Aspects Of Family Law Research Articles

Regulating Family Law in Federations: The Impact of De/Centralization, Religion, and International Treaties on Abortion and Child Marriage Policies

AbstractThere has been little study of the effects of federalism on the regulation and reform of family law (FL). This article addresses that gap by identifying variables that affect two aspects of FL: child marriage and abortion. The underlying research question is what conditions make it easier to reform discriminatory FL in one federation compared to another. FL involves multiple rules governing marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, and often inheritance and family property use. Many gender scholars also include reproductive self-determination, specifically abortion. FL rules also have multiple elements: e.g., marriage regulations govern age, “race,” sex, domicile, etc., that often differ across constituent units. The main variable examined is the extent of centralization, because the dominant pattern of regulation in these cases is centralized legislation and decentralized implementation. The other two variables explored are religion and international norms-building and their effects on FL regulation and reform.

Some Aspects of the Court Protection of Family Rights and Interests

The scientific article is devoted to some aspects of judicial protection of family rights and interests. At the present stage of development of society, one of the priority areas of public policy in Ukraine is the protection of family rights and interests. Achieving this goal is ensured through various legal means, among which a special place is occupied by judicial protection. In connection with the duplication of the list of methods of judicial protection in family and civil legislation of Ukraine, one of the problems that attracts attention is the ratio of methods of civil and family protection, as well as clarifying the possibility of applying civil legislation to regulate family relations. Therefore, the purpose of this scientific article is to analyse the problematic aspects of family law and civil law regulation of judicial protection of family rights and interests. As a result of the study, it is substantiated that the only mandatory prerequisite for establishing a legal relation by a court decision is the prior establishment by a court of a relevant legal fact as a basis for the emergence, change or termination of the legal relationship. In view of this, the court, except for cases of adoption, as well as the establishment of a separate residence on the application of spouses, protects family rights and interests in a separate proceeding not by establishing a legal relationship, but by confirming the presence or absence of legal facts, which are the basis for its occurrence, change or termination. It is established that the legislator's regulation of such special methods of judicial protection of family rights and interests as establishing a legal relationship and its annulment is due to the special legal nature of family legal relations, which does not exclude the possibility of “subsidiary application” to protect the rights and interests of their subjects using civil protection methods (recognition of the right and invalidation of a transaction).

Bureaucratizing Sharia in Modern Indonesia: The Case of Zakat, Waqf and Family Law

This article examines the “bureaucratization” of Sharia in Indonesia, giving special attention to zakat, waqf and other aspects of family law. The bureaucratization of Sharia aims to modernize the legal system for Muslims in order to provide certainty and justice in solving legal disputes. While some scholars view the incorporation of Sharia into state law as an attempt at Islamization, this study argues that this process reflects increasing bureaucratization rather than Islamization. The incorporation of Sharia into state law is a project of formalizing a state-defined brand of Islam and Sharia legislation. This phenomenon has precedence in premodern Muslim governance and can be traced from the colonial period. In contemporary Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and religious courts have played a central role in bureaucratizing Sharia. To support the argument, this study will explore Indonesian family law, including zakat and waqf.

Hukum Keluarga Islam dalam Perspektif HAM Universal (UDHR) dan HAM Islam (UIDHR)

Human Rights contain provisions relating to Islamic law, especially family law. As a Sharia scholar, this topic is crucial to observe. This paper analyzes several aspects of family law in human rights, both universal human rights and universal human rights, such as marriage, inheritance, and child custody. There are the similarities and differences in both of these human rights like in the case of marriage. In Universal Declaration Human Rights, marriage is permissible for a couple without consideration of religion at all (article 2), whereas in Universal Declaration Human Rights, there is strong indication (Article 19 (1)a) that inter- religious marriage is forbidden, such as the comments of Elizabeth Mayer and others.DOI: 10.15408/ajis.v16i1.2892

Nation and Family: Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism, and Gendered Citizenship in India. By Narendra Subramanian. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014. 377 pp. $65 paper.

