Asian Partners Research Articles

Beyond Paradigms

Why did claimant states in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute, especially China, recently increase its militarization activities, in unprecedented ways that were relatively absent in the previous decades? Espousing an analytically eclectic explanation rather than using one single International Relations (IR) paradigm, this essay demonstrates three key exploratory arguments. First, the enduring Chinese military insecurity from American dominance in Southeast Asia has been recently amplified by the confluence of China’s economic rise, and more importantly, the power struggle in the current Xi Jinping-led regime. The article offers a domestic politics-oriented approach in explaining the strategic resolve of Beijing to militarize the disputed SCS region. Second, although many countries in the region uphold a ‘hedging foreign policy strategy’, which refers to their strategic engagement both with China and the USA, the Southeast Asian countries’ patterns of foreign policy behaviour and identity politics suggest that their longterm aspiration still relies on the USA as their primary security guarantor. Third, notwithstanding such perception of Southeast Asian states towards the USA, this article demonstrates that Washington’s long-term commitment of upholding its security guarantees to its Southeast Asian partners is hindered by the US interest to strategically engage with Beijing on broader issues of global governance.

US Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Prospects for China

Underneath the first executive stroke exercised by President Donald Trump, the US has withdrawn the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Trump has his own logic of resurrecting the US economy, creating more jobs, protecting industries, arresting currency devaluation by the Asian countries and banning the corrupt practices of dumping cheap imports from the Asian trading partners, notably by China. However, the Asian partners think otherwise. They were demanding for the great opportunities offered by the US market and consumers. For them, the US withdrawal is a severe setback to the robust economic ties with the US and for the multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in the Asia-Pacific region. As the TPP was considered to jointly target the Chinese economy by the 12 partners. On the contrary, the US withdrawal, furnished with an unprecedented leverage to China to continuously grow in the 21st century and to overcome its economic slowdown while further expanding its economy.

Roivant and Poxel join for imeglimin

Roivant Sciences, an investment vehicle of biotech investor Vivek Ramaswamy, will put $50 million into the French biotech firm Poxel in exchange for worldwide rights, except in Asia, to Poxel’s developmental diabetes treatment imeglimin. The drug is in Phase III trials in Japan with Poxel’s Asian partner, Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma. Poxel says its drug works by increasing insulin secretion and cutting glucose production.

The United States and Asia in 2017

Early Trump administration initiatives upset regional stability, complicating the foreign policies of Asian partners and opponents alike. Subsequent pragmatic summitry eased regional anxiety and clarified the new government’s security and political objectives. The administration’s national security strategy, released in December, provided a well-integrated security, economic, and diplomatic strategy for Asia and the rest of the world.

Mental healthcare in Saint Lucia.

St Lucia is a small island in the eastern Caribbean with a population of approximately 200 000 people. Although St Lucia is formally ranked as a high middle-income country, there are pockets of deprivation and relatively low living standards. Mental health services in St Lucia have increased considerably and advanced over recent years because of a coalition between the government of the island and South East Asian partners. The National Mental Wellness Centre opened several years ago and has much improved facilities. There remains a significant shortage of community-based services, no mental health law, and a pervasive community stigma and apprehension regarding those with mental health problems.

Geographical Indications in European Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA): Challenges in Implementation

Geographical indications (GIs) refer to signs or symbols used on products that have specific geographical origin and possess quality, reputation or distinctive characteristics linked to their place of origin. Hailed as an important tool to protect the living cultural and gastronomic heritage, GIs have been embraced with a long standing strong-form protection among European countries and have gained ground elsewhere around the world, especially in Asia-Pacific region. The European Union (EU) also asserts its entrenched pro-GI position by means of, among others, encompassing its internal benchmark of GI protection in a number of bilateral negotiations with Asian countries such as free trade agreements (FTA) with South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam. Finalized at the end of 2015, European Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) has marked another successive glory of the EU in line with its strategy to globally transplant its notorious sui generis protection regime of GIs. As an agriculture-intensive country and the first developing partner in Asia that has concluded an agreement with the EU, Vietnam had explicitly recognized the prominence of GIs by establishing and enabling a thorough legal and policy framework for the protection of GIs. This thesis focuses on addressing the foreseeable obstacles encountered by Vietnam when it comes to implementation of GI mandates under EVFTA in light of the relevant domestic institutional framework on GIs and the enforcement thereof by public authorities and interested economic operators. It demonstrates that within the context of EVFTA, the stance of the EU as a bigger negotiating partner with a prominent say in GIs plays a vital role in framing the content of the GIs section. Conclusively, EVFTA has set a more ambitious standard of GI protection as against what is obligated under Vietnamese national legislation. As a result, Vietnam shall possibly need to take serious account of challenges in quality management of GI-denominated products so as to make in-time adaptations in both institutional and practical terms. In addition, possible pitfalls pertaining to business awareness of GI significance, small-scale GI product groups, technical assistance and GI product market entry are also envisaged.

