In his influential book, Vom Musikalisch-Schinen, Eduard Hanslick argued that it is impossible to represent the emotions in music because music cannot represent the "conceptions" or cognitive content which help to define the emotions. "The feeling of hope cannot be separated from the representation of a future happy state which we compare with the present; ... Love cannot be thought without the representation of a beloved person, without desire and striving after felicity, glorification and possession of a particular object."' Yet music cannot represent these ideas or objects; all it can do is to represent the "dynamic" aspects of emotional life. Hanslick's words have echoed down the years, influencing both philosophers of music and music theorists and critics. Among philosophers, Susanne Langer repeats almost verbatim Hanslick's strictures on emotional expression in music, claiming that music can represent only the dynamic aspects of emotional life, its patterns of motion and rest, tension and relaxation. On her view, music "reveals the rationale of feelings, the rhythm and pattern of their rise and decline and intertwining, to our minds ..."2 Unlike Langer, Peter Kivy believes that music can express particular emotions. In The Corded Shell he argues that some musical phrases mimic human gestures which are expressive of a particular state of human feeling, and other musical features are expressive of particular feelings by virtue of some conventional association. Music can sound like a person loudly lamenting or joyfully jumping; or it can sound sad just because music in a low register and the minor key conventionally signifies sadness.3 Significantly, however, virtually all the musical examples of expressive music which Kivy cites are confined to a very limited set of feelings, mostly joy, sadness, and restlessness. The vast majority are also accompanied by words, which, of course, help to establish expressiveness. In a more recent book on music, Music Alone, which deals with "pure" or "absolute" music, Kivy continues to maintain that music can express particular emotions, but he echoes Hanslick in arguing that the emotions which music can express are only those which need not be directed toward any kind of object. Music can be sad or joyful or restless without being sad, joyful, or restless about anything in particular.4 This requirement would seem to rule out the possibility that music can express cognitively complex emotions. Like Hanslick, Kivy seems to think that it simply cannot be done. Tendencies in twentieth-century music and music theory have helped to establish the notion that music cannot express complex human emotions. In the second quarter of the century, for example, Igor Stravinsky was at the forefront of a reaction against romantic music and musical aesthetics, claiming that "music is, by its very nature, essentially powerless to express anything at all,"5 while cultivating a more reticent neoclassical style. Somewhat later, the serialists and advocates of aleatoric music began to experiment with mathematical procedures that increased the temptation to think of music in the medieval way, as belonging with arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy in the quadrivium. More recently, the dominant theoretical systems, including Schenkerian theory and set theory, have tended to concentrate on what they take to be music's internal relationships, emphasizing rigidly recursive structural hierarchies and quasi-mathematical manipulations and terminology, respectively. In the last decade, however, a number of
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