Army Leaders Research Articles

A ‘lantern in the dark night’: the origins and early development of China’s SIGINT service

This article explores the origins and early development of China’s Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) service, using data released officially since the mid-1980s. Born from revolutionary crisis in the late 1920s, the Red Army’s SIGINT service was founded in 1931, an offshoot of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s development of wireless communications. Though the USSR provided some training assistance, the formative early development of the service relied more on indigenous resources: the training of teenage novices in underground facilities in Shanghai and the Central Soviet and the use of equipment that was self-made, illicitly procured or seized on the battlefield. In the years that followed, Red Army SIGINT – much respected by CCP/Red Army leaders – survived defections and cryptographic obstacles to play a major role in the defence of the Central Soviet against Guomindang encirclement. As military defeat became inevitable, SIGINT also helped to facilitate the successful Red Army retreat that became the historic Long March.

The Role of the Army to the Thai Political Intervention After the 2006 Coup D'État

After the coup d’etat by the group of army commander on September 2006, the Thai political conflicts have become much more complicated and turbulent than the previous ones that the decisiveness of the military coup can control and recover the peacefulness in the country. In addition, the political consciousness of each political mass much expands at the present time. This causes the ignorance to other different political thoughts and feelings and might lead to the political violence at last. Thus, some political groups beseeched the army leaders to do the coup d’etat. However, the flow of the democratic process blooming in all level citizens not to accept the military coup combining with the using informal power of the military leaders to influence the government establishing in the late 2008 and the suppression of the political protest in 2010 caused the serious negative images from the international sight. This phenomenon makes the military leaders showing their intention not to intervene to this conflict as before. The academic circles and the public believe that the military coup cannot be occurred and the paradigm of the army leader to accept the civil government better improve than in the past. This article aims to study the role of the army to the Thai political intervention by studying the army’s withdrawal conditions and the political role reduction. The research result found three important factors which are (1) the growth of the democracy, (2) the law to protect the soldier transfer from the politic, and (3) the independent organization under the 2007 constitution. These 3 factors make the army be able to reduce its role and not necessary to be a major player occurred in the previous Thai political history. Although, this role reduction and the limitation under the constitution, the military always still has strong influence to maintain the national and political safety.

Should the ‘D’ in PTSD Be Changed to an ‘I’?

