Aristotle's Notion Research Articles

The Practical Wisdom of Phronesis in the Education of Purported Virtuous Character

AbstractIn the context of the recent revival of virtue ethics, the notion of character formation under the rational guidance of Aristotle's notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom, has been exalted as the principal aim of moral education. However, this is not unproblematic insofar as the promotion of Aristotelian phronesis seems to operate on rather different levels or to be ambivalent between the two rather different (and demonstrably separable) aims or goals of fostering reasonably sound deliberation and judgment concerning “right” or good (moral or other) agency or action and the allegedly optimal (empirical) psychological ordering of cognition and affect to the end of good or commendable human character. In this paper, David Carr argues that while the first of these aims is by and large educationally acceptable and defensible, the second is neither a desirable nor coherent educational goal.

From “What Works” to “Why it Works” – From a Humean to an Aristotelian Understanding of Causality

Purpose: Authors of this theoretical article are questioning Hume's view on causality by arguing for Aristotle’s pluralistic view as an alternative strategy for social work research and practice. Methods: Aristotle's notion of causality is applied to discuss its relevance, and then tested on a real case, thereby illustrating how it can contribute to explain why something works. Results: Different types of causes can reveal characteristics that are preconditional for professional's and service user's mutual roles in enhancing outcomes. They can further reveal the architecture of the intervention; the underlying processes for actions to reach a desired goal. Discussion: To deliver knowledge of relevance in social work, one needs to explain the results of an intervention through causal analysis as well as understanding the content and processes of it. Aristotle's forms of causality make it possible to take the contextual historicism of social phenomenon into consideration and give knowledge beyond effects.

The Significance of Aristotle's Four Causes in Design Research

Abstract In this article we demonstrate that and why Aristotle's four causes are essential for a scientific articulation of designerly knowledge. We show that properly understood, Aristotle's notion of a cause, including the final cause, is not in conflict with modern science. Rather, when it comes to understanding living beings as such, all of the four Aristotelian causes are still crucial. We argue that this implies that design research, too, must appeal to the four causes, because artifacts must be understood in terms of the role they play in the life of living beings.

Alienation and action in the young Marx, Aristotle, and Arendt

Alienation and action in the young Marx, Aristotle, and Arendt

Maulbertsch und die tragische Malerei : die Deckenbilder der Legende des hl. Stephan in der Pfarrkirche von Pápa

The narrative unfolding in the ceiling paintings at Pápa can be taken for a painted tragedy of a complex plot based on Aristotle's notions of change of fate (peripeteia) and recognition (anagnorisis), the precedents of which are not to be sought in ceiling painting but much rather in the history of pictures of the classical approach produced in the early modern age. In terms of classical rhetoric, the style of the three ceiling frescoes corresponds to Quintilian's second category, the sublime and vehement mode of representation (genus sublime, genus vehemens) aimed at moving the recipient. The vision of heaven has a crucial role in the cycle, for the celestial sphere, in the plot the promise of salvation ensures areversal of fortune, an auspicious denouement. The earthly events stir the recipients' emotions but the involvement of justice in the afterlife calms them, thus allowing perfect catharsis to happen. The change of fate in the third fresco is related to the moment of recognition. Through the great masters of the 16th and 17th centuries, pathos theory and the conception of peripeteia became a fundamental, even commonplace pictorial narrative method in history painting and Tridentine religious art of the early modern age. With the Pápa ceiling frescoes Franz Anton Maulbertsch (1724–1796) gave evidence of his broad pictorial culture by choosing from among these visual panels and formulas with a keen eye and shaping them to his own liking.

What is Matter in Aristotle's Hylomorphism?

Aristotle's notion of matter has been seen either as unintelligible, it being some mysterious potential entity that is nothing in its own right, or as simply the notion of an everyday object. The latter is the common assumption in contemporary approaches to hylomorphism, but as has been pointed out, especially by scholars with a background in ancient philosophy, if we conceive of matter as an object itself we cannot account for the unity of hylomorphic substances. Thus, they assume that a hylomorphic substance is an essential unity and matter not a constituent at all. This solution to the problem of unity, however, brings us back to the mysterious notion of matter. For these reasons, I will revisit Aristotle's conception of matter in this paper. I will argue that an understanding of form as a cause of being requires that matter be an independent constituent of the individual substance. However, I agree that the conception of matter as an individual object with an essence makes it impossible to solve the problem of unity. We therefore need to take seriously Aristotle's assertion that matter is nothing in its own right and not an individual. By denying that matter is an individual, Aristotle does not introduce a mysterious entity, nor does he deny that it can be identified independently of the whole; instead, matter for Aristotle is an irreducible plurality, and this explains why it is not an individual and has no essence. I will conclude with some observations on how this gives rise to two competing versions of hylomorphic constitution.

