Army's Ability Research Articles

Tracking Democratization: Insights for Planners

ABSTRACT: Drawing from previous debates on the topic of state- and nation-building in this journal, this article offers a baseline understanding of the theories of democratization. It then provides a convenient visualization of the political transition from an autocratic or failed state to This visualization should be useful to practitioners and policymakers engaged in strategically expanding The officially stated goal in Iraq was, and the ultimate political objective of many recent US ground military operations has been, promoting (1) In two recent Parameters articles on nation-building, it became clear that a general disagreement exists over whether postconflict rebuilding realistically entail creating a democracy. (2) Obviously, understanding what it takes to promote democracy can precondition the Army's ability not only to fight effectively but also to secure the political objectives of war. (3) If the ultimate end state includes the successful transition from military authority to democratic civilian authority, then it is incumbent upon military commanders to set conditions for the success of the nascent To do this, commanders and planners need a basic understanding of democratization even though guidance for military leaders on how to promote democracy is lacking. Broadly speaking, there are two methods to promote (4) The political approach concentrates on building institutions that support democracy by transition from autocracy to Alternatively, the developmental approach concentrates on setting conditions for a stable democracy to develop over time. Success requires both. Even though applying only the political approach leaves out key social aspects of democratization, most doctrinal literature concentrates on the political approach and neglects the developmental approach, making the task look far easier than it really is. This article explores what the developmental approach provide strategists and planners and offers a rudimentary, but quantifiable, understanding of the efforts necessary to transition and consolidate from an unstable state to a viable This discourse does not explore the academic nature of democracy but distills an extremely complex sociopolitical event down to its essence--the fewest possible variables that still yield a demonstrable relationship--to provide a simple way to conceptualize and visualize the transition to While discussing other metrics, this analysis focuses on theories of democratization, the process of democratization, a functional definition of democracy, and the most salient democratization data points. An introduction on using key metrics to estimate timelines relevant to defense policy is also provided. The article concludes with some thoughts on factors to consider when discussing democratization with civilian leaders and policymakers. Theories of Democratic Transitions The causes of a society's transition from an autocratic to democratic government are not fully understood. Over the years, researchers have proposed multiple theories that are generally placed into one of four categories: social structural evolution, where both the elite and the general populations simply witness the inevitable transformation of civilization; top down, driven by the elites; bottom up, forced by the general populace; or a hybrid combination of the three. The structural approach, commonly referred to as modernization theory, recognizes a societal correlation between democracy and certain structural factors that usually include average income, average education, availability of media sources, and levels of industrialization and urbanization. (5) Namely, increases in income, education, and urbanization associated with industrialization create conditions favorable for With these changes, the population adopts equalitarian value systems. …

