Army Culture Research Articles

Posting Holistic Health and Fitness Reels on Social Media Platforms to Improve Soldier Health in the Brigade.

As of 2020 Holistic health and fitness (H2F) teams have been embedded into brigades to engage Soldiers in Preventative Mental, Physical, Nutritional, Spiritual, and Sleep Readiness services. This represents a change in Army culture from a focus on testing to one of wellness because of increasing sleep concerns, mental health concerns, and injury rates. Soldier awareness of H2F services, where to find them, how to use them, and command endorsement of H2F professional's services has been limited and not well studied. Most soldiers fall into the Generations Y and Z categories, and this population tends to access information primarily from social media sources. Social media platforms therefore represent potentially effective ways to reach these individuals to increase their awareness of H2F services. This quality improvement project used therapist produced brief interactive videos covering the topics of sleep hygiene and consequences of sleep supplement use and sleep deprivation, mental readiness, and journaling as a form of mindfulness. Video reels were posted to one brigade H2F's social media (Facebook and Instagram) platforms to improve Soldier awareness and engagement in wellness activities in these areas. Data were tracked before and after the initiation of the reel series via Facebook and Instagram MetaBusiness Suite, and via utilization tracking for H2F occupational therapy group and 1:1 visits. Data tracked before and after the initiation of the video series revealed an 898.2% increase in Facebook access, including reel reach, and increases in 1:1 and group sleep and mental readiness visits to the H2F occupational therapist. The use of social media to facilitate soldier awareness and use of H2F mental and sleep readiness services is a viable option for H2F units seeking to enhance their reach in these areas. The project created very little demand on the local therapist's time or to brigade resources and may help increase Soldier accessing of H2F resources online and directly.

The digital cult of the offensive and the US military

ABSTRACT For the US, the information age seemed to advantage the offense, with technologies and campaigns of long-range, fast, and overwhelming first strike advantage. But where did the US digital cult of the offensive come from? To answer this question, I examine the development of two key US warfighting concepts – the Army’s field manual 100-5 and the 2012 Air Sea Battle. The exploration reveals a complicated relationship between civ-mil relations, an American and Army culture at a key domestic moment, and a geopolitical context which culminated to create a digital cult of the offensive in the information age.

Changing the guard: Organizational science and social psychology in the US army.

The US Army employed organizational and behavioral sciences in the context of the emerging Postindustrial political economy to shape its new strategic thought in the 1980s. This article examines how a group of military intellectuals in the Army applied ideas from these sciences to promote officer decision-making and decentralization while maintaining the Army's culture and ethics. They had significant reservations about bringing new ideas from the social sciences into the Army because Robert McNamara's modern cybernetic strategy had scarred the Army's morale and sense of self during the Vietnam War. Instead, the intellectuals carefully adapted ideas into the Army with an unsentimental attitude as it emerged from its post-Vietnam decline so it could fight complex maneuver warfare. Their strategic thought in the late Cold War made the Army a flexible global-spanning force for the unipolar moment in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Lahure Culture and Educational Achievement in the Gorkha Communities in Pokhara Metropolitan City, Nepal

Nepalese societies have a long history of Gurkha Army culture for centuries. There is no question about the role of this culture in enhancing the socioeconomic status of these communities from the past. However, along with its positive aspects, this trend has brought some possible adverse effects on those communities who are directly or indirectly associated with the Gurkha Army recruitment process. This study has aimed to explain the possible impact on education attainment of youth from these communities due to participation in the Army preparation and selection process. For the study explanatory research methods were used, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data for insightful investigation of the phenomenon, where 184 aspiring youths from different army training centers operated in Pokhara Metropolitan City, Kaski were selected to gather quantitative insights from young individuals from the Gurkha community actively engaged in Army preparation training. Furthermore, qualitative data was collected through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) conducted with esteemed principals and administrative figures from educational institutions offering class 11 and 12 courses in Pokhara, Kaski. The recruitment process for the Army, particularly among youths from the Gurkha communities, presents a significant challenge to educational pursuits, resulting in a diversion of focus away from academic endeavors. This trend has led to a substantial number of individuals prioritizing military training over education. Consequently, this phenomenon has adversely affected educational attainment, limiting future opportunities for these communities. Additionally, the Gurkha community’s historical involvement primarily in Gurkha recruitment has perpetuated their societal exclusion and marginalization. While self-realization within the Gurkha community is crucial, effective governmental policies promoting inclusive education and opportunities are equally imperative. Collaborative efforts between communities and policymakers are necessary to bridge these disparities, fostering an equitable environment and integration beyond traditional roles.

