Aspects Of Human Action Research Articles

IF YOU COULD READ MY MIND: ON THE HISTORY OF MIND AND OTHER MATTERS

ABSTRACTIn The Primacy of Method in Historical Research: Philosophy of History and the Perspective of Meaning, Jonas Ahlskog presents a critical and lucid engagement with contemporary philosophies of history and makes a sustained case for a return to the ideas of history and social science as developed by R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch. What philosophy needs again is, first, a recognition of the “primacy of method”—that is, the insight that what one knows about reality depends on how one knows it. Second, philosophers need to take “the duality of method” seriously again and to recognize that the modes of explanation in the human sciences and the natural sciences are categorically different from each other—especially now that this difference has been blurred in recent debates about the Anthropocene. Ahlskog's book is thus also a contribution to the classical debate about causal explanation versus meaningful understanding. On closer analysis, however, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” on “historical method” suffer from an insufficient engagement with counterarguments. A first line of critique challenges the idea that human action cannot be explained causally. A second line of critique challenges the idea that all aspects of human action can be “understood,” because the unintended aspects and consequences of individual actions cannot. These require causal explanation. A third line of critique concerns Ahlskog's denial of the fundamental plurality of ideas of history and the social sciences. Squeezing this plurality into one philosophical mold comes at a price. Unintentionally, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” also show that much.

The Unrest of the Enlightened Self: The Scope of Human Action in Spinoza

My aim in this paper is to examine some of the distinctive facets of human action in Spinoza’s philosophy and show their intrinsic connection with each other. By analyzing in detail how Spinoza addresses different aspects of human action in his main work, the Ethics, it is possible to notice that for him free human agency implies two interrelated features: on the one hand, the adequate knowledge of the causes that determine it, and, on the other hand, a growing capacity to impact with greater power the scenarios in which it takes place. Thus, in contrast with quietist and passive readings, I show in the following that the two aforementioned characteristics are part of the Spinozian philosophical conception of agency as such. By pursuing this line of thought, it is also possible to establish a link—not always noticed in the secondary literature—with some of the central lines of thought contained in the Theological-Political Treatise. In discussing these theses, I advance the idea that the Spinozian conception of human agency involves a serious readjustment of the metaphysical vision of the agent, a change in her conduct and ethical practices, and an altogether different conception of politics and religion.

Two‐stream spatiotemporal networks for skeleton action recognition

AbstractSkeleton‐based neural networks have been considered a focus for human action recognition (HAR). It is noteworthy that the existing skeleton‐based methods are not capable of combining the spatial and temporal features reasonably to derive more effective high‐level representations, and it continues to be a challenging task of learning and representing the skeleton action discriminatively. In this study, a novel two‐stream spatiotemporal network (TSTN) is proposed, which is capable of processing the spatial and temporal features respectively and collectively to achieve a better representation and understanding of human action. The temporal branch stacks three gate recurrent unit (GRU) blocks in a new architecture to encode the temporal correlations from different aspects of human action, achieving high‐level temporal semantic feature expressions. The spatial branch encodes the spatial features with multi‐stacked graph convolutional network (GCN) blocks. Self‐attention mechanisms incorporated with the graph structure of the skeleton are explored to add weight influence and structural hints to further enhance the performance. The experimental results verify the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed model in skeleton action recognition; the model reaches state‐of‐the‐art on specific datasets.

Paradigms for Political Action. A Draft for a Repertoire

Whether politics is a separate sphere or an aspect of human action is a subject of academic controversy. I focus here on the political aspect of action, which is not exclusive of other aspects. There are no ‘naturally political’ issues nor is there anything completely devoid of a political aspect. I am now taking a step backwards to discuss the seemingly simple ‘political or not’ question, as compared to the ‘political in which sense’ question, which I have discussed elsewhere. In this article, I stay on the ideal–typical level, as I want to discuss alternative ways of marking the criteria for the political aspect, without discussing the views of other scholars in detail. I call the procedure for judging and naming this aspect political literacy, a way of making explicit the presence of the political aspect in some phenomena or questions. What is political at a certain time can, in other words, be judged as the result of a politicising reading of the phenomena in question. Here I shall construct a repertoire of certain ideal–typical criteria for marking the political aspects and making sense of actual disputes regarding the political. The repertoire includes the criteria of political action under such headings as expediency, partisanship, controversy and contingency. I regard the view of politics as belonging to a separate sphere as a zero option. All of the paradigms can be regarded as different facets of politics as a contingent activity.

