Arms Control Policy Research Articles

International arms trade and transfers: Rising producers, advanced technology, and adapting regulations

The end of the Cold War era has ushered in a century in which great military powers like the US, China, and Russia continue to dominate the arms trade, yet minor powers are also investing heavily in arms manufacturing and technologies and profiting from lucrative arms transfers. Changes in the arms trade have fostered cooperative international regulatory practices and agreements, but recent conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine highlight the need for strong end-use monitoring, post-shipment verification, and international accountability for dubious trade deals. This study analyzes changes in top arms producers, new complexities in arms regulation due to advancing technologies and artificial intelligence, arms-control policies of international organizations and top arms producers, and the risks of poor regulation.

External threats and state support for arms control

The successful closure of arms control negotiations today is conditional on the commitment of many more states than during the Cold War. The question of what determines states’ positions on arms control has therefore become increasingly relevant. Multiple scholars have identified external security threats by other states as the key explanatory factor of opposition to arms control, but empirical evidence hereof is so far limited to a small set of cases. Against this backdrop, this article carries out a global examination of the effect of external threats in the form of interstate disputes and rivalries on state support for arms control. This analysis is facilitated by a novel measure of arms control support that combines United Nations General Assembly voting data with manual coding of 1,178 resolutions. Across a variety of model specifications, the results do not show any significant effect of external threats on support for arms control. This article argues that this means either that the two variables are not related at all, or that two opposing mechanisms cancel out each other: arms control not only entails costs, but also benefits for states that face external threats, as it limits both states involved in a rivalry or dispute. Either way, this study challenges the notion that there is a strictly negative relationship between external threats and arms control support and thus contributes to our understanding of arms control and foreign policy making in general.

Shaping strategic arms trade controls: A multivariate approach

AbstractThe objective of this study is to measure the stringency of strategic arms trade controls across countries and explain the variation herein. This regulatory framework is implemented by sovereign states to control the international transfer of military‐strategic items that potentially contain a security risk. For the purpose of this study, I apply a two‐stage approach. In the first step, I employ factor analysis on more than sixty regulatory indicators related to the rigorousness of and compliance to strategic arms trade controls in a particular country to construct two new measures. The first measure is related to the extent of implementing arms trade laws and legislation, while the second captures the enforcement and control of this kind of regulation. The individual country scores indicate that there exists substantial variation in the extent to which countries implement and enforce strategic trade regulations. Therefore, in the second step, I use the predicted factor scores as a dependent variable in a Bayesian Model Averaging analysis to test several economic and political theories and find the key drivers of the stringency of strategic arms trade regulations and control policies. The general findings of this analysis suggest that the implementation and enforcement of strategic arms trade controls are primarily determined by the trade‐off between two competing policy objectives: national security on the one hand and domestic economic interests on the other. In particular, the implementation effort of arms trade laws and legislation is mainly explained by economic factors, while the degree of enforcement and control is more associated with political factors.

Arms Exports: The Normality of a Scandalous Subject: A Comment

Arms Exports: The Normality of a Scandalous SubjectA Comment Michael Geyer (bio) On February 19, 2022, just a few days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a German opinion poll found that 63 percent of respondents opposed sending weapons into "war and crisis areas," against 34 percent who thought this might be justified in some cases. A mere 3 percent did not know.1 The surprisingly high level of certainty in matters of arms transfers suggests deep-rooted convictions. A similar poll some five years earlier counted a whopping 83 percent who said they were opposed.2 These polls must be taken with a grain of salt, but they do confirm the overall sense, reinforced by still more polls, that Germans want their foreign relations to be peaceful, or, as one op-ed remarked, "want to do good in the world, but preferably the soft way."3 When on Sunday, February 27, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in a policy statement to the Bundestag the rearmament of the Bundeswehr and direct, if still tightly circumscribed, arms exports to Ukraine in light of the Russian invasion on February 24, this was an epochal change—in the first place because it met with the overwhelming approval of the German public.4 Much will be written about this policy statement and what may come of it. Skeptics were quick to point out that nothing much or not enough came of it in the immediate aftermath, while critics feared that too much was happening already.5 Their call for prudence (Besonnenheit) instantly produced a media storm of indignation.6 Retrospectively, on the question of arms exports, the more tantalizing and, for a historian, more answerable question runs as follows: How did Germany emerge as one of the world's top arms exporters—reaching an all-time high in 2021—even though German opinion roundly rejected such exports on principle?7 This contrast need not be understood as contradictory, but the simultaneity of a high level of arms exports and widespread skepticism about them requires explanation. The argument here is that in order to find an answer to this apparent paradox we must examine the arms (export) control policy and [End Page 241] the politics of the social-liberal coalition governments of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt in the long 1970s, a model that is unraveling before our very eyes in 2021/22 at the hands of another socialdemocratic-liberal-green coalition under Chancellor Scholz. Implicit in this argument is a historical-temporal proposition. I will take the half century between the 1970s and 2020s as a single unit of analysis,8 viewed as a fifty-year European interregnum. As an effect of détente, Germany and Europe in those years began to move beyond the Yalta/Potsdam truce in Europe that facilitated a tense, conflictual and highly militarized, but experientially "miraculous" postwar reconstruction. Typically, this period is associated with the uncertainties of rapid globalization (1970s–2008) on the one hand and the end of the Cold War in Europe in 1989/1991 on the other hand, with the 1989/1991 caesura as the main turning point. But I agree with those who mark 1979 as a watershed year, and while this may have appeared as a mere periodization game, the events in 2022, foreshadowed in developments since 2008, suggest otherwise.9 This framing might appear as somewhat of an overreach for a comment on a set of papers about German and Austrian arms exports and their control, but not if we consider that one, if not the key feature of the 1970s–2020s interregnum was the making and unmaking of a Europe-wide arms control and disarmament regime that reduced force levels in Europe—notwithstanding the continuing presence of tactical nuclear weapons—to an all-time low, at least by twentieth-century standards.10 Arms export controls are an altogether minor, though not negligible, aspect of this overall regime of arms control. They can serve as a point of entry into the European arms control and disarmament regime that defined the era. This approach may even make sense of the initial puzzle of Germany and Austria "after the boom" with their simultaneous arms (export...