Перспективы и проблемы привлечения китайских инвестиций в экономику Сербии

In the last two decades, in a time of transition and transformation of a planned economy into a free market economy, Serbia has almost lost its primary industry sector. In other words, the Serbian primary industry sector was largely “de-industrialized” although in the secondary and tertiary industry sectors maintained a certain vitality and development potential. Starting from the political changes of the 2000, Serbia catches up with other countries in the region in the most important aspects of the transition process. In this sense, foreign direct investments have a significant impact on the Serbian economy, by improving economic structure and giving it new competitive qualities, increasing access to international markets, serving as a resource for improving the balance of payments and helping to accept modern technology, knowledge and management. It gives real hope that Serbia with the help of foreign capital will be able to re-industrialize their production and to restore and develop its industrial capacity. Serbia sees China as the most important foreign trade and financial partner in Asia and as a major partner in achieving its strategic economic objectives. Lack of financial resources needed for realization of the planned economic development goals, enables China to invest own financial resources on favourable terms using the Serbian market openness and good mutual relations permeated with mutual trust and benefits. For the proper understanding of Sino-Serbian relations, this study gives first short explanation of the Chinese strategy of the “New Silk Road”. Then, it includes analysis of the development of Serbian-Chinese political and economic relations (especially in the field of foreign investment). The final part of the study includes evaluation of comparative advantages and certain disadvantages for the Chinese foreign investment in the Serbian economy, which in itself has certain significance for the realization of the “New Silk Road” strategy”.

The Impact Of ASEAN Free Trade Area On Intra-Asean Manufacturing Trade

This study investigates the effects of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreement on the bilateral manufacturing trade between the 10 member countries of ASEAN and 39 of their trading partners. The period ofstudy covers 1995 to 2014. Results obtained from panel data analysis of the gravity model with random effectsshow that the economic sizes, populations, relative endowments, common language and geographical factors like distance, island, landlocked and neighbour are significant determinants of the bilateral manufacturing trade for ASEAN member countries. Moreover, results obtained from the fixed effects model in this study suggests that AFTA has generatedpure trade creation effects in terms of exports. Ontop of that, AFTA has resulted in larger magnitude of trade creation effects in imports than import diversion effects. Overall, AFTA promotes trades among ASEAN member countries through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, for bringing aboutpure trade creation effects in terms of exports as well as imports and also trade diversion effects in terms of imports. In sum, this study with more recent data set covering more ASEAN trading partners shows empirical evidence to justify the success of AFTA arrangement.

China’s “Going Out” Strategy in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of the Automobile and Electronics Sectors

In view of China’s “going out” programme, this article argues that mainland Chinese firms have not made significant breakthroughs in the Southeast Asian automobile sector, primarily because of a competitive and still consolidating marketplace, various national regulations of Southeast Asian countries and the need to dovetail their own corporate goals with those of their Southeast Asian partners. Meanwhile, mainland Chinese firms have made major advances in the Southeast Asian electronics sector by offering low prices and high-quality products and services. In addition, they also collaborate with marketing firms that possess intimate knowledge of the marketplace.

