Arms Control Policy Research Articles

Arms control, nuclear strategy and Australian foreign policy: The Fraser years

(1989). Arms control, nuclear strategy and Australian foreign policy: The Fraser years. Interdisciplinary Peace Research: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 57-73.

Soviet ballistic missile defense and the western alliance

Introduction Background: Ballistic Missile Defense and Alliance Security Reassessments of Soviet Strategic Defense 1. Soviet BMD Capabilities and Activities Before the ABM Treaty Since the ABM Treaty Overall Soviet BMD Prospects 2. Interpretations of Soviet Behavior Race Interactions Bureaucratic Politics A Composite Hypothesis Approval of the ABM Treaty Military Doctrine Force Posture Trends Interpretations and inferences 3. Implications for the Western Alliance Soviet Strategic Priorities Potential Consequences in War Potential Consequences in Peace 4. Soviet Arms Control Diplomacy and the Unlikely Prospect of Breakout Incentives and Inhibitions Regarding Breakout The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative in Soviet Eyes Soviet Arms Control Policy 5. Alliance Reactions: Arms Control and Deterrence Grounds for Western Consensus Continuing Arms Control Efforts Force Posture Improvements Maintaining Stable Deterrence and Alliance Security Notes Index

Sights to be lowered for missile defense effort

The Strategic Defense Initiative, one of the largest R&D projects in the U.S. today and the cornerstone of the Reagan Administration's arms control and national security policies, is due for substa...

New Directions in Soviet Arms-Control Policy

New Directions in Soviet Arms-Control Policy

Soviet Arms Control Policy in Perspective

Soviet Arms Control Policy in Perspective

Arms Control and Canada's Security Policy

If the recent white paper on defence is representative of changing Canadian attitudes towards security, then the way in which Canadians understand arms control may also be changing.1 In response to the gap between Canada's present military commitments and its actual capabilities, the white paper favours scaling back Canada's international commitments and concentrating on the defence of Canadian sovereignty. Couching the rationale for this changed focus in the language of sovereignty protection, particularly in Canada's north, echoes the increased political sensitivity in Canada to this issue. In the future, political support for defence policy may well be tied to the way in which it addresses issues of Canadian sovereignty. This trend is part of the overall tendency to define Canada's security questions in terms of a rather narrow, self-regarding conception of Canadian defence interests whose objectives are territorial integrity, control of territorial and coastal waters, and protection of sovereignty. As a result, there is a risk that the defence of Canada will come to be conceived as ending, rather than starting, at the country's territorial boundaries.2 If this view is indeed becoming increasingly widespread, then it must affect how arms control is conceived. Just at a time

The Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition, by William V. O'Brien and John Langan

This book presents papers on the ethical aspects of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include the concept of a ''just'' war, national defense, political aspects, religion and politics, the failure of deterrence, conventional warfare, nuclear deterrence and democratic politics, the future of the nuclear debate, non-proliferation policy, arms control, national security, and government policies.

Arms Control and Canada's Security Policy

Arms Control and Canada's Security Policy

Denial and punishment: Straddling the horns of NATO's dilemma

It may be useful at the outset to define our terms. By military doctrine I shall understand the principles which are laid down as true concerning the deployment and employment of military force in the event of war. In the case of NATO they are embodied in MC 14/3 and amplified by authoritative spokesmen for the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary General of NATO or SACEUR. The doctrine typically establishes the relationship between challenge and response and among the various measures available for response. It should give general guidance to operational planning and the force planning process as well as provide a bridge between foreign policy and military dispositions. By arms control I shall understand measures — tacit or explicit; unilateral, bilateral or multilateral — designed to reduce or otherwise constrain the deployment or employment of military force. It seems clear therefore that military doctrine and arms control may at times constitute opposite sides of the same coin or of very similar coins. The purpose of arms control is to prevent war and limit the damage if a war should break out in spite of the efforts to prevent it. The purposes of a military doctrine is to provide coherence and cohesion to the process of mustering military force to deter and defeat an enemy. The perspective of military doctrine is typically one of maximizing the chance of success at the minimum cost, in other words it is concerned about the efficient allocation of means. The perspective of arms control is to prevent the military means from dictating or dominating political decision-making. Arms-control policy and military doctrine form a complex medley of policy perspectives on the prevention and conduct of war.