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Professional NewsFull AccessShould the ‘D’ in PTSD Be Changed to an ‘I’?Aaron LevinAaron LevinSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:30 Oct 2013https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.pn.2013.10a17AbstractKeep the “D” in PTSD until there’s evidence showing that an alternative provides a better description and improved access to treatment, say RAND Corp. researchers.Taking the ‘D’ out of PTSD might do more harm than good, concluded authors of a RAND Corp. report issued in late summer.In discussions leading up to the publication of DSM-5, U.S. Army leaders asked APA to change the term “posttraumatic stress disorder” to “posttraumatic stress injury.” The Army argued that “disorder” was a stigmatizing term among its soldiers and caused them to avoid evaluation and treatment (Psychiatric News, July 6, 2012).“However, there is no known empirical evidence demonstrating that the proposed name change is perceived as beneficial among service members, or would result in a more socially acceptable category, or would increase the number of those seeking treatment,” wrote RAND’s Michael Fisher, M.S., and Terry Schell, Ph.D.“The expectation of senior Army officials that changing the name of PTSD to PTSI would by itself reduce stigma and increase willingness to seek treatment is shown to be an interesting hypothesis, but one in need of empirical testing,” said Darrel Regier, M.D., M.P.H., director of APA’s Division of Research, in an interview with Psychiatric News.Diagnoses serve many purposes, noted Fisher and Schell. They not only identify the signs and symptoms of a disorder and help determine treatment options, but also provide a common language for researchers, clinicians, patients, and policymakers. The creation of the PTSD diagnosis in DSM-III also legitimized the condition and explained why people with the condition were different from other, “healthy,” people, they said.“The issue is not so much the name; the issue is all the other elements that support it,” agreed former U.S. Air Force psychiatrist Robert Ursano, M.D., a professor and chair of psychiatry at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and director of the Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress, in an interview. “We need to have a language that speaks to our patients about the stress injury they have received but also a language that addresses how to direct their care.”Ironically, introduction into DSM-III of PTSD as a diagnostic category, a decision applauded by Vietnam War veterans and their advocates (including many psychiatrists), was seen as a victory for a population of already-stigmatized soldiers, offering them a path to treatment.Any psychiatric diagnosis can be stigmatizing, but there is little evidence suggesting that PTSD is more stigmatizing than other mental illnesses in general, said the authors.However, fear of discrimination by a soldier’s immediate superiors or unit commanders “is a significant barrier to the seeking of treatment by U.S. military service members,” they pointed out, but a new label for the same underlying condition might be equally stigmatizing or discriminatory.Would a change in terminology lead to more treatment? Not likely, in the absence of evidence, the authors said.“In fact, it may be the case that the public views psychiatric ‘injury’ as more permanent, more severe, or more disabling than psychiatric ‘disorder’,” they suggested. “The disorder is characterized not by the presence of stress itself, but rather by the failure to spontaneously recover from stress in a normal manner.”There was another inconsistency in the Army’s request to rename PTSD, noted Fisher and Schell. The Pentagon does not now view PTSD in the same light as other combat injuries. It does not award the Purple Heart to soldiers who have only PTSD and no qualifying physical injury. By contrast, the Canadian Forces awards the Sacrifice Medal to any service member killed or wounded, including those with a “mental disorder diagnosed by qualified mental health practitioner and directly attributable to hostile action.”“The strongest conclusion is that changing the name without changing some of the internal military practices of discrimination by commanders…would not have an appreciable impact on stigma reduction or treatment rates,” Regier said.“A great deal of literature, science, and medical operations has been developed around the name posttraumatic stress disorder,” said Ursano. “That now conveys an entire way of approaching the problem in terms of medical care, and we don’t want to disrupt that major movement forward.”More research among active-duty troops and veterans is needed to test some of these hypotheses, Regier added, noting that APA would evaluate the results of such research when considering revisions of DSM-5. ■“The Role and Importance of the ‘D’ in PTSD” is posted at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/OP300/OP389/RAND_OP389.pdf. 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A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870-1871 by David Wetzel (review)