Nation and Family: Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism, and Gendered Citizenship in India. By Narendra Subramanian. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014. 377 pp. $65 paper.Nation and Family points to the need to examine carefully the ways in which conceptions of nation inform attempts to regulate family life through law and policy in plural societies. It addresses questions about plurality of personal laws and the patterns and pace of family law reform in independent India. One of the principal arguments Subramanian makes is that the extent and direction of personal law reform is determined by specific interactions between discourses of nation and community and the coalition-building ambitions of the political elites. In India this resulted in what he describes as modest yet reforms as compared to changes in other multicultural nations such as Turkey, Tunisia, and Indonesia that he surveys in Chapter 2. Subramanian presents an interesting introductory account of the various combinations of conceptions of postcolonial nations, responses to colonial institutions and discourses, desires for both the indigenous and the in several postcolonial nations, and the different forms of multiculturalism and family law these combinations have produced. This broad comparative overview is a significant contribution that serves as an invitation for more in depth comparative research in this field.In chapters that follow Subramanian traces the changes in particular aspects of family law in India, first in law, and then in Muslim and Christian laws. Subramanian argues that reforms in the latter two started late and have been slower, primarily because policy makers, majority of whom were Hindus, regarded culture as being more dynamic. They also failed to recognize the impetus for social change within minority communities and relied instead almost exclusively on Hindu concerns and initiatives in order to understand and reduce the existing inequalities (p. 277). In case of Muslims, there was also a misreading of the community's desire for a distinct personal law as a resistance to any change in the family law, with serious implications for gender equality. Subramanian also sheds light on the ways in which the policy makers' ignorance of the nature of reform the Muslim mobilizers were seeking coupled with their reliance on stereotypes of Christian communities being more open to modern values led to the different approaches to Muslim and Christian personal law reforms in the country, which in turn resulted in more marginalization of Muslims than of Christians.While Nation and Family focuses primarily on the role of policy makers in legal reform, it also offers interesting comments on legal elites, especially on the tendency of judges trained in a particular tradition to rely on colonial personal law while interpreting statutes, unlike religious elites who are often committed to reform agendas that are also based on what Subramanian refers to as precolonial traditions (page 37). …

Unanticipated Consequences of Changed Relationship Legislation

Relationships are formed, operate and are dissolved “in the shadow of the law”. There have been major changes in family law over the past forty years, with both Australia and New Zealand going down a similar path to other western countries. This paper outlines the changes in relationship property legislation drawing on the New Zealand experience. It considers how, from an economics perspective, these are likely to change behaviour and the nature of society. Risks and returns from relationships have changed, with potential transfer of assets being greater and occurring with more and shorter relationships. This can affect relationship formation and dissolution, as well as behaviour and bargaining positions within relationships. Only a limited range of possible implications were considered in the New Zealand parliamentary debates leading to the legislative changes. This was largely due to narrow framing of the issues. Additional possibilities can readily be predicted using basic economics reasoning. These relate not just to relationships and families, but also to decisions on education, career and lifestyle. Broader perspectives can also be taken. There are contradictions between aspects of family law, the policy objective of inclusion, concerns about population aging (including issues of care of the elderly), and aspects of happiness research. While policy changes may be generated through political movements, informal adaptations to the changed environment will also occur. These will result in both anticipated and unanticipated consequences. Consideration of these raises additional questions. Standard economic analysis based on theory and within a tightly specified set of assumptions gives some insights, but it is important to also remember Keynes’ warning about additional reserves, qualifications and adjustments that are necessary for real world application. The paper attempts to present a broad perspective.”

Reform of the marriage law in Argentina

The reform of marriage law in Argentina including same-sex couples brought a great deal of equality to the system but it has some elements inconsistent with other aspects of Family Law that remain unmodified. The modification of the marriage regime addressed the issues related to the equality principle and solidarity as the aim of the law. This article argues that the reform is not in full harmony with the Argentine legal system.