Species of Human Actions in Aquinas Determined by Both Object and End

Species of Human Actions in Aquinas Determined by Both Object and End Joseph Pilsner C.S.B. In his moral writings, St. Thomas Aquinas dedicates much effort to identifying various kinds of human actions (e.g., almsgiving, murder, liberality, robbery, etc.) and to examining what determines such species.1 Among the various aspects of human action, the two he considers most important for determining moral species are "object" (what an agent is doing) and "end" (an agent's purpose in acting).2 Objects specify for Aquinas when they possess a morally relevant formal character (ratio) revealed by a comparison to right reason. An object with such a formal character will either realize or oppose some moral good if willed. Suppose that a married man is considering "having sexual relations with a woman." This description of his possible action may be accurate, but it is insufficient for a determination about whether it would be good or evil in kind. When the action under consideration is compared with right reason—in this case, a correct understanding of how sexual powers ought to be used—aspects of the man's action relevant to this comparison will come to light; St. Thomas holds that these aspects should be included in the object's formal character. Sometimes the comparison will reveal [End Page 565] aspects which indicate conformity with right reason; for example, the man's object might be "having sexual relations with his own spouse." This object (with its formal character now identified) will determine a morally good human action of marital love. At other times, however, the comparison with right reason might reveal something discordant: the object might be "having sexual relations with another's spouse." This object has a distinctive opposition to the good of marriage as discerned by right reason; it defines or specifies an evil kind of human action, adultery.3 What role does an end play in specification? For Aquinas, in some cases, a human action will receive a moral species from its object, and no further determination relevant to this moral species will be added by an end. For example, a man may have as his object "to present himself as other than he is." If the man wills this object simply from the pleasure of carrying out this deception and for no further end, then according to St. Thomas, this object by itself will determine the moral species of dissimulation (simulatio).4 On another occasion, this man might have a further end for dissimulating, but if this end has no special relation to right reason, then here too, the object will determine the action's only moral species. If, however, the end on account of which some object is chosen possesses its own distinctive relation to right reason, then, according to Aquinas, this end would determine an additional moral species. For example, in a case where a man is "having sexual relations with another's spouse" (object) as a means to "appropriating secretly some possession" of his paramour (end), the human action would have the species of adultery from its object and theft from its end.5 The end, like the object, is opposed to right reason, but the evil brought about by willing the end is essentially distinct from the evil brought about by willing the object. An end in such a case has a special importance in specifying the human action: since the object is willed for the end's sake, the species from the end has a certain formal primacy over the species from the object. Note, however, that for St. Thomas, the species from this end does not subsume, alter, or contribute to the species that the action receives from its object. The human action in this case remains adultery from its object, even when it is determined to be theft (the more prominent species) from its end. [End Page 566] There is a third way, according to St. Thomas, in which an object and end can be related to the specification of human actions, and this third way is the primary concern of this article. In certain species of human action, Aquinas holds that an object and end together contribute to...

Interpretations of Al-amanah Among Muslim Scholars and Its Role in Establishing Peace in Society

Al-amanah (honesty) is a fundamental virtue associated with all aspects of human actions. Its fulfillment is a command of the Almighty Allah and His Messenger. To achieve its understanding and in order to realise its significance in the contemporary world, we examine the concept of al-amanah as it is understood by experts from different disciplines. The study concentrates on the interpretations of the Qur’anic word al-amanah, mentioned in the Surah al-Ahzab 33: Ayah 72, which talks about it in various aspects of a person’s life. The study presents the meaning of al-amanah according to lexicographers and Muslim scholars from several disciplines such as tafsir, hadith, Islamic jurisprudence, as well as ethics. In conclusion, the study finds that al-amanah enables humans to eliminate ignorance, injustice, treason and so on from society, thus creating a more peaceful environment.

Converting Evidence Into Data: The Use Of Law Enforcement Archives As Unobtrusive Measurement

The newly emerging area of Investigative Psychology provides a behavioural science basis for crime detection by examining investigative processes and criminal behaviour. It draws upon a range of material collected by law enforcement agencies that is not widely utilized in the social sciences. This may be regarded as a form of non-reactive, unobtrusive data that has many of the advantages originally promoted by Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest (1966) and more recently explored by Lee (2000). The value of such data, derived from police sources, has been demonstrated in a variety of Investigative Psychology studies. However, law enforcement material is not usually collected as data but rather as evidence. Consideration is therefore given to how to address the challenges this poses. The unobtrusive measures derived from police investigations provide a different perspective on crime and other aspects of human actions from that based on more conventional sources of data such as questionnaires and interviews. To assist in the effective use of measures derived from police information a framework for considering this material is proposed reflecting the range of sources of measures that Lee (2000) identified; personal records, running records, physical traces, and simple observation. As in other areas, close attention to the methods of collecting such material can considerably improve its utility. The measures being utilized in Investigative Psychology therefore offer some fruitful directions for other areas of social science research. Development of these measures can also improve the effectiveness of criminal investigations.