The Purple Heart and suicide risk in Post-9/11 U.S. Army Combat Veterans with a traumatic brain injury: A mixed methods study

ABSTRACT Active service members and Veterans with a combat-related traumatic brain injury (TBI) are four times more likely to attempt suicide than those without a TBI. TBIs are the signature injuries of the Post-9/11 conflicts and Combat Veterans (i.e., current and former service members who deployed in support of a combat mission) with these injuries are entitled to receive the Purple Heart medal. However, potentially tens of thousands of Combat Veterans did not receive, or were denied the Purple Heart during the first decade of the Global War on Terrorism because a TBI was not documented during the deployment. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the meaning of the Purple Heart and examine the impact of the Purple Heart on Army Combat Veterans with a combat-related TBI. Findings from this mixed methods study revealed that not receiving the Purple Heart is associated with increased suicide risk and lower quality of life after a brain injury. Additionally, thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness, and perceived military institutional betrayal are associated with increased suicide risk in Army Combat Veterans with a TBI. This mixed methods study provides important insights into how Army culture is perceived and the power of the Purple Heart among this high-risk group of Combat Veterans.

The Fun Mother and Her Lovely Assistant

The Fun Mother and Her Lovely Assistant

Lord’s Resistance Army Culture Provides Opening to Prevent Attacks and Advance Humanitarian Efforts

A recent increase in defections from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)—a Central Africa-based religious militia—has resulted in a rise in violent, survival-motivated lootings of local villages and nongovernmental organization (NGO) outposts perpetrated by former LRA members who are deterred from rejoining their home communities by perceived resentment and hostility among local community members. These ongoing hostilities have compounded an existing humanitarian crisis in Central Africa and intensified regional instability. Cultural data show that if NGOs partnered with local leaders, reintegrated LRA defectors, and tailored their reintegration narratives to appeal to LRA cultural biases, they are more likely to preserve NGO resources through a sustainable decrease in attacks and an increase in successful reintegration efforts.

Minority representation, tokenism, and well-being in army units

ABSTRACTRacial and ethnic diversity is increasing in the US Army and women are moving into more combat roles. This puts minority soldiers at risk for being underrepresented in their work units. Tokenism theory predicts that when a work group has less than 15% representation in a social group, the numerically underrepresented minority (i.e., token) members are subject to three disadvantages: higher visibility, informal isolation, and role encapsulation. In the Army, where many companies contain small numbers of women and racial minorities, some soldiers may face additional stressors and constraints. We explored psychosocial, organizational, and health outcomes of all identifiable token women (N = 4,425) and Black soldiers (N = 5,040). Tokens were remarkably similar to non-tokens and majority soldiers on outcomes such as coping skills, adaptability, organizational trust, sleep, substance use, and pain. The intersection of token status in terms of race and gender was not related to any appreciable differences. One potential explanation is the shared Army culture that emphasizes group unity and the importance of the mission above individual characteristics and goals. The Army depends on cohesion, organizational identification, and commitment to the group in order to reduce stress and anxiety, and to maximize combat performance. For soldiers who have internalized this culture, it could be easier to see past individual differences such as gender and race and identify others in the unit as fellow soldiers primarily.

