Reconstruction Of Argument Research Articles

Comment on Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology

AbstractThis comment discusses Kaidesoja (2013) and raises the issue whether his analysis justifies stronger conclusions than he presents in the book. My comments focus on four issues. First, I argue that his naturalistic reconstruction of critical realist transcendental arguments shows that transcendental arguments should be treated as a rare curiosity rather than a general argumentative strategy. Second, I suggest that Kaidesoja’s analysis does not really justify his optimism about the usefulness of causal powers ontology in the social sciences. Third, I raise some doubts about the heuristic value of Mario Bunge’s social ontology that Kaidesoja presents as a replacement for critical realist ontology. Finally, I propose an alternative way to analyze failures of aggregativity that might better serve Kaidesoja’s purposes than the Wimsattian scheme he employs in the book.

Multimodal argumentation in news magazine covers: A case study of front covers putting Greece on the spot of the European economic crisis

In this paper, front covers of news magazines are studied as a distinct multimodal genre that invites readers to buy the magazine not only by attracting their attention but also by assuming a position with respect to the particular cover story. In order to account for the argument that a front cover may convey in support of that position, an argumentative reconstruction is required that also needs to take seriously into account the way in which the verbal and the visual modes interact to create meaning. The study proposes a multimodal argumentation perspective on the systematic reconstruction of the arguments that front covers of news magazines put forward. As a case in point, six covers by two German weekly news magazines are analysed, featuring the role of Greece in the eurozone crisis in the period 2010–2012.

Een systematische catalogus van argumenten

In this article I develop a systematic catalogue of arguments that is based on a formal ordering principle and can be used as a point of departure for research in artificial intelligence and various kinds of empirical research such as research into argument quality. The catalogue is constructed by combining a formal-linguistic typology of arguments, developed and presented in earlier articles, with a formalized account of the pragma-dialectical classification of standpoints. First, I provide an account of the nature of arguments that avoids infinite regress problems in argument reconstruction. Then, I summarize the formal-linguistic typology of arguments, which consists of two main types – 'predicate arguments' and 'subject arguments' – and combine the typology with a formalized account of the pragma-dialectical classification of standpoints, which consists of three types – 'prescriptive standpoints', 'evaluative standpoints', and 'descriptive standpoints'. Finally, for each of the types of standpoints, I discuss what types of arguments are suitable to support them, describe the relations between the predicates and subjects of the argument and the standpoint involved, and give some examples of argument types distinguished in the literature that match the description.

Per una rilettura della polemica Croce-Enriques

According to a common interpretation, Enriques’ efforts to make widespread a model of philosophy open to dialogue with science were hampered by Croce, who supported an obsolete form of humanism tending to deny the epistemological value of science and, as a consequence, to reject all collaboration or even any communication between science and philosophy. However, this reconstruction of the polemical argument between the two thinkers in the two-year period 1911-1912 is incorrect. This is because Croce’s doctrine of the economic-practical value of science was in line with the prevailing trends within the international epistemological debate at that time, trends that Croce knew very well and appreciated. He opposed Enriques’ project not out of an indiscriminate aversion to scientific culture, but due to the fact that, though mistakenly, he saw Enriques’ quite anti-conventionalist and anti-pragmatist realism as a recovery of the old form of positivism.

A Logical Analysis of the Main Argument in Chapter 2 of the Proslogion by Anselm of Canterbury

The primary aim is the reconstruction of the main argument of the second chapter of Anselm’s Proslogion. To be proved is the statement that God, or something than which nothing greater can be thought, exists in reality. I proceed by a piecemeal analysis of every sentence of the Latin original and its subsequent translation into a formal second-order language with choice operator. Reconstructing Anselm’s reasoning demands interpretative input and additions. For example, the formula ‘quod maius est’ has to be suitably interpreted and expanded. Furthermore, I try to explicate Anselm’s maius predicate in terms of a perfection predicate and to develop a general proof for Anselm’s theorem, i.e. the statement that something/that than which something greater cannot be thought has all greater-making attributes.

