Association Of Southeast Asian Nations Governments Research Articles

Institutional Quality and Trade Competitiveness in ASEAN Region: Implication for Inclusive and Sustainable Development

This study examined institutional quality and trade competitiveness in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) using panel data and a fixed effect model. It was revealed that while control of corruption, government effectiveness, and political stability, absence of violence and terrorism significantly encourage trade competitiveness by about 33.126%, 91.958%, and 55.004%, weak regulatory quality, rule of law, and lack of voice and accountability significantly discourage trade competitiveness by about 25.331%, 95.599%, and 7.561%. ASEAN governments and their citizens should strive harder to effectively run all-inclusive and democratic governments, encourage strong regulatory quality, impartial rule of law, and voice and accountability.

ASEAN, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the politics of pragmatism

Abstract The timid response of member governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has puzzled many western observers as it flagrantly violates the most basic norms of international law to which ASEAN expressly subscribes. This article seeks to provide answers to this puzzle. Informed by practice theory, the article transcends conventional realist explanations of how small and medium-sized countries respond to great power politics. Combining material and cognitive arguments, practice theory allows identifying the cultural and ideational roots of these policies and uncovering mismatches between rhetoric and agency. It suggests that, conceptualized as communities of practice, ASEAN member countries' foreign policy elites have developed a path-dependent pragmatism, which guides their response to great power politics and hence the war in Ukraine. Employing a qualitative mixed-methods approach, the empirical part of the article examines how south-east Asia's diplomatic communities of practice define pragmatism and shows that, historically, pragmatism has strongly guided their foreign policies. It traces ASEAN governments' pragmatic responses to the war in Ukraine at three levels: the national, regional and the (global) multilateral level. The article concludes that liberal proselytism does not help the West to win over ASEAN member countries to support its pro-Ukraine course.

Strengthening Virology Research in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Preparing for Future Pandemics.

ABSTRACT.The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region is known to be a global hotspot to viral outbreaks because of many factors. To limit the impact of future outbreaks, it is crucial for the ASEAN governments to strengthen regional virology research capacity. The ASEAN governments have collaborated in several virology initiatives, with the most recent being the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Center for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases. However, several challenges, including technology disparities, nationalistic tendencies, and the lack of public acceptance toward virus sharing, need to be addressed to maximize the region’s collaboration potential in virology research. We recommend the governments to 1) prioritize the strengthening of research capacities; 2) develop stronger cooperation and possible centralization of efforts on top of national capacities; 3) develop an equitable and secure research framework; and 4) improve the public awareness regarding the importance of regional public health responses.

The EU’s Connectivity Strategy Towards ASEAN: Is a ‘European Way’ Feasible?

Connectivity is a new key concept in the European Union (EU)’s economic diplomacy towards Asia. In addition to infrastructure of all sorts, it comprises digital, economic regulatory and societal connectivity. The EU Commission promotes a ‘European way’ in its new Asia strategy, which emphasizes a sustainable, comprehensive and international rule-based approach. The connectivity strategy is not least an answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an enormous unregulated Eurasian infrastructure diplomacy project that has enabled China to become perceived as the EU’s systemic rival. This article analyses these three ‘European way’ dimensions to explore the potential of the connectivity strategy regarding the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). While ASEAN governments have become more cautious about China’s BRI, they also represent uneasy partners for the EU’s high-standards connectivity strategy. Leaning on the concept of hybrid interregionalism, this article argues that for a ‘European Way’ to emerge, the EU must coordinate its policies with key actors both within and as regards ASEAN, and especially with governments that share similar values, agreements and concerns regarding the BRI in the East Asian political economy.

Corruption and Good Governance: An Analysis of ASEAN's E-Governance Experience

Since its formation in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has progressed to become an economic powerhouse. From a loosely formed grouping in the 1960s, its members have since undergone massive integration. A key motive of the Association is to transfer government and public services onto a technology platform, termed e-government. An important concern is whether e-governance can reduce corruption and stimulate sustainable development. Using traditional governance measures and e-governance indices, this paper analyses the state of governance and corruption in ASEAN. While the deepening of e-governance - via government and public participation - has raised the potential for improving good governance practices, that in itself can be counterproductive as socioeconomic agents could broaden corrupt practices by appropriating its public-good-like characteristics. Hence, ASEAN governments have to implement changes in their communications strategies and feedback mechanisms, remove barriers blocking the spread and use of information technology, and promote a collaborative environment with civil society organizations, while considering the use of the carrot and stick approach to improve good governance. © 2019 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.

