Army Organization Research Articles

Life‐Cycle Maintenance Costs by Facility Use

The U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, Champaign, Ill., has developed several data bases for determining life‐cycle costs of building facilities by functional use. Four data bases have been implemented in a DOS environment for an embellished personal computer. The simplest data base contains average annual maintenance per square foot by building use. The second data base contains both yearly component replacement and annual reoccurring maintenance cost per square foot by building use. The third data base contains labor hours per square foot, equipment hours per square foot, and material cost per square foot by building age and building use. The most detailed data base contains labor hours per square foot, equipment hours per square foot, and material costs per square foot for each individual maintenance task. All data bases can be applied by any organization (cities, universities, corporations) for resource prediction. The data bases are currently being applied by several Army organizations, the Department of the Interior‐Historical Preservation Council, Department of the Navy, ASTM (American Society for Testing Materials), and many private organizations. Contents and application of the data bases are described in this paper.

MANPRINT Enhancement Methods: Organizational Change Process Review

The Army has developed a program to improve the effectiveness of the systems it procures by considering human factors very early in the system acquisition cycle. This program is called “MANPRINT,” and was established in approximately 1985 as a top-down management initiative by the Chief Of Staff of the Army. MANPRINT is an acronym that stands for “MANpower and PeRsonnel INTegration.” The creation of MANPRINT within the Army has had a significant impact on both the structure of the Army organization and the procedures by which systems are acquired. The US Army has commissioned a study to evaluate the effectiveness of the MANPRINT study and to make recommendations for its enhancement. A major purpose of this study is to assess the degree to which the MANPRINT program has been adequately instituted and incorporated into the organizations and operations of the combat development and materiel acquisition communities. Another purpose is to evaluate the degree to which the MANPRINT program targets those who are accountable for design trade-off decisions involving MANPRINT issues, and the implications for improving MANPRINT. An organizational design of the MANPRINT program will be presented with positive and negative constructive criticism. Statistics describing the sample will be presented. A content analysis of interview results will be presented, and questionnaire results will be presented in appropriate graphical format. The presentation will conclude with recommendations for enhancing the MANPRINT organization.

A Survey of Software Quality Assurance

This summarizes the authors' research into the state-of-the-practice of software quality assurance (SQA) in software organizations throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). Information was obtained through personal visits to a limited number of software facilities and by utilizing a SQA questionnaire that was mailed to 27 DoD software organizations. Twenty questionnaires were returned from Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force organizations involved in the Life Cycle Software Support (LCSS) process. The survey developed information regarding such topics as: staffing; personnel qualifications; quality standards used; SQA responsibilities; error data collection; adequacy of existing documentation; staff composition; distribution of SQA effort; and workforce mix. In addition, a list of SQA ``Lessons Learned'' was developed from comments made by DoD quality managers. The results of this study indicate a wide variance in the application of SQA within the DoD.

Lucie Gallistel Colvin (ed.), The Uprooted of the Western Sahel: migrants' quest for cash in the Senegambia. New York: Praeger, 1981, 385 pp. £28.25, hardback.

The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a turning point in the history of Abyssinia and the peoples of the Horn of Africa due to the fact that the Christian state of the highland plateau succeeded not only in maintaining its independence vis-a-vis European colonialism but also in expanding its territory three-fold. This led to the conquest and incorporation of about 70% of the populations currently comprising the polity. This historical development was facilitated, among other things, by the Shoan access to firearms, better army organization, foreign advisors and, above all, the understanding of European colonizers and their imperial rivalry during the «Scramble for Africa ». Despite this incontestable advantage over peoples with different levels of socio-economic organization, Abyssinia failed to subjugate some regions for years due to stiff resistance. The most bitter and protracted resistance was sustained by the Arsi-Oromo, the largest single branch of the Oromo nation. This paper reconstructs how the Arsi Oromo managed to raise a fighting force large enough to resist the imperial army for more than a decade thanks to their military tradition enshrined in their socio-political organization called Gadaa, unity, solidarity and determination. The victory of the Shoan kingdom and the defeat of the Oromo, as that of many other societies, had far-reaching implications: the latter lost their sovereignty, most of their land, and ended up as colonial subjects and serfs in the newly created empire. This paper highlights how contemporary Ethiopia came into being through wars of conquest and the consequent tormented state of centre/periphery relations.

