Asymmetrical Federalism Research Articles

How do citizens attribute responsibility in multilevel states? Learning, biases and asymmetric federalism. Evidence from Spain

Recent empirical evidence suggests that decentralization challenges the stakes of democratic control by blurring responsibility attribution between levels of government. Exploring the implications of decentralization on accountability requires a better understanding of the conditions under which decentralization affects clarity of responsibility. The theoretical claim in this article is that these conditions are related to the particular design and duration of decentralization arrangements. To test this proposition, individual data from a system where decentralization varies both in design and duration – the Spanish State of Autonomies – are used. Results show that clarity of responsibility has worsened where decentralization has adopted a more intertwined (marble-cake) design and that individuals may “learn” on responsibility attribution the longer they experience a particular distribution of competences.

Democracy, Representation, and Self-Rule in the Indian Constitution

VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee , Seite 177 - 195

Constitutional politics in Canada after Charter: liberalism, communitarianism, and systemism

1 Constitutional Politics in Canada: The Charter and Beyond 2 Systemism and Canadian Constitutional Politics 3 Identifying Concepts and Theories 4 Liberal Theories: Negative Identity, Megapolitics, and Institutional Imbalance 5 Communitarian Theories: Asymmetrical Federalism and the Citizens' Constitution 6 A Critique and Comparison of Liberal and Communitarian Theories 7 Conclusion Notes References Index

A Corporate Geography of Canada: Insights into a Multi-Jurisdictional Model of Corporate Governance

Comparative corporate governance has long focused on national models of corporate governance with particular attention paid to the balance of influence between divergent path dependence and convergent global market forces. Within this debate, the Canadian model of corporate governance has received little attention and has long been assumed to be an extension of the U.S. model. An analysis of the corporate geography of Canada demonstrates that the path-dependent forces of Canada's resource-dependent economic development remain a principal determinant in contemporary corporate Canada. Continued resource dependence in combination with a system of asymmetric federalism has led to a distinctively multi-jurisdictional model of corporate governance. As corporate interests are provincially distinct because of the heterogeneous distribution of natural resources and markets across Canada, this model may lead to provincial lock-in and an associated degree of managerial entrenchment.

Understanding the Multinational Game: Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism

This article presents a baseline theory of asymmetrical federalism in multinational states. Two arguments building on a game-theoretic foundation link central and regional elites’ strategic choices to questions of federal stability. The first argument concerns the creation of asymmetrical institutions. In a confrontation game between the center and national minorities credibly threatening to exit the framework, the center’s decision to grant asymmetrical autonomy ensures mutual cooperation. Yet by extending the level of autonomy for minority regions, federal asymmetry creates a third player, the nonadvantaged regions. Consequently, the second argument models asymmetrical federalism as a “nested game” where events in the ethnonational arena determine the payoffs in the federal arena. Asymmetrical federal rules turn out to be inherently unstable from a perspective that takes all actors in all arenas into account. A narrative of the development of Russian federalism exemplifies the theory.

Shariacracy and Federal Models in the Era of Globalization

Nigeria has Africa’s largest concentration of Muslims and the world’s largest concentration of black Muslims. As the twenty first century began to unfold, more Muslim states in the Nigerian federation adopted some version of Islamic law, although the country as a whole is supposed to be secularist. The Shari`ah in northern Nigeria, which became a passionate protest against the political and economic marginalization of northern Muslims, is also sometimes a form of cultural resistance to western education and the wider forces of globalization. One systemic problem posed by shariacracy as a mode of governance is whether a federal system can accommodate theocracy at the state level and still be a secular state at a federal level. Nigeria has a religious form of asymmetrical federalism that contrasts with the linguistic form of asymmetrical federalism successfully practiced in Switzerland.

Shariacracy and Federal Models in the Era of Globalization

Nigeria has Africa’s largest concentration of Muslims and the world’s largest concentration of black Muslims. As the twenty first century began to unfold, more Muslim states in the Nigerian federation adopted some version of Islamic law, although the country as a whole is supposed to be secularist. The Shari`ah in northern Nigeria, which became a passionate protest against the political and economic marginalization of northern Muslims, is also sometimes a form of cultural resistance to western education and the wider forces of globalization. One systemic problem posed by shariacracy as a mode of governance is whether a federal system can accommodate theocracy at the state level and still be a secular state at a federal level. Nigeria has a religious form of asymmetrical federalism that contrasts with the linguistic form of asymmetrical federalism successfully practiced in Switzerland.

Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria in the Light of Asymmetrical Federalism

In the debate that ensued after the extension of Shari’ah to the penal codes in northern Nigeria, there emerged, among other things, the thesis that the extension of Shari’ah can be accommodated under asymmetrical federalism. Many analysts have accepted this thesis uncritically. The main thrust of this article is to explore the main dimensions of the theory of asymmetrical federalism and find out whether the extension of Shari’ah to the penal codes in northern Nigeria can be accommodated under the theory of asymmetrical federalism. The article argues that the extension of Shari’ah to the penal codes in northern Nigeria represents an unusual form of asymmetrical federalism.

The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism: Reconsidering the Role and Responsibilities of Ottawa

This article argues that while asymmetrical arrangements among the units of any federation are necessary and even desirable, federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction in Canada over the past few decades have triggered a protective impulse in the provinces that has resulted in a multiplication of deals recognizing provincial differences. The nature and variety of such arrangements are undermining the sense of federal comity, goodwill, and understanding so critical to national unity. To avoid heading further down this trajectory and attenuating the bonds that hold the nation together, the federal government should reconsider its role in the federation. While the current Conservative government policy of open federalism begins this reconceptualization of federal and provincial roles and responsibilities, more constructive and principled action is required.

Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971–1991) and Their Impact on Federalism

Introduction In the period 1971-1991, Quebec was the province that constantly pressed and negotiated with the federal government for more provincial rights in the field of immigration. The province signed four immigration agreements with the federal government in the immigration sphere: the Lang-Cloutier Agreement of 1971, the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement of 1975, the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978, and the McDougall-Gagnon-Tremblay Agreement, known as the Canada-Quebec Accord of 1991, which is still in effect today. Each new agreement gave the province additional powers and autonomy in this field. The role that the provincial government of Quebec acquired in the selection, recruitment, reception, and settlement processes of new immigrants over those two decades is enormous--well beyond that which any other Canadian province has aspired or managed to accomplish. The main argument used by Quebec to justify its demands has always been that the province is distinct society and, therefore, needs and autonomy to determine who settles in the province. It has to be noted as well that three of the four immigration agreements cited above were initiated by the provincial Liberal Party and only one by the Parti Quebecois. Thus, the immigration policy of the province of Quebec during the period in question was consistent and essentially followed the same direction, regardless of the political party in power in the province. This essay will argue that the Canada-Quebec immigration agreements had crucial effect on the Canadian federal system, because they maintained asymmetrical federal-provincial relations in the immigration policy of Canada. Each new agreement enlarged this while additionally undermining the role of the Canadian government in the immigration process. This essay will also examine how Quebec used the immigration autonomy that it obtained as foundation and incentive for its independence movement. Finally, this essay will analyze the impact that this policy might have had (or might continue to have) on the other Canadian provinces and on the immigrants destined for Quebec, and discuss whether these agreements infringed on the mobility rights of the new permanent residents, as defined by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 6. Asymmetrical Federalism and the Distribution of Powers in the Immigration Policy A number of Canadian political scientists consider asymmetry the term of choice to replace special status rhetoric, which is more or less discredited in the ears of many Canadians, particularly those from western Canada. Asymmetrical federalism is a form of federalism in which one or more constituent units have differing powers and responsibilities. (1) The ideally symmetrical federal system would be system in which all units are equal to each other in regard to factors such as territory, jurisdiction, culture, and history, whereas the ideally asymmetrical system would be model in which every unit has unique feature. (2) This is theoretical definition, of course; in practice, one or few units need in any given federal system. In the Canadian federal system, however, there is only one province--Quebec--which strongly demands asymmetry, and it does so in various areas, including in the authority over immigration. There are two extremely different views regarding Quebec's demands. Supporters of such argue that it is the best way to retain Quebec in the federation and to satisfy Quebec's needs as province with different culture than the rest of Canada. The opponents, however, argue that an asymmetrical system is just strategy of the provincial government of Quebec in move toward complete independence. (3) The alignment of roles between the federal and the provincial governments in the field of immigration is predetermined by the Constitution: * Section 95 of the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867 defines both the federal and provincial authority over immigration policy. …

Assessing asymmetrical federal design in the Russian federation: A case study of language policy in tatarstan

This article seeks to further the understanding of language policy in Tatarstan by examining the development of language legislation and policies in the republic in the post-Soviet period and by placing the issue of language policy within a federal – republican context. The article finds that asymmetrical federalism is an appropriate and workable response to Tatarstan's demands for policy capacity over issues pertaining to language. It is Russia's federal design itself, and not processes of ad hoc constitutional bargaining, which creates governance capacity in this policy area and provides Tatarstan with the de jure power to implement measures to protect the Tatar language.