Reviewed by: A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870-1871 by David Wetzel Dirk Bönker A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870-1871. By David Wetzel. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. Pp. xvi + 310. Paper $26.95. ISBN 978-0299291341. A decade ago, David Wetzel published an important study of the political origins of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, in which he offered a welcome counterpoint to the Prusso-centrism of most accounts of the outbreak of that war (A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War [Madison, 2001]). With A Duel of Nations, Wetzel has now published the long-awaited sequel. It offers a multilayered analysis of the diplomacy of the war itself, focusing on the key French and Prussian decision makers, yet also extending to the statesmen of the other leading powers in Europe, from Britain to Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. The analysis covers the span of the entire war, ranging from its declaration in July 1870 to the collapse of the Second Empire and the subsequent formation of a new Republican government in France, to the armistice in late January 1871 and the ratification of the preliminaries of peace by the French National Assembly on March 1, 1871. Like its predecessor, the book is an impressive piece of scholarship. Well written and incisively argued, it is based on a clear command of the available secondary literature and printed primary sources, as well as vast multinational archival research, mostly involving diplomatic records and personal papers. Two issues emerge as central to the diplomacy of this mid-nineteenth century war of nation and empire: first, the question of international intervention and the [End Page 698] localization of the war, and, second, the challenge of ending war and negotiating peace. Exploring these issues from the perspectives of the major participants, Wetzel superbly shows how Otto von Bismarck dealt, ultimately successfully, with the interrelated tasks of localizing the war and bringing it to a successful conclusion. The Prussian minister president worked hard to prevent an internationalization of the war, from the specter of a League of Neutrals in the first weeks of war to the repercussions of the Russian decision to use the war to advance the empire's interests in the Black Sea by annulling the Black Sea clauses of the Peace of Paris of 1856. Bismarck also resisted the efforts of Prussian army leaders to fight the war to some imaginary military "finish," and he focused on finding French leaders willing and capable of both accepting defeat on France's behalf and negotiating peace on Prussian terms. This included representatives of the old Imperial Regime, as well as those of the new Republic. Wetzel also succeeds at reconstructing the tortured struggles of Jules Favre, Louis Adolphe Thiers, and other representatives of the post-Napoleonic government to admit that the war was lost following the catastrophic defeat of the armies of the Second Empire, and then to accept the consequences. Their efforts to end the war took place in a fast-developing, turbulent situation, defined by the realities of continuing Prussian military dominance, limited international support, and tumultuous French politics, which not only countenanced a restoration of imperial rule but also involved the flourishing of radical politics. Moreover, demands for peace ran up against the will of some members of the new government, led by Léon Gambetta, the new charismatic Secretary of War. This group wanted to fight, at all costs, a nationalist-republican guerre à outrance based on a combination of newly raised provincial armies and guerilla warfare behind Prussian lines. All in all, Wetzel has written a concise overview of the diplomacy of the war of 1870-71. He does not cover uncharted terrain, however, or make a bold new argument. In fact, Wetzel wisely presents his book as an up-to-date diplomatic history in English that heavily draws on the work of others—including the outstanding work of historian Eberhard Kolb on Bismarck's diplomacy and peacemaking, which is only available in German (Der Weg aus dem Krieg...