INTERVENING AT THE BOTTOM: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WITH ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN AN ARMY WORK‐SETTING1

If Organizational Development technology is expected to have an effect on soldier perceptions, attitudes, and performance, then it must be assured that OD interventions adequately penetrate to their level. This may not be likely to occur in a multi‐layered Army organization. This study examines the effects of a series of OD techniques in an Army organization where penetration was assured by dealing directly with the troops at the lowest levels. The results showed positive changes in soldier perceptions and performance following an OD program including survey feedback, participative problem‐solving, and job enrichment techniques.

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICING OD IN THE ARMY1

During the past five years, organizational development has actively entered the military arena. This type of organization has certain characteristics which have strong implications for the practice and impact of OD interventions. Drawing specifically upon Army organizations, six of these characteristics are discussed including structure, total immersion environment, personnel rotation, personnel reductions, military‐civilian dichotomy, and organizational objectives.

From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963

From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963

James E. Hewes, Jr. <italic>From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963</italic>. (Special Studies.) Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army. 1975. Pp. xvii, 452

James E. Hewes, Jr. <italic>From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963</italic>. (Special Studies.) Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army. 1975. Pp. xvii, 452

From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963

From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963

From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963. By James E. HewesJr., Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975, Pp. xvii + 452. $11.45.

From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963. By James E. HewesJr., Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975, Pp. xvii + 452. $11.45.

Firearms in the Central Sudan: A Revaluation

The recent thesis propounded by Fisher and Rowland regarding the role of firearms in the Central Sudan requires considerable modification. While one must concede that the observable effects of firearms in the nineteenth century were not profound, this statement must be qualified to account for the incipient revolution in military technology, army organization, and political structure that occurred in many of the Central Sudanese states in the last quarter of the century. The relative ease with which European imperial powers conquered these states has tended to obscure from historians the dynamics of internal change that became manifest during the last decades of their independent existence.It is clear from the evidence presented in this article that the increasing use of firearms intensified the tendencies toward bureaucratization and the centralization of power in the states of the Central Sudan. The creation of regular standing armies, the formation of slave musketeer units commanded by slave officers, and the progressive devaluation of feudal institutions in favour of bureaucratized political and military structures, were the distinguishing characteristics of this period. Although history is irreversible, it is interesting to ponder the possible alternative outcomes of this nascent revolution. Its directions were clear, its destination unknown. In this article we have argued that these developments in politico-military organization did in fact represent a new departure which, if permitted to run its course, would have radically affected the subsequent history of the Central Sudan. It is our contention that the Fisher-Rowland thesis underestimates and misinterprets the nature of these changes.

Firearms, Horses and Samorian army Organization 1870–1898

The army of Samori Ture in 1887 was recruited from four sources: the regular army of sofa (infantrymen with firearms), the conscripted reserve of kurustigi, detachments sent by chiefs under Samori's protection, and a cavalry force consisting in part, perhaps, of volunteers. The emphasis on infantry rather than cavalry differentiated it from the armies of other nineteenth-century Islamic reformers.Among the factors which influenced the structure and tactics of the army, as well as the diplomatic and military strategy of the Samorian state, were the supply of firearms and horses. Initially the Samorian army was armed with muskets from the coast, primarily Freetown, and horses from the north-western part of the Sudan. From mid-1891 to mid-1892 the muskets were replaced with breechloaders and repeaters obtained by direct negotiation between Samori and Freetown traders, and during this period or before it an indigenous firearms industry was established. After this, the French advance cut Samori off, partially at least, from his sources of supply; from 1893–98 the search for new supply areas was a major preoccupation of the Samorian regime. Arms came from the Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast, and horses from the Mossi states. Here, as formerly in the west, Samori was able to use existing trade routes.

Research in the Army

The ultimate goal of research in the Army is to improve, through knowledge, the effectiveness of its operational forces. It depends upon contributions from all the scientific disciplines in a mutual effort carried out by in-house scientists and those in the universities and non-profit and industrial organizations of the nation. The growing power of electronics in the solution of a broad class of problems is pointed out, and its relationship to other areas requiring support by the Army is indicated. A distinction between the research and exploratory development programs of the Army is drawn, showing the contract funding levels and relative emphasis among the scientific disciplines. Some characteristics of the transition between the two are expressed. A brief description is given of the Army's organization and management for research, and some selected areas of important electronics research are cited.