The European Union’s trade and investment policy in Asia: new challenges and opportunities in a changing global environment – or: following individual roadmaps

Asia is Europe’s largest trading partner and EU-Asia trade relations have undergone a rapid change since the global financial crisis. On a global scale, the new multilateral trade agreements such as the now stalled Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving European Unions’ (EU) major trading partners such as Japan, Singapore and Vietnam also have the potential to change the trade equations. In this paper, we evaluate the new EU trade policy which has been designed to ensure that the EU benefits from the changing global trade scenario and also look at the steps which have been taken by the EU to promote trade relations with its major trading partners in Asia in the predicted ‘Asian century’. We look into the Free Trade Agreements, which are being negotiated with its Asian partners and seek to understand the reasons which have resulted in delays in their signing and negotiations. We evaluate new policies pushed forward by its Asian partners such as the One Belt One Road policy by China and Japan’s policy of securing a large number of trading agreements in the America. Moving ahead, we also shed light on the indirect factors that may influence the success of EU trade negotiations in Asia such as the EU policy on granting China market economy status and the commencement of the ‘Brexit’ process. Lastly, we try to present a list of immediate priorities for EU in Asia, which will ensure that it secures a toehold in trade with the region. All in all, it is shown that the EU has not one and the same approach for all Asian countries but it negotiates flexibly and individually country by country. Because of this “country by country approach” the EU is also not ready to enter into general EU-ASEAN trade negotiations again.

China y América Latina: ¿Socios estratégicos o competidores?

Rev.esc.adm.neg
 This document has as main objective to discuss the dual role that China is playing in Latin America, on one hand, a strategic trade partner in Asia, source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and key ally in the international arena, on the other hand, China is a formidable competitor particularly in the manufacturing sector. To reach the main objective, we make a brief description of the international trade relation between China and Latin America for the last 15 years, also, a review of the investment flows in different economic sectors, and lastly, a description of the political and diplomatic relation between Latin America and China. From this, it can be inferred that the bilateral relation is prominently framed by the trade of commodities from Latin America to China and the Chinese investment in the sourcing of natural resources.

Reaffirming U.S. Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: A Japanese Perspective

Reaffirming U.S. Alliances in the Asia-Pacific:A Japanese Perspective Noboru Yamaguchi (bio) From a Japanese perspective, the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific under the Trump administration seems to be far more robust than many in the region worrisomely speculated during the presidential election campaign. Despite Donald Trump's tough words on U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe as a presidential candidate, the administration's approach in East Asia, centering on the alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), has been positive and pragmatic, endorsing the importance of the hub-and-spoke network of bilateral arrangements between the United States and Asian partners.1 Visits to Asia by Secretary of Defense James Mattis in February and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in March, followed by Vice President Mike Pence in April, have signaled that the United States will keep emphasizing its Asia policy and cooperation with allies and partners in the region. This essay discusses, first, how Japan sees the Trump administration's commitment to Northeast Asian security; second, the implications of the Trump administration's Asia policy; and third, the outlook for the U.S.-Japan alliance in the near future. The U.S. Commitment to Northeast Asian Security in the Trump Administration The Trump administration has so far proved the United States' strong commitment and firm resolution to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. In particular, the administration's willingness to cooperate with important players in the region, including China as well as U.S. allies Japan and the ROK, to address the threat posed by North Korea exemplifies its commitment to regional stability. For Japan, while serious concerns [End Page 13] remain regarding the future direction of China, whose rise might have both positive and negative impacts on the regional and global strategic environments, North Korea constitutes the paramount foreign threat to national security. North Korea has been vigorously pursuing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs despite a series of UN resolutions.2 In 2016 alone, the country conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear tests and launched 24 missiles. Pyongyang has claimed that it is developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the United States.3 With the possibility of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, the danger posed by such programs is no longer regional but soon could directly threaten the United States. On March 6, 2017, North Korea simultaneously launched 4 missiles with a range of around one thousand kilometers, 3 of which landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan. Ten days later, presumably in response to North Korea's accelerated missile and nuclear programs, Secretary Tillerson made it clear that "all options are on the table" to deal with North Korea's destabilizing acts against Japan. He further commented in Seoul on March 17 that "if they elevate the threat of their weapons program to a level that we believe requires action, that [military] option is on the table." 4 This statement was powerfully endorsed earlier by Secretary Mattis on February 3 when he stated that "any use of nuclear weapons would be met with a response that would be effective and overwhelming." 5 These words were followed by deployment of the carrier strike group headed by the USS Carl Vinson near the peninsula. Strategic bomber overflights, frequent port visits by U.S. Navy ships to the ROK, and joint exercises with Australia, the ROK, and Japan, among other actions, also demonstrate U.S. determination and capabilities on issues related to Northeast Asian security. The U.S. attack against Syria on April 6 reinforced this message to North Korea and other concerned parties that the United States will not tolerate any action threatening the international community with the use of [End Page 14] weapons of mass destruction. This message was seemingly well understood by China and conveyed to North Korea. Indeed, one of the Chinese Communist Party's own international media outlets, the Global Times, openly warned North Korea and expressed China's reluctance to be involved in a military conflict, stating that "if Pyongyang's unwavering pursuit of its nuclear program continues and Washington...