Why (most) Indonesian businesses fear the ASEAN Economic Community: struggling with Southeast Asia’s regional corporatism

By the end of 2015 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had ushered in a common market, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). However, the groups most affected by it – small businesses – were bypassed in the decision-making process. They are the victims of a selectively inclusive state corporatism which member countries have transferred from their domestic political system to the regional level. In this article I argue that the decision to create the AEC was promoted by ASEAN governments together with foreign economic and local corporate interests. This coalition was able to frame the AEC in a way that small businesses perceived it as a win-win scheme. Empirically the article focuses on Indonesia.

Achieving an ASEAN single shipping market: shipping and logistics firms’ perspective

ABSTRACTTo establish an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Single Shipping Market (ASSM) is an important part of ASEAN governments’ overall plan to achieve an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. It is expected that a single shipping market will improve the region’s logistics performance and international competitiveness. To achieve this vision, however, the ASEAN countries need to remove any remaining barriers to logistics performance. In this light, the objective of this paper is to identify these barriers and assess their effects on the logistics performance of shipping and logistics firms based in ASEAN countries. Using a questionnaire-based survey, the study revealed several barriers affecting their logistics performance with varying significance among these countries. Unless these barriers from the perspective of the industry are removed, the ability of the shipping and logistics industry to benefit from a liberalized market would be limited. These perceived barriers are examined in detail and strategies to address them are proposed. The ASEAN experience is applicable to similar countries in the process of integrating their international shipping sector as well as contributes to the understanding of the different barriers and how these barriers can affect the logistics performance of shipping and logistics companies.

A Proposed ASEAN Disaster Response, Training and Logistic Centre Enhancing Regional Governance in Disaster Management

The Southeast Asian region is remarkably vulnerable to natural disasters which repeatedly cause devastations to both human lives and properties. However, current disaster relief efforts have not lived up to the high standards. Even worse is that humanitarian efforts have been frequently frustrated by the rejections from national authorities under the name of “sovereignty”. All these problems necessitate a widely accepted, politically neutral, well coordinated and effectively governed organization within the region. We, hereby propose a Disaster Response Training and Logistic Centre under the umbrella of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which aims to mitigate the devastation of disasters, to provide accurate relief assessment, and training for relief team on a regular basis, and to allocate and mobilize humanitarian aid. The Centre will be endorsed through an agreement by all ASEAN governments. The philosophy underpinning the organization reflects a regional approach whereby stronger government involvement and regional integration in disaster relief is indispensable in the context of the Southeast Asian region.

ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community

From a geopolitical perspective, the Asian littoral divides into three subregions: Northeast Asia (the People's Republic of China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan and the Russian Far East), Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka). Both Northeast Asia and South Asia contain political and economic Great Powers. In the latter, India's economic activities and growing politico-security influence extend to all of Asia. In the former, Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan play significant global economic roles, while Tokyo and Beijing are also major political-security players. By contrast, Southeast Asia contains no Great Powers with global reach. While the region consists of several states with vibrant economies--Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand--or economic potential--Vietnam and Indonesia--in geopolitical stature, Southeast Asia pales in comparison to its Northeast and South Asia neighbours. Yet Southeast Asia is where most Asian regional organizations originate and whose structures and procedures are determined by Southeast Asian preferences. The primary goal of this article is to explain how this has happened, what the implications are for Asia's future and whether Southeast Asian states organized for the past forty years through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be able to maintain their pivotal position in Asian affairs. For the past several decades, the Asia-Pacific region has been marked by a difficult asymmetry: the most dangerous disputes lie in Northeast and South Asia while the region's multilateral institutions designed to manage and reduce conflict have originated in Southeast Asia. While ASEAN has maintained its organizational integrity, it has added new internal and external dimensions. The former include the incipient ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization which has been particularly vocal in condemning Myanmar's human rights violations, and the Track Three ASEAN People's Assembly, an NGO that brings a variety of societal interest groups together to lobby ASEAN governments. ASEAN-dominated organizations encompass the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security matters, ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea and China), various ASEAN+1 dialogues with important states, the ASEAN-Europe meeting (ASEM), and most recently, regular dialogues with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Africa and Latin America. The newest and most contentious addition to the mix is the East Asian Summit (EAS) inaugurated in December 2005. The EAS brings ASEAN+3 countries together with India, Australia and New Zealand--all of which have signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a membership condition. Conceptualizing ASEAN The Asia-Pacific region has no hegemon. Instead, political, economic and social networks proliferate. Regional issues are addressed through collective action. The various frameworks have diminished the strength of the absolute sovereignty norm that dominated ASEAN at the time of its 1967 creation. Over the ensuing decades, security issues have become increasingly transnational. Money laundering, human trafficking, environmental degradation, multi-national river development, migratory maritime species, terrorism and piracy require multilateral regime building rather than ad hoc diplomacy. In theory, at least, organizations such as ASEAN have established procedures and decision-making rules in which all governmental stakeholders have a voice. (2) Conceptualizing ASEAN, International Relations theorists generally employ three analytical frameworks: neo-realism, neoliberalism and constructivism. (3) Neo-realists disdain ASEAN's role in regional security because, in their view, institutions are epiphenomenal. Stability depends on the distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific and not on an international organization of small and medium states confined to Southeast Asia. …