Towards an anthropology of action: From pastoral techniques to modes of action

This article starts from the hypothesis that societies are characterized by their propensity towards certain forms of action – forms that differ in their means, rather than their ends. It then proceeds to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the different dimensions or aspects of human action: manipulation/operation; passive/active/interventionist; endogenous/exogenous/participative; direct/indirect; positive/negative/contrary; internal/external; continuous/discontinuous. This framework is the product of extensive research on pastoral techniques among Siberian Yakuts, but can also be applied to actions carried out in other spheres that concern behaviour towards nature and towards other people. In so doing, the article strives to resolve certain key problems within the anthropology of action.

Che cosa unisce Weber, Bachtin e Vygotskij?

As the title suggests, the main focus of the book edited by Bruno Maggi, Interpretare l’agire: una sfida teorica, is on human action and theoretical challenges of interpreting it. The volume is a remarkable contribution for at least two reasons, which are also its purposes. First, it shows that an interdisciplinary approach is more useful and required in order to analyse human action. In this perspective, thirteen researchers, from various nationalities (French and Italian), age (younger and elder), disciplinary frameworks and approaches (sociology, psychology, economy, etc.) present their point of view on different aspects of human action. Second, it points out that they share a common epistemological orientation, alternative to the classical conceptual dichotomies (objectivism/subjectivism, system/action, etc.): Maggi calls it the «third way». It had been identified by Weber within the Methodenstreit and can be found in the thinking of many authors, like Simon, Giddens, Elias and also in Vygotsky’s psychological and Bachtin’s sociolinguistic contributions. The «third way» is a unitary conception of acting, it denies the opposition between explanation and understanding, as it regards them as complementary parts of the same cognitive process. Interpretare l’agire is a volume by many hands but it has unity, in its plan as well as in its execution. Maggi organizes the exposition in the following way: the first part of the book deals with the epistemological, theoretical and methodological principles of elder researchers’ approaches (Clot, Faïta, Maggi, de Terssac); the second part is made up of young scholars’ essays (Albano, Bournel Bosson, Fabbri, Masino, Prot, Salento, Saujat, Thoemmes, Zamarian) illustrating the heuristic potential of previous theories in the analysis of a heterogeneous variety of phenomena (from the processes of family socialization to the dynamics of teaching or job training; from a sociological study of labor law to organizational learning).

Editorial Introduction: Putting Virtues Into Practice. A Challenge for Business and Organizations

Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in virtueethics and its application to business (Hartman 2006, 2008;Koehn 1995, 1998; Solomon 1992, 1993, 2003; Whestone2001). ‘‘Virtue ethics’’—as opposed to utilitarian andconsequentialist ethics, on the one hand, and deontologicalethics, on the other—puts special emphasis on the devel-opment of moral character. This makes virtue ethics anexcellent platform from which to analyze various aspectsof human action, professional work, and business activity.Some authors have focused on the individual level,showing how virtue ethics can provide insight into howmanagers behave and make decisions (Arjoon 2010; Bas-tons 2008; Bertland 2009; Jennings 1991; Parkan 2008;Provis 2010; Whetstone 2003). In fact, through their work,human beings not only produce goods and services butalso, and more importantly, develop a series of abilities andcompetences that shape their personalities. Human beingsnot only transform their environment through their workbut they also transform themselves.Most people undertake their professional activity in abusiness context. Goods and services offered by businessesare produced through the joint effort of people workingtogether. Businesses create environments that can eitherfavor or hinder the personal development of workers. Forthose reasons, other authors have chosen to write on virtueson the organizational level (Drake and Schlachter 2008;Dyck and Wong 2010; Moore 2005a, b; Sandin 2009).Third, through their products and services, businessesmake an impact on society. People in business should askthemselves how their work and their products or servicescontribute to building better societies and better citizens.Some products are clearly dangerous to people and socie-ties; other products are controversial at the least; but mostof them have a positive impact, although in variousdegrees. Hence, virtues may also be considered relevant fortheir bearing on communities and societies as a whole(Gonza´lez 2003; Graafland 2010; Wells and Graafland2012).In summary, virtue ethics provides managers and busi-ness leaders with an opportunity to ask themselves whatkind of people they become through their actions and howtheir decisions impact the lives of others. It gives them achance to consider what kind of business environments andcultures they should build, how business goals, policies andprocedures foster positive or negative learning in theiremployees and what kind of societies they contribute todeveloping through their operations and the products andservices they offer.Virtue ethics is not only a theoretical approach thatmakes for interesting comparison with other ethical theo-ries (Arjoon 2008; Chan 2008; Everett et al. 2006; Heugens