The role of the U.S. Congress in Determining Nuclear Arms Control Policy under the Biden Administration

On November 3, 2020, a general election was held in the United States, as a result of which Joe Biden was declared the new president and a third of the Senate and the entire House of Representatives were re-elected. Under the new administration, nuclear arms control, one of the very few possible spheres of U.S.-Russian cooperation, is believed to be reanimated. At least, the president-elect has kept his promise to extend the last remaining treaty in this sphere, the New START, for five years without any preconditions. However, despite the traditionally stronger role of the executive branch in the development and implementation of U.S. nuclear policy, the legislative branch, represented by the U.S. Congress, has particular instruments to influence the decision-making process. This paper sets out to analyze how the new balance of power in Congress established after the 2020 general election will affect actions taken by the Biden administration in the sphere of nuclear arms control. For this purpose, the authors used methods of situation analysis, analytical and predictive measures. In the end, the authors conclude that, despite the Democratic majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the continued strong opposition from Republicans in both houses of Congress will not allow the president-elect to significantly change the current political course in the field of nuclear arms control.

Prelude to the Transformation: China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy during the U.S.-China Rapprochement, 1969–1976*

Prelude to the Transformation: China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy during the U.S.-China Rapprochement, 1969–1976*

Printing Insecurity? The Security Implications of 3D-Printing of Weapons.

In 2013, the first gun printed out of plastic by a 3D-printer was successfully fired in the US. This event caused a major media hype about the dangers of being able to print a gun. Law enforcement agencies worldwide were concerned about this development and the potentially huge security implications of these functional plastic guns. As a result, politicians called for a ban of these weapons and a control of 3D-printing technology. This paper reviews the security implications of 3D-printing technology and 3D guns. It argues that current arms control and transfer policies are adequate to cover 3D-printed guns as well. However, while this analysis may hold up currently, progress in printing technology needs to be monitored to deal with future dangers pre-emptively.

Beyond MAD: Obama’s Realistic – but Risky – Effort to Reduce the Role of Nuclear Weapons

New presidential guidance may, finally, render obsolete the Mutual Assured Destruction paradigm that has structured US nuclear strategy and arms-control policy for over 50 years – if a security dilemma can be avoided.

Riot Control Agents and Chemical Weapons Arms Control

This article examines the issue of riot control agents as it relates to the subject of chemical weapons arms control at the international level and, more specifically, implications for the United States. The article examines how the issue of riot control agents has complicated efforts for the United States to enter into and ratify chemical weapons-related arms control agreements. The article provides an overview of chemical weapons, examines the relevant arms control agreements, explores why and how riot control agents influence debates over the merits of these treaties, and explains why riot control agents remain a contentious issue in chemical weapons arms control and foreign policy in the United States.

Twentieth-Century Arms Control Policy May Fail in the Twenty-First

Beginning in the early 1980s, the central theme of U.S. diplomacy with the former Soviet Union and now Russia has been the mutual reduction of the overwhelming destructive capability of strategic arsenals as a means to reduce the primary threat to America. The record of accomplishment is impressive. Not only are the allowed force levels in the latest agreement dramatically lower than their Cold War peaks, the New START Treaty continues and builds on protocols that have created unprecedented transparency and confidence. It is time to ask: What is the next step that will have the highest payoff in reducing the nuclear threat to America? Between the United States and Russia, where the strategic calculus is very well understood, further bilateral stockpile reductions in the near term will lead to only limited improvements in national security. Priority and resources should be shifted to understanding how to deal with the emerging realities of a multipolar nuclear world, where risks can be just as grave and the techniques for managing them are not as well understood.