Army culture(s)

There is little doubt that culture is the “secret sauce” that allows some armies to perform at a remarkably higher level than others. However, soldiers are not only members of an army; they are also part of a government bureaucracy and citizens of a state. This paper considers the effect of national, government and army cultures on the Canadian Army during coalition operations of the 1990s and 2000s. The paper argues that as a liberal and relatively non-corrupt country, Canada’s national culture created stresses in coalitions where partner militaries permitted illegal activities and did not respect women soldiers. Canadian government culture affected operations through its lack of experience and concern for military matters and low strategic analysis capacity. Canadian troops were deployed without adequate resources on missions with poorly defined objectives. Canadian Army culture – oriented to mechanized combat operations – supported strong operational performance and effective links with American, British and French partners. However, it created great internal stresses in stability operations where soldiers witnessed atrocities but could not intervene. The paper questions whether current levels of cultural training within the Army can be effective given competition with other training requirements and the short duration of field assignments.

The Centurion Mindset and the Army's Strategic Leader Paradigm

ABSTRACT: Army culture does not currently value or incentivize education and broadening for senior leaders, as it did prior to 1950. Various structural factors, such as the creation of a mega-bureaucracy, co-equal service branches, and a fixation with tactics, have contributed to the decline in numbers of educated and broadened leaders in the molds of Generals Pershing, MacArthur, and Eisenhower. The Army's strategic performance since the Korean War is symptomatic of this cultural decline. ********** On October 12, 1972, General Creighton Abrams became Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), a promotion that symbolized the further devaluation of broadly educated leaders in favor of tactically minded centurions. Centurions in the Roman legions, combining the command authority of a contemporary company commander with the experience of a sergeant major who directed tactics. Superior legates or generals orchestrated campaigns to achieve Rome's strategic objectives. (1) Abrams epitomized the tactically centered centurion paradigm, and it is small irony the US main battle tank bears his name. In his mold, well-meaning but misguided Army leaders of the post-World War II era, have championed tactical career progression that stunted officer strategic broadening, and ensured the rise of centurions often incapable of performing as true generalists. The institution's transition from valuing an officer career path that produced sufficiently developed leaders helped birth the so-called training revolution, which Abrams and like-minded leaders enshrined. These men sought to ensure no more Task Force Smiths would occur, referring to an untrained and underequipped Army task force that North Korean tanks rolled over in 1950. This simplistic lesson still resonates within the Department of the Army, which recently opted to preserve brigade readiness at the expense of middle-management at headquarters, ignoring the likelihood Task Force Smith was symptomatic of overall institutional decline. (2) General William DuPuy's view of the quintessential Army leader was molded as a junior officer who experienced an earlier version of Task Force Smith in the days following the Normandy invasion. (3) DuPuy later became the architect of Abrams' tactical colossus. Fixation on tactics instead of strategy reflected the searing of dangerous World War II combat experiences into DuPuy, Abrams, General William Westmoreland, and others of their generation. Dispassionate analysis, however, informed but not overcome by experience, often occurs only at a safe distance from the subject matter at hand, and these leaders seemed incapable of distinguishing institutional maintenance from individual combat. Experiences such as those of Dupuy do have some merit, revealing how insufficient tactical preparedness led to unnecessary casualties in America's first battles and beyond. (4) The choice of developing strategic thinkers is not a zero-sum game with tactical wherewithal, however, as Army formations must also maintain tactical effectiveness. The shift to a centurion paradigm has come at a cost. The Army's Tactical Paradigm In some ways, the battlefield-dominant US Army created by these men has become a more ethical version of the Wehrmacht, which the institution intentionally sought to emulate in the years after WWII. The Army has developed a force capable of winning nearly every firefight, while simultaneously blunting its development of strategic leaders. The outcomes of wars clearly rest on more than military strategy. Factors such as poor policy, enemy efficiency and will, resources, and luck also affect outcomes. However, the Army's painfully obvious inability to achieve national objectives since the Korean War against the likes of the Islamic State of the Levant (ISIL), the Taliban, Iraqi and Somali insurgents, and the North Vietnamese Army, reveals an institution in need of reform. (5) The debate over these failures has centered on martial frameworks such as counterinsurgency versus conventional operations and AirLand Battle doctrines. …