Habits, routines and temporalities of consumption: From individual behaviours to the reproduction of everyday practices

The terms habit and routine have come to be used with increasing frequency in debates about ‘behaviour’ change and sustainable consumption, where dominant approaches, dubbed as ‘portfolio models of action’ by their critics, employ these terms to capture human deficiencies in the translation of pro-environmental values into corresponding actions (the ‘value–action’ gap). Alternative approaches present habits and routines as the observable performances of stable practices. Informed by these approaches, this article makes three ‘conceptual moves’ in order to demonstrate the need for empirical attention to the temporal conditioning of everyday practices. First, it is argued that conceptual usages of the terms ‘habit’ and ‘routine’ are often imprecise and used generically to capture many different aspects of human action. A threefold conceptual framework comprising of ‘dispositions’, ‘procedures’ and ‘sequences’ is proposed as a preliminary step in dealing with this problem. Second, it is suggested that generic uses of the terms ‘habit’ and ‘routine’ imply multiple forms of temporality. Again, as a conceptual sorting exercise, three categories of temporality pertinent to understanding the performance of practices are examined: time as a resource; the temporal demands of practices; and temporal rhythms. Third, the relationships between the conceptual variants of habitual and routine actions and temporalities of practices are examined through reference to empirical research. In conclusion, it is argued that reducing habits and routines to generic descriptions of behaviour within portfolio models of action is inadequate for developing understandings of the reproduction of everyday practices. Rather, empirical and conceptual attention to the relationships between practices, temporalities and different forms of action are required if the challenge of fostering more sustainable ways of life is to be met.

The practical wisdom of personalism

PurposeCurrent mainstream management theory is based on incomplete assumptions regarding the nature of human beings and human action, leading to damaging practical results. This paper aims to draw on personalism for the formulation of better assumptions for theory.Design/methodology/approachThe main problems in current assumptions are analysed. A combination of the exclusion of human intentionality with a view of human beings as self‐interest maximisers who betray relationships if it is in their interest so to do, leads to practical proposals for management that distort human behaviour and tend to make people less trustworthy. Nevertheless, such assumptions are not entirely wrong; it is their incompleteness that is problematic. They need to be able to include the intrinsically relational aspect of the human being. In personalism, the human being is seen as a duality, individual‐person, which can provide a way of conceiving both the self‐interested and self‐giving aspects of human action in an integrated way.FindingsThree brief examples of how these expanded assumptions can give us better guidance in management situations indicate the further potential of this line of research. Personalism grounds human dignity in the idea of the person as the imago dei, a Christian idea. The paper discusses the relevance of this idea for management today.Originality/valueThe value of the paper is that it builds a bridge between current management problems and a well‐developed philosophy, allowing the resources of this tradition of thought to be accessed towards the end of creating better management theory and practice.

Activity Theory: A Useful Framework for Analysing Project-Based Organizations

This paper contributes to the efforts to understand the dynamics of project mode of work and project-based organizations by highlighting the usefulness of Activity Theory and the associated concepts from practice-based approaches to organizations. The author utilizes his experiences during his doctoral work in the setting of software development firms in India. Initially, the theoretical roots of the Activity Theory are explored in the context of other practice-based frameworks. Through an elaborate structuring of the elements in social and organizational situations, the concept of “activity” tries to overcome the separation of human action from the relevant elements embedded in the context. By engaging with various aspects of systemic and individual peculiarities in understanding a situation, the Activity Theory strives to make the analysis of organizational situations richer and deeper. The importance of such an approach for analysing project mode of work is explored and its feasibility is illustrated by suggesting that projects in software development can be analysed effectively as “activities”. While conceptualizing organizational units like software projects as activities, it is important to also visualize devices for understanding their interactions with other activities within and outside the organization. This is especially true for outsourced software development work. For this, the ideas of “boundary objects” and “boundary spanners” are conceptualized in an activity theoretical way. By utilizing these ideas, it is illustrated how two dimensions of inter-activity interactions can be identified and studied. It is especially noted that multiple activity memberships and trajectories of organizational actors and tools can be profitably incorporated into research efforts that strive to bring such interactions in project-based organizations to the limelight. From a practice perspective, the ideas associated with the Activity Theory can help in looking at the challenges of project management in newer ways. For example: It can give them a vocabulary to understand expertise in newer ways. Resultantly, it can help them explore ways of facilitating the creation and maintenance of expertise in the project. The theory can also help them create processes for inter-activity interactions creatively by considering the socio-historical aspects of other activities both within and outside the company. Like other frameworks used for organizational analysis, the Activity Theory focuses on certain aspects of human action and interprets them using a unique vocabulary and theoretical standpoint. This inevitably results in concerns, limiting factors, and the grey areas where the framework may not be as illuminating. These are explored and some directions in which they could be addressed are pointed out at the end of the article.