The Enduring Power of Mass Production, Mass Consumption and Mass Destruction

Zia Mian directs the Project on Peace and Security in South Asia, at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security. His research interests include nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policy in South Asia, and issues of nuclear disarmament and peace. He is an Editor of Science & Global Security, an international journal for scientific and technical studies relating to arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation policy. He is a co-editor with the late Smitu Kothari of Out of the Nuclear Shadow (2002) and Bridging Partition: People's Initiatives for Peace between India and Pakistan (2010). He has published in Development.M.V. Ramana has a Ph.D. in Physics from Boston University and is currently with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University. He works on the future of nuclear energy in the context of climate change and nuclear disarmament. Ramana is completing a book on nuclear power in India. He is a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the International Panel on Fissile Materials, the national coordinating committee of India's coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace and the Global Council of Abolition 2000.

Continuity and Change in the US Arms Control Policy in the Middle East

Continuity and Change in the US Arms Control Policy in the Middle East

China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World

A new wave of interest in the complete elimination of nuclear-weapons is washing over international security institutions. Although the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is as old as the nuclear...

Ties that bind: John F. Kennedy and the foundations of the American–Israeli alliance

In August 1962, John F. Kennedy became the first American President to sell a major weapon system, the Hawk anti-aircraft missile, to Israel. The Hawk sale was part of a much larger shift in thinking about the role of the bilateral relationship with Israel in achieving America's regional objectives. This article analyses the motives for President Kennedy's decision, which represented a decisive break from the arms control and diplomatic policies pursued by Presidents Truman and, especially, Eisenhower. The article ultimately concludes that President Kennedy's new orientation was driven primarily by his affinity for the Jewish state and his more receptive attitude towards Israel's security needs, whose accommodation he thought necessary to achieve stability in the Middle East.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat

Over the last decade, increased attention has been paid to terrorism, particularly to the new wave of terrorist groups, fundamentalist movements, and extremist organisations such as Al-Qaeda. September 11 marked the beginning of a turbulent phase in which states face a new kind of threat made up of a complex network of insidious revolutionary and nationalist forces. Such transformations have given rise to an unprecedented number of publications. However, both political violence and terrorism remain sources of endless disputes and controversies because of their political implications. At the same time, in the scientific community, terrorism studies lack conceptual and methodological uniformity. In his article, Domenico Tosini synthesises and discusses some major findings from this research. Courses using such a review will be confronted with the four major topics that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of the consequences of counterterrorism policies.

Wolfgang Kurt Hermann Panofsky

Wolfgang Kurt Hermann Panofsky

Influence Without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control Diplomacy During the Cold War

This article examines the evolution of middle power diplomacy on arms control during the Cold War. It argues that despite several attempts to influence major arms control negotiations, the structural constraints imposed by strict bipolarity—particularly during the early stages of the Cold War—limited the room for diplomatic manoeuvre by the small and medium-sized states. Factors such as the geographical voting groups within the United Nations system and the self-imposed discipline within traditional alliance structures typically restricted middle power initiatives on the important questions of international security such as arms control. Nonetheless, a number of efforts were made by leading middle powers such as Australia and Canada to progress the cause of arms control and significant policy ideas were at least canvassed during this time. The historical evidence shows that the middle powers were not innocent bystanders in the Cold War arms control debates, but whatever influence they had was ultimately subordinate to the overwhelming structural power of Washington and Moscow.

Interview with Maurits R. Jochems

AbstractAmbassador Maurits R. Jochems is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations in the International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). His functions include responsibility for the Alliance's work in the field of civil emergency planning. As a Dutch Foreign Service career diplomat, he has been seconded to NATO since August 2005. Before taking up his current position he was Director of International Security Policy in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with operations, NATO and EU security policy issues, UN disarmament and arms control, OSCE matters and arms export policy. He has also served at Dutch embassies in Kingston, Bonn, Beirut, Brussels (NATO) and Rome.

A World of Our Making: Constructivist Understanding of China's Arms Control and Disarmament Policy

Constructivism maintains that the world is socially constructed by human practice, and seeks to explain how this construction takes place by stressing the importance of intersubjective meanings and understandings and the interaction between agent and structure. This article employs the norm as an intersubjective meaning built into domestic milieu in order to understand the constitutive process of the norm's impact. As an aggregate of the interaction between states and international institutions (regimes) in a certain time span, the concept of a “constitutive dynamism” between state and institution illuminates how the individual state's interest could be influenced and transformed. The Chinese perspective on the international ACD agenda diversified and significantly transformed into a more norm‐oriented direction. The norm‐bound belief spreads more and more among the ACD experts once the ACD regimes won “universal reality” which international society approved. The dynamism, which integrates the social structuring of international relations by reconstructing the state (agent) and the international system (structure), provides a tool for comparative analysis, which differs from existing rationalist approaches. This would make it possible for IR researchers to draw a more complete picture of the interaction in our interdependent world, which is now undergoing a sovereignty‐blurring phenomenon.

Warfare: NRDC Knocks Nukes

Warfare: NRDC Knocks Nukes