The Christological Prudence of the Natural Slave

AbstractThe account of prudence found in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae and the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is bound up with his endorsement of Aristotle's notion of the Natural Slave in his Commentary on Aristotle's Politics. This connection not only hobbles his account of the virtue of prudence, but also weakens other areas of his theology, including his account of providence. A creative rereading of Aquinas's biblical commentaries, however, affords Aquinas the opportunity to correct himself. Aquinas's commentaries on Paul, especially the Commentary on Philippians, provide ample resources for doing so. The Christ hymn of Philippians 2:5-11 forms the cornerstone of a thoroughly Christological, even Apocalyptic, account of prudence, which overcomes the tensions in Aquinas's account of prudence resulting from his endorsement of natural slavery. This scriptural reformulation of prudence heightens the stress on exemplification even further and in so doing makes its exercise more conducive to peaceableness. Due to the political dimensions of prudence, these shifts have an ecclesiological dimension that reveals Aquinas's affinity with Giorgio Agamben's philosophical account of mendicant life.

Continuity and Mathematical Ontology in Aristotle

In this paper I argue that Aristotle's understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle's notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction between continuity and contiguity. Next I argue briefly that Aristotle intends for his discussion of continuity to apply to pure mathematical objects such as lines and figures, as well as to extended bodies. I show that this leads him to a difficulty, for it does not at first appear that the distinction between continuity and contiguity can be preserved for abstract mathematicals. Finally, I present a solution according to which Aristotle's understanding of continuity can only be saved if he holds a certain kind of mathematical ontology.

Divinity, Noēsis, and Aristotelian Friendship

Aristotle's NE X claim that the best human life is one devoted to contemplation (theoria) seems in tension with his emphasis elsewhere on our essentially political nature, and more specifically, his claim that friendship is necessary for our flourishing. For, if our good can be in principle realized apart from the human community, there seems little reason to suggest we 'need' friends, as he clearly does in NE VIII & IX. I argue that central to Aristotle's NE X discussion of contemplation is the claim that our chief good accords with whatever is 'most divine' in us, viz. our rational nature (NE 1177b2-18). Thus, the best human life involves the excellent exercise of our rational capacities. I distinguish two ways in which human beings flourish through exercising their rationality. The first is in the activity of theoria. The second, I argue, can be found in the virtuous activity of complete friendship (teleia philia). For Aristotle the truest form of friendship is an expression of rationality. It is characterized not merely by our living together, but conversing, and sharing one another's thoughts (NE 1170b12-14). Examining Aristotle's notion of a friend as 'another self (alios autos), I argue that through friendship human beings come to better know themselves and the world in which they live. Complete friendship involves a (uniquely human) second-order awareness of oneself in another, and through this awareness our understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live is enriched, confirmed, and enjoyed through the presence of other minds. Thus, the highest form of Aristotelian friendship is an intellectual activity through which we attain an analogue of the divine contemplation of the unmoved mover, thereby living with respect to what is most divine in us, but doing so in accordance with our uniquely rational-political nature.

Aristotle's Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action

In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try to show that the similarities between Aristotle's rational powers and powers as they are commonly understood in contemporary accounts of agency, especially regarding their two-sidedness and up-to-usness, are only superficial. Aristotle's rational powers are not genuinely two-sided, and their being up to the agent has nothing to do with the availability of alternative courses of action.

Understanding Aristotle's Notion of the Mean: A Case Study in Anger

In this paper, I argue that purely quantitative understandings of Aristotle's concept of "the mean" (as presented in Nicomachean Ethics) are oversimplified, and I make this argument by analyzing the particular emotion of anger. Anger, I contend, helps to complicate the purely quantitative understanding of the mean, insofar as, I argue, the amount of anger experienced is not the morally salient feature in determining whether or not the anger is virtuous. Rather, anger is one example of an emotion or trait for which other, non-quantitative parameters of the mean are more salient, giving us a more nuanced understanding of what the mean is. Anger is virtuous not when it is in the right measurable degree, but rather when it is directed at the proper target. In this way, the virtue-making property of anger is distinctly qualitative. Examining anger provides insight into the concept of the mean and its role in Aristotle's ethics, and also helps to shed light on contemporary debates about political anger.