Organizational Change and Adaptation in the US Army

ABSTRACT: The military profession changes by both slow evolution and sudden revolution. This article offers a typology to understand the factors that influence such changes, and then suggests how each factor might help or hinder the US Army's ability to adapt in the near future. ********** Between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the US Army transformed how it prepared for war. This shift grew from an equally stark change in how the officer corps conceived military professionalism. The old professionalism was built upon the belief that military competence was a product of character, common sense, and natural aptitude. Those innate qualities might be refined through experience or study but were largely beyond the ability of the institution to manufacture. Consequently, there was little effort to train officers in anything but the technical skills of engineering and gunnery. The new professionalism, by contrast, assumed command was a communal affair built upon a body of expert knowledge that could be codified, imparted, and regulated through umpired field training, professional education, and tactical doctrine. These activities implied the Army can, indeed must, shape the manner in which officers think and act. In war times, the change in professionalism was manifest as a shift from informal direction grounded in the personality of the commander to more formal control using impersonal staff procedures. The former was embodied by the figure of a general sitting atop a hill, aides dashing off with orders dictated by the commander; the latter was characterized by a command post filled with staff officers producing detailed written plans in accordance with standardized procedures taught at a staff college. Although undeniably more functional, the elements of personality were sacrificed in the transition. Individuals lost autonomy as they were subsumed within standardized organizational structures. Officers commissioned in the 1890s regarded this change as a natural evolution; one officer sneeringly called the era of his immediate predecessors the Army's Dark Age. (1) From the vantage of this younger generation, the path was one of progress. Previous generations would not have agreed. They found that the notion the institution could manufacture commanders misguided and offensive. These irreconcilable views disprove the myth of a universal military profession. There is no normative standard against which all can be judged. Instead, military professionalism can take many forms, each reflecting the prevailing ideas and values of its society and time. Because these ideas and values are so fundamental to those who hold them, a major shift in professionalism creates a significant divide within an army. Soldiers from either side of the division might be as foreign to each other as if they came from different countries. Those accustomed to the old ways regard the change as one for the worse, a betrayal of what they hold dear. Those who come up in the new tradition cannot fathom how their predecessors could have been so backward. The first part of this article provides a conceptual framework to explain why such changes happen. The second portion applies the framework to the US Army. Using lessons from the past and observations of the present, this article explores the possibility a significant professional shift is decades in the future or whether one might already be underway. Why Military Organizations Change The existing scholarship of military adaptation provides several models of organizational change. In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington examines the case of the US Army as just described. He argues a separation from society that was born of civilian neglect and geographic isolation in the late nineteenth century allowed military professionalism to flourish. His argument rests upon a flawed understanding of the beliefs of the officer corps of the time and its relationship with society. …

Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times

ABSTRACT: Force reductions resulting from the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review significantly compromise the US Army's ability to maintain the global commitments and positioning necessary for managing strategic risks arising from multiple, unforeseen sources. In this article, the authors discuss how active duty Army capacity affects America's strategic risk. ********** During the upcoming decade, the United States will be challenged by a new strategic threat or worse, multiple strategic threats. How will the US Army respond if sequestration cuts continue? The near-future Army--for better or worse--will originate in this decade. The size and readiness of the near-future Army will offer one of two options, either reducing America's strategic or increasing it. So what would be the right size of the Army if we want to reduce America's strategic risk? The results of 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) led to reducing the size of the Army to levels unseen since before World War II. Unfortunately, the current force reduction can only produce one result, the weakening of the joint force's ability to deter conflict, which accordingly increases America's strategic risk. Since the publication of the 2014 QDR, numerous new threats have emerged to challenge the Army's reductions. Daesh captured large parts of Iraq and Syria. The Syrian Civil War escalated, causing a Middle East and European refugee crisis. Russia annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and intervened alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain the Assad regime in Syria. North Korea remained bellicose, testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China continued its territorial expansion in the South China Sea, and the Taliban continued to intensify offensive operations in Afghanistan. All of these events occurred in just the last several years; what might the next few years bring? While acknowledging the indispensable roles of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as strategic reserves, their roles, missions, and sizing are beyond the scope and length of this article, which focuses on the size of the active duty Army. This discussion considers what the Army brings to the fight in relation to forward presence and deployable capabilities, the current and future demand on land forces, and examines two options for rightsizing the Army to reduce strategic risk. To set the stage for Army force sizing, we discuss the definition of strategic and five troubling assumptions about future war. Strategic Risk How does strategic relate to the size of the current and future US Army? Strategic is the probability of failure to achieve a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The smaller the army, the higher the of failure to obtain a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. (1) Senior US Army leaders view today's Army at high risk in regards to the emerging threats and potential for future great-power conflict. High is the rating in which the Army would not be able to accomplish all its assigned tasks in the allotted time and level of casualties. (2) Five Faulty Assumptions While assessments of strategic risk, acceptable cost, and the size of the Army are complex, several false assumptions about future war and landpower have gained currency in defense circles. These assumptions increase national strategic by failing to appreciate Army capacity-capability with sufficient scale and endurance--as an essential element of national security. The is troubling because it threatens to consign the US military to a repetition of the mistakes of recent wars and the development of joint forces ill-prepared for future threats. Forward-positioned land forces do not prevent conflict. Deterrence depends on the demonstrated ability to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its objectives, and deterrence theory states deterring aggression is most likely to succeed when the potential aggressor believes the threats will be enacted. …

