Aristotle's Position Research Articles

Was Aristotle the 'father' of the epigenesis doctrine?

Was Aristotle the 'father' and founder of the epigenesis doctrine? Historically, I will argue, this question must be answered with 'no'. Aristotle did not initiate and had no access to a debate that described itself in terms of 'epigenesis' and 'preformation', and thus cannot be considered the 'father' or founder of the epigenesis-preformation controversy in a literal sense. But many ancient accounts of reproduction and embryological development contain analogies to what early modern scientist called 'epigenesis' and 'preformation', and, in this analogous sense, Aristotle can be considered a precursor of the epigenesis-preformation controversy. But is Aristotle's position actually epigenetic (in this analogous sense), as most of the traditional interpreters hold, or preformationist, as some of the recent scholars believe? I will argue against the one-sidedness of both readings that Aristotle's account of reproduction and heredity contains mainly epigenetic, but also a few preformationist characteristics. Whereas, for instance, Aristotle's idea of a successive development of the embryo's parts is doubtlessly epigenetic, Aristotle's idea that the development of the embryo is an actualization and enlargement of potential parts, which are simultaneously present in the semen, can be considered a preformationist feature.

From Aristotle to Marx: A Critical Philosophical Anthropology

Marx's determination of the species-essence (Gattungswesen) provides a consistently critical orientation by inverting Aristotle's commitment to the priority of actuality over potentiality in accounts or definitions of the human essence. This privileging of potentiality in definition renders the human essence historically developmental and makes good on some of Aristotle's own commitments. If, as Aristotle holds, the form of the species has the power or potency to cause the development of a child into a fully formed adult, then its definition ought to privilege potency. Further, if distinctly human capacities are rational capacities for opposites, then no account that begins with one actual side will provide a satisfactory account of human abilities. Marx was aware of Aristotle's position on potentiality and in the 1844 Manuscripts, Grundrisse, and Capital Marx developed the critical dimension of his philosophical anthropology by thinking the human as a constrained set of historically developing potentialities.

Aristotle and Animal Mind

I propose a study on Aristotle's philosophy of animal mind by facing the perspective that the Stagyrite denied thought and reason to non-human animals due to their failure to speak. I will discuss basic concepts of Aristotle's philosophy of mind to conclude that Aristotle's position is open to a concept of animal mind with three main features.

Aristotelian Necessities

Aristotelian Necessities

There is Something About Aristotle: The Pros and Cons of Aristotelianism in Contemporary Moral Education

The aim of this article is to pinpoint some of the features that do—or should—make Aristotelianism attractive to current moral educators. At the same time, it also identifies theoretical and practical shortcomings that contemporary Aristotelians have been overly cavalier about. Section II presents a brisk tour of ten of the ‘pros’: features that are attractive because they accommodate certain powerful and prevailing assumptions in current moral philosophy and moral psychology—applying them to moral education. Section III explores five versions of the view that Aristotle's position is somehow anachronistic and out-dated. As none of those bears scrutiny, Section IV addresses ten features of Aristotelianism that do not seem to sit well with contemporary moral philosophy and psychology: the genuine ‘cons’ of Aristotelianism. It is subsequently argued that if we want to avoid acquiring Aristotelianism on the cheap, those less attractive features need to be engaged head-on: reinterpreted, revised or simply rejected.

Revitalizing Aristotle's Doctrine of Equity

This article argues for the contemporary relevance of Aristotle's doctrine of equity. Too often, similar arguments make this doctrine relevant by abstracting from the details of Aristotle's position or, conversely, fixating on details without due consideration of the epochal gap that separates us from Aristotle. After an initial survey of these limited approaches, the article proceeds to a more adequate account of Aristotle's doctrine of equity with the help of Heidegger. In particular, what Heidegger offers is a nuanced argument as to why Aristotle's manifest absorption in the concrete details of his face-to-face society is not a limitation to his doctrine, but a strength. We, no less than Aristotle, are enmeshed in logos, in a background ordering not at the command of our will, but we have a greater difficulty seeing this. Thus, where equity for Aristotle above all required expert engagement with logos, equity bids us first to acknowledge that the logos is.

Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of Virtue

Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea that virtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which the intellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefit of this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue. This benefit, though, is only available to some accounts of virtue. Annas claims that Aristotle rejects this skill model of virtue, and so the model of virtues as a skill that Annas endorses for the modern virtue theory is Socratic.This paper argues that while Aristotle rejects the Socratic model of virtue as a skill, he does not reject the model of virtue as a skill altogether. Annas has mischaracterized Aristotle's position on the skill model, because she has not recognized that Aristotle endorses a different account of the structure of skill than the one put forth by Socrates. In addition, recent research on expertise provides an account of skills very much at odds with the description of skills offered by Annas, but similar to the account endorsed by Aristotle.Contrary to Annas, not only is the skill model of virtue compatible with a neo- Aristotelian account of virtue, but it also appears that basing a skill model of virtue on a Socratic account of virtue is likely to prove unsuccessful.

Leisure, contemplation and leisure education

I argue in defense of Aristotle's position that contemplation (theoria) is the proper use of at least some of one's leisure and that, consequently, leisure education must consist in teaching the inclination and capacity for contemplation. However, my position is somewhat more flexible than Aristotle's, in that I allow that there are other activities worthy of some leisure. My argument examines Aristotle's own comments on the importance of theoria as well as commentaries by Ackrill, Nagel, Broadie, Green and Telfer. In the conclusion I argue that there are good reasons to think that studying Philosophy is one of the best strategies for leisure education.

The Intellect-Body Problem in Aquinas

This paper is concerned with the central thesis of Aquinas's argument against the Averroist account of the intellect, which he often expresses by the claim, intellectus est forma corporis , “the intellect is the form of the body”. This claim is fundamental to Aquinas's philosophical psychology since it closely relates not only to his interpretation of Aristotle's position, but also to his attacks against the Averroist account of the intellect. However, this claim is quite subtle, and so there has been a debate between two contemporary scholars, Wéber and Bazán concerning the questions of what Aquinas means by the claim and what are his grounds for it. I will offer an interpretation that differs from theirs by arguing that both of them fail to explain Aquinas's genuine intention.

Future contingents, non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle muddle

For whatever reason, we might think that contingent statements about the future have no determinate truth value. Aristotle, in De interpretatione ix, for instance, held that only those propositions about the future which are either necessarily true, or necessarily false, or 'predetermined' in some way have a determinate truth value. This led Lukasiewicz's in 1920 to construct a three-valued logic in an attempt to formalize Aristotle's position by giving the truth value 1/2 = indeterminate to future contingents and defining '-', '&' and 'v', where 1 = true and 0 = false, as:

Aristotle on the Perfect Life.

Aristotle's teaching on the subject of happiness has been a topic of intense philosophical debate in recent years. Did he hold that happiness consists of the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, or that supreme happiness is to be found only in the practice of philosophical contemplation? The question is vital to the relevance of his ethics today. Anthony Kenny helped to set the terms of the debate a quarter of a century ago. Later, in his book The Aristotelian Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1978), he argued that Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics has no less claim than the better-known Nicomachean Ethics to be taken as a late and definitive statement of Aristotle's position. In this new book he refines his view of the relationship between the two treatises and shows how to reach a consensus on the interpretation of the texts. Aristotle's admirers struggle to read a comprehensive account of the supreme happiness into the Nicomachean Ethics; Dr Kenny argues that those who are prepared to take the neglected Eudemian Ethics with equal seriousness are able to presrve their admiration intact without doing violence to any of the relevant texts.

The Darwinian Biology of Aristotle's Political Animals

Recently, some political scientists, such as James Q. Wilson and Roger Masters, have argued for a Darwinian social theory that would support a revival of Aristotelian naturalism in the social sciences. As a contribution to this project, I argue that Darwinian biology confirms Aristotle's biological understanding of political animals. Thomas Hobbes's criticisms of Aristotle's position rest on dichotomies-nature versus culture, instinct versus learning, animality versus humanity-that have been refuted by modern biological research. Rejecting these false dichotomies would permit a unification of the social sciences and the natural sciences with Darwinian biology as the crucial link.

