Possibly important repercussions in the development of rationales for scientific languages are suggested by Professor Leonard's endeavor to show why and how interrogatives and imperatives, as well as declaratives, are to be classified as true or as false.' Granted that some non-declaratives possess sufficient cognitive content to sustain an assignment of truth-values, certain problems turn upon the scope of the proposed theory. How sweeping are the principles operative in such an approach to nondeclaratives? Does the theory permit any convenient employment of nondeclaratives without commitments to truth or falsity? For instance, if a criterion of meaning is proposed, can the interests of consistency be served by recourse to nondeclarative formulations of the criterion Or can a so-called presupposition of science be analyzed as neither true nor false by recasting it in terms of some non-declarative status At such points, the matters to which the proposed theory would commit us can scarcely be traced without slipping into mere conjecture. Moreover, to venture criticism, which the seminal tenor of the theory merits, is likewise to indulge in tenuous extrapolation. Surely this difficulty made itself felt when Professor Wheatley focused attention upon the proposed treatment of indirect questions, i.e., questions such as Who is Governor of Minnesota ? As Wheatley observed, ... all indirect questions having an answer at all are true, and presumably if all indirect questions are true, they are trivially true.2 Such a trivialization of truth-value, Wheatley supposed, is a symptom of serious trouble. I must agree. However, when Wheatley quite plausibly presumed, from the circumstance that indirect questions are trivially true, that such expressions can be known a priori to be true, he slipped into a mis-reading of the proposed theory, as has been clarified by Leonard: In brief, I do not hold, and my theory does not imply, that 'Who is Governor of Minnesota?' can be known a priori to be true, nor does my position imply that this indirect question is necessarily true.3 Of course, if 'Who is Governor of Minnesota?' cannot be known a priori to be true, one might plausibly presume that it can be known empirically to be true. But this presumption would be equally misleading. On the proposed theory, the truth-value of 'Who is Governor of Minnesota?' is derived by correlating this expression with a proposition, namely the (true) proposition which satisfies the propositional function 'x is Governor of Minnesota'. To know that the expression is true, we must know that it is a legitimate, answerable question,