To Win Wars, Correct the Army's Political Blind Spot

Abstract: Within increasingly complex operational environments, the Army's apolitical approach to war represents a political blind spot. This condition undermines the Army's ability to match military means to political objectives and to set the conditions for victory. To correct this blind spot, the Army must leverage reflective conversations about the political aspects of conflict. To develop this ability in its soldiers, the Army should increase its use of mentoring. ********** As part of the post-Iraq-post-Afghanistan reset, much has been written about how the US Army fights and whether its current doctrine is capable of producing victory. In response to these discussions, and the wars themselves, much has also been written about the need for the Army to become a learning organization, one capable of innovating in the face of increasingly complex operational environments. Most of these debates are insightful, yet miss the mark. They fail to identify the central cause that underlies the unsatisfying outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq and that risks future failures--the Army's political blind spot. The problem is not how the Army fights nor how it learns to fight. The problem is how the Army understands the fight. Often, it does not. Too often, the Army fails to consider and develop a tailored understanding of the political context, that is, specific political conditions, the range of desired ends sought by actual or potential belligerents or other strategic foreign audiences, associated with a given conflict. This failure makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Army to effectively apply its doctrine in pursuit of victory. This blind spot springs from an apolitical approach to warfare. It leaves the Army unable to appreciate the political conditions in which conflicts occur. This situation cannot be remedied through the Army's formal educational systems. Organizational and budgetary constraints make such remedies impossible. Formal educational programs must focus first on the delivery of formative skill sets and knowledge, rather than transformative understandings of theory, critical thinking, and the causal logic necessary to assess political conditions. To correct the Army's political blind spot, informal methods must be leveraged. Army-wide reflective conversations about the political aspects of past and potential conflicts are needed. Such conversations should be undertaken in the spirit of the Army's process for crafting strategic leadership. They should be an open dialogue of alternative points of view, seeking to explore the recursive effects of political conditions and military action. (1) These discussions should be carried out via professional publications, The Army Press, and social media-and facilitated through personal mentoring. The increased use of such reflective conversations will increase the Army's ability to appreciate the political context within which wars occur--and enhance its ability to set the conditions for victory in the twenty-first century. Political Roots of Recent, and Potentially Failure Over the last two years, counter-insurgency debates have given way to discussions of why the Army failed--or in Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger's view, lost--in Afghanistan and Iraq. (2) In Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future, Colonel Matthew Morton highlights the importance of this dialogue: [c]onclusions about the recent era of conflict will affect US officers as they ascend to higher ranks... He notes how future senior officers understand their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq will affect the advice they give civilian leaders. (3) It will also affect how they fight future conflicts, and even their understanding of modern war. Major Jason Warren notes that the Army's exceptional tactical prowess has paradoxically led to strategic impotence. Warren cites the rise of a centurion mindset as the principal reason the Army has repeatedly failed to achieve national objectives. …