Army and Society in England 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms*

Between 1870 and 1900 British military organization was extensively revised by act of Parliament. The reforms went further than any previous changes in the history of the British army. They were so enduring that the modem British army has its foundation in these years, particularly in the legislation associated with the name of Edward Cardwell, Gladstone's Secretary of State for War in the Whig-Liberal Ministry of 1868-74. The Cardwell reforms were a vital part of that ministry's legislation to diminish the influence of privilege and acknowledge the place of merit and efficiency in the professions, the civil service, education, and the army. Cardwell's legislation for the army, however, was not so beneficial as historians have implied. Too much of the existent knowledge of British military organization in the late nineteenth century is based on a sympathy with those reforms which glosses over their weaknesses and makes alternative schemes seem reactionary. The Cardwell reforms were neither so new nor so radical in their effects as many reformers intended. A detailed study of army organization between the Crimean and the Boer Wars leads to the conclusion that much of the old continued while many of the changes made under Cardwell failed to take hold. It is time that more emphasis was placed on this conservative aspect of British military history rather than on the liberal and novel features of army reform in the late Victorian period. Why was it, for example, that the country which was the first to experience technological and industrial change on a national scale, and which extended its colonial empire farther than any power in Europe, was also the last among European powers to transform an eighteenth-century army into an instrument of modern warfare?

The Effect of the Cardwell Reforms in Army Organization, 1874–1904

(1960). The Effect of the Cardwell Reforms in Army Organization, 1874–1904. Royal United Services Institution. Journal: Vol. 105, No. 620, pp. 515-524.

New Developments in Army Weapons, Tactics, Organization, and Equipment.

New Developments in Army Weapons, Tactics, Organization, and Equipment.

A Laboratory for Combat Operations Research

The Combat Developments Experimentation Center at Fort Ord, California, has been established to measure the effectiveness of Army organizations and procedures in controlled field experiments. Available are approximately a regiment of troops and 250 square miles of land. A technique of experimentation which requires a previously unattained degree of coordination in the soldier-scientist team has been devised. These experiments are, in essence, Monte Carlo war games played with actual troops and equipment. Only weapons effects are simulated.

Army Organization: Numbers or Efficiency

Army Organization: Numbers or Efficiency

PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION

A description of patients seen in an Army psychiatric clinic in Germany can give only a general idea of the personality problems encountered. A great many patients with fundamentally psychiatric problems are treated in other clinics. Perhaps even more important in regard to the dependent and War Department civilian population is that the majority of individuals with neurotic tendencies fostered by occupation life probably do not seek medical attention at all. The somewhat artificial pattern of occupation life encourages the development of latent neurotic potentialities. The diminished force of such restrictive and inhibiting factors as home and church influences, social pressures exerted by other community groups, and the precariously balanced moral and ethical feelings imbued during early life is not compensated for by the rather rigid, paternalistic, impersonal, often frustrating framework of Army organization. This, and the lack of accustomed recreational and intellectual outlets, often stimulate the d...

PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF WOMEN SERVING IN THE ARMY

In considering the psychiatric aspects of women serving in the Army, it must be recognized at the outset that there are at least two rather different groups which have distinctive characteristics, namely, the professional women, of whom the nurses are the largest component, and the essentially nonprofessional group, the Women’s Army Corps. The professional category, including physiotherapists and dieticians, but omitting doctors, is a more or less homogeneous group. The WACS, however, are composed of heterogeneous elements who merge in a composite picture because of their community of interest. Both of the major divisions have three fundamental characteristics in common which differentiate their psychiatric problems from those of men. Two of these factors were inherent in the army organization, namely, that women were volunteers and noncombatants. The other is simply that they were women. The influence of these basic conditions on the two groups and their differences and similarities will be discussed briefly. The professional group, as typified by the nurses, presented less complex problems in many ways. They were motivated largely by patriotism to carry on a critically needed job for which they alone were specifically qualified. They were in work traditional for women and so were not in competition with men. They were previously selected by their hospital training, they had a common educational background, and they continued in an occupational field to which they were accustomed. Their environment was a relatively protected one in which there was the usual hospital discipline and the maternal attitude of their superiors and of the doctors. And finally, probably most important of all, they were supplying a service which gratified the passive needs of men, and which identified these women with the mother, the wife, or the sweetheart back home.