Language Argument Research Articles

Research Article: Creating Environmental Stakeholder Profiles: A Tool for Dispute Management

In Israel, the same governmental bodies and environmental organizations appear repeatedly as environmental disputants. Irrespective of the conflict, they usually hold consistent perspectives and positions. This research offers a methodology for identifying values frames and creating stakeholder profiles to assist negotiators and disputants in finding common ground or trade-offs in resolving disputes. The profiles enable stakeholders to couch their interests and arguments in language (or frames) understandable to other stakeholders. They enable interveners to steer discussions toward trade-offs or reframing of issues. The research is based on interviews with 160 stakeholders in nine Israeli environmental disputes at national, regional, and local levels.

Towards a Formal and Implemented Model of Argumentation Schemes in Agent Communication

Argumentation schemes are patterns of non-deductive reasoning that have been the focus of extended study in argumentation theory. They have also been identified in computational domains including multi-agent systems as holding the potential for significant improvements in reasoning and communication abilities. By focusing on models of natural language argumentation schemes, and then building formal systems from them, direct implementation in multi-agent environments becomes a possibility. The formal, representational and implementational details are presented here, along with results that demonstrate not only advantages of flexibility, scope, and knowledge sharing, but also of computational efficiency.

About the Meaning of the Legal Aspect of Practical Semantics in Estonian Legal Order

This article is aimed at regarding, from the author’s viewpoint, one possible jurisprudential theory for rational understanding of legal order – the structuring theory of law. It is very important that cognition of a legal order should be based on the rules which could be designated as “laws of jurisprudence”. Naturally, this does not mean legislation within the concept of objective law. Rather, these laws can be referred to as certain regularities, ignorance of which would, however, either impossibly or substantially complicate the legal process of decision-making, both in law-making (as the so-called decisional function is contained in law itself1) or the practical legal process of making decisions (the application of law). In recent years, a conception involving cooperation between linguists and jurists has emerged in the discussion of jurisprudential methodology. This constitutes an interdisciplinary approach to motivation of legal decision-making and involves, on the one hand, “practical semantics” and researchers thereof,2 and on the other hand, representatives of the so-called structuring theory of law.3 In specialist literature, the structuring theory of law has also been referred to as the Muller Schoo1.4 The role of language and linguistic arguments in the discussion and practice of legal working methods serves as a connective principle in such interdisciplinary approach (co-operation).

Epoché, the Transcendental Ego, and Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Phenomenology

This essay is concerned with defending Husserl against the criticism that he is insufficiently attentive to intersubjectivity. It has two moments; the first articulates what I take to be a general version of the critique and then turns to a discussion of a version derived from Wittgenstein's private language argument and the ensuing debate regarding this critique between Suzanne Cunningham and Peter Hutcheson. This discussion concludes by noting a general agreement between the two participants that Husserl's ego is not directly involved in intersubjective relationships. I argue that as long as this is granted, the broader criticism cannot be answered. Whence, the second moment defends Husserl against this critique arguing that Husserl's transcendental ego is an intersubjective one.

Wittgenstein Underground

This paper argues that Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground makes a fundamental point that runs directly counter to the received popular image of the work; i.e. the understanding that Notes describes a consciousness reflecting on itself, hermetically sealed within its own Cartesian interior. In truth, a closer reading shows that the mind depicted therein is profoundly relational and situated in a particularized context, and that this discursive mind characterizes what Wittgenstein says about mental privacy in the context of the private language argument. The upshot is that language is not secondary, not an afterthought, and thus not posterior to pure subjectivity of the kind that many who celebrate "inferiority" take as a given human experience.

Private Languages and Private Theorists

Simon Blackburn objects that Wittgenstein's private language argument overlooks the possibility that a private linguist can equip himself with a criterion of correctness by confirming generalizations about the patterns in which his private sensations occur. Crispin Wright responds that appropriate generalizations would be too few to be interesting. But I show that Wright's calculations are upset by his failure to appreciate both the richness of the data and the range of theories that would be available to the private linguist.

Five Private Language Arguments

This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a ‘useable criterion of successful performance’ (Pears) or ‘operational standard of correctness’ (Glock) for its correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails.