暴力修行：道教謫凡神話與水滸的忠義敘述

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.
 對於《忠義水滸傳》可以采取宗教文學的現代讀法，就是從“暴力修行”的角度切入解讀，所采用的即是“出身修行”的奇傳文體，在三教與小説的關係中，只有從道教文化才能深入理解其創作旨趣。從《宣和遺事》所保存的古本到後來的百回定本，兩本之間的敘述儘管繁簡的差異極大，但是在宗教文化的淵源上仍可見其間存在的内在關聯，其一即是天書母題（motif）：從一卷到三卷，都反映道教與民間的九天玄女信仰，相信其秘授兵符與王朝的開國創業神話有關；其二爲謫凡母題：從下凡到謫凡乃是在凡間的修行，這種思想既爲小説戲劇夙所傳承，也是全真道與净明忠孝道的教内思想；其三則是一僧一道母題：代表佛教之眼與道教之眼，從出現魯智深與公孫龍之名到繁本的詳細敘述，都各以高僧與高道的身份預示宋江的未來命運。從遺事本到定本的敘述者都依據道教文化改造巨盜宋江，使其成爲星主宋江，其形成的時期應該在金元統治下的華北地區，反映漢軍世家在北方持久抗金、抗元的忠義意識，連同華北的漢人都曾基於民族認同，借用傳述宋江及其兄弟的“忠義”事迹，寓托其同情忠義軍首領所遭遇的命運，類似的事例就如邵青、李全等其人其事。歷來的索隱派均指陳水滸好漢曾被用於影射忠義軍的領袖，而小説敘述形成的關鍵，則是借用謫凡神話夸説其人物的“非常化”，在小説中將其“出身”星君化，使之具有“神煞并存”的性格與能力，故需在暴力中完成其凡間的“修行”。從天罡院、伏魔殿的罡煞隱喻，到聚散過程中以殺止煞的暴力表現，既可使水滸人物高度的隱喻化，也方便用於影射歷史事件中的忠義軍首領。在小説敘述中所完成的這種虚構性的想像世界，證明敘述者能够成功運用“非常化”的藝術手法，方便將所有的人物悉數納入36、72的聖數中，因而創造了謫凡神話的敘述模式。在明清小説中從此建立形式結構統一的文學譜系，在明代萬曆中葉以後也啓發了系列出身、修行志傳體的寫作風尚。由此可見水滸敘述在中國小説史上的非凡成就。
 This essay is a new attempt to read the Zhongyi shuihu zhuan (Allegiance and Righteousness in Water Margin) from a contemporary perspective of religious literature. The methodology includes: (1) interpreting the text by conceiving a theme of “religious conversion through violence”; and (2) assigning the novel under the genre of sagas on “the heroes’ origin and their religious conversion.” While the novel has relationships with the Three Teachings (i.e., Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism), the author’s intent can only be fully apprehended by means of Taoist culture.
 Although there are significant discrepancies in length and details between the relevant narratives in the early version of the Memorabilia from the Xuanhe Reign-period and those in the one-hundred chapter version of Water Margin, the two texts are intrinsically related because they both derive from a common religious culture and contain shared elements, which give rise to three motifs. The first concerns the divine books. Chapters one to three reflect some Taoist and popular beliefs in the Mysterious Goddess of the Nine Heavens, whose esoteric bestowal of military tallies is believed to be prophetic for the founding of the dynasty. The second motif is about transcendents being banished to the mortal world. In fiction and drama, there are two kinds of such visitations, namely: the transcendent (1) descending to the mortal world and (2) being banished to the mortal world. They make two kinds of religious practices and represent a creed about allegiance and filial piety maintained by the Quanzhen and Jingming Taoist Schools. The third motif is the side-by-side appearance of a Buddhist monk and a Taoist adept. These two characters each represent the visions of their respective teachings. From the first mention of Lu Zhishen’s and Gongsun Long’s names in early sources to the expanded version (Water Margin), the eminent monks and Taoist adepts play the role of harbingers of Song Jiang’s fate. Taoist culture was a common intellectual foundation for both the Memorabilia and Water Margin. Only by means of this foundation may Song Jiang be transformed from a brigand to an astral spirit.
 This kind of thinking probably took place during the Jin and Yuan Dynasties in northern China, as it reflects the Han troops’ continuous resistance which allied with the sense of ethnic identity of the Han people in the north against the Jin and Yuan invaders. Through recounting the deeds and allegiance of Song Jiang and his sworn brothers, the authors explicitly express their sympathy for the fate of the loyal army leaders. Parallels respectively include the episodes on Shao Qing and Li Quan. Allegorists have long treated the heroes from Water Margin as a reflection of the loyal army leaders. However, it was a crucial point when the story was first formed, because the anonymous author(s) deified the protagonists and created their “supernatural” nature by means of the concept of “transcendents being banished to the mortal world.” The protagonists were therefore imparted with “both divine and daemonic” characteristics and abilities. As such, they would need to accomplish their “religious conversion” through violence. Highly allegorical reading may work in the understanding of the evil spirits in the Court of the Big Dipper and the Basilica of Subduing Demons, as well as the agglomeration-dissipation process of stopping evil through violence. These may be understood as a metaphor for the characters in Water Margin, and for the loyal army leaders in history. The creation of a fictive, imaginary world in the novel proves the narrator’s success in the artistic technique of “supernaturalization,” whereby the protagonists are assigned to the divine numbers of 36 and 72, and hence a narrative mode of myths of “transcendents being banished to the mortal world” is created. This marked the establishment of a literary genealogy of the unified formal structure in Ming-Qing fiction and inspired a trend in the writing of hagiographic novels on religious conversion since the middle of the Wanli reign-period (1573-1620) of the Ming Dynasty. This hallmark and influence reflect the remarkable achievements of the Water Margin in the history of Chinese fiction.