The EU's Peace and Security Narrative: Views from EU Strategic Partners in Asia

AbstractThe EU has consistently struggled to forge a foreign policy narrative which promotes internal cohesion and supports the EU's efforts to exert international influence. The 2016 EU Global Strategy is the latest iteration of collective efforts to tie strategy and purpose to the EU's coherent identity in the world. This study compares the EU's strategic partners of peace and security with narratives about the EU held in the EU's strategic partners in Asia. Whilst we find reasonable coherence in the EU's projection of the international system and its role in it, its identity as an actor, and its response to policy issues on the ground, views from Asia largely contest these claims. This article employs a strategic narrative approach to conceptualize and empirically trace how the formation, projection and reception of EU narratives are part of broader circuits of communication through which EU might be recognized, legitimized and achieve influence.

The Value and the Limitations of Comprehensive Multilateralism: An EU Perspective on the Asia-Europe Meeting

This article examines the attitudes of the European Union on the development of Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It looks first at the trajectory of EU positions on ASEM, before specific sections explore the EU perspective on the style and format of ASEM, on the substantive issues under discussion, and on the wider geo-political relevance of the institution. In order to provide a critical assessment of the EU’s position, the article also discusses some of the key alternative relationships the EU has with the Asia-Pacific region, be it multilaterally or bilaterally. By way of conclusion, the article argues that despite the limitations of ASEM, the process still retains an added value in the context of the wider diplomacy between the EU and its Asian partners.

Avoiding the Labors of Sisyphus: Strengthening U.S.-India Relations in a Trump Administration

Avoiding the Labors of Sisyphus:Strengthening U.S.-India Relations in a Trump Administration Ashley J. Tellis (bio) For close to two decades now, the transformation of U.S.-India relations has been a bipartisan project in Washington. It has also been uniquely successful, as alternating Republican and Democratic administrations have worked with governments led by both the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Congress Party to exorcise the ghosts of old corrosive Cold War disagreements. As a result, the United States and India, once sharply divided by the issues of alliances and alignment, today routinely declare their commitment to a durable strategic partnership. Former Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, arguably the progenitor of the new collaboration, once boldly declared the United States and India to be “natural allies.”1 At that moment in 1998, the vision of fraternity seemed like fatuous rhetoric. But to the credit of Vajpayee’s successors (Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi) and their U.S. counterparts (George W. Bush, in particular), his ambition was brought to fruition rapidly and productively enough for Barack Obama to assert that U.S.-India ties could become the “defining partnership” of the century ahead. The first section of this essay discusses the potential implications of the “America first” agenda that Donald Trump outlined during his presidential campaign for U.S.-India relations and regional security more broadly. The second section then assesses several challenges facing the bilateral relationship. The Outlook for U.S.-India Relations during the Trump Administration Although it is not inevitable, Donald Trump’s election as the 45th president of the United States could interrupt the dramatic deepening in U.S.-Indian ties to the disadvantage of both nations. If this outcome were to materialize, it would not be necessarily because Trump harbors [End Page 43] any particular animus toward India. During the election campaign, he admittedly did complain that “India is taking [U.S.] jobs” and that the United States was being “ripped off” by many Asian countries, including India.2 But he also declared that he was “a big fan,” and that “if…elected President, the Indian and Hindu community will have a true friend in the White House.”3 The variety of positions expressed by Trump suggests that the potential threat to the continuing transformation of U.S.-India relations comes less from his views on India—which are probably unsettled—than it does from his iconoclastic convictions about the relationship between the United States and the world. Throughout the campaign, Trump emphatically affirmed his opposition to the existing international order, arguing that the United States, far from being its beneficiary, was in fact its principal victim. To remedy the inconveniences flowing from this pernicious “globalism,” his America-first campaign promoted an agenda that rejected multilateral free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, demanded that allies bear a greater share of the burdens associated with their defense, and eschewed U.S. military intervention in virtually all instances other than to avert direct threats to the U.S. homeland. While many elements of this nationalist agenda are understandable—even defensible—the worldview it represents diverges from that which initially cultured the evolving U.S.-Indian partnership. Going back to the earliest years of the George W. Bush administration, the United States’ rapprochement with India was premised on the assumption that the principal strategic problem facing both countries consisted of the rise of China and the threat it posed to both U.S. primacy and Indian security—not to mention the safety of the United States’ other Asian partner and allies—simultaneously. Since it was assumed that the United States would subsist as the principal protector of the liberal international order, and the Western alliance system in particular, even in circumstances where the containment of China was impossible because of the new realities of economic interdependence, the Bush administration slowly gravitated toward a strategy of balancing China by building up the power of key states located on its periphery. [End Page 44] India’s large size, its geographic location, and its own rivalry with China made it the ideal partner in such a strategy. Hence, it was not surprising that the Bush administration...