XII—The Stoic Analysis of the Sorites

T he discovery of the Sorites is attributed by Diogenes Laertius to Eubulides together with many other famous paradoxes.' It is not our concern to decide whether this testimony is reliable nor to examine why such a concentration of difficult puzzles was created by a single man or by a small group of dialecticians. There are scholars who are convinced that the real inventor of the Sorites was Zeno of Elea with his argument of the Millet Seed,2 while others think that his reasoning has little to do with the Sorites.3 Even wider is the range of opinions about the target of the Eubulidean paradoxes and in particular of the Sorites. A quite widespread view is that Eubulides used the Sorites to attack Aristotle, a sport he was fond of, and in particular his doctrine of the mean.4 A piece of evidence for this position may be that Aspasius and the anonymous commentator on the Nicomachean Ethics both refer to the Sorites as an objection to Aristotle's position.5 But there are no clear hints that Aristotle discussed it nor is there any clue that he felt the soritical argument as a difficulty for his own views.6 So, even if Aristotle was

Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem

In this paper I will argue that Aristotle's position on the mind-body problem is probably best characterized as dualism. The question of whether dualism is true divides into three questions: Are there immaterial, non-physical substances? Are there non-physical mental events? Are there non-physical mental properties? Since Aristotle's position is clearer with regard to the first two issues than the third, I will confine the discussion to an examination of Aristotle's position on those questions. Section I deals with Aristotle's commitments in relation to the question about substance and section II deals with the issue in relation to events. An alternative account of Aristotle's position on the second issue is examined and rejected in section III. I will argue that, with reservations, it is plausible to say that Aristotle accepts the existence of non-physical substances. On the question of mental events, I will argue that Aristotle's position is at odds with both the dualist and the physicalist views, but since in this case too it is plausible to say that Aristotle accepts the existence of non-physical events, his overall position is best classified as dualist. The evidence drawn on occurs largely in the comparatively neglected first book of De Anima. Many have thought, correctly, that Aristotle's views on the intellect commit him to some sort of dualism with regard to the rational soul, but reject this as an accurate representation of his position for other types of soul sensitive, nutritive, etc. My argument in section 1 rests on no assumptions about the soul peculiar to the intellect. Aristotle's dualism regarding the soul holds for any kind of soul, including the souls of plants. However, section II deals only with psychic events which have the soul as a subject. Digestion and other actualizations of the nutritive soul are not mental events because the proper subject of digestion, for example, is the body alone.

Compulsion and Voluntary Action in the Eudemian Ethics

In this paper I wish to examine Aristotle's views on compulsion and voluntary action in the Eudemian Ethics II.6-9. This topic, like the Eudemian Ethics generally, has received little attention from scholars. Even the fifteen papers of the fifth Symposium Aristotelicum devoted to the Eudemian Ethics' have nothing to say about its treatment of voluntary action. And while the subject is helpfully and interestingly discussed in Anthony Kenny's book on Aristotle's philosophy of action,2 his account also distorts Aristotle's views on a number of important points. As I hope to show, the position adopted by Aristotle is of interest, differing significantly from what we find in the Nichomachean Ethics. I will begin with an examination of those conditions in Aristotle's definition of voluntary action which are especially important for the understanding of his views on compulsion. Then I will attempt to explain Aristotle's position as it is found in the main discussion of compulsion at the end of Book II, chapter 8. Finally, I will note some difficulties arising from Aristotle's treatment and explain how they are avoided in the Nichomachean Ethics.

Aristotle on Acquisition

AbstractAristotle is reputed to be a thinker for whom nature is a standard which enables political judgments to avoid being arbitrary. By examining his discussion of acquisition in the Politics, this article reconsiders whether and how this reputation is deserved. Although Aristotle's discussion seems to represent a classic case in which theoretical reflections on nature issue in a moral condemnation of limitless acquisition, a subsequent distinction between theory and practice limits the practical consequences of his remarks on nature. This observation invites a rethinking of Aristotle's position on the relationship between nature and political life.

Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's concept of space and its later influence

Summary This study considers the contribution of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529–1597) to the development of the concepts of void space and an infinite universe. Patrizi plays a greater role in the development of these concepts than any other single figure in the sixteenth century, and yet his work has been almost totally overlooked. I have outlined his views on space in terms of two major aspects of his philosophical attitude: on the one hand, he was a devoted Platonist and sought always to establish Platonism, albeit his own version of it, as the only currect philosophy; and on the other hand, he was more determinedly anti-Aristotelian than any other philosopher at that time. Patrizi's concept of space has its beginnings in Platonic notions, but is extended and refined in the light of a vigorous critique of Aristotle's position. Finally, I consider the influence of Patrizi's ideas in the seventeenth century, when various thinkers are seeking to overthrow the Aristotelian concept of place and the equiv...