Perspectives on phronesis in professional nursing practice.

The concept of phronesis is venerable and is experiencing a resurgence in contemporary discourses on professional life. Aristotle's notion of phronesis involves reasoning and action based on ethical ideals oriented towards the human good. For Aristotle, humans possess the desire to do what is best for human flourishing, and to do so according to the application of virtues. Within health care, the pervasiveness of economic agendas, technological approaches and managerialism create conditions in which human relationships and moral reasoning are becoming increasingly de-valued. This creates a tension for nurses, and nursing leaders, as the desire to do what is morally right is often in conflict with contextual demands. In this paper, Aristotle's writing on phronesis is examined with a focus on his classic conceptions of eudaimonia, the virtues, deliberation, judgement, and praxis. Building on Aristotle's work, a number of contemporary views are explored with a focus on what various conceptualizations offer for the discipline of nursing. These expanded conceptions of phronesis include attention to: embodiment in practice; open-mindedness including the capacity to stay curious and open to recognizing what we do not know; perceptiveness as a disposition towards insight and aesthetic understanding; and reflexivity as an ongoing process of interrogation and inquiry into ourselves and our actions. Drawing on these concepts, we discuss the affordances of phronesis as a morally informed guiding force to attend to modern-day challenges in nursing practice and nursing leadership.

La noción de identidad en los "Tópicos"

Aristotle's notion of identity is investigated on this article. This investigation is focused on Top. I7, where different ways of using of the word 'same' are analysed. Two major claims are made. First of all, Aristotle does not seem to be committed to hold that there are different types of identity. The second point concerns contingent identity. What Aristotle says about numerical identity does not commit him to the view that identity can be contingent and it is consistent with the claim that identity statements are in all cases necessary.

Engagement and practical wisdom in clinical practice: a phenomenological study.

In order to understand the lived experiences of physicians in clinical practice, we interviewed eleven expert, respected clinicians using a phenomenological interpretative methodology. We identified the essence of clinical practice as engagement. Engagement accounts for the daily routine of clinical work, as well as the necessity for the clinician to sometimes trespass common boundaries or limits. Personally engaged in the clinical situation, the clinician is able to create a space/time bubble within which the clinical encounter can unfold. Engagement provides an account of clinical practice as a unitary lived experience. This stands in stark contrast to the prevailing notion, referred to as a dual discourse, that describes medicine as the addition of humanism to science. Drawing on Aristotle's notion of phronesis and Sartre's definition of the situation, we illustrate how this novel perspective entwines clinical practice, the person of the clinician, and the clinician's situation.

Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union by Michael Gorman

Reviewed by: Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union by Michael Gorman Victor M. Salas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union. By Michael Gorman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 177. $99.99 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-107-15532-9. This volume explores Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical account of the Incarnation, in which Jesus Christ is understood to be one person with two distinct natures. Gorman helpfully begins with an overview of the dogmatic determinations established by the early Church's ecumenical councils; these framed the parameters (and limits) within which theologians could develop their metaphysical accounts of the hypostatic union and remain orthodox. Coupled with this dogmatic framework is the more proximate tradition of Christology articulated in the Sentences of Peter Lombard, wherein three Christological "tendencies" are advanced: assumptus homo, subsistence, and habitus. Without addressing the particulars of each tendency, Gorman notes that Thomas, like most of his contemporaries, prefers the second (subsistence theory) over the others, and it is the task of Thomas's metaphysics of the Incarnation to explain what is involved in that approach. The success of Thomas's project is not always clear insofar as he leaves undeveloped or opaque what some would desire to be clearer or more definitive. Gorman's project, then, attempts to be both historically accurate and speculative and, in both cases, as intellectually honest as possible. The first chapter addresses Thomas's understanding of "person" and "nature." The usual catalog of associated metaphysical terms (e.g., "hypostasis," "suppositum," "res naturae," "substance") emerging from the classical Boethian definition of "person" comes to the fore. Here, Gorman makes a rather peculiar claim regarding Aristotle's notion of "second substance": "'second substance' means approximately the same thing as 'nature' (this is the sense of substance that is at work in a phrase like 'consubstantial with the Father')" (15). It is far from evident, however, that the όμοουσιος is the same as Aristotelian "second substance," for the reason that the latter relates to first substance as a species or a genus (i.e., a universal) does to a particular subject (i.e., ύποκείμενον). But what sense does it make to say that the "nature" of God is a universal or a species? Would that be to imply that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit stand as individuals (first substances?) within the same species, or even species within the same genus of deity? The first option would result in polytheism, the second in absurdity. Be that as it may, the remainder of the chapter elucidates Thomas's account of substance, which has four determining features—the most important of which is "subsistence," followed by "individuality," "substanding," and "unity." Accordingly, if a person is a special kind of substance, persons too will enjoy these same four characteristic marks of substance. Given that a "person" is a substance of a peculiar kind of nature, Gorman treats what "nature" means for Thomas. Though said in many ways, the relevant form of "nature" in discussions of personhood is "substantial nature," which functions [End Page 309] as a supposit-grounder: that in virtue of which something subsists as a suppositum. Moreover, a substantial nature makes something subsist by making it to be a subsisting thing of a certain kind. Chapter 2 relates Thomas's metaphysical understanding of (personal) substances to the dynamics involved in the Incarnation itself. As a nature is that whereby something subsists as a certain kind of thing, to say that Christ has two natures is to say that Christ subsists as both divine and human. Moreover, as natures are principles of operations, insofar as Christ acts through his human nature (e.g., healing, suffering), the divine person himself undertakes these actions. Gorman helpfully draws attention to a special sense in which it is said that Christ assumes a "human nature." "Human nature" as such only pertains to that which is proper to being a human, namely, a "rational animal." Yet, within a human being there is more than just "rational animal," since human beings enjoy a variety of accidental features and particular determinations that emerge from their human nature. This latter, broader category is what Gorman calls "human reality" (45). He suggests...

Aristotle on Things and Super-Things

Does Aristotle's terminology provide some guidance when we inquire into the origins of the notion of thing? Naturally, one might think of Aristotle's notion of being, which is meant to capture ever...

Quantum potentiality revisited.

Heisenberg offered an interpretation of the quantum state which made use of a quantitative version of an earlier notion, [Formula: see text], of Aristotle by both referring to it using its Latin name, potentia, and identifying its qualitative aspect with [Formula: see text] The relationship between this use and Aristotle's notion was not made by Heisenberg in full detail, beyond noting their common character: that of signifying the system's objective capacity to be found later to possess a property in actuality. For such actualization, Heisenberg required measurement to have taken place, an interaction with external systems that disrupts the otherwise independent, natural evolution of the quantum system. The notion of state actualization was later taken up by others, including Shimony, in the search for a law-like measurement process. Yet, the relation of quantum potentiality to Aristotle's original notion has been viewed as mainly terminological, even by those who used it thus. Here, I reconsider the relation of Heisenberg's notion to Aristotle's and show that it can be explicated in greater specificity than Heisenberg did. This is accomplished through the careful consideration of the role of potentia in physical causation and explanation, and done in order to provide a fuller understanding of this aspect of Heisenberg's approach to quantum mechanics. Most importantly, it is pointed out that Heisenberg's requirement of an external intervention during measurement that disrupts the otherwise independent, natural evolution of the quantum system is in accord with Aristotle's characterization of spontaneous causation. Thus, the need for a teleological understanding of the actualization of potentia, an often assumed requirement that has left this fundamental notion neglected, is seen to be spurious.This article is part of the themed issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions'.