Zero-Knowledge Proofs and String Commitments Withstanding Quantum Attacks

The concept of zero-knowledge (ZK) has become of fundamental importance in cryptography. However, in a setting where entities are modeled by quantum computers, classical arguments for proving ZK fail to hold since, in the quantum setting, the concept of rewinding is not generally applicable. Moreover, known classical techniques that avoid rewinding have various shortcomings in the quantum setting.<br /> <br />We propose new techniques for building <em>quantum</em> zero-knowledge (QZK) protocols, which remain secure even under (active) quantum attacks. We obtain computational QZK proofs and perfect QZK arguments for any NP language in the common reference string model. This is based on a general method converting an important class of classical honest-verifier ZK (HVZK) proofs into QZK proofs. This leads to quite practical protocols if the underlying HVZK proof is efficient. These are the first proof protocols enjoying these properties, in particular the first to achieve perfect QZK.<br /> <br />As part of our construction, we propose a general framework for building unconditionally hiding (trapdoor) string commitment schemes, secure against quantum attacks, as well as concrete instantiations based on specific (believed to be) hard problems. This is of independent interest, as these are the first unconditionally hiding string commitment schemes withstanding quantum attacks.<br /> <br />Finally, we give a partial answer to the question whether QZK is possible in the plain model. We propose a new notion of QZK, <em>non-oblivious verifier</em> QZK, which is strictly stronger than honest-verifier QZK but weaker than full QZK, and we show that this notion can be achieved by means of efficient (quantum) protocols.

Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy

Bayesian reasoning has been applied formally to statistical inference, machine learning and analysing scientific method. Here I apply it informally to more common forms of inference, namely natural language arguments. I analyse a variety of traditional fallacies, deductive, inductive and causal, and find more merit in them than is generally acknowledged. Bayesian principles provide a framework for understanding ordinary arguments which is well worth developing.

Concepts, language, and privacy: An argument “vaguely Viennese in provenance”

I consider two notable recent philosophical theories of concepts (Fodor and Peacocke) in relation to some challenges set by Wittgenstein in his notorious private language argument. The challenge is formulated in terms of contraints on the explanation of the relation between thought and language. I try to show how these theories of concepts relate to constraints that arise from this challenge. I also relate the challenge to a recent contribution in the debate about narrow and broad content. In so doing I try to illuminate how this philosophical debate bears on some issues in cognitive psychology. In particular, I suggest it bears on nativism about concepts, the relation between an adequate notion of public language and thought, and the idea that concepts are “in” mentalese, a Language of Thought. Accommodating these considerations requires increasing the consideration of linguistic evidence and the linguistic character of concepts in laboratory research if distinctively human thought is to be explained.

HOW TO TALK TO YOURSELF OR KRIPKE's WITTGENSTEIN's SOLITARY LANGUAGE ARGUMENT AND WHY IT FAILS

Abstract: In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein argues that it is possible for individuals in communities to speak a language and otherwise follow rules, but impossible for a single, conceptually isolated individual to do so. I show that the roots of the argument lie in his general account of the legitimacy of practices, and that he actually argues for two distinct conclusions: (a) solitary individuals cannot have useful practices of rule‐following and (b) solitary individuals cannot place substantive restrictions on their own behavior. I show that if it is, in fact, possible for individuals in communities to use language and follow rules, then both of Kripke's Wittgenstein's anti‐solitary language arguments fails; and, furthermore, that his general account not only fails to exclude the possibility of solitary language‐use and rule‐following, it actually guarantees their possibility.

Mental Verbs and Semantic Development

This theoretical essay examines how mental verbs acquire meaning as they emerge in children's lexicon. The article begins by describing the ostension paradigm, which presumes that meaning derives from the relation between a mental verb and a corresponding referent. This paradigm is then critiqued by drawing on Wittgenstein's private language argument. The private language argument contends that meaning is tied to how a person uses a word in everyday discourse as opposed to whether one has correctly mapped a label and referent. Drawing from this argument, the semantic development of mental verbs is considered within the framework of contemporary theories emphasizing semantic development as a process of learning how, when, and for what purpose words are used. The implications of this view for theory of mind development are discussed.