Reconstructing Arguments

Traditional logical reconstruction of arguments aims at assessing the validity of ordinary language arguments. It involves several tasks: extracting argumentations from texts, breaking up complex argumentations into individual arguments, framing arguments in standard form, as well as formalizing arguments and showing their validity with the help of a logical formalism. These tasks are guided by a multitude of partly antagonistic goals, they interact in various feedback loops, and they are intertwined with the development of theories of valid inference and adequate formalization. This paper explores how the method of reflective equilibrium can be used for modelling the complexity of such reconstructions and for justifying the various steps involved. The proposed approach is illustrated and tested in a detailed reconstruction of the beginning of Anselm’s De casu diaboli.

The Structure of Climate Skeptical Arguments. Conspiracy Theory as a Critique of Science Die Struktur klimaskeptischer Argumente. Verschwörungstheorie als Wissenschaftskritik

Questioning and rejecting the scientific consensus on climate change causes, climate skeptics argue that climate science is involved in a global conspiracy, guided by self-interest and aspirations of societal change. On the basis of 97 climate skeptical non-fiction books, this article reconstructs the logical structure of climate skeptical (or denialist) arguments, with a special focus on the construction of the causes for climate change. The analysis shows that climate skeptical arguments are made on three levels: on the level of insight from climate science, on the level of an intuitive sociology of science and on a political/economic level, thus achieving the desired effect of moving the audience emotionally. The reconstruction of arguments may serve as a basis for more quantitative research, but it is also useful for entering the debate with climate skeptics as it allows anticipating climate skeptical objections.

Citizens’ Consultations – Public Spaces of Argument Evaluation? A View from Critical Discourse Analysis

Abstract The article applies a recently developed framework for the reconstruction and evaluation of arguments based on practical reasoning (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012) to the analysis of a public consultation session organised by the Romanian Ministry of Environment and Forests in 2011, which made partial use of digital media. The session is concerned with the Environmental Impact Assessment report in a case of public notoriety in post-communist Romania: the goldmining project at Roșia Montană. The findings indicate that the critical questioning by the public is aimed at rebutting the corporation’s main claim and proposed course of action, but its final outcome is conditioned by the institutional context and the steps that follow the consultation session.

God, Totality and Possibility in Kant'sOnly Possible Argument

AbstractThere has been a groundswell of interest in the account of modality that Kant sets forth in his pre-CriticalOnly Possible Argument. Andrew Chignell's reconstruction of Kant's theistic argument in terms of what he calls ‘real harmony’ has aprima facieadvantage in that it appears to be able to block the plurality objection (namely, that even if every modal fact presupposes some ground, this does not entail that all modal facts share the same ground). I argue that it is both textually and philosophically problematic to interpret Kant's argument in terms of real harmony. Then, I set forth an alternative response to the plurality objection which does not require the adoption of the problematic notion of real harmony. Instead, I argue that the objection can be overcome by observing that the argument seeks to ground modal facts as a totality and that, according to Kant, such relations can be accounted for only by their schematization in a single intellect.

