Aristotle's Ethics Research Articles

Wayward Sons and Failing Fathers:

It has been a long time since anyone has taken seriously the possibility that a literary source might ever be identified for Chaucer’s Cook’s Tale. The reason for this is not simply that this tale has been preserved only in what appears to be an accidentally truncated form.1 Even at fifty-eight lines long, it remains a substantial “stub,” and it provides a number of potential clues to the nature of the story that Chaucer probably intended to tell.2 Indeed, it defines its dramatis personae and its thematic concerns so fully as to create what is actually quite a detailed profile for the identity of its source, and it is perhaps precisely because this profile is so detailed that it has always seemed so difficult to find an exact enough match for it among all the classical or medieval stories that Chaucer is likely to have known. In other words, it is not an absence of

Aristotle's moral realism reconsidered: phenomenological ethics

Introduction I: Aristotle and Kant: Actions within the Moral World 1: Action, pirhoalphakappatau nu and Visibility 2: Phronetic Perception 3: Aristotelian Constructivism 4: Kant: Action, the Good and their Common Categories II: Phenomenological Voices and their Dissonances 5: Towards a Phenomenological Moral Realism 6: Heidegger on Aristotle's and Kant's Ethics 7: Gadamer and Practical Rationality 8: Arendt on Action and Performances Conclusion: The Many Faces of Moral Realism Notes Selected Bibliography Index of Names Index of Subjects Index of Passages

Dynamis. Metafizyczne pojęcie możności i jego rola w filozofii praktycznej Arystotelesa

The author considers Aristotle’s conception of potency ( dynamis ), a fundamental notion in his metaphysics. One of its important functions is to connect his metaphysics and his practical philosophy. Showing this connection involves an analysis of the most important parts of the Metaphysics (Books Delta and Theta) and its application to an essential element of Aristotle’s practical philosophy, the notion of virtue (arete). However, Aristotle’s practical works (the three Ethics and the Rhetoric) contain apparently contradictory definitions of arete: in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines arete in terms of the notion of disposition (hexis), while in the Rhetoric he makes use of the notion of potency. An examination of this apparent contradiction clarifies the true significance of potency in Aristotle’s philosophy

The politics of action research: “If you don't like the way things are going, get off the bus”

Participatory action research is lauded for its emancipatory potential and practice relevance. Little research has focused on the ethical and political dimensions of power relations between management gatekeepers and staff in large organizations in the negotiation of action research. To illuminate the dynamics of this engagement, this paper is informed by Aristotle's practical ethics of phronesis, arguing that ethics emerge through human interaction. The paper reports on a multi-method study and intervention in inter-professional learning and collaboration, conducted between 2008 and 2010, across an Australian health system. It draws on results from researchers' progress notes, 139 semi-structured interviews and focus groups (492 participants), more than 200 h of organizational document analysis, and more than 200 h of ethnographic observation. From conventional thematic analysis, we note that the project had considerable support from senior managers who were gatekeepers for the research. Such support stemmed from managerialist tendencies, with senior managers explicitly aligning inter-professionalism with prospective health reforms and improvements to quality of care and patient safety. Senior managers were also enthusiastic about standardized processes. Many frontline staff were less supportive, and some were suspicious of or hostile towards management-led processes to improve and evaluate care. Some senior managers' self perceived alignment with and support for the research process changed to resistance once this finding was presented. This paradox in the interplay of research findings and research process evinces the inherent tension between organizational politics and conducting action research that reflexive researchers need to negotiate in knowledge translation, exchange or mobilization exercises.

Loving the Fine: Virtue and Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics. By AnnaLännström. Pp. 145, Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, $27.50.

Loving the Fine: Virtue and Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics. By AnnaLännström. Pp. 145, Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, $27.50.

A Dialectic Model of Development of Stakeholders’ Theory and Corporate Governance: from Hume Utilitarianism to Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Nowadays, developing the opinion of anti-corporation has formed a large part of biases and social judgments of the management science. Among these, because of performance of some companies and managers, the attention to the ethical issues in the field of theorizing and management practices has increased and has been considered by researchers in individual and organizational levels. In this study, the authors attempt to define a general orientation of management theories by emphasizing on the two theories of agency and stakeholders in the form of offering a dialectic model of developing the Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Governance. They intend to show that despite the proposed criticisms, the organizations are moving toward developing the ethical behaviors in their series and this movement is due to the change of ethical fundamentals of corporation theory from profit-orientation of Hume to Virtue Ethics of Aristotle.

Aristotle's ethics in the business classroom

How some of Aristotle’s ideas can be incorporated into an introductory course in business is discussed. In particular, these are aspects of human development and business ethics addressed in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle’s view of the good life and his doctrine of the golden mean are elaborated.

Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics

The Nicomachean is one of Aristotle's most widely read and influential works. Ideas central to ethics - that happiness is end of human endeavor, that moral virtue is formed through action and habituation, and that good action requires prudence - found their most powerful proponent in person medieval scholars simply called the Philosopher. Drawing on their intimate knowledge of Aristotle's thought, Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins have produced here an English-language translation of Ethics that is as remarkably faithful to original as it is graceful in its rendering. Aristotle is well known for precision with which he chooses his words, and in this elegant translation his work has found its ideal match. Bartlett and Collins provide copious notes and a glossary providing context and further explanation for students, as well as an introduction and a substantial interpretive essay that sketch central arguments of work and seminal place of Aristotle's Ethics in his political philosophy as a whole. The Nicomachean has engaged serious interest of readers across centuries and civilizations - of people ancient, medieval, and modern; pagan, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish - and this new edition will take its place as standard English-language translation.

Pleasure in medical practice

It is time to challenge the issue of pleasure associated with the core of medical practice. Its importance is made clear through its opposite: unhappiness--something which affects doctors in a rather worrying way. The paper aims to provide a discussion on pleasure on reliable grounds. Plato's conception of techne is a convenient model that offers insights into the unique practice of medicine, which embraces in a single purposive action several heterogeneous dimensions. In Aristotle's Ethics, pleasure appears to play a central role for action's assessment and intensification. Pleasure is also tightly associated with the Kantian faculty of reflective judgment, which operates at the heart of clinical reasoning. Indeed, practicing medicine means to deal with the particular and the manifold, requiring clinical judgment, but also relying on embodied habitus. With Bourdieu's notion of habitus, pleasure is the mark of a happy practice, which presupposes a deep involvement in one's field. Throughout our inquiry, the question of pleasure comes to offer a critical reappraisal of real medical practice and leads to consider ethics more as a component of techne than as a separate realm of concern.

Emotional Intelligence Meets Virtue Ethics: Implications for Educators

Preamble The notion that there is more than one kind of intelligence for human beings, and that social and emotional intelligence (EI) is just as critical as cognitive intelligence for success in the world is by now fairly well-received and well-established in North American educational contexts. The main proponents of social and EI are Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (2002) who are noted for advancing the notion that social and emotional intelligence is important for effective leadership in any organizations, including teacher and teaching in schools. Convinced that this notion is applicable all educational contexts, Goleman with others founded the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL) in 1994 with the mission to establish social and emotional learning as an essential part of education (CASEL, 2009). (1) His work been enormously influential in various and leadership contexts, ranging from business leadership classroom management. But the more we--the authors of this article--are impressed by the magnitude of salutary influence that the Goleman et al. (2002) EI work spreads in diverse educational domains, the more we see its limitations as an educational project that can actually and practically augment people's EI and ethics. We have chosen consider EI in this article not only because of its far-reaching influence in the field of as abovementioned but also because of the claim that it was inspired by Aristotle's virtue ethics (Goleman, 1995) and its association with ethical development. (2) Our own research and practice interest been fostering ethical development in people via virtue ethics, and if EI is, as Goleman et al. (2002) claimed, such a singularly important ingredient, we would like investigate their conceptualization of EI and consider the possibility of further developing and fortifying it. Given the acceptance of EI, its claimed value and roots in virtue ethics prompted us research the limitations of the EI work by Goleman et al. (2002), and search for works that would address these limitations. (3) The Goleman et al. (2002) EI project attracted a healthy debate regarding its philosophic and practical foundations. (4) This discussion suggests that there is empirical evidence that EI a positive impact on student's behaviour; however, we believe instructive philosophic concerns remain. We are particularly concerned about the educator's EI impacting students' learning and emotional intelligence, a concern also identified by others (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009). Our paper advances the thesis that the cultivation of educators' EI requires the practice of virtue ethics. We establish this thesis by first examining the limitations of the Golemanian EI, and then by showing how these limitations can be addressed by MacIntyre's (1984, 1988) virtue ethics, which is a contemporary version of Aristotelian ethics. In the process, we also address what we see as MacIntyre's (1984, 1988) theoretical limitations that are in the way of extending virtue ethics become the cornerstone of school teaching and learning. We also bring in Vokey's (2001) work support our thesis. We present our work on the marriage of EI and virtue ethics as a challenge the conventional and hegemonic conception and practice of that marginalizes the of the heart. (5) Educators' Emotions Are No Private Matter Goleman et al. (2002) held that the leader acts as the group's emotional guide and has maximal power sway everyone's (Goleman, et al., 2002, p. 5). The emotions of the leader are important because, for example, if people's emotions are pushed toward enthusiasm, performance can soar. He refers this effect as resonance. That is, those under the influence and guidance of the leader/educator come into emotional resonance with her or him: Whether an organization fails or flourishes depends a remarkable extent on the leaders' effectiveness in this primal emotional dimension (Goleman et al. …