“ Enhanced Interaction” with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?

Introduction In June 1998, against the backdrop of the Asian economic and financial crisis and serious diplomatic disagreements with neighbouring Myanmar, (1) former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan called on members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to adopt the concept of flexible engagement as a corporate policy. (2) Flexible engagement was to allow ASEAN governments to publicly comment on and collectively discuss fellow members' policies when these would have cross-border implications, i.e. adversely affect the disposition of other ASEAN states. Surin Pitsuwan's bold proposal constituted a multi-pronged challenge to ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture (Haacke 1999, pp. 583-85). (3) First, flexible engagement appeared to challenge the principle of non-interference in the sense that agreement on the concept seemed designed to pave the way for unsolicited involvement in the of other states. Second, the proposal challenged the norm of quiet diplomacy because the concept was to explicitly allow for public discussion and criticism of one ASEAN country by another. And, third, by suggesting that the Association should become involved in intra-state issues if these entailed adverse consequences for other members, flexible engagement also challenged the long-standing norm that ASEAN should not take up collectively what for the most part would previously have been regarded as bilateral disputes. Arguably, the proposal also threatened to remove the ambiguity that until then had allowed individual member states to sometimes engage in and/or tolerate perceived instances of diplomatic interference. While noting that flexible engagement would indeed amount to a new departure for ASEAN, the Thai Foreign Minister was adamant at the time that flexible engagement was not incompatible with the principle of non-interference. Rather, it was an attempt to delimit the range of situations in which individual member states would henceforth still be justified to appeal to the norm of non-interference to ward off outside involvement in their so-called internal affairs. Notably, the flexible engagement idea did not amount to the advocacy of a new security model. Nor was it meant to denote for ASEAN a sudden shift from a state-centric view of security to new security referents or a shift to an exclusive preoccupation with a new category of threats. In the event, the overwhelming majority of ASEAN countries rejected Surin's proposal, mainly because not to do so seemed to potentially open up a can of worms that could endanger intramural stability and, in some cases, jeopardize regime security. Having repulsed flexible engagement, ASEAN governments nevertheless informally agreed to henceforth allow for enhanced interaction. (4) This decision reflected the realization of ASEAN decision-makers that they ultimately could not prevent each other from publicly commenting on those intrastate developments that had a perceived detrimental social, economic or political impact on other members or the Association as a whole. Nevertheless, at the time there was (or seemed to be) a subtle but significant difference between enhanced interaction and flexible engagement, insofar as enhanced interaction appeared to imply that individual member states could comment on other members' domestic affairs although ASEAN should not. In other words, as a compromise, enhanced interaction de facto condoned efforts of individual ASEAN leaders to take their colleagues to task on matters heretofore perceived as domestic affairs if the issue at hand had cross-boundary implications, while still ruling out the legitimacy of such endeavours being undertaken under ASEAN's auspices. Notably, when put into practice, enhanced interaction quickly proved deeply disruptive and divisive within the Association and led to the temporary reassertion of more traditional understandings of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture (Kraft 2000, Ramcharan 2000, Haacke 1999: 598-603). …