Modest Expectations: Gender and Property Rights in Urban Mexico

This article examines gender and property in Guadalajara, Mexico, in the light of debates that oppose formal title to the social embeddedness of rights in customary law and assert that titling is bad for women. The article focuses on urban homes, private property, and civil law but finds that qualities regarded as characterizing customary property relations also shape popular understandings of property in urban Mexico. Discussion groups and social surveys in four low-income neighborhoods addressed two aspects of family law and property: whose name should appear on titles, and who should inherit the home. The results show that women, as wives, sisters, and daughters, have a secondary relationship to property. They also suggest that the opposition of individual title to socially embedded rights is a false dichotomy and that generalizing arguments about formalization and especially the negative gender implications of titling risks replicating the universalizing tendencies of Western property models.

Jimutavahana's Dayabhaga: The Hindu Law of Inheritance in Bengal

This is a translation of a 12th-century Sanskrit legal text, with the original text. The Dayabhaga was one of the most important texts in the history of Indian law. The text, fairly late and inspiring little attention, is important because the British elevated it to such prominence in their new colony in the early 19th century. It was known as the authority on inheritance and significant aspects of family law for the eastern Indian region. The case law and scholarship that surround this text have shaped Indian personal law right up to the present day.

The Case Against Same-Sex “Marriage”

Argues that same-sex “marriage” is a logical and practical impossibility and has serious implications for both other aspects of family law and the respect for human life and children in our culture. Asserts that the movement for same-sex “marriage” is a logical outgrowth of our culture’s separation of sex and procreation. Argues that the basis for opposition to this movement may be the residual reservoir of traditional understanding about marriage in the American public. It is because of an abiding interest in marriage based in our culture and especially in our law that one cannot talk about the immorality of homosexual sexual acts without talking about marriage because one way — a perfectly adequate way — to describe what is immoral about sodomy is to say that it is a non-marital sexual act and that is because it is the teaching of the Catholic Church that marriage is the principle of all upright sexual activity. The position of marriage in our culture and in our law is quite degraded now. Most times it is difficult to get even a neutral audience to see the connection between the laws that prohibit consensual sodomy and marriage (i.e., why such laws are needed to help buttress marriage), although those connections can be made and should be made. What I address in this paper, specifically, are the dangers of the legal recognition same-sex “marriage.” The dangers have something to do with marriage. Legally recognizing same-sex “marriage” is dangerous, and it ought not to happen. It violates moral truth. It is not exactly right to say that same sex “marriage” is immoral, although it’s not wrong to say that. It is not quite right to say that it is morally impermissible. This is because expressions such as these suggest that it is something that can be done, but ought to be prohibited — like abortion. Abortions can happen, but they ought to be prohibited and they are seriously immoral. Same-sex “marriage,” however, is impossible, given what marriage really is. It is simply not possible for two men to be married to each other or for two women to be married to each other. So the short answer is that the danger in recognizing same-sex “marriage” is that the law will recognize as valid and capable of being treated like any other marriage something which in fact is impossible.

Lawyering, Husbands' Rights, and "the Unwritten Law" in Nineteenth- Century America

By the 1850s, many aspects of family law appeared uncertain and contested. Legal reform had altered the balance of legal power within marriage. A mid-nineteenthcentury American husband knew-or might suddenly discover-that he was no longer sure of his legal rights over his wife, no longer sure of his rights over his children. He had lost some security of possession over his domestic domain. In the zerosum game of marital struggles, wives had gained public legal rights, and that necessarily meant losses of rights for husbands. Still, if a man found his wife the arms of another man and he killed the other man on the spot, he would never be convicted of murder. His exemption was part of a complex of self-defense rights, at one with his right to shoot a burglar or a malicious trespasser, to repel, violently if necessary, someone who had invaded his property (although, like other property holders acting self-defense, the man might be convicted of manslaughter). His exemption was part of the privileged identity of a husband. Other men protective or patriarchal roles -fathers, brothers, sons, fiances -possessed no articulated exemption from prosecution for murder if they killed seducers found the arms of their dependents. Nor were wives entitled to kill their husbands' lovers. All of them -wives as well as fathers, brothers, sons, and fiances -often escaped conviction and punishment when juries refused to convict. But only a husband had a developed legal privilege. And he had that right only if he had found his wife and her lover together, a seriously and unquestionably compromising position. And only if he had acted immediately. Time was of the essence. The privilege demanded an act in the heat of passion. Otherwise, if he dawdled, if he planned, if he thought about what he should do, he became a premeditating murderer. He became someone who should