Review Essay: After the Arab Spring

In a speech delivered on 19 May 2011, President Obama identified the following US core in the Middle East: (1) countering terrorism, (2) stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, (3) securing the free flow of commerce and safeguarding the security of the region, and, (4) standing up for Israel's security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace. (1) The US military and intelligence presence in this region are designed to support these objectives and to reassure US allies while deterring potential adversaries such as Iran. Currently, it is not clear if the changes brought about by the Arab Spring uprisings will require the US military to find new ways to protect these interests or what adjustments to US basing and other military activity may be required. The ongoing civil war in Syria and the still unfolding political results in Arab nations that have successfully overthrown the despots that once ruled them add to the uncertainty. Understanding the development and evolution of the Arab Spring is, therefore, an important prerequisite for addressing some key aspects involving future US national security requirements. Fortunately, there are a number of excellent works on the subject that can be useful for US Army professionals and others seeking to do so. In examining these books, this essay seeks to help address an ongoing concern of US Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno, who in March 2012 stated, We have learned many lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that--whether you are working among citizens of a country, or working with their governments or Armed Forces--nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values. (2) Tremendous insight into these cultural issues and values can be gained by examining the history, and especially the recent history, of the countries we view as partners and also those we view as potential adversaries. At this time, it is particularly important to consider the goals and aspirations of the Arab publics that participated in the Arab Spring and to find ways in which the US national interest can be advanced while respecting the concerns and values of Arab populations. To be engaged partners, US Army personnel must be informed partners, and the Arab uprisings are perhaps the most important set of events to occur in this region since at least the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, a strong understanding of the regional trends will help US Army leaders provide valuable and relevant advice to the civilian leadership on when and how the use of landpower options is a reasonable idea and when it may be especially problematic. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] How the Arab Uprisings Developed, Succeeded, and Sometimes Failed One of the most important studies addressing recent events in the Middle East is The Arab Uprising by Marc Lynch. This work presents an interesting and insightful overview of the Arab uprisings which began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to a number of other Arab states. Lynch examines the origins and development of these uprisings with special attention given to how the actions in various countries influenced other Arab states. Lynch views the Arab uprisings beginning with Tunisia as part of a process evolving regionwide and defines the Arab Spring as the span of time in which that process began and moved forward. While Lynch speaks of a unified narrative among protestors, he does not overgeneralize and is careful to highlight the differences among the numerous countries involved with the Arab uprisings. As an expert in Arab media, Lynch also examines the ways citizens were able to access information and coordinate protest activities. In doing this, he avoids the trap of viewing these struggles as the result of social media, which he instead treats as an enabling technology. In examining the role of technology, he remains alert to the possibility that activists using social media may not be good representatives of the mainstream of their societies. …

Perspectives on Suicide in the Army National Guard

Suicides in the US military were observed rising in 2004, most notably in the Army and Marine Corps, and particularly, in the Army National Guard (ARNG). Alarmed, Army leaders and researchers have offered various explanations and prescriptions, often lacking any evidence. In the present study, three data sets were used to examine evidence for various perspectives on suicide—dispositional risk, social cognitive, stressor-strain, and social cultural/institutional, each having different emphases on relevant explanatory variables and underlying mechanisms of suicide. Primary risk factors associated with having committed suicide among the 2007–2010 ARNG suicide cases were age (young), gender (male), and race (white), supporting the dispositional risk perspective on suicide. Some evidence supported the stressor-strain perspective in that postdeployment loss of a significant other and a major life change showed statistically significant, yet weaker associations with increased suicide intentions. Implications of results are discussed for future research and preventive strategies.

The Micropolitics of “the Army You Have”: Explaining the Development of U.S. Military Doctrine After Vietnam

The U.S. Army's recent embrace of counterinsurgency warfare and nation building complicates theories of military politics. For decades, critics declared the army too risk averse, too parochial, and too insulated to change, often thwarting civilian demands for greater flexibility. How should we understand these recent, unexpected changes? In this article I synthesize insights from historical institutionalism and American political development to derive a micropolitical perspective on institutional change. This approach advances two components as necessary before an institution transforms. First, mid-level agents shift the unofficial discourses through which they understand and describe the institution's core missions and capabilities. These slow and often subtle changes create a mismatch between the mid-level actors and the institution's paradigm. This erosion of institutional order provides an opportunity to reformers. The second component of transformation is the work of these reformers to forge coalitions with elites inside and outside government and press institutional leaders for change. In the rest of the article, I demonstrate the efficacy of the micropolitical approach by investigating how the army developed its AirLand Battle doctrine after the Vietnam War. My analysis of recently declassified correspondence, oral-history interviews, and the writings of officers and experts shows how mid-level officers and external reformers were able to shift the discourses of army leaders and develop an institutional paradigm that endured for decades. Indeed, AirLand Battle influenced the Weinberger criteria for deploying American troops, and it shaped U.S. conduct during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This suggests a research program that could demonstrate why and how the U.S. Army's way of war changed during the 2000s, as well as how durable this transformation will be.