Deepening and Widening of Production Networks in ASEAN

This paper assesses the recent widening and deepening of machinery production networks in ASEAN by using highly disaggregated international trade data over 2007–13. Based on both traditional trade value data analysis and a novel approach to the diversification of exported products and destinations, we confirm the steady development of back-and-forth trade links, notably with East Asian partners, centering on Singapore and Thailand. In addition to the five ASEAN forerunners, Vietnam is an increasingly active player in such networking. Although their degree of participation is still limited, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar also show signs of joining production networks.

Deciphering the Shift in America's South China Sea Policy

The tensions resulting from the territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes between China and five Southeast Asian countries--Brunei, Indonesia, (1) Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam--have for years dominated the headlines on the South China Sea and defined the lens through which the issue is seen. While the United States has at times expressed its concerns over incidents in which destabilizing actions occurred, these developments had minimal impact on the US grand strategy of preventing the rise of a potential hegemon in the Western Pacific. Prior to China's push to enlarge the features it occupies in the Spratly Islands, US officials largely viewed the sovereignty dispute as a matter to be resolved between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and were careful in framing the issue as a diplomatic rather than a military challenge. While Washington had always emphasized its commitment to, and the need for all sides to respect, freedom of navigation and overflight and the unimpeded flow of global commerce, it has never enunciated in unequivocal terms what the United States would do to uphold these principles. This position would change as a result of US assessments of the implications of China's artificial island building beginning in late 2013. The United States is not a party to the South China Sea dispute. Yet it is a party to a disagreement and contest with a rising China on the meaning of freedom of the seas--a principle that is central to US core interests--and what the regional security landscape of the Asia-Pacific ought to look like in future years. Understanding the crux of this contest is important for grasping the role that the South China Sea plays in US grand strategy, and factors that can lead to substantive changes in US policy on the issue, or lack thereof. This article begins by deciphering what the United States views as its core interests in the South China Sea that have the potential to either support or upend US grand strategy. It posits that the United States has two fundamental and enduring core interests in the South China Sea: defending its view on freedom of the seas, and maintaining the naval and air superiority of the United States in the Western Pacific. The article moves on to offer an overview of America's South China Sea policy in the context of the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and is based on the premise that US officials began to devote significantly more attention and resources to the issue as a result of greater US focus on regional issues, especially with regard to Southeast Asia. This section also sheds light on the evolving nature of the disagreement between Beijing and Washington in light of the US rebalance. It presents a context for understanding how China's artificial island building, if strategically deployed, can be a nexus between these two sets of disputes, with the of causing the fundamental disagreement between the United States and China to spill over into the South China Sea. The following section elaborates official US views on China's reclamation activities and its implications for US core interests and grand strategy in the Asia Pacific. It seeks to capture the shift in US strategy on the South China Sea. This article concludes that the United States has responded with a new, active strategy that aims to: first, deter China from taking further actions at its reclaimed features that would alter the existing military balance of power in the region; and second, make it pay a net effect for its behaviour--should it continue to pursue an aggressive course of action--by engaging more forcibly with Southeast Asian partners. The final section outlines how the new shift in US policy has manifested itself to date, and analyzes the extent of its effectiveness as of this writing towards China's actions and for US core interests. This article seeks to capture a US-centric view of the evolving nature of the South China Sea dispute in relation to its grand strategy. …

Joint Crediting Mechanism under the Paris Agreement and Its Implication to the Climate Policy in Korea