Ethics and Army Leadership: Climate Matters

Abstract: As US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms, it is important to explore how Army leaders--and their organizations--have lapsed into questionable ethical conduct. This article addresses the tension between competence and character within the Army's culture, offers lessons from the business world on ethical behavior and leadership, and critiques current Department of Defense (DoD) and Army approaches to assessing ethical climates. (1) ********** US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms. Some observers may claim this exposure is nothing new. Recently, however, the Army revealed 129 commanders of brigades and battalions have been relieved 2003. (2) Of that number, 25 were relieved in combat zones. More troubling (and paradoxically reassuring) is the Army's disclosure that seven general were relieved and two court-martialed. In 2005, for instance, the four-star commander of US Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Kevin Byrnes, was relieved for disobeying a lawful order from the Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker. In addition, since 2001, the Army vice chief of staff has issued 100 memoranda of reprimand, 147 memoranda of concern and conducted 45 verbal counselings of general officers for myriad behaviors contrary to good order and discipline in the Army. (3) This article explores how Army leaders and their organizations have lapsed into questionable ethical conduct. Among other things, such an examination enables one to discern lessons for senior leaders and stewards of the Army profession. Rather than offering tabloid exposes (there are plenty), the following analysis focuses on systemic organizational assessments and solutions to ethical situations, not on the details of any specific recent case. This article concludes with two recommendations for Army leadership: 1) develop evidence-based developmental programs on individual character and moral development, and 2) develop empirically validated research instruments to assess ethical climates as part of the DoD or separate Army organizational climate survey. Strong ethical foundations are essential for the Army profession and the nation it serves. While the number of reported occurrences of unethical behavior is relatively small compared to a large DoD population of nearly 3 million active, reserve, and civilian members, even isolated cases receive a high degree of media attention and undermine public trust in the profession. As one reads the reports of investigations and courts martial, the root causes of such behavior are invariably attributed to individual failings--the senior leader's lack of character and the lack of moral courage of those around the leader to challenge questionable behavior. However, these assessments rarely consider differing levels of analysis: individual, organizational, and institutional. Concerns about the Profession In some cases, relieving high-level military was part of the civil-military relations exchange, which often requires a delicate balancing act between civilian officials and uniformed officers. Striking examples during the Global War on Terror are the cases of Commander of US Central Command Admiral William Fox Fallon, Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley, and Commander of US Forces and International Security Forces Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, in their clashes with senior civilian leaders--the president and defense secretary. (4) Of greater concern are those cases in which behavior contrary to professional ethics is the issue. There have been high-profile investigations of senior for violations of Joint Travel and Joint Ethics Regulations like US Africa Command's General William Kip Ward (substantiated), and US European Command's Admiral James Stavridis (unsubstantiated). …

The U.S. Army Initiates a Proactive Approach to Leverage Cross- Cultural Understanding: The Case for the Culture & Foreign Language Enterprise

This article will describe how the U.S. Army has created a culture & foreign language enterprise in an effort to leverage cross-cultural understanding in support of U.S. Army mission objectives. Topics to be addressed include problems and challenges related to cultural issues that the U.S. Army has encountered since September 11, 2001 during military operations in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and surrounding countries in the region and steps taken to address these problems and challenges. Such topics describe the workings of the Army bureaucracy as it sought to maneuver resources in a manner that could effectively address culturally oriented issues and obstacles. The resulting approaches that have been created, funded, defended and sustained are detailed as examples of how large government institutions can persevere with agility to address such goals. The primary focus of this article, regarding the aforementioned, is the Army Culture & Foreign Language Enterprise. The life of this Enterprise exemplifies how a vision for utilizing civilian social science Ph.D.s, in support of Army goals & objectives related to culture, came to fruition and effectively functions. This description illustrates how such an Enterprise approach can be employed in other types of settings and with other types of issues.