The Law Commission and the Family Home

The enactment of the Children Act 1989 brings to an end one major piece of family law reform in which the Law Commission played a leading role. The publication of the Commission's discussion paper on the Ground for Divorce in 1988 is a first stage in an equally fundamental review, the outcome of which must have profound implications for many aspects of family law. In publishing its Working Paper on Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home the Commission seems to have acted in the belief that they were addressing a discrete topic which could usefully be considered in isolation from some more fundamental issues. Perhaps this belief explains why the Working Paper is in some respects flawed. The aim of the Law Commission was not to propose major changes in the present law as to domestic violence and occupation of the family home, but rather to put forward a system of unified remedies, to produce 'a single set of remedies which could be made available in all courts and all family proceedings'.2 Under the existing scheme, jurisdiction is divided between the High Court, county courts and magistrates' courts, and is derived from several different pieces of legislation; so there is evident fragmentation which quite properly attracted the Commission's attention. It is important to note two features of the present law. First, in the High Court and the county courts, remedies for domestic violence and the regulation of the occupation of the family home are run together. Jurisdiction rests on the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 and the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976, and in consequence of the decision of the House of Lords in Richards v Richards3 the criteria in section 1(3) of the 1983 Act are of general relevance. In the magistrates' courts, the jurisdiction under the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978 is violence based. This prompted the Law Commission, in considering a unified scheme, to suggest the enlargement of the magistrates' jurisdiction. Second, under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976, the same remedies are available in the county court to cohabitees as are available to spouses.4 As a result, the Working Paper frequently addressed the position of both without distinguishing between them. However, it then had to ask whether, under a unified system, magistrates should have the power to regulate, enforce or grant rights of occupation in the case of cohabitees.5 The Commission's concern to create a unified system of remedies obscures the policy issues underlying some key distinctions. One is the distinction between, on the one hand, cases of violence and threatened violence and, on the other, cases where a marriage is in the process of breaking down. Violence needs an urgent and strong response, whereas the question of occupation of the family home on relationship breakdown lacks that urgency, and raises quite different policy issues. Unified treatment of the occupation rights of spouses

Rhetoric and Reality: Regulation of Out-of-Court Activity in Matrimonial Proceedings

This article examines some procedural aspects of family law. First, it will be argued that the development of these aspects belies some conventional wisdom about the evolution and operation of family law. Second, empirical evidence of the actual effect of procedural requirements suggests that they may not always work in their intended manner. Third, the article examines the implications of the data for the frameworks for the analysis of out-of-court activity offered by Mnookin and Kornhauser' and Galanter.2 The emphasis of this article is firmly directed to out-of-court activity. Negotiated settlements, as in most areas of the law, are the norm in matrimonial law.3 This is not to say that the principles of statute and precedent are irrelevant. Rather, as Galanter writes, we have to ask,

A multidisciplinary urban response to child abuse and neglect

Saskatchewan is a self-governing province of about 1 x lO 6 within the Federal system of Canada. The University city of Saskatoon has 150,000 population and a fair degree of political autonomy. Health and social programmes are provincially administered as are certain aspects of family law. The Federal Government contributes with money and advice in selected areas of all of these. In order to effect change, a number of individuals, groups and organizations must be approached, persuaded and asked for assistance.

Some Aspects of Family Law in Pre-Exilic Israel

Some Aspects of Family Law in Pre-Exilic Israel

Some Aspects of Family Law in Prpj-Exilic Israel 1)

Some Aspects of Family Law in Prpj-Exilic Israel 1)