The war for Korea, 1950-1951: they came from the north

for 1950-1951: They Came from the North by Allan R. Millett Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010 644 pages $45.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] To military historian and one-time US Marine officer Allan R. Millett, the Korean not so much the forgotten war the neglected He opens by chastising his fellow historians for their Eurocentric studies of the Cold War, noting that one devoted eight pages to the Korean War, another a page and a half, and a third skipped over the Korean conflict from 1948 to 1953. Millett, to the contrary, asserts that strategic thinkers and serving officers could learn much from the Korean that applicable today. author, a professor at the University of New Orleans, asserts: I propose that the Korean an example of the one great lesson of twentieth-century warfare: that no conflict should be categorized simply an interstate war or civil war or even a limited insurgency. While such definitions may advance statistical analysis, they are not much help for field diplomats and soldiers. He adds: Understanding the Korean will provide even more relevant examples of a war that embodies almost every aspect of contemporary Particularly pertinent: The Korean conflict remains a major window on the Chinese way of war. most appropriate way to view it, Millett writes, would be as a Maoist people's war, the global socialist template for wars of national liberation and postcolonial succession. Phase One began in 1945 with the end of World II and the division of in which the Soviets took the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel and put Kim II Sung in power while the US took the surrender in the south--and then went home. Phase Two started in 1948 when North sent a column of 1,800 partisans into the south to take advantage of a rebellion there. But South Miller asserts, won the unknown war before the forgotten war. That brought on the North Korean invasion of June 1950, which had the backing of Joseph Stalin in Moscow and Mao Zedong in Beijing. Millett labels that Phase Three of the conflict in but contends that Stalin and Mao guessed wrong on the North Korean army's ability to conquer South which led to the intervention of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) in November of 1950. That, Millett says, is the subject of this book, the second in a trilogy on the Korean conflict. author, whose writing a model of clarity, doesn't say it outright but he might well have renamed the Korean the Sino-American War. Note the book's title, The for Korea, not the War in Korea or The between the Koreans. Both the South Korean and North Korean armies turned in spotty performances, to the dismay of their respective American and Chinese allies, leaving the brunt of the battle to the two foreign armies. Mao's motive, having come to power in Beijing just a year before, was to drive the United States off the Asian mainland. …

The Crisis in British Army Recruiting in the 1930s

During the 1930s, the British army suffered a shortage of recruits despite the depression. This study explores the response of the War Office to the crisis, which undermined the army's ability to undertake its peacetime and wartime roles. The study is important in helping to elucidate the army's place in society, as the War Office had to examine itself and its public image to understand the reasons for the shortage. The War Office concluded that its image as a bad employer, an inefficient military force and as the object of pacifist propaganda played a crucial role in deterring recruits. Despite intense, and partially successful, efforts to improve its public relations structure and measures to combat the bad image, the main reasons for the improvement in recruiting from the fall of 1937 were the lowering of the physical standards required of recruits and the improving conditions in the service. The army remained a source of public pride, but one that was separated from society and whose recruits tended to be attracted by economic incentives.

The Health Assessment Longitudinal File Imperative: Foundation for Improving the Health of the Force

A smaller active duty force and an increased operational tempo have made the Reserve components (RC) essential elements in the accomplishment of the mission of the U.S. Army. One critical factor in meeting mission is maintaining the optimal health of each soldier. Baseline health data about the RC is currently not being collected, even though increasing numbers of reserve soldiers are being activated. The Annual Health Certification and Survey is being developed as a way to meet the RCs' statutory requirement for annual certification of health while at the same time generating and tracking baseline data on each reservist in a longitudinal health file, the Health Assessment Longitudinal File. This article discusses the Annual Health Certification Questionnaire/Health Assessment Longitudinal File, which will greatly enhance the Army's ability to accurately certify the health status of the RC and track health in relation to training, mission activities, and deployment.

Reinventing Army Recruiting

Imminent catastrophic failure was the mantra as manpower shortfalls were becoming a constraint on the army's ability to support national strategy. The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) reinvented recruiting by developing a Contract Forward methodology—a hybrid between a just-in-time and an inventory-based system. This methodology enabled the organization to better support national military security obligations while increasing military recruiting production by 17.5 percent and to completely eliminate a forecasted deficit. USAREC had cost-efficiency savings of $204 million out of a $1 billion program (20 percent savings).

Health Service Support and the Principles of War

The U.S. Army's ability to meet the challenges set before it is hinged on three components: superb soldiers and leaders, weapons and equipment equal to the requirements established, and a doctrine that is on the one hand sound and on the other hand understood. The Army's doctrine is set on the foundation of the Principles of War, a collection of logical ideas governing the prosecution of war. Developing the ability to apply these Principles to health service support concepts is required to enable the Army Medical Department to be successful in combat and during peacetime.

Women in the United States Army

This article addresses the recent increase in the utilization of women in the United States Army. It traces the history of women in the Army from the turn of the twentieth century to the present and recounts research (both published and unpublished) concerning (1) attitudes toward the use of women in the Army, (2) the impact the changing role of women has had on the Army's ability to perform its mission, and (3) the adjustment of women to the Army. Finally, the author speculates about the future of women in the Army.