タイプとしての意味とハンプティ・ダンプティ理論 : ダメットの議論の再構成

タイプとしての意味とハンプティ・ダンプティ理論 : ダメットの議論の再構成

Apparent Generalisations about Fictional Characters

AbstractThis essay will be concerned with an evaluation, modification, and critique of van Inwagen’s famous argument for the existence of fictional characters. In the first section a reconstruction of the original argument will be provided, and three different challenges for this version of the argument will be pointed out. The first challenge concerns van Inwagen’s commitment to first-order predicate logic as a canonical language for the formal representation of truth-conditions of assertoric sentences in natural languages, and the problematic semantic complexity of van Inwagen’s original example sentences of quantifications about fictional objects. The second challenge concerns his commitment to a Quinean conception of ordinary language quantifications that conceives of first-order quantifiers as existentially loaded. The third challenge concerns van Inwagen’s tendency to interpret our ordinary intuitions about the truth-values of specific sentences as intuitions about the truth-values of the literal contents of these sentences. In the second section, a more detailed investigation of these three challenges will be provided; and a modified, and less problematic, alternative version of the argument will be proposed. It will be shown that the truth-conditions of van Inwagen’s original example sentences cannot be adequately represented on the basis of first-order predicate logic. I will propose alternative and less complex example sentences that are sufficient for the required purpose. Additionally, a reformulation of the argument will be proposed that avoids a commitment to a specific sort of formal framework. After that, it will be shown why the assumption of a Quinean conception of quantification unnecessarily increases the burden of proof. A reformulation of the argument will be proposed that avoids the commitment to a Quinean conception of quantification. Furthermore, I will make a third and final adjustment of the argument that allows us to remain neutral concerning the specific status of our truth-value intuitions concerning the proposed example sentences of generalisations about fictional objects. In the third and final section, three possible responses of an irrealist concerning fictional objects will be evaluated. The first option makes use of a recent semantic analysis of the modifying adjective ›fictional‹ proposed by Sainsbury. According to this analysis, a sentence like ›There are fictional mice that talk‹ is semantically equivalent with the claim ›There are fictional works according to which it is the case that at least one mouse talks‹. The second option additionally makes use of Sainsbury’s conception of spotty scope for ordinary language quantifiers and other related sentential operators. It will be shown why both options cannot account for the desired true readings of our example sentences. Finally, a third solution will be proposed and defended. This solution makes use of a substitutional interpretation of specific fictional generalisations based on a negative free logic to undermine the modified argument. It will be shown how this solution allows us to provide a correct analysis of the desired readings of our example sentences of generalisations about fictional characters. After that, two problems of this account will be discussed. The first problem concerns the extension of the proposed strategy to more complicated and sophisticated example sentences. The second problem concerns the independent motivation of a substitutional treatment of at least certain natural language quantificational expressions.

Teaching and Learning, Stories and Arguments

This paper explains and illustrates a method of argumentative reconstruction that may be used in the teaching of stories. Without maintaining that argument is superior to narrative or that all narratives should be cast as arguments, I illustrate the benefits of this approach for critical thinking and the discussion that ensues when one seeks to articulate the message of a narrative and the reasons offered in the narrative to support it. The examples discussed here are parables.

Kant's Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes

AbstractIn the firstCritique,Kant attempts to prove what we can call the ‘principle of intensive magnitudes’, according to which every possible object of experience will possess a determinate ‘degree’ of reality. Curiously, Kant argues for this principle by inferring from a psychological premise about internal sensations (they have intensive magnitudes) to a metaphysical thesis about external objects (they also have intensive magnitudes). Most commentators dismiss the argument as a failure. In this article I give a reconstruction of Kant's argument that attempts to rehabilitate the argument back into his broader transcendental theory of experience. I argue that we can make sense of the argument's central inference by appeal to Kant's theory of empirical intuition and by an analysis of the way in which Kant thinks sensory matter constitutes our most basic representations of objects.

The Argumentative Reconstruction of Multimodal Discourse, Taking the ABC Coverage of President Hu Jintao’s Visit to the USA as an Example

This paper addresses the question how to analyze multimodal public discourse in such a way that the resulting reconstruction of the rhetor’s accountability either obliges the rhetor to acknowledge the argumentative reconstruction as valid or to refute its validity in a meta-discussion. This is a challenge for discourse theory as well as for argument theory because multimodal discourse seems far removed from the ‘standard’ propositional format of an argument. We argue that multimodal discourse should be analyzed as a coherent and relevant discourse, assuming the possibility of instant interactions between all modes. We introduce a method that allows us to account for an argumentative reconstruction in a systematic way. We illustrate our method by analyzing the ABC news item titled Hu Jintao Visit: Economics and Panda Bears of January 20, 2011, holding ABC news as a rhetor accountable for several far reaching standpoints that are implied in the multimodal format.

Reference Failure, Illusion of Thought and Self-Knowledge

One of the main issues concerning different versions of content externalism is whether or not they are compatible with the privileged access thesis. According to the so-called ‘illusion version’ of externalism, in reference failure cases (such as cases in which an empty proper name is involved) the subject suffers an illusion of entertaining a thought. In this paper, I shall concentrate on a recent argument offered by Jessica Brown, which she calls the “illusion argument”, to the effect that the illusion version of externalism undermines the privileged access thesis (Brown, 2004). After criticizing Brown's argument, I shall try to reconstruct the illusion argument in a more defensible and straightforward way. I will exploit, in my argument, solutions proposed by Goldman and Alston for the so-called ‘generality problem’ (Goldman, 1986; Alston, 1995). Moreover, I shall offer a stronger formulation of the global reliability condition for knowledge, upon which my reconstruction of the illusion argument is based.

The Logic of Indirect Insulting in Legal Discussions: A Speech Act Perspective

In discussions about the accusation of insulting, there is sometimes a disagreement space because the values underlying the protection against insulting have to be balanced against the value of free speech. Legal discussions about insulting often focus on the problems concerning this weighing and balancing of principles. But apart from the possible weighing and balancing problems, the legal qualification of insulting is problematic because the statutory language on this topic is vague and because language users can opt for indirect insulting. As a result there is room for achieving certain communicative and interactional effects by means of argumentative strategies such as qualifying an insult as part of a public debate, or by means of linguistic choices. Certain acts count as an insult and others do not, while the others can have the same interactional effect of being insulted. This aspect of insulting has received little attention in legal research on this subject and it is my aim in this contribution to solve some of these problems by providing a theoretical framework to describe these argumentative strategies and linguistic choices. In my opinion these argumentative strategies and linguistic choices can be analyzed by making use of insights from speech act theory. In this paper I present some analytical tools for analyzing indirect insulting within the framework of this theory. First, I clarify the communicative (illocutionary) and the interactional (perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act indirect insulting. Second, I analyze how the interactional effects can be analyzed as implicatures. These analytical tools are necessary for the reconstruction of argumentation for and against the standpoint that someone insulted someone else. I will start with an analysis of article 137c of the Dutch Criminal code: what counts as an insult according to Dutch law?

Pre-Socratic Discrete Kinematics

Abstract We present a neglected heterodox version of Zeno’s paradox of the Stadium, underlining some problems that a discrete kinematics would have to account for. Building on our reconstruction of the Stadium argument we provide new arguments to show that a discrete kinematics cannot uphold three independently plausible assumptions about motion, that we label No Switching, Granular Continuity and Different Velocities, and hence it should drop at least one.

Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision

This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument has to be evaluated. The suggested procedure includes rules for recording whether the author in fact accepts or denies the premises and the conclusion, as well as tests for enthymematic validity and strategies for revising belief state ascriptions. Different degrees of interpretive charity can be exercised. This is one reason why the interpretation or reconstruction of an enthymematic argument typically does not result in a unique outcome.

The Hicks‐Malinvaud average period of production and ‘marginal productivity’: A critical assessment

Malinvaud took up the concept of the average period of production introduced by Hicks in Value and Capital and then Capital and Time, in an article of 2003 celebrating Wicksell's contribution to the theory of capital, where he observed that once techniques are ranked according to the average period for a given initial rate of interest, a rise in the rate of interest entails the use of a technique with a shorter average period. After a brief reconstruction of Malinvaud's argument, it is shown that the result is far less encouraging for neoclassical theory than it might seem. The most important problem is not the fact that change in the interest rate affects the average period of production associated with a technique, despite the concern this aroused in Hicks and Malinvaud, but rather that it affects the ranking of techniques. An example with two techniques is used to show that a rise in the rate of interest entails the use of a technique with a shorter average period even in the case of reswitching simply because the ranking of techniques is inverted at the two switch points.

The European Difference: Karl Heinz Bohrer's Critique of the European Project

Literary critic and essayist Karl Heinz Bohrer offers a Eurosceptic perspective on the German commitment to a united Europe. This article is a reconstruction of Bohrer's argument. It identifies two distinct critiques. The first is a somewhat prosaic observation that the differences between the national traditions of Europe are simply too great for a united Europe to be viable. The other is a more complex reflection on “European decadence”: Europeans lack the will that is required to project power, and power is a precondition for cultural achievements. Protestantism—the “Protestant mind”—plays a central role in this second critique. The two critiques are connected through Bohrer's conception of the nation-state as an entity that integrates in an agonistic way legal and cultural power.