not all. In many cases, if not the majority, children can communicate with their lawyers, understand their options, and assist their advocates. In addition, when lawyers function in their traditional roles as advocates, they can assist the child clients in the comprehension of factual and legal issues involved in their cases and thereby facilitate the decision-making process. Children involved in the court system need true legal advocacy in the form of the traditional lawyer-client model. Lawyers who take on the advocate role must operate within the ethical rules set forth by the profession. When faced with the task of representing diminished capacity clients, lawyers should look to the governing rules and represent their clients within that framework. This article addresses the primary dilemmas lawyers face when representing children in abuse and neglect proceedings and how lawyers can effectively advocate for their child clients.

Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Re-Litigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action

One of the most serious pathologies of the modern class action is the danger of serial attempts to certify a class action. Because the bar of res judicata traditionally applies solely to the parties who had their day in court, it is easy for class action attorneys to seek certification for a never-ending parade of identical class actions, simply by changing the named plaintiffs, who, for purposes of certification, are completely fungible. As a result, the potential for redundancy, inefficiency and harassment of potential class defendants is all but unstoppable, effectively forcing defendants to settle class actions which may well fail on the merits. In Smith v. Bayer, the Supreme Court did little or nothing to ameliorate the problem. Instead, it simply assumed that the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) will obviate the problem by authorizing removal to federal court of class actions brought in state court. But the Court grossly overstated the impact of CAFA on this serious problem. In this Article, we propose a solution to the problem of serial certification attempts by reconsidering the underlying DNA of the modern class action. In so doing, we explain the important differences between the nature of the attorney-client relationship in traditional litigation on the one hand and in the modern class action, on the other. These factors lead us to re-characterize the modern class action as a form of “guardianship” litigation model. In effect, the class attorneys operate as the litigant, acting on behalf of the interests of the absent class members. The modern class action, then, represents a form of what can be labeled “capitalistic socialism” — class attorneys work to redistribute wealth to those whom they represent, out of what are often purely capitalistic motivations. Once one accepts the guardianship model as the proper description of the modern class action, it logically follows that the class attorneys, as well as the named plaintiffs, should be treated as real parties in interest for purposes of res judicata. Admittedly, such an alteration represents a radical shift in res judicata theory, but it does so in order to bring modern res judicata doctrine in line with the innovative nature of the modern class action. As a result of our proposal, class attorneys will not be able to engage in harassment simply by changing fungible named plaintiffs. Instead, class attorneys, like any real party in interest, will have only one opportunity to seek class certification; a denial of certification will constitute direct estoppel barring the class attorneys from ever seeking re-certification under an identical standard.

The insider threat and employee privacy: An overview of recent case law

The detection of insider threats is one area of ongoing work at the CERT® Insider Threat Center. This paper addresses the legal landscape surrounding employee privacy in the workplace. While this broad area implicates many different types of law, this paper focuses on some current issues that employers may want to be aware of when implementing policies and practices to mitigate the insider threat, including monitoring of current employees. Electronic, physical and other methods of monitoring are discussed, which can reveal insider threat indicators. Relevant federal and state laws are also discussed.11Although the objective of this paper is to provide an overview of recent legal challenges in this area, it should not be used as a substitute for the advice of a licensed legal profession. Neither Carnegie Mellon University nor the Software Engineering Institute offer legal advice. The materials presented in this article are provided for informational purposes only. These materials are not offered as and do not constitute legal advice or legal opinions. The transmission or receipt of this article does not constitute or create an attorney-client relationship between the sender and the receiver. This article should not be used as a substitute for the advice of a licensed legal professional. ® CERT® is a registered mark owned by Carnegie Mellon University.

Conning the IADC Newsletters:Protecting The Corporate Counsel Communications Shield: The Attorney-Client Privilege Is Alive and Well for Company Lawyers