The 2007 Provincial Election in Newfoundland and Labrador

On the surface, there was nothing special about the 2007 Newfoundland and Labrador general election, which saw Danny Williams re-elected for a second term as Premier. That his Progressive Conservatives would win a solid majority was never in doubt. There were no emerging issues, major gaffes or innovative campaign tactics, and few tight races. The de facto referendum on Williams’ leadership became a coronation. As Mackinnon (2007: 1) wrote about the Prince Edward Island election held five months earlier, “some campaigns are over before they begin.” In this case the only intrigue was how many Liberal or New Democratic Party candidates would form the opposition. 
 However the results do illustrate that a relatively homogenous electorate can rally around a leader who decries the province’s status in the Canadian federation. Furthermore, when elected officials from all major parties have been implicated in a scandal, many electors respond by not participating in politics. Political scientists can therefore draw comparative insights, such as asymmetrical federalism reminiscent of Quebec Premier Jean Lesage in the early 1960s, political scandal similar to the Grant Devine administration of Saskatchewan in the early 1990s, or about civic engagement generally.

Handbook of fiscal federalism

Contents:Foreword Introduction: Fiscal Federalism - A Review of Developments in the Literature and PolicyEhtisham Ahmad and Giorgio BrosioPART I: APPROACHES TO FISCAL FEDERALISM1. The Political Economy of DecentralizationBen Lockwood2. Horizontal Competition Among GovernmentsPierre Salmon3. Modelling Vertical CompetitionAlbert Breton4. Spatial Interactions Among GovernmentsFrederico Revelli5. Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of DecentralizationRoger D. Congleton6. Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ): A Complement and Alternative to Today?s FederalismReiner Eichenberger and Bruno S. Frey7. Contract FederalismPaul Bernd SpahnPART II: DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT8. Decentralization and DevelopmentPranab Bardhan9. Fiscal Federalism in Planned EconomiesGovinda Rao 10. Decentralization and Service DeliveryJunaid Ahmad, Shantayanan Devarajan, Stuti Khemani and Shekhar ShahPART III: IMPLEMENTING MULTILEVEL FISCAL SYSTEMS11. The Assignment of Functions to Decentralized Government: From Theory to Practice Bernard Dafflon12. Normative Versus Positive Theories of Revenue Assignments in Federations Maria Flavia Ambrosiano and Massimo Bordignon13. Tax Competition in a Federal SettingJohn D. Wilson14. Intergovernmental Redistributive Transfers: Efficiency and EquityRobin Boadway15. On the Implementation of Transfers to Subnational GovernmentsEhtisham Ahmad and Bob Searle16. Subnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerations Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria Albino-War and Raju SinghPART IV: EMERGING ISSUES17. The Assignment of Revenue from Natural ResourcesGiorgio Brosio18. Decentralization and the EnvironmentSilvana Dalmazzone19. Corruption and Decentralized Public GovernanceAnwar Shah20. Fiscal Federalism and National UnityRichard M. Bird and Robert D. Ebel21. Institutions of Federalism and Decentralized GovernmentBrian GalliganIndex

Asymmetrical Federal Systems: Self-determination, Cultural Identity, and Political and Fiscal Decentralization

McGarry argues that asymmetrical federalism may be an optimal form of governance for culturally heterogeneous societies when—as is often the case—different communities, be they “national” or “regio...

Comment: The “Necessity” of Asymmetrical Federalism?

Federal forms of government are diverse creatures. They can be centralized or decentralized, majoritarian or consociational, multinational or homogeneous. But they also vary in the ways that the re...