Army Culture Must Change to Fight Spiraling Mental Health Crisis

Army Culture Must Change to Fight Spiraling Mental Health Crisis

Stigma, Barriers to Care, and Use of Mental Health Services Among Active Duty and National Guard Soldiers After Combat

This study examined rates of utilization of mental health care among active duty and National Guard soldiers with mental health problems three and 12 months after they returned from combat in Iraq. Stigma and barriers to care were also reported for each component (active duty and National Guard). Cross-sectional, anonymous surveys were administered to 10,386 soldiers across both time points and components. Mean scores from 11 items measuring stigma and barriers to care were computed. Service utilization was assessed by asking soldiers whether they had received services for a mental health problem from a mental health professional, a medical doctor, or the Department of Veterans Affairs in the past month. Risk of mental problems was measured using the Patient Health Questionnaire, the PTSD Checklist, and items asking about aggressive behaviors and "stress, emotional, alcohol, or family" problems within the past month. A higher proportion of active duty soldiers than National Guard soldiers reported at least one type of mental health problem at both three months (45% versus 33%) and 12 months (44% versus 35%) postdeployment. Among soldiers with mental health problems, National Guard soldiers reported significantly higher rates of mental health care utilization 12 months after deployment, compared with active duty soldiers (27% versus 13%). Mean stigma scores were higher among active duty soldiers than among National Guard soldiers. Active duty soldiers with a mental health problem had significantly lower rates of service utilization than National Guard soldiers and significantly higher endorsements of stigma. Current and future efforts to improve care for veterans should work toward reducing the stigma of receiving mental health care.

THE VALUE OF DOCTRINE

Two serving officers provide a revealing insight into doctrinal engagement amongst front-line officers, which casts serious doubts on the government's claim that British personnel understand the mission in Afghanistan. Their study, conducted amongst British officers with at least two combat operations under their belt, finds an alarming disconnect between political objectives and military doctrine. Harvey and Wilkinson offer a range of recommendations for reform, and issue a clarion call for the reinvigoration of doctrine at the heart of army culture.

Group Cohesion, Culture, and Practice

Anthony King's “The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Military” formed part of an ongoing debate in this journal on military group cohesion. For him, the main vector for cohesion is collective military practice in training and operations, which he sees as a precursor to social relationships. In his critique, Guy Siebold drew attention to social psychology's approach through the “standard model.” In this article, the author suggests that all approaches to military group cohesion would be enriched by an understanding of the organizational culture in which the soldiers are embedded. The author seeks to demonstrate this point by providing an outline of a model of British Army culture at the unit level, and showing how it adds value to military cohesion analysis by applying it to one of King's ethnographic examples and by briefly showing how it would provide a richer context for the use of social psychology's standard model.

'A Wonderful Lot of Chaps': Observations on New Zealand Army Culture in War Letters from Rod to Molly McLeay, 1940-1942

The prevalent egalitarianism, mateship and hierarchy in the New Zealand army and as expressed in the letters of a junior officer Roderick Moscrop McLeay to his wife Molly during his period overseas during World War Two is analyzed. The letters show that the New Zealand Army at war was a hierarchical organization with clear distinctions among the various ranks.

Tobacco Use in the Army: Illuminating Patterns, Practices, and Options for Treatment

Tobacco use by soldiers has been prevalent throughout the 20th century. Tobacco has been seen as a "right". Additionally, tobacco was viewed as a boost to a soldier's morale and to provide comfort, while reducing stress in austere conditions. Today, tobacco is known to increase healthcare costs, adversely affect readiness, and impact the military members' physical performance. The purpose of this ethnographic study was to describe patterns, practices, and experiences of active duty Army soldiers who use tobacco, have quit using tobacco, and have relapsed after a period of tobacco abstinence. Five themes were uncovered: (1) Experiences associated with use of tobacco, (2) Tobacco use in the Army, (3) Experiences of starting and restarting tobacco, (4) Balancing health risks with tobacco use, and (5) Tobacco use regulations and policies. Findings are consistent with the conclusion that the Army culture supports soldiers' tobacco use.

Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today

Much of the reporting on the Iraqi and Afghan wars focuses on the ground dimension....The fact remains, however, that Iraq and Afghanistan are air wars as well, and wars where airpower has also played a critical role in combat. --Anthony H. Cordesman (1) What a difference a year makes. idea that airpower would be playing a critical role in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would hardly have been predicted in December 2006, when the Army and Marine Corps issued a completely revised--but airpower lite--counterinsurgency (COIN) manual commonly known as Field Manual (FM) 3-24. (2) Complimentary reviews appeared in unlikely venues such as New York Times Review.(3) What seems to have captured the imagination of many who might otherwise be hostile to any military doctrine were the manual's much-discussed Zen-like characteristics, particularly its popular Paradoxes section. (4) This part of the manual contained such trendy (if ultimately opaque) dictums as sometimes, the more force used, the less effective it is and some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot. (5) These maxims helped create the perception that the new doctrine was a kinder and gentler form of COIN that largely eschewed the concept of killing or capturing enemy fighters as a means of suppressing an insurgency. (6) Supporting this interpretation the fact that FM 3-24 favors deploying enormous numbers of forces--20 per 1,000 residents (7)--each of whom, according to the manual, must be prepared to become ... a social worker, a civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout. (8) Further, as popularly understood, the aim of this revamped force was not to confront the insurgents themselves, but rather to win hearts and minds of the indigenous population. (9) To do so, the manual prefers a low-tech approach compatible with traditional Army culture that has individual soldiers engaging in close, personal contact with the target. In FM 3-24's interpretation of COIN, that target a country's populace. All of this discussion left little theoretical room for the role of airpower. FM 3-24's examination of airpower confined to a brief, five-page annex that essentially conceives airpower as aerial artillery. Accordingly, airpower discouraged not just because the use of force generally disdained by the popular interpretation of the manual's theory, but also because of the mistaken idea that air-delivered munitions are somehow more inaccurate than other kinds of fires. (10) In perhaps no other area has the manual been proven more wrong by the events of 2007. As this article will outline, the profound changes in airpower's capabilities have so increased its utility that it now often the weapon of first recourse in COIN operations, even in urban environments. As to weapons' accuracy, by early 2008 Human Rights Watch senior military analyst Marc Garlasco made the remarkable concession that today airstrikes probably are the most discriminating weapon that exists. It important to underline that the manual's flawed conclusions about airpower are not the result of nefariousness or service parochialism. Rather, FM 3-24 draws many of its lessons from counterinsurgency operations dating from the 1950s through the 1970s. While this approach remarkably effective in many respects, it inherently undervalues airpower. revolutions in airpower capabilities that would prove so effective during 2007 were unavailable to counterinsurgents in earlier eras. writers of FM 3-24 were stuck with antiquated ideas about what airpower might contribute to a joint COIN effort. In any event, many welcomed the kinder and gentler approach to COIN as being a near-total reversal of the less-than-successful strategy then in effect in Iraq. In early 2007 one of FM 3-24's principal architects, General David H. Petraeus, arrived in Iraq as the senior US commander, and the manual quickly became known as The Book on efforts there. …

Civilian Psychologists in an Army Culture: The Ethical Challenge of Cultural Competence

The Army represents a discrete cultural group with unique features of language, manners, norms of behavior, and belief systems. Cultural competence, traditionally applied to the treatment of ethnic and racial minorities, is also essential for the ethical treatment of Army personnel. We describe some of the challenges and opportunities that non-veteran civilian psychologists may experience when conducting psychological assessments, treatment, and command consultations in an Army medical treatment facility. In addition, training procedures, including Army cultural exposure experiences, training on relevant regulations, observation of experienced Army psychologists, and mentoring, are recommended to assist civilian psychologists in obtaining the knowledge and skills required for ethical practice.