Happiness and the Good Life

Near the end of his paper Carson says that, although he has not done "enough to refute the view that happiness is an 'inclusive gooď in the way that Aristotle conceived," he believes that he has destroyed "any motivation there may be for accepting Aristotle's view" (pp. 85-86). And he asserts, in conclusion, that, if his arguments are well taken, "happiness is not nearly as important a concept as many philosophers have thought" (p. 86) . In this note I shall argue that Carson's attack on Aristotle's position that happiness ( eudaimonia ) is an "inclusive good" fails for several reasons, the chief of which is that the concept of happiness which he employs in his criticism of Aristotle's view is quite unAristotelian. Though Carson's arguments should convince us that "contentment," or "being satisfied with one's life,"2 is not an "inclusive good," Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia is not merely a notion of contentment, and we are given no reason to believe that his notion is a spurious one. In Section I, I shall briefly articulate one pertinent concept of an "inclusive good" and make some general comments on the status of Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia , as employed in Book 1 of the Nico machean Ethics (NE). Then, in Section II, I shall assess Carson's attack and exhibit the major shortcomings of the three arguments in which the attack consists. I shall conclude, in Section III, with a point about the evaluability of Aristotle's view.

St. Bonaventure and Arabian Interpretations of Two Aristotelean Problems

The writings of St. Bonaventure contain very strong critiques of the interpretations by Arabian philosophers, notably Avicenna and Averroes, of Aristotle's position on the origin of the world and on the nature of the human intellect. These two Aristotelean problems are handled by St. Bonaventure initially in his Commentary on the Sentences (1254-1256). 1 He takes the stand that the world as a whole was brought into being, and that its intrinsic principles of matter and form were produced from nothing. Regarding the ancient philosophers, he sees as unreasonable the Platonist position that the world was produced from pre-existent matter to which, after some time, the maker of the universe conjoined forms previously existing and separated from matter. The Aristoteleans came closer to the truth in saying that the world was made, but not from pre-existing principles. Bonaventure finds it difficult, nevertheless, to understand whether or not Aristotle held that matter and form were made from nothing. He did not apparently hold such a position, thus failing to reach the truth, though less than the other ancient philosophers.2 Their common failure to see that the world came to-be from nothing gave rise to the opinion of an eternal world, which was sustained seemingly by Aristotle, the more excellent of the philosophers: it was ascribed to him by the

Rhetoric, Dialectic and Syllogistic Argument: Aristotle's Position in "Rhetoric" I-II

In Rhetoric I-II Aristotle analyses the kind of reasoning used by orators. He suggests that rhetoric, the art of persuasion, has certain affinities with dialectic, the art of dispute. He also analyses how rhetorical reasoning falls short of the syllogistic reasoning which he explores at length in the Prior Analytics. The relationship of rhetoric to dialectic and to syllogistic argument is complex and difficult. In this paper I shall argue that Aristotle was himself unclear about this relationship, and that his lack of clarity explains certain obscurities in the Rhetoric which have troubled the commentators. The first point to consider is what does Aristotle mean by 'dialectic'. He expounds the method of dialectic in the Topics, which is a list of rules for debating exercises. The Greek term t67r6n literally means 'places', but Aristotle uses it in a logical context to mean something like 'grounds for argument'. He identifies '6rcog with =GoLxeLov in Rhet. 1396 b 20-21, and says in Met. B.2.998 a 25-7 and A.3. 1014 a 35 b 1 that a arotyeZov is a proposition whose demonstration is presupposed in the demonstration of other propositions. So a =odXLov or T67tog is a proposition whose truth is taken for granted in a number of arguments. (Cf. also a remark in Rhet. 1403 a 17-18: g,'L yocp CoOLX?LoV xXol 'r64oc et; 8n E?u that parallel lines do not meet; this proposition is the foundation on which all subsequent theorems are based. In the Topics, the Sr6not are grouped into four principal classes corresponding to the four kinds of predicables, namely, accident, genus, necessary property and definition. In order to use the '6mOL, one must be able to apply the doctrine of the predicables. For example, under the heading of 'accident' Aristotle includes the topic of asserting a predicate to be an accident when it is not really an accident (Top. II.2.109 a 34-5: Etq lkev 8& t6no; '6 ip,XCnetv et cT xa'&XXov 'vTWX -rpo67ov urapXov k mlipepBqx6g hr0oWcoxev). Thus if someone argues that justice is good in some circumstances but not in others, one method of refuting him is to show that justice is always and invariably good (i.e. that goodness is a necessary property of justice, not an accidental one).