The question that I have offered as the subtitle of this essay is one that German philosopher Jurgen Habermas felt personally obliged to answer in an essay entitled Morality and Ethical Life: Does Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics. There, Habermas acknowledges the great degree of similarity between his discourse ethics and Kant's moral philosophy. He also accepts the cogency of criticisms of Kant. He rejects, however, the idea that critique applies to discourse ethics. After a brief exposition of discourse ethics, Habermas identifies what he understands to be the key points of similarity and difference between his theory and Kant's. Then he explains the degree to which four of most trenchant criticisms of Kant apply to discourse ethics. He claims, Hegel's objections apply less to the reformulations of Kantian ethics itself than to a number of resulting problems that discourse ethics cannot be expected to resolve in a single stroke. Habermas argues that the problems with discourse ethics do not stem from its justification but rather its application. He professes a firm belief in the ability of moral argumentation to produce a political situation in which the competing aims of individual rights and solidarity are realized.