This article originally appeared in April 2013 Business Litigation Committee newsletter. IN THE CURRENT electronic era, one of substantial challenges facing defense lawyers is protecting written communications involving corporate counsel. In many companies, corporate counsel are now often part of business management team, no longer only relegated to providing legal advice when asked to do so. Frequently, legal department attorneys are located with business unit and are actively engaged with company executives and product managers in both legal aspects of business and day-to-day business decisions. In fact, company titles for in-house lawyers sound like those of executives rather than lawyers, including Executive Vice-President, Chief Compliance Officer, Senior Vice-President, Chief Privacy Officer or Corporate Secretary. These positions bring our company lawyers directly into cross-hairs of business litigation involving company decisions ranging from intellectual property and contract disputes to product liability and environmental contamination matters. The various scenarios raise interesting factual questions for traditional protections afforded to clients in attorney-client relationship, particularly when it comes to assertion of attorney-client privilege or attorney work product protection. This sacrosanct principle is the oldest of privileges for confidential communications known to common law. (1) As all are aware, with certain exceptions, privilege protects against disclosure of confidential communications between attorney and client within context of seeking legal advice from a lawyer. The privilege necessarily encourages candid and open conversations between clients and their attorneys, allowing attorneys to more effectively represent their clients' interests by understanding inner-most workings of company operations, errors made in judgment, discussions surrounding correction of problems and liabilities that might flow from those decisions, and issues relating to damage control. These kinds of lawyer-related communications likely would be deemed relevant to any litigation concerning such issues and these communications are often accomplished electronically and become central to discovery disputes when placed on a privilege log. Discoverability of these written communications is challenged through motion practice with communications initially described generally along with names of those sending, receiving and copied. The object of defense is to keep these communications from being produced, even for review by trial judge or magistrate judge or discovery master. To do so, defense lawyers must have detailed substantive knowledge of communications, electronic history of communications, inter-relationship between those involved in communications, particularly lawyers, and motivations for communications. Since It]he burden of establishing existence of privilege is on person asserting it, (2) it will be necessary to prepare affidavits from those involved explaining factual basis for assertion of privilege, so that those making legal decision understand how and whether privilege or protection comes into play. For most part, since outside lawyers are invariably consulted for legal advice, they rarely will be asked to disclose information provided to them by clients, and since communication is almost always protected, we will not address outside counsel in this article. (3) The greater challenge comes when in house counsel are involved because those seeking communications argue that privilege is inapplicable or waived and cannot shield them from disclosure. To be sure, courts acknowledge that the need to apply [the attorney-client] privilege cautiously and narrowly is heightened in case of corporate staff counsel, lest mere participation of an attorney be used to seal off disclosure. …

Taking the Next Step in the Legal Response to Domestic Violence: the Need to Reexamine Specialized Domestic Violence Courts from a Victim Perspective

INTRODUCTION S.S. and R.T.'s story involved many of the elements common to domestic violence cases: multiple instances of physical, verbal, and psychological abuse of S.S. by her ex-boyfriend R.T.; initial reluctance on S.S.'s part to report the incident to the authorities out of hope that the violence would simply cease; and the eventual arrest of and entry of order of protection against R.T. that he repeatedly violated, resulting in the filing of additional charges against him. (1) As these charges moved into court, S.S. assisted the prosecution by providing detailed written depositions outlining the history and circumstances of the altercations between her and R.T. (2) Soon afterwards, the case, People v. Tancredi--like many others involving multiple, interconnected matters related to domestic violence in New York--ended up in one of the state's Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) courts. (3) Then, less than a month after R.T. was arraigned in IDV court, his attorney filed a separate lawsuit on S.S.'s behalf, alleging that certain state actors had violated her civil rights by coercing her into testifying. (4) Given the essential role S.S. was playing in the prosecution, the state immediately filed a motion to appoint independent counsel for her. (5) The IDV court, recognizing elements of domestic violence in R.T.'s actions, readily granted the motion: This Court is part of the community's coordinated response to domestic It would be contrary to our purpose and mission, if individuals charged with domestic violence offenses are permitted to utilize such a questionable attorney client relationship, as a sword, and thereby strategically block the prosecution of their cases.... Victims of domestic violence often fail to follow through with their initial willingness to cooperate with the People's prosecution. Many victims return to their abusive partners due to financial concerns ... [or] due to fear for their safety or that of their family and children. And for some women, having become so entrenched in a cycle of abuse and violence, they return out of habit. By inducing, or by merely permitting a victim to enter into attorney-client relationship with them, it is conceivable that the attorney participates knowingly or otherwise in the defendant's strategy of coercive (6) The court thus undertook to provide the victim with a list of advocate organization[s] to facilitate her access to an independent and experienced attorney who is fully familiar with the special and unique dynamics of representing a victim of domestic violence. (7) Tancredi offers a view into the ways in which specialized domestic violence courts, like the IDV court highlighted in the case, can offer effective response to what has been recognized as a societal epidemic of domestic (8) These courts--although they take slightly different forms in each of the jurisdictions in which they are implemented--are typically defined by a docket dedicated solely to domestic violence-related matters, court personnel trained in intimate panner violence, and close ties to community organizations that offer, among other things, batterer intervention programs and victim support. Whereas a non-specialized court's lack of resources might have prevented it from giving due attention to the state's motion, the Tancredi court was able to analyze in detail the issues it presented. Further, rather than simply assuming that order of protection alone would keep S.S. safe, the Tancredi court--because of its specialized training in domestic violence--remained attuned to the ways R.T. could harm her, even recognizing how his supposedly benevolent move of aiding S.S. in seeking legal redress for violation of her civil rights might fit into his pattern of manipulation and control. Finally, the court's alliances with domestic violence related community organizations allowed it to facilitate S. …