BOOK REVIEWS 105 ble for reason's becoming practical is the existence of man who subjects himself to reason .... That there is a moral domain is due to the existence of the domain of man" (p. 127). Reason, then, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the moral domain. Thus, had Kant been consistent he would have been led, not to the primacy of Practical Reason, but to a philosophy, a metaphysics, of human existence--and it is this which would provide the unifying theme of his critical philosophy. This volume of studies is a brilliant example of what occurs when a philosopher of major proportions engages the Kantian problematics: The internal dialogue is an exciting and subtle testimony to the act of critical philosophizing. RICHARD M. ZANER Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas Boston Studies in the Philosophy o] Science. Vol. II: In Honor of Philipp Frank. Edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartovsky. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1965. Pp. xxxiv + 475. ---- Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, 1962-1964. $9.75.) Something for everyone or nothing for anyone? After the compliments to Philipp Frank by, among others, Carnap, Margenau, Von Mises, and Nagel, the symposiasts turn to their own preoccupations without the ghost of a connection with Frank or any other common thread. For logicians of science, Schlesinger and Hempel argue about the paradoxes of confirmation, Follesdal and Chisholm about contrary-to-fact conditionals, quantification, and modality in causal contexts. For historians of science, McMullin and Wartovsky discuss the evolution of the concept of mass out of the concept of matter (in a way that seems to miss the sense in which mass is not a quantitative equivalent of matter, but a quantitative property of matter , i.e., how it behaves in dynamic systems). Everett Mendelsohn and Ernst Meyr talk, in an instructive way, about the actual effects of physical theories (e.g., that of elastic bodies) on the development of nineteenth-century biology. For phenomenologists, Herbert Marcuse and Aron Gurwitsch discuss the possible "Galilean" misinterpretations of science consisting of the supposition that there is an absolute separation of the real (and mathematical) and perceptual everyday world. Whiteheadians are represented by Abner Shimony and J. M. Burgers speculating on how Whitehead might have adapted his philosophy of the organism to quantum physics. Michael Stock, O.P., tries to show that Freud is compatible with Aristotelian and Thomistic psychology. Mili5 Capek and Donald Williams rehearse the Parmenides-Heracleitus controversy about temporal reality in an interesting if somewhat bewildering pair of papers. Norman Rudich tells us that poetry, like science, is cognitive, thus justifying its inclusion in this volume. Hanson claims that it is impossible to conceive mathematics as a closed system, modelled on a mathematical system, in a lively paper in which scholarship has the appearance of being displayed rather than used. A long and complicated paper by Sellars criticizes the Identity approach to the mind-body problem, in the form held, apparently, by Herbert Feigl. It is not clear how anyone could possibly hold the view as Sellars states it, nor why it is so imperative, as Israel Scheffier maintains in his comments, that scientists must be reductionists. Finally, there is a long debate involving J. J. C. Smart, Sellars, Hilary Putnam, and Paul Feyerabend, entitled "Conflicting Views about Explanation." It is, in fact, a long endeavor to get clear, without paying too much attention to one another, what views each takes on the question: How do theoretical statements relate to observation statements? Finally, there is a piece by Sir George Thomson who seems rather bewildered about such goings on, but manages nonetheless to offer a humble and lucid account of the world of science that, alone among the contributions to this volume, bears the mark of actual contact with that world. k. R. LoucH Claremont Graduate School ...
Read full abstract