Integrating Learning, Leadership, and Crisis in Management Education

This article presents a model and case study used to teach crisis leadership as a management education topic. The materials emerge from studies of U.S. Army leaders (company commanders and platoon leaders) working in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors explain how examples and cases from military combat provide tools to teach about crisis leadership. The authors describe a case study based on a battle fought in Afghanistan in 2002 that they use to increase awareness of the nature of, the experiences associated with, and the competencies necessary to deal with crisis. Finally, the authors link their pedagogy to theory on crisis, leadership, and learning.

Learning, Leadership, and Crisis in Management Education: Learning from Army Officers

This article describes a model and case study used to teach crisis leadership as a management education topic. The materials emerge from a study of Army leaders (Company Commanders and Platoon Lead...

The Paradox of Transition to “Democracy” under Military Rule

This paper closely studies the 18 days of the revolution in Egypt as well as the post-revolutionary transition and examines the role of the army in this period. A central question the paper attempts to answer is how to explain the apparent paradox about how the Egyptian military lent pivotal support to the protestors during the revolution itself, but now, in its administrative role during the transitional period, seems so reluctant if not actively resistant to allowing actual democratic change, to the extent of using excessive repressive measures. I argue that a set of complex and contradictory economic, social, historical/cultural and international geopolitical factors pressured the army to take the stance of siding with the revolution at the time of the revolt. I suggest that the army leaders sided with the revolution only to establish a form of democracy that retains the interests and the economic empire of the army. I then analyze different explanations for the excessive repressive measurements the army leaders have taken against peaceful protests and calls for more comprehensive democratic reform. And I argue that all these explanations are valid, but should be understood in the larger problem of the revolution's challenge to the military rule in Egypt that has been in place since 1952. The paper is based on: (1) an ethnographic work conducted in Cairo from February 4, 2011 to April 15, 2011; (2) 60 interviews with Egyptian activists, 50 of them randomly selected from different groups during the revolution, made in person, and 10 selected interviews with activists during the transitional period, the latter conducted by phone; and (3) archival work, especially on op-eds written by Egyptian intellectuals before and after the revolution in Egyptian newspapers. The paper contributes to literature on the sociology of revolutions and post-revolutionary transition.

...Η Δημοκρατία δυσχερής; Η ανάπτυξη των μηχανισμών του "αντικομμουνιστικού αγώνος" 1958-1961

Borrowing its title from a sympathetic political biography of Greek statesman Constantine Karamanlis (by French author Maurice Genevoix), this study utilizes the private papers of a former deputy minister for Press and Information and a number of other primary and secondary sources in order to elucidate the psychological warfare and propaganda campaign which the Greek government waged against primarily its left-wing opponents during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In May 1958, the United Democratic Left (EΔΑ) and its allies were returned the second largest party in the Greek Parliament with almost a quarter of the national vote. Coming less than nine years after the end of the Greek Civil War, this success alarmed many a supporter of the re-elected Karamanlis government, including the Palace, the military and the United States agencies then active in Greece. At an early stage, the prime minister appeared convinced that the situation called for drastic action. In addition to occasional crack-downs on leftist activity, an extensive network of state agencies and non-state groups evolved with avowed aim to ‘combat communism’. Yet, after two years of organizational proliferation and various non-starters, the ‘operational responsibility’ for the co-ordination and implementation of the ‘anti-communist struggle’ passed to the trusted Army leaders. This operation culminated on the eve of the October 1961 elections. In the wake of Karamanlis’ third electoral victory, both EΔΑ, whose vote was severely curtailed, and the regrouped centrist opposition denounced the result as the product of ‘violence and fraud’. Available evidence points at a sustained campaign, authorized by prime minister Karamanlis, secretly funded by the state budget and orchestrated by government agencies. Its primary aim was, of course, to help suppress leftist influence but in the process it did much to improve the appeal of the ruling party. The security apparatus and extraordinary legislation inherited from the Civil War years was complemented by new agencies and a host of private groups which combined ardent anti-communism with more self-seeking aims. US agencies also offered know-how and material support. Public opinion was ‘cultivated’ through various channels, including the governmentcontrolled radio, the pro-government press and subsidized journalists (including foreign correspondents), freely distributed publications, theatre, cinema, plus mobile ‘information’ units which roamed the countryside – covertly operated by the Army whose role increased as the government anxiously sought tangible results. Proof of this campaign was presented by the Centre government which ruled in 1964-65 but was disputed by the right-wing opposition and Karamanlis himself, who denied any personal involvement. In the face of the evidence available, such disclaimers hold little water. The longer-term effects Karamanlis’ decision to directly involve the Army in what primarily was a political and ideological contest would become painfully apparent when officers seasoned in the ‘anti-communist struggle’ abolished constitutional rule and seized power in 1967.