The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics. By Paula Gottlieb

The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics. By Paula Gottlieb

Ethik und christliche Identit�t bei Gregor von Nyssa (review)

Reviewed by: Ethik und christliche Identität bei Gregor von Nyssa Jonathan J. Armstrong Sandra Leuenberger-Wenger. Ethik und christliche Identität bei Gregor von Nyssa. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum, 49. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008. The present monograph represents a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of Zürich in 2007. Leuenberger-Wenger introduces her study by reflecting on the interrelation between ethics and Christian identity in the theology of Gregory of Nyssa. The very foundational question in Aristotle's ethics ("What is the good life?") presupposes an answer to the theological question: "What is the end of man?" The author explains succinctly: "The question of the good life is the question of who man is and where the purpose and meaning of his existence is to be found" (1). The coordinates of biblical theology and classical philosophy serve to orient this study of Gregory of Nyssa. In Part One, Leuenberger-Wenger reviews Gregory's sermons and paints a portrait of his ethics for the community. In Part Two, the author discusses Gregory's theological treatises and explores his ethics for individuals. Poverty, alms, extortion, vulgarity, sexuality, social policy, and slavery are some of the themes in Gregory's preaching that Leuenberger-Wenger examines in Part One. Those in Gregory's church were frequently recent converts to Christianity, and Gregory could not assume that they had been raised in a Christian environment. The congregants were poor—financially as well as intellectually—and Gregory consciously followed the Christian tradition of paideia in his preaching in order to supply for his listeners some elementary education. Gregory labored to [End Page 650] alleviate the material poverty of the congregation, preaching passionately on the virtue of Christian charity. His depictions of the plight of the poor are horrific. The poor were treated like animals—less than animals in fact, for the rich treated their house animals with more compassion than the city beggars. The stories that Gregory tells in his sermons reveal a certain intimacy with the poor of the city, and he insists that these miserable creatures were people in possession of reason and deserving of justice. The author notes: "In Gregory's portrayal of the poor, it is clear that his purpose is to show how undeserved the plight of the sick and the poor is, as well as the contempt shown to them. Gregory identifies natural disasters, wars, and disease as the causes of their poverty" (53). According to Leuenberger-Wenger, Gregory also advances a surprisingly negative and modern view of institutional slavery. Slavery is to be condemned, Gregory decries, because it places a material price on people, their rationality, and their souls, asking, "Is there any difference in these matters between the slave and the one who rules over him?...Do they not have the same bodily organs? Will they not both become ashes in death? Is there not one judgment? Are not the kingdom and hell both common to all?" (103). Although Gregory stood against slavery, he also opposed revolt as a means to achieve social justice and therefore he stopped short of advocating the abolition of slavery. For this failure, Gregory has drawn much criticism from modern scholars. Gregory addresses other issues as well, including the enslavement to sexual lust, gluttony, and fasting. Leuenberger- Wenger's thesis is perhaps best substantiated in the second part of the book when she turns to examine Gregory's ethical instructions to those who are advanced in Christian discipline. As she then notes, according to Gregory, Christian maturity means never to stop striving for perfection: "Virtue as the fulfillment of human existence and its destiny is a central theme for Gregory. Virtue brings human nature to perfection and lets it bloom like a flower" (178). The book would be worth reading for Sandra Leuenberger-Wenger's careful analysis of Gregory's homilies alone. The author repeatedly points out that in his preaching Gregory adopts the rhetorical structures he learned during his classical education. The author also expends a great deal of effort in demonstrating that Gregory's ethical conclusions are in fundamental agreement with Greek philosophy. In this respect...

O QUE SIGNIFICA COMPREENDER A ÉTICA NICOMAQUEIA DE ARISTÓTELES?

Early in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle claims that the goal pursued by that work is not knowledge but action; a bit later he says that reading / studying the lessons therein contained would be useless if it did not serve to somehow make us better. The aim of this paper is to present what I take as being the practical understanding that Aristotle requires from the reader / student of the NE, as opposed to a purely theoretical understanding of the issues addressed by that work. One can read the NE as a purely theoretical treatise, considering irrelevant the question of whether or not we are motivated to pursue a virtuous life. But one should not read it that way, according to Aristotle. To understand that the virtuous life is the best means to pursue that life. As I intend to show, the Aristotelian requirement that students of the NE have been educated in good habits in order to follow its lessons properly is a strong indication supporting the idea above. Aristotle had in mind the fact that it is only in a mature character that moral arguments, even if very general ones such as those in the NE, can motivate action.