Before the Conference of Parties (COP) 21 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2015, most parties of UNFCCC had submitted their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) and to achieve their voluntary targets, some parties consider using international market mechanisms. As one of such mechanisms, Japan promoted its own bilateral mechanism called Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM). In this study, feasibility studies and projects under JCM have been analyzed by project type, sector, country and region, which could provide some implications in designing Korea’s future climate policy to achieve Korea’s targets of 11.7% using international market mechanism in INDC. Since 2010, JCM has promoted 542 projects and feasibility studies in 44 countries according to the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) database. Among 542 projects, about 80% were feasibility studies implying that JCM was more focused on project identification. However, current trends of JCM show that more projects will be soon implemented based on these feasibility studies. For sectoral categorization, projects were categorized into seven sectors-energy technology, energy efficiency, renewable energy, waste management, city, strategic planning and projects related to the country’s efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). JCM projects were mitigation focused with more than 70% of projects were related to energy efficiency, renewable energy and energy technology. At the regional and country level, JCM is highly focused on Asia and especially, more than 100 projects were developed in Indonesia. Based on the analysis of JCM, in order to develop bilateral international mechanism for Korea, it is worthwhile to emphasize that Korea considers Asian countries as her partner. In addition, Korea may consider the collaboration with Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to implement projects identified by Korea and Asian partner countries. Furthermore, strategically, it is recommendable to develop jointly with Japan who has already capacity and networks with other Asian countries to mitigate GHG emissions. Such financial resources from MDBs and Japan may contribute to meet the 11.3% of GHG reduction target from abroad according to INDC of Korea.

Practical Problems of Legal Regulation of Customs Duties Developing an International Trade Between the Republic of Lithuania And East Asian Countries

Abstract For more than ten years (since 2004) the Republic of Lithuania is a member of the EU and is realizing its economic and trade relations with other foreign countries, and regulating customs duties according to the requirements of the EU Common Commercial Policy. However, in the recent years foreign trade (in particular - exports of goods) remained one of the main factors which increased an economic growth (recovery) in the Republic of Lithuania after the global economic crisis of the world, which began in 2008. In this context, the search for new markets and expansion of trade relations with new trade partners in Asia became essential in order to diversify the structure of the national economy and avoid dependence on traditional trade partners, such as Russia. Taking into account this strategic goal, the article seeks to answer a question whether an existing foreign trade regulation system ensures the status of Lithuania as an attractive partner of foreign trade with East Asian countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore) and what regulatory instruments (customs duty rules and procedures) should be used on the national level to ensure cooperation with these countries. In order to answer this problematic question, the first chapter of the article overviews general tendencies in Lithuanian foreign trade with the countries of East Asia, while the second chapter is dedicated to describe regulatory regime for import customs duties on the national level (in line with the major provisions of the EU Common Commercial Policy). The practical problems and obstacles to international trade are presented in the third chapter and are illustrated by the examples of case law, which was formed in disputes relating to the decisions and actions of Lithuanian national customs authorities for the period from 1 May, 2004 (since entry to the EU)).

“Counting One's Allies”: The Mobilization of Demography, Population, and Family Planning in East Asia, Late 1920s–Present

This article interrogates the category “Cold War family planning” for the East Asian context (1945–1991), arguing that the category remains highly relevant while also reflecting a much longer regional history of demography and population studies. In this sense, the category is both useful and insufficient, especially if we fail to examine a revised periodization and a constructed nature for the category. If the category as constructed has its origins in a highly charged, ideological binary following the close of World War II and the fracture of colonialism, this reduced version of the narrative prioritizes the role of external partners, funding and grant agencies, and the attempt by powerful nations to reconstitute their relations with postcolonial nations through developmental aid. In turn, the longer version of the story emphasizes actors on the ground, the role of registration and demographic practice, and parties who strategically used the arrival of external actors to mobilize their own agendas. Cold War family planning thus represents a dynamic, interactive story, one in which multiple sets of partners with distinct agendas were able to work together. Building from this more complicated version, the final section of the article turns to the role of postwar Japan and Asian developmentalism, noting that family planning activities became a core part of the aid offered by emerging donor nations by the 1970s. Many Southeast Asian nations today encounter not just colonial history but also the reconfigured version of an earlier paternalism made available through their Asian partners.