P1-S6.21 Chlamydia trachomatis screening initiative among female US army soldiers deployed to Korea

ObjectivesTo determine the prevalence of Chlamydia trachomatis (Ct) infections among female US Army soldiers deployed to the Republic of Korea; to identify high-risk groups; and to develop data to inform...

Training Leaders on Emotion Management Skills: Challenges in Designing a Blended Learning Program

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the challenges in creating an effective distance learning program to train emotion management skills in Army leaders. We present (1) a four tiered blended learning program intended to support both didactic and experiential learning and (2) the theoretical underpinnings to support the learning program design. Feedback from Soldiers on prototype versions and redesign decisions are also included.

Army Trying to Solve Puzzle of Rising Suicide Rates

Army Trying to Solve Puzzle of Rising Suicide Rates

Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier’s War on the Eastern Front (review)

Reviewed by: Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier’s War on the Eastern Front Lee Baker Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier’s War on the Eastern Front. By Boris Gorbachevsky. Translated and edited by Stuart Britton. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008. ISBN 978-0-70061605-3. Illustrations. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index. Pp. xix, 453. $36.95. There is an enormous amount of material upon which historians of the Second World War can rely when researching and writing. In addition to official documents there are numerous memoirs. Those written by German veterans of the Second World War have been published ever since the end of the war, but until fairly recently there were no memoirs from Soviet veterans, and those which did exist could not be [End Page 1379] read without great care as to intent, censorship, and a host of issues which made them problematic (some of the same problems can be seen in German memoirs). While still requiring careful reading, many of the memoirs coming from the Soviet veterans of the east have proven to be very valuable in understanding the war. This memoir is an addition to the Modern War Studies series put out by Kansas over the last few years. It is an excellent addition to the literature, in this case the memories of Red Army veterans. While no memoir can satisfy everyone, this one goes a long way towards answering the questions most historians would pose if given the chance to interview a veteran of the fighting in the east. This inclusiveness makes the book not only lengthy for a memoir but also one of the best available because it addresses so many issues. It begins, as usual with this genre, with some background family information (Jews from the countryside outside of Moscow) and then continues with the author’s training experiences. The remainder of the book segues back and forth between the war years and the immediate pre-war years. This allows the author to weave both his personal and professional life into the narrative. His initial engagement, and the bulk of his combat experience, came near Moscow in the great battle at Rzhev during the summer of 1942 and lasted until March 1943, during which time entire Soviet armies disappeared into this meat grinder. The author then participated in the battles which drove the Germans from Moscow and Smolensk and on to Orsha, where the Soviet summer offensives of 1944 smashed the entire central front. His unit then drove westward into Poland and Prussia, finally ending up in Silesia by the war’s end. The author thus participated in some of the largest and most important battles in the east, but instead of focusing too heavily on fighting, which in memoirs tends to become the mere description of local events (think of Guy Sajer’s memoir), he focuses on Soviet fighting techniques and the inanities of army life, including both its highlights and low lights. He is especially careful to point out the stupidities of army leaders and the pointlessness of much of their effort to stop the Germans. His criticisms form a large part of the narrative, which makes it both useful and an interesting addition to memoir literature. But the descriptions of the various battles, of which the battle for Rzhev forms the bulk of the book, are worthy of being read by both specialists and the general reader. Lee Baker University of Cincinnati, Raymond Walters College Cincinnati, Ohio Copyright © 2009 The Society for Military History