In pursuit of the good: intellect and action in Aristotle's Ethics

In pursuit of the good: intellect and action in Aristotle's Ethics

The way of originality/personality of education through cultivation of phronesis - Based on Aristotle's Ethics -

The way of originality/personality of education through cultivation of phronesis - Based on Aristotle's Ethics -

The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics (review)

Reviewed by: The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics Matthew Walker Paula Gottlieb. The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. xix + 241. Cloth, $85.00. In this work, Paula Gottlieb offers a wide-ranging overview of Aristotle's virtue ethics that puts Aristotle's doctrine of the mean at the center of discussion. She distinguishes this doctrine from a doctrine of moderation, and identifies the doctrine as one of equilibrium: just as a well-calibrated scale registers the right weight, the well-calibrated, virtuous agent responds appropriately in his circumstances. The virtues, then, are balanced dispositions (between extremes). Further, they are in a mean "relative to us," where, Gottlieb argues, the specific features of the agent that such relativity concerns vary according to the sort of situation that the agent faces. Against this background, the first half of Gottlieb's book examines various issues that surround Aristotle's theory of virtue. Gottlieb argues that Aristotle can appeal to the doctrine of the mean to identify and independently establish certain dispositions as virtues, even if they are not recognized as virtues in a particular cultural context. Hence, Gottlieb's account emphasizes Aristotle's "nameless" virtues, and suggests that Aristotle's theory does not simply recapitulate conventional Greek ethical beliefs. After rebutting the claim (attributed to Philippa Foot and Christine Korsgaard) that virtues are remedial dispositions that correct flaws in human nature, Gottlieb appeals to the doctrine of the mean to explain why certain dispositions (e.g., perseverance) plausibly fail to possess virtue-status, just as she explains how such putative virtues as benevolence show up on Aristotle's table in the form of generosity, magnificence, and friendliness. In a brief discussion, Gottlieb applies the doctrine of the mean to defend the virtue-status of certain dispositions that Aristotle does not explore (e.g., tolerance). In examining Aristotle's unity of the virtues thesis, Gottlieb offers a useful discussion of the sense in which ethical virtue is a disposition "involving" (meta) reason, not one merely "according to" (kata) reason. On a traditional reading, dispositions are "according to" reason if they follow a source of reason external to the agent (e.g., the agent's parents), whereas they "involve" reason if they follow the agent's own reasoned understanding. On an alternative reading (proposed by J. A. Smith), by contrast, dispositions "involve" reason if they are merely accompanied by reason, but are "according to" reason if they are actually caused by reason. On Gottlieb's proposal, however, dispositions "involve" reason when they are thoroughly integrated with reason, whereas dispositions are merely "according to" reason when they incidentally follow what reason prescribes (as happens, e.g., in the case of the enkratic agent). In the second half of the book, Gottlieb turns her attention to Aristotle's views on ethical reasoning, and she explores such topics as the practical syllogism, fine motivation, what the virtuous agent needs to know, and the political implications of Aristotle's theory of virtue. In a stimulating chapter, Gottlieb examines how Aristotle would treat problems of dirty hands and tragic dilemmas. According to Gottlieb, Aristotle denies that virtuous agents facing bad options perform base deeds that taint their characters. Rather, Aristotle allows that an action bad without qualification can nevertheless be good with qualification (in certain pressing circumstances). For instance, if an agent finds himself in a situation in which he must obey a tyrant's orders to save his family, he may nevertheless do the best he [End Page 397] can in the circumstances—and perform the right action—by obeying the tyrant. While the agent may feel regret for obeying the tyrant, the agent's character need not be tainted; the agent's regret need not extend to himself, but may extend only to the bad circumstances in which he has found himself. Gottlieb is a straightforward writer. Her accessible prose makes this a suitable volume not only for Aristotle specialists, but also for students of normative ethics who seek an overview of Aristotle's virtue ethics and its differences from Kantian and utilitarian moral theories. Her book performs the worthy task of highlighting the doctrine of the mean's important...

UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

The concept of health: beyond normativism and naturalism

Philosophical discussions of health and disease have traditionally been dominated by a debate between normativists, who hold that health is an inescapably value-laded concept and naturalists, such as Christopher Boorse, who believe that it is possible to derive a purely descriptive or theoretical definition of health based upon biological function. In this paper I defend a distinctive view which traces its origins in Aristotle's naturalistic ethics. An Arisotelian would agree with Boorse that health and disease are ubiquitous features of the natural world and thus not mere projections of human interests and values. She would differ from him in rejecting the idea that value is a non-natural quality. I conclude my discussion with some comments of the normative character of living systems.

Pleasure in Aristotle's Ethics. By Michael Weinman

Pleasure in Aristotle's Ethics. By Michael Weinman

The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics

The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics