In the global environmental and biodiversity crisis, nature conservation efforts often focus on the treatment of symptoms rather than on the source of the collapse. How humans shape— or, as the case may be, degrade—their environment certainly depends on their industrial, agricultural and resource exploitation systems. But even deeper, all these practices of environmental transformation are ruled by humans’ cultural systems of representations. For instance, it has been recognized long ago that the way people think of themselves as apart from nature has negative effects on the way they deal with and treat their environment. These dualistic human/nature conceptions, however, are in turn grounded on other representations, and central among them is the permanent assertion of human’s uniqueness among the living. Arguments surrounding the specialness of the human species are subject to a constant renewal through the continuous supplying of new and less new evidence. Human culture/civilization, human’s mastery of or achievement on earth, human intelligence/rationality, the capacity of language, etc. are among the most prominent and frequent claims of human specialness. It is worth noting, however, that there is not so much a debate about the question as a contest for finding the ultimate and conclusive argument. I will argue that despite its widely accepted evidence, this is not only a hazardous question to be occupied with, but also nonsense. Surprisingly, the arguments about human specialness ignore their inherent vicious circle (petitio principii). Indeed when comparing the species, human specialness supporters extrapolate some attribute unique to humans or another—i.e., an attribute that only humans share or have more than other species (as the examples mentioned above, of culture, rationality, language etc.), and declare them as accounting for human specialness. In so doing, they elevate specifically human characteristics as criteria to measure specialness per se. However, these criteria, while important for the human species itself, bear no independent relevance outside the human reference system. The fallacious reasoning consists, then, in that what has to be proven (human specialness) is implicitly assumed in the premises (human characteristics as specialness criteria). In a more illustrative way, this homocentric perspective would be equal to and no more legitimate than the specialness assessment of the Cheetah species (Acinonyx jubatus) from Cheetahs’ point of view, based on their unequaled celerity, or of vegetal species from a plant’s point of view, based on its capacity to do the photosynthesis. Of course, these characteristics are never put forward as measures of specialness for humans, because they bear no special relevance to them. These examples demonstrate that there are characteristics that are unique to a species without necessarily accounting for a species’ specialness, joining herewith what Darwin already termed in 1871 differences “of degree and not of kind”. In order to avoid arbitrariness, definitions of specialness, to be legitimate, would have to rely on a well-defined criterion that is common and relevant to all species in their own reference systems. One such criterion with all species encompassing relevance could be, for instance, the principle of survival. From this perspective, however, humans wouldn’t be more special than any other species in the present time. Similarly for every other criterion that could be found, precisely because of its relevance for all species, its selection would necessarily imply (according to the principles of evolution) that it is favored among all survived species. The impossibility of finding a valid criterion that enables the affirmation of a species’ uniqueness does not