ICT Investments and Electronic Commerce Initiatives in ASEAN

ICT Investments and Electronic Commerce Initiatives in ASEAN

Southeast Asia–China Relations: Dialectics of “Hedging” and “Counter‑Hedging”

Hedging At the dawn of the twenty-first century, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) heavily promotes trade and investment with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to help it integrate into the world trading order, several member states have also made themselves available in various ways to help the United States retain a military presence in East Asia, as well as acceded to Japan's desire to complement its economic weight in Southeast Asia by playing a more active role in international peacekeeping or regional attempts to fight piracy. ASEAN is aware that it is a small player in the East Asian economic-cum-security arena where the presence of the United States, Japan, and an increasingly powerful China are not only unavoidable, but also keenly felt. By striving for a distribution of power that allows regional countries to maintain a stable external environment conducive to the maximization of trade and investment opportunities, but at the same time deny a potential hegemon the ability to assert undue dominance, Southeast Asian governments hope to achieve essential policy goals such as maintaining national independence, foreign policy autonomy, regional peace, and economic growth. If ASEAN states are engaging in a form of pragmatic “hedging” behaviour, this is principally motivated by the need to optimize economic benefits and minimize security risks in response to an environment of uncertainty, primarily driven by the rise of China as an economic and military power. The region hopes to maximize economic opportunities with China, but is uncertain as to its future foreign and security policy orientation. Will China as a strong country behave like a threatening military hegemon or a friendly economic partner to countries in the region that are, vis-a-vis China, militarily weak, economically unsteady, and beset by ethnic, religious, and boundary problems? ASEAN governments strongly believe that increasing the interdependence of the Chinese economy with that of Southeast Asia and the rest of the world has the effect of giving Beijing a stake in the peace and stability of the region.

The growing role of NGOs in ASEAN

The role and activities of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in Southeast Asia are increasing, says JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University. This growth is being encouraged both by the increasing emphasis, world‐wide, on regionalization and by the attempts by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote regional economic cooperation. Although in the past NGOs have been on the periphery of ASEAN, Aviel argues that the future of the Association may depend as much on the activities of NGOs as on those of ASEAN's governments and private enterprises. In this article, Aviel focuses on the role played by NGOs in the Asian region and their relationship with ASEAN. She predicts that NGO activity in Southeast Asia will continue to grow and forge links between people in the region.

The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced interaction: Intramural challenges to the ‘ASEAN way’

This article examines the challenges to the diplomatic and security culture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as posed by Thailand's spurned proposal for ‘flexible engagement’ and the pursuit of ‘enhanced interaction’ by some ASEAN members in intramural relations. It asks whether these challenges should be understood as turning points in the way in which regional leaderships in Southeast Asia interact. The article argues that while the ‘ASEAN way’ is indeed changing, this change, at least for the moment, focuses mainly on extending the range of issues and contexts traditionally defined as internal affairs in which other ASEAN governments may now legitimately become involved. Considerations about ASEAN cohesion, regime security and regional influence do not suggest an imminent or complete abandonment of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. The likelihood that enhanced interaction will continue to be pursued by ASEAN leaderships should therefore not be seen to imply that principles such as quiet diplomacy or restraint have already become obsolete.

The Need for Common Investment Measures within ASEAN

A growing proportion of international trade within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) occurs within multinational enterprises. In an effort to liberalize trade policy within the region, policies governing direct foreign investment should also be evalu ated. ASEAN governments have achieved a significant level of convergence in investment policy regimes through unilateral reforms. One outcome of this non-cooperative approach, however, has been an unusually high level of investment incentives within ASEAN. This article evaluates investment regimes within ASEAN and considers the likelihood of a regional agreement on investment measures.

Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing Incentives

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has always presented observers with something of a paradox. Its reputation as the most successful regional grouping among less developed countries stands in marked contrast to its singular lack of achievement, despite a succession of proposals, in promoting economic cooperation among its member states. The percentage of the total trade of the member states conducted with each other, although higher than the intraregional trade of other groupings of less developed countries, fell in the 1970s and has only recently recovered to the levels prevailing at the time of ASEAN's creation in 1967 (see Table 1). While ASEAN's success in defusing regional conflicts provided the political prerequisites for the rapid growth of the economies of the region, the direct contribution to this growth made by regional economic arrangements was negligible. Given this unpromising record, the skepticism that greeted the announcement in January 1992 of ASEAN's most recent trade initiative, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), is understandable. Was this skepticism justified or have circumstances changed such that the incentives for ASEAN governments to pursue regional economic cooperation are much greater than in the past? Commentators often attribute ASEAN's previous lack of success in the economic realm to a lack of political will. But lack of political will is merely a shorthand expression for the response of governments to the imbalance between the damage that domestic actors believe regional economic cooperation will do to their interests, and the expected gains to be derived from

ASEAN and SAARC Revisited: More Lessons

A recent article compared the origins and development of the South Asian Asso ciation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), seeking to analyse SAARC's prospects by drawing some lessons from new experiences of ASEAN.1 This complementary essay will attempt to amplify and give different shades of emphasis to the conclusions drawn in that ground-breaking study. Some comparison between South Asia and Southeast Asia as case-studies on regional co-operation will also be made. The primary lessons drawn from the ASEAN experience were presented as: pursue goals that are simple and workable rather than grandiose show-case items; work through an indigenized system for planning. A second set of observations relates to decision-making style. The ASEAN experience argues for informality, frequent discussions, patience ? progress will take time ? and the use of public exposure to draw in non-governmental groups to promote co-operation. All of the above can well serve as guidelines for SAARC interaction. Underlying such mechanics, however, a more important factor was discussed: There was not only the political will to submerge some of the differences for the sake of peace and stability within the sub-region but the members also saw clearly their unity as beneficial in relation to third countries.2 Common political will is explained by a convergence of interests which must precede and be the foundation for the diplomatic mechanics in a political process. To illustrate this, remember that ASEAN's predecessor, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), incorporated many of the rules, procedures, and guidelines that supported ASEAN interaction in the first ten years; but it lasted barely three years before conflicting individual national and regime interests rendered it moribund. Consequently, the questions of importance to SAARC members ? how and why ASEAN members came to possess the political will to co-operate ? are best explained by a discussion of the interests common to the ASEAN governments. A first observation is that the motivating interests of the states have varied at different times during the history of their association. As different internal and situations have prevailed, different ASEAN case-studies and different lessons can be drawn. A first case is the post-formation era which well illustrates that one important commonality uniting the ASEAN members was an external threat, which at a general level meant communism.3 To emphasize and lend strength to this factor, it should be noted that in the early years, unlike today, there was a shared focus on one threatening factor, Maoist China, which was equated 221

The Challenge to ASEAN Political Co‑operation

Political co-operation among the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seeks to achieve certain general political goals. These include, firstly, the promotion of a good-neighbour policy ? the political GNP; secondly, strengthening the political will to co-operate in various fields on a bilateral and regional basis; thirdly, the enhancement of cohesion and solidarity within ASEAN; and fourthly, the advancement of the concept of regional unity and eventual integration. There are sound bases for political co-operation among the states in ASEAN to succeed. They have experienced a common colonial and historical past and were influenced by European colonialism and the Japanese Occupation. These events have left different imprints on the ASEAN societies, but all of them have learnt useful lessons from their contacts with external powers. A common legacy of the colonial period is the basic format of a parliamentary democratic system which has been built upon by the governments concerned. They are attempting to develop various democratic institutions which suit their indi vidual national'characters. Another basis for political co-operation is the development-oriented economic strategy of the present governments. Such an approach emphasizes a free-market economy, the active role of foreign investment and technology, and the effective and maximum utilization of the natural and manpower resources of the country. Ideologically, there is the common perception that the main internal threat to the existence and survival of their societies is communism. Each has banned the communist party from open political activity and has not legalized it as a political party. The ASEAN states have been threatened by communist rebellions, insurrec tions and infiltration. The problem still exists today and the ASEAN governments have co-operated to deal with this threat. Apart from sharing experiences in counter-insurgency operations, they have, on a bilateral basis, improved joint exercises to pursue the communists located along their common borders. Finally, another basis for political co-operation in ASEAN is the agreement among them that decisions on issues affecting the region should be made through a process of consensus and that disputes should be resolved through peaceful means. This is embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation signed at the Bali summit in February 1976. As in other types of co-operation among ASEAN members, one should define