Introduction: Guinea-Bissau Today—The Irrelevance of the State and the Permanence of Change

As I was writing this introduction, Guinea-Bissau was rocked by yet another “political crisis.” On the night of March 1 and 2, 2009, the army chief of staff, General Batista Tagme Na Waie, and the president of Guinea-Bissau, João Bernardino “Nino” Vieira, were killed in the space of a few hours. As was to be expected, articles mushroomed in the international press in the following days, sporting headlines that we have long since become accustomed to, such as “Guinea-Bissau Collapse Deepens after Leader Killed” (Pitman 2009) or “Guinea-Bissau Threatens Return to Bad Old Days in Africa” (George 2009). An article by theEconomistIntelligence Unit was entitled—with a literary touch reminiscent of Conrad'sHeart of Darkness—“Edge of the Abyss.” These days Guinea-Bissau, particularly since the 1998–99 civil war, seems to be the poster child for all the negativity generally attributed to African countries, an overlapping of political, economic, and humanitarian crises, in blatant confirmation of the picture of “shadowy Africa” that James Ferguson pinpoints as one of the features of international discourse on Africa today (2006:15,190).Despite these clichéd articles (identical in tone to those that have appeared during the various crises that have characterized the last decade of Guinea-Bissau's history) and pessimistic forecasts from international experts, these violent events have not triggered any real political or civil turmoil. The following morning the capital city, Bissau, was calm. The army leaders declared that they had no intention of intervening in the upcoming elections.

The Application of a Model of Adaptive Performance to Army Leader Behaviors

To better understand the adaptive capabilities of junior Army leaders, we applied an existing nine-dimension adaptability model to critical incidents of leader behaviors. We examined interview data from two samples of U.S. Army leaders (40 combat veterans and 24 training facilitators). The adaptive behaviors performed most in combat reflected the Deals with Unpredictability and Handles Emergencies dimensions, whereas in training contexts they reflected the Leads Adaptive Teams and Solves Problems Creatively dimensions. The model represented all of the adaptive capabilities; however, the dimensions varied across the samples. To promote adaptability, the leaders recommended developing mental adaptability skills and adaptive teams.

Dynamic analysis of combat vehicle accidents

AbstractTo the chagrin of well‐intentioned Army leaders, dozens of soldiers are killed each year as a result of combat vehicle accidents. The objective of this study is to look beyond the events and symptoms of accidents which normally indicate human error, and instead study the upper‐level organizational processes and problems that constitute the actual root causes of accidents. After a short review of the literature we report on our development of a system dynamics model. We then discuss the results of several simulations; these suggest that high‐level decisions that balance mission rate and operations tempo with troop availability, careful management of the work–rest cycle for deployed troops, and improvement of the processes for evaluating the lessons learned from accidents would lead to a reduction in Army combat vehicle accidents. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

“Through a Looking Glass”: The United States Army Looks at the Red Army of Workers and Peasants 1919–1926

After the withdrawal of units of the U.S. Army from the Soviet Far East in 1919–20 in wake of the abortive anti-Bolshevik campaign launched by the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, the American military maintained a watchful eye on the growth and development of the Red Army. This interest in the Red Army can be seen in the articles that appeared in the Infantry Journal and other military journals during the 1920s that evaluated the capabilities of the Russian Army of the 1920s, the Soviet system of government, and Bolshevism in general. While the majority of Army leaders busied themselves with the absorption of the operational and tactical lessons of the recently concluded World War (1917–1918), other, more thoughtful officers wrote about and discussed both the Imperial Russian and Red [i.e., Soviet] armies in articles published in the Infantry Journal during the 1920s.1 1 See Captain Daniel S. Appleton, ‘The Russian Army of Today’, Infantry Journal, 25 (October 1924) pp. 415–7. Hereafter cited as Appleton, Russian Army of Today.