The Air-Launched Cruise Missile and Canadian Arms Control Policy

The Air-Launched Cruise Missile and Canadian Arms Control Policy

Nuclear Confrontation in Europe and Soviet Arms Control Policy

Nuclear Confrontation in Europe and Soviet Arms Control Policy

Cold Light on Cold War

Americans can be thankful for their many wise and articulate analysts in such places as the Brookings Institution and Time's Washington bureau, as well as in the State Department and other branches of the U.S. Government. Leon V. Sigal, for example, was a visiting scholar at' Brookings when he wrote Nuclear Forces in Europe. His already wide reading knowledge had been enriched by experience as assistant director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in 1970-80 and by discussions with others at Brookings (for instance, Raymond L. Garthoff, former executive secretary of the SALT I delegation). Strobe Talbott has written two previous books on arms control and foreign policy while working in Washington as Time's diplomatic correspondent. Trained at Yale and Oxford, he has served also in the London and Moscow offices of Time. Talbott has read widely and seems to have easy access to many U.S. policymakers on arms control. Sigal and Talbott display not only a powerful mastery of the relevant facts, but also an ability to present complexities with elegant clarity. They have additional gifts of empathy, wisdom, and cautious realism concerning what can and should be done about arms limitation.

Nuclear weapons in Europe, edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984, 118 pp. Price: $5.95 paper. Trilateral Security: Defense and Arms Control Policies in the 1980s, by Gerard C. Smith, Paolo Vittorelli, and Kiichi Saeki. New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1983, 106 pp. Price: $3 paper

Nuclear weapons in Europe, edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984, 118 pp. Price: $5.95 paper. Trilateral Security: Defense and Arms Control Policies in the 1980s, by Gerard C. Smith, Paolo Vittorelli, and Kiichi Saeki. New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1983, 106 pp. Price: $3 paper

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War: The Shape of the Catholic Debate

ARGUMENT ABOUT nuclear policy has been a fact of public life in the West since the awesome power at the heart of matter was first unleashed during the Second World War. This debate has assumed a number of distinct forms, which have been influenced by the political climate prevailing between the superpowers, by the state of relations between members of the Atlantic Alliance, by the development of new technological capacities, by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and by the level of public awareness and understanding of nuclear-policy questions. Recent events suggest that the state of the nuclear question is assuming a distinctive form in the present moment. US/USSR relations are at a most delicate and dangerous point. Tensions have increased significantly in the aftermath of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland. These tensions are reflected in the US Senate's nonratification of the SALT II treaty and in the acrimonious exchanges at the Helsinki Accord review conference in Madrid. At the same time, the two sets of negotiations which have recently begun in Geneva on strategic-arms reductions and on the control of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe have opened at least a slim possibility of new developments in arms-control policy. The new state of the question is also shaped by the significant strains which have recently developed within NATO. A significant intellectual debate has begun within the Alliance about the wisdom of a NATO declaratory policy renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons. Further, technological developments have created the possibility of deploying formidable new first-strike weapons, such as MX and Trident II, and weapons which are difficult to detect both before and after they are launched, such as the cruise missile. Possession and deployment of such

New Directions for Arms Control

Abstract While strategic arms-control negotiations remain deadlocked, advances in technology threaten to upset the nuclear balance unless the United States follows new directions in its weapons and arms-control policies.

Covering Arms Control: A TWQ Roundtable

Abstract In this exclusive interview, four experienced journalists familiar with arms-control issues discuss the Reagan administration's arms-control policies and media coverage generally of the arms-control issue.

Arms control and foreign policy under Reagan

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a relative newcomer in Washington, has experienced traumatic shifts in leadership and support. These shifts coincide with the acceleration of the arms race and the failure to negotiate reductions.

A National Arms Control Policy for the 1980s

The SALT decade saw two balances—strategic and European—tilt against the West. Arms control policy requires better integration with U.S./Allied defense planning needs. It must address differences in superpower deterrence doctrines and negotiating requirements and NATO dependence on non-NATO areas. Policy in each arms control forum should be judged according to criteria of Western security interests and international strategic stability.

Defense and Arms Control Policy: Approaches to Their Study

Policy Studies JournalVolume 5, Issue 4 p. 497-510 Defense and Arms Control Policy: Approaches to Their Study Edward A. Kolodziej, Edward A. Kolodziej University of IllinoisSearch for more papers by this author Edward A. Kolodziej, Edward A. Kolodziej University of IllinoisSearch for more papers by this author First published: June 1977 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1977.tb01157.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume5, Issue4June 1977Pages 497-510 RelatedInformation

Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives

With one exception, the papers collected in this volume ... were aired for the first time at a conference sponsored by the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar of the Center for Policy Study and held at the University of Chicago, on May 26-27, 1972.