Assurance Capabilities Research Articles

Embedded Software Assurance for Configuring Secure Hardware

The authors define embedded end markets affected by software assurance issues, then examine ways in which security and assurance capabilities are partitioned in hardware and software. They then look at the problems inherent to configuring secure hardware.

Do Small Arsenals Deter?

Ward Wilson’s article “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima” provides a startling explanation for the end of World War II in East Asia.1 Wilson argues that, contrary to established wisdom, Japan’s decision to surrender stemmed not from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but from the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan on August 8, 1945. He bases his argument on the following propositions: (1) in the context of the massive destruction caused by the conventional bombing of Japanese cities at the time, the atomic bomb was not qualitatively different; (2) the havoc caused by these attacks did not undermine Japan’s determination to press on with the war in hopes of obtaining favorable terms of surrender; (3) the Japanese leadership’s reaction to the devastation of Hiroshima does not reoect a perception that the atomic bomb was decisive in its effects; and (4) in contrast, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, by eliminating available options for a favorable end, compelled Japan to surrender quickly. Wilson’s analysis concludes that small nuclear arsenals may not deter aggressors. Whereas large nuclear forces may have such a capability (200 weapons is where the author draws the line), “the logic of deterrence may be different where small arsenals are concerned. If destroying one or two cities does not coerce an opponent, then perhaps the threat of limited nuclear retaliation does not deter when the stakes are high enough” (p. 179). In short, small nuclear powers are inherently unstable and, logically (though the author does not state this explicitly), such states can achieve deterrence stability only if they expand their armories. Wilson’s basic argument about the Japanese decision is a plausible one, drawing considerable evidence from archival sources, though it is thin with respect to the Soviet factor, as only a single source is cited (pp. 174–175). I question, however, his inference regarding the requirements of deterrence today. Contrary to Wilson’s claim, the size of a nuclear arsenal does not matter, and more speciacally, small arsenals are adequate for obtaining deterrence. A review of how nuclear powers behave when war is nigh demonstrates that the concept of “assured second-strike capability” based on the capacity to inoict casualties into the millions is a mythical notion that does not accord with histori-

SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT A FIRST STRIKE

This article critiques recent articles in Foreign Affairs and International Security that argue that in the foreseeable future the United States could acquire an assured first-strike capability vis-à-vis Russia and China thanks to technological improvements in U.S. nuclear delivery systems and a general decline in the numbers and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces. Notwithstanding these articles, this analysis finds that mutual deterrence will persist regardless of the scale of possible future imbalances because deterrence is a highly flexible phenomenon. The pertinent question is not whether the United States will be able, in a surprise first strike, to cripple severely Russian response capabilities, but whether political stakes in any foreseeable conflict could justify the risk of even a small retaliatory strike on the United States. This article also assesses whether the Foreign Affairs and International Security articles could inadvertently exacerbate an already highly charged anti-American sentiment in Russia, possibly laying the foundation for a revitalization and expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Augmenting LZ‐77 with authentication and integrity assurance capabilities

AbstractThe formidable dissemination capability allowed by the current network technology makes it increasingly important to devise new methods to ensure authenticity and integrity. Nowadays it is common practice to distribute documents in compressed form. In this paper, we propose a simple variation on the classic LZ‐77 algorithm that allows one to hide, within the compressed document, enough information to warrant its authenticity and integrity. The design is based on the unpredictability of a certain class of pseudo‐random number generators, in such a way that the hidden data cannot be retrieved in a reasonable amount of time by an attacker (unless the secret bit‐string key is known). Since it can still be decompressed by the original LZ‐77 algorithm, the embedding is completely ‘transparent’ and backward‐compatible, making it possible to deploy it without disrupting service. Experiments show that the degradation in compression due to the embedding is almost negligible. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

SOFTWARE QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CASE TOOLS Creating an AI-Enhanced CASE Tool

Abstract Artificial intelligence (Al) techniques can be applied within the IS shop to improve quality assurance. This article describes an Al-assisted method for migrating software quality assurance capability to conventional CASE tools.

Air quality in Metropolitan Manila: Inferences from a questionable data set

Abstract Metropolitan Manila, Republic of the Philippines, is one of the more polluted cities in the world. It may be unique in that, to all appearances, the air pollutant loading is virtually all particulate. The Philippine government is now, with support from a number of international agencies, attempting to set priorities and control the most serious of its environmental problems. There have been numerous attempts to estimate the relative contributions of various sources of air pollutants, but the lack of emission factors applicable to the specific technologies used in Manial makes these suspect. Air monitoring data are available, but are seriously compromised by the lack of quality assurance capabilities and calibration facilities for the monitors. During years 1987–1989 several data sets were taken at stations in the area. The sampling/monitoring equipment consisted of the survivors from a larger number of devices bought a number of years earlier, and kept running by progressive cannibalization of less viable instruments to provide parts for the balance. Hence neither the accuracy nor the precision of the data were known. Accuracy could not, of course, be ascertained. However, a number of statistical techniques (some only marginally applicable in the strict statistical sense, since the data were almost certainly not normally distributed) showed the data to have about the expected dispersion, to have some interesting coherences, and to reveal that the airborne particles had, on average, a quite constant iron content. Almost certainly this indicated a significant soil source for particulate matter, not previously identified. On the whole, the data set was probably better than most visiting scientists had believed, and could be used for planning further studies, though not for setting control priorities.

The development of the essential drugs program and implications for self-reliance in Tanzania

This report provides a background history of the Essential Drugs Program (EDP) in Tanzania. Because of a scarcity of drugs in the Ministry of Health (MOH) managed units a program to fill up the empty shelves was welcomed. Critical questions were not addressed about other important policy components. Success of the EDP has been measured in terms of a successful delivery of drugs without questioning the source and its reliability in the near future. Other program components have not been implemented successfully to insure the program's sustainability and self-reliance. There is a need to improve local production, quality assurance capability, inspection, intersectoral linkages and active local participation in shouldering the financial burden.

Test Facilities for Radioactive Material Transport Packages (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, USA)

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has extensive capabilities to test full-scale and model packages that have been designed to the testing requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71.73. These are the same teststhat are specified in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material’, Safety Series No.6, 1985 edition as amended in 1990. This report provides information about the facilities, personnel qualifications, prior test experience, and quality assurance capabilities which are available to support package testing.