Om att förstå en handling - från kausalanalys till normanalys

How to understand an action - from causal analysis to norm-analysisIn order to explain and understand actions, one has to find concepts that are sufficiently encompassing to make room for every aspect of underlying causes. Since norms govern and guide behaviour, whether it be social, economic, political/administrative or technical behaviour, the concept of “norm” has this capacity. In this article, the author argues for, and gives an exposition of, what he calls norm-analysis. Causal analysis is used as a point of contrast, and analyses of power as a point of departure, in elaborating the characteristics of normanalysis. It is argued that the proposed concept of “norm” has several advantages when it comes to understanding and explaining human action. The concept has three dimensions: (a) will and values, (b) knowledge and cognition, and (c) systemic possibilities for action. The three dimensions cover different aspects of human actions and behaviour, but the main point is that explanations of human action should be conceived in terms of a combinatory effect of these different dimensions. The norm model is not a theory but a kind of screening device in order to sort out relevant facts in a case. It thereby lays the foundation for a theory of action.

Between a Boulder and a hard place: The dialectics of positivism, constructivism and hermeneutics.

Abstract Psychology is unable to demonstrate its legitimacy as a rigorous profession or a positive science. The Boulder model as well as the alternative theories proposed by the positivists, constructivists and hermeneuticists are part of a larger and more fundamental dialectical process; one that finds its historical significance within the philosophical tradition as well as all aspects of human action. It is time for psychology to wake up from the repressive slumber of positivism and reaffirm its position as a human science.

System for Analyzing and Evaluating Human-Related Nuclear Power Plant Incidents

Developed as a remedy-oriented system for systematically analyzing and evaluating humanrelated incidents occurring in nuclear power plants, the present system aims particularly at identifying causal factors and at deriving proposals for specific hierarchical countermeasures. Unlike conventional methods, which are based on checksheet format, and are thus devoid of logical methodology for conducting the analysis, and which thus lack the means of searching for underlying causal factors, and which do not record factual information on the sequence of events, our system incorporates innovative techniques such as ; (a) a modified fault tree method for searching the underlying causal factors, (b) compilation of related events into sequential charts, (c) technique for devising proposed hierarchical redundant countermeasures, and (d) implementation procedures set out in practical manual form for easy familiarization and application. Through several trial applications, our method has proved to permit identifying underlying causal factors even down to those associated with the software aspects of human action and state of mind, and with the mode of management, organization, operating rules and document forms, all of which are liable to be overlooked. The results of analysis are stored in database to permit subsequent searching to serve as useful material for activities aimed at promoting plant operation safety.

Conventional aspects of human action, its time, and its place

In the last few years a broad debate has taken place in books and journals about the time of action. Many different views have been propounded, and many an ingenious argument has been devised. I submit that those views are insightful but that the arguments have been misplaced. The views are at bottom compatible, for they differ in what they call ‘action’. I propose that our conception of action is so enveloped in conventions that there is no factual issue, per se, about the time and place of human action. There are actually several layers of conventionality involved in our timing and placing of actions. The crucial philosophical issues pertain to the clarification of those conventional layers. Among these issues are: (i) What are the conventions involved in timing and locating actions? (ii) What is the rationale for those conventions? (iii) Is that rationale sufficient to show the usefulness of those conventions? (iv) Can and should those conventions be improved upon?

Action, Action Descritpion, and Narrative

HE AIM OF THIS PAPER is to show that a general theory of action may provide partial insight into the structure of narrative discourse. The intuitive idea behind this investigation is that one of the characteristic properties of narrative discourse is that it contains action descriptions. Such action descriptions are also given in current action theories of several disciplines, for example, philosophy, logic, the social sciences, and linguistics (pragmatics).' These theories provide a general, systematic, and explicit characterization of the structure of human acts, as distinct from nonacts, events, or states, of act sequences and interaction and of the conditions for successful action. The first part of this paper will briefly and informally summarize conclusions of recent action theories derived from philosophical logic. I shall focus upon the abstract structure and conditions of acts, neglecting specific psychological, social, historical, moral, economical, or other aspects of human action.