The Culture of Equity in Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Britain and America by Mark Fortier

Reviewed by: The Culture of Equity in Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Britain and America by Mark Fortier Neil Guthrie Mark Fortier. The Culture of Equity in Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Britain and America. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015. Pp. viii + 154. $104.95. This slender book is the continuation of an earlier one by Mr. Fortier on the concept of equity in the early modern period (Elizabeth I to the eve of the Restoration), but necessarily with glances back to Aristotle's notion of equity and the development of equity in the English courts. The risk of reading (and reviewing) just the continuation, which runs from 1660 to the end of the long eighteenth century, might be a failure to understand the historical background. Mr. Fortier does a good job, however, of sketching out the main argument of part one in his introductory chapter. There is, to start with, Aristotle's sense of equity as "a method of restoring the balance of justice when it has been tilted by the law." This has striking similarities with equity as a concept in English law, where the courts of equity developed in order to mitigate the perceived rigidity and harshness of the courts that applied the common law. (Equity itself became ossified, ironically, and a by-word for rigidity; Dickens's Jarndyce v. Jarndyce is a case in the equitable court of Chancery.) Other sources of "equity" are the Roman notion of aequitas, and the religious context of the Old and New Testaments. Naturally, these sources overlap—although in the early modern period, Mr. Fortier detects less of the direct influence of Aristotle, and more of Cicero. There are risks in writing a book about a keyword (in Raymond Williams's sense), but Mr. Fortier manages to avoid them. The first is a tendency to find evidence of the chosen concept in everything, as though (in this instance) equity were the over-arching principle in the period. The other risk is that, in focusing on "equity" as a term, it will be overlooked as a concept. As Mr. Fortier points out, equity is one of the central themes of the Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure but is never mentioned by that name in either. Mr. Fortier has considerable terminological vagueness to contend with but sees this as a source of "usefulness and power." The Culture of Equity is not a history of legal institutions, but of "words and ideas." In a short book, Mr. Fortier is able to convey variety and tone, without making it seem that "equity" is so elastic a term it can fit [End Page 90] whatever comes its way. It is, variously, "impartiality (or at least opposed to partiality), reading for spirit and intent rather than strictly by the letter, balance, proportion, judgment, reason, do unto others, common and unchanging rules of justice." There have been many studies of equity as a theme in the literature of the early modern period (notably Shakespeare and Milton), but less on the concept in works of the Restoration and eighteenth century. Mr. Fortier argues that this is, in part, because there is simply less focus on equity in the later period, in spite of individual works (like Pamela) where it is a significant underlying principle. Mr. Fortier identifies some competing uses of the concept of equity in the Restoration. First, there was a backlash by Royalist writers who sought to reclaim equity—and in particular, the associated maxim salus populi suprema lex. The idea that the good of the people was the supreme law had been used before the Civil War to defend the Crown's override of parliamentary or judicial authority, but also by the Roundheads to justify the supremacy of popular will over royal authority. After 1660, equity and salus populi returned to the Royalist vocabulary (with exceptions; Sir Roger L'Estrange detested it), while remaining part of the polemics of those "less favorable to absolutism." Equity was deployed by those who upheld the necessity of conformity to the established church, but also by those who argued the case for toleration of dissent, particularly that of the Quakers. In the years leading up to the revolution...

Moja przygoda z praktycyzmem

For forty years I have been using in all my Polish scientific works the term "practicism" ("praktycyzm"), and its equivalents in my publications in French, German and Italian. This term has its strong background in Aristotle's notion and term of praxis, which was with precision defined in the commentaries to Nicomachean Ethics, in particular, by numerous medieval commentators. However, this term became not to be a popular one – both in colloquial and philosophical languages, although, it was used later by some other Polish historians of philosophy. When I relate today, and once again explain the sense of my studies on practicism, I do it to inspire young philosophers to search the new terms and definitions for better, maybe well-aimed, description of the phenomena and contents, which I called "practicism".

Preserving a combat commander’s moral agency: The Vincennes Incident as a Chinese Room

We argue that a command and control system can undermine a commander's moral agency if it causes him/her to process information in a purely syntactic manner, or if it precludes him/her from ascertaining the truth of that information. Our case is based on the resemblance between a commander's circumstances and the protagonist in Searle's Chinese Room, together with a careful reading of Aristotle's notions of `compulsory' and `ignorance'. We further substantiate our case by considering the Vincennes Incident, when the crew of a warship mistakenly shot down a civilian airliner. To support a combat commander's moral agency, designers should strive for systems that help commanders and command teams to think and manipulate information at the level of meaning. `Down conversions' of information from meaning to symbols must be adequately recovered by `up conversions', and commanders must be able to check that their sensors are working and are being used correctly. Meanwhile ethicists should establish a mechanism that tracks the potential moral implications of choices in a system's design and intended operation. Finally we highlight a gap in normative ethics, in that we have ways to deny moral agency, but not to affirm it.