United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism

Many studies highlight constitutional asymmetry as a desirable feature of federal systems in multinational countries. This article looks at India which, mainly because of the special provisions for Kashmir in the 1950 constitution and the status of newer small states in the north-east, is generally described as asymmetrically federal. I show that, while India exhibits considerable de facto asymmetry, asymmetry in the constitutional powers granted to individual states has (i) not been important for India's ability to ‘hold together’ as often assumed and (ii) not entailed special protection of cultural or national minorities. I thus cast doubt on the normative political philosophy, particularly informed by Canadian and Spanish debates, that advances the idea of asymmetrical federalism as a model of governance in potentially divided societies.

Asymmetric federalism between globalization and regionalization

The question ‘who speaks for the Europeans?’ involves a basic contradiction in European constitutional engineering: federalist autonomy developed against democratic representation on the basis of popular sovereignty of equal citizens. Working on a European Constitution includes the search for a fair balance between the modes of representation. This paper shows, however, that the balance remains precarious. Asymmetries in the de iure institutional settings and in de facto social and economic development permanently reshuffle the balance. Older theories of federalism in the age of classical modernism started from a rational model of symmetric states' rights. Postmodernist thinking with its patchwork scenarios developed more tolerance towards asymmetries. The neo-liberal paradigm leads away from ‘participatory federalism’ in the direction of a ‘federalism of competition’. In the early federations the poor territories in a ‘class struggle from below’ asked for subsidies from the centre. In recent federations a ‘class struggle from above’ is developing. The rich states fight for asymmetries because they feel punished if they have to subsidize the poorer areas.

Does fiscal redistribution discourage local public investment?

AbstractThis paper studies the determinants of regional (oblast‐level) public investment in transitional Russia, focusing on the effects of federal fiscal redistribution. A model of local government expenditure in the presence of regional asymmetries shows that revenue redistribution from wealthy to poor regions discourages local public investment. Random‐ and fixed‐effects estimation of regional panel data for 1994–97 supports the existence of a disincentive effect from fiscal redistribution on regional public investment, which varies according to a region's federal status and wealth: non‐republics have a lower propensity to invest out of transfers than out of own income, as do regions with above‐median per capita income. Republics reduce public investment more than current spending in response to higher federal taxation. Russia's ‘asymmetrical federalism’ thus creates different fiscal incentives for different types of regions.

The New Federalism and the Paradoxes of Regional Sovereignty in Russia

face additional problems, including significant pockets of traditional rule, corruption, and provincial resistance to centrally imposed market reform.3 Russia's transition would seem to be a classic example. During the 1990s ethnic republics and predominantly Russian regions challenged the center on revenue collec tion, erected barriers to interregional trade, and adopted laws and decrees at variance with federal ones. Regional leaders also pressed the federal government into signing bilateral power-sharing treaties and agreements granting some of them a host of special prerogatives. In fact, regional assertiveness and asymmetrical federalism left many won dering about the continued viability of the Russian state. Yet regional prerogatives have eroded under Vladimir Putin. With the election of 2000 Putin set out to strengthen the vertical flow of power, imposing seven new feder al supervisors over Russia's eighty-nine subjects, removing regional leaders from the upper house of parliament, and demanding that regional laws and constitutions conform to federal ones.4 Within a year a number of Yeltsin-era decrees granting regions special privileges were revoked; federal government budget policies grew more standardized; and noncompliant laws and constitutional provisions were amended or discarded. Within two years, twenty-eight of the forty-two power- sharing treaties were renounced, and federal authorities hollowed out most of the others.5 If regional power had grown uncontrollable under Yeltsin, it was not apparent from the campaign to recentralize under his successor. The recasting of the Russian system thus raises a puzzle. If regional power had in fact grown so substantially, how could the federal government roll it back? In part, the answer lies in the consolidation of power at the federal level. The reduc

Asymmetric federalism: Are federated micro-regions viable?

Federated micro-regions are constituent units of federations having a maximum population of 300,000. Many are ethnically based. Although not larger than cities, these 55 territories are, constitutionally speaking, equal entities of their federations and have in some instances even shaped their own foreign policy. This article provides an analysis of their ability to withstand structural constraints and take advantage of the opportunities which smallness offers. In the first part, it discusses problems related to economies of scale and identifies a trend to establish new rather than merge existing federated micro-regions. The second part highlights external relations activities of some federated micro-regions and explains their partly pragmatic, partly political motivation.