The Eudemian Ethics on Knowledge and Voluntary Action

Abstract

In this paper I wish to explain and critically assess the Eudemian Ethics' account of the role of knowledge in voluntary action. As we shall see, the account we find there has a number of shortcomings, and I will also attempt to make improvements in Aristotle's theory which do not do too much violence to his original position. The understanding of Aristotle's views on the conditions for voluntary action in the Eudemian Ethics (hereafter EE) is central to the understanding of its account of moral responsibility for actions, for EE identifies the class of actions for which an agent is responsible with the class of actions which are voluntary. Unfortunately, this identification is a source of serious difficulties in EE's explanation of voluntariness. I will use the notion of 'moral responsibility' in such a way that when an agent performs an action for which he is morally responsible, then if the action is good he and it are morally praiseworthy, and if the action is bad then he and it are morally blameworthy. But many actions for which I am morally responsible are morally indifferent, e.g. my action of squeezing my toes while writing the previous sentence. I will assume that Aristotle believes that when an agent is in this way subject to praise and blame his action is one for which the agent is morally responsible.'