Compulsion and Voluntary Action in the Eudemian Ethics

Abstract

In this paper I wish to examine Aristotle's views on compulsion and voluntary action in the Eudemian Ethics II.6-9. This topic, like the Eudemian Ethics generally, has received little attention from scholars. Even the fifteen papers of the fifth Symposium Aristotelicum devoted to the Eudemian Ethics' have nothing to say about its treatment of voluntary action. And while the subject is helpfully and interestingly discussed in Anthony Kenny's book on Aristotle's philosophy of action,2 his account also distorts Aristotle's views on a number of important points. As I hope to show, the position adopted by Aristotle is of interest, differing significantly from what we find in the Nichomachean Ethics. I will begin with an examination of those conditions in Aristotle's definition of voluntary action which are especially important for the understanding of his views on compulsion. Then I will attempt to explain Aristotle's position as it is found in the main discussion of compulsion at the end of Book II, chapter 8. Finally, I will note some difficulties arising from Aristotle's treatment and explain how they are avoided in the Nichomachean Ethics.