The Use of Introspection in the Study of Problems Relating to Interpretation from Japanese to English

Introspection has been used widely to study translation processes in Indo-Europeon languages. In this study, the method of introspection was adapted to study interpretation processes in Japanese-English interpretation. Seven native speakers of English with varying levels of competence in Japanese-English interpretation skills took part in this study. The results indicate that rather than vocabulary, a better knowledge of argument and structure of the target language is essential for proficient interpreting. This is especially crucial when the topic of interpretation calls for the use of formal Japanese, as in the case of this study. As Japanese is a language which is characterized by the use of different registers and styles for different occasions, the findings of this study suggest that in the context of conference interpreting, student interpreters could benefit from increased exposure to the use of formal Japanese.

Japanese learners’ acquisition of English manner-of-motion verbs with locational/directional PPs

This study investigated first language (L1) influence on second language (L2) argument structure in a situation where an L2 argument structure forms a superset of its L1 counterpart. In such a situation, a partial fit between the L1 and the L2 may trigger L1 transfer, whereas availability of positive evidence may allow the learner to arrive at the L2 grammar (White, 1991b). This study tested these predictions by investigating whether Japanese speakers can recognize the directional reading of English manner-of-motion verbs ( walk, swim) with locational/directional PPs ( under, behind), such as John swam under the bridge, where under the bridge can be either the goal of John’s swimming (directional) or the location of John’s swimming (locational). By contrast, their Japanese counterparts allow only a locational reading, as Japanese is more restricted than English in allowing only directed motion verbs ( go) to appear with a phrase expressing a goal. Thirty-five intermediate Japanese learners of English and 23 English speakers were tested using a picture-matching task. Results show that, unlike English speakers, Japanese speakers consistently failed to recognize a directional reading. I suggest that positive evidence need not only be available but also be frequent and clear in order to be used by L2 learners to broaden their interlanguage grammar.

New Perspectives on Metaphysical Solipsism

C. D. Rollins, in Solipsism, classifies solipsism into two categories, epistemological and metaphysical,1 and observes that while many philosophers have championed epistemological solipsism, no major philosopher has advocated ontological solipsism. Of epistemological solipsism he says: In some degree or style has been espoused by almost every major philosopher since Descartes. After all, is easy to believe that knowledge about what exists is empirical and that all empirical knowledge originates in inner cognitive states of persons. (Rollins, 1967, 490) Rollins indicates that for a time metaphysical solipsism was not dismissed completely-he says that was often considered implausible but incapable of being re futed2 (Rollins 1967, 488)-but that Wittgenstein's private language argument virtually dealt a death blow.3 In present essay, however, shall use considerations pertaining to Cantor's diagonal argument to suggest that private language argument is not final word on subject. When have reached this point in my argument, solipsism will still be just one theory among many; but shall then provide reasons that may increase its plausibility, even if only slightly. Metaphysical Solipsism As is well known, metaphysical solipsism has tended to be expressed by catch-phrases such as Only exist and I am whole of reality. Neither of these expressions is adequate; as Bertrand Russell, in Human Knowledge: its Scope and Limits, points out, the words have no clear meaning unless doctrine is false (Russell, 1948, 176). That aside, however-for moment, at least-the fact that metaphysical solipsism has had no major proponent is perhaps not surprising: presumably any such proponent would feel no need to record ideas for others who are considered to be illusory. Fortunately, more detailed summaries of metaphysical solipsistic position are available: Every claim concerning existence or nonexistence of anything is grounded in experience and could not possibly extend beyond it. An existential claim which seemed to reach beyond experience could have no basis or reference; would apparently be unintelligible and not strictly a claim at all. But experience is essentially immediate; in itself is never mistaken (only inferences from can be mistaken), and is had by one person only and is private to him. Hence, existential claims can never truly, and perhaps never with full intelligibility, claim more than existence of experiencing self and its states, and indeed perhaps never claim more than this as of moment of experience. (Rollins 1967, 488) It goes without saying that many philosophers have taken some or all of above ideas as a starting point for an argument, if only to criticize argument later. Descartes is obvious example of a philosopher who does this. But is generally accepted that Descartes' attempt to re-establish reality of his doubted world (by means of claiming, via ontological argument, etc., reality of God and then claiming it is impossible for him ever to deceive me [Descartes, 1941, 111]) is questionable to say least. One receives impression on reading Descartes that he is clutching, for emotional reasons (solipsism is felt to be implausible), at anything and everything that might return conviction that there is a real, exterior world. The above is not really a defense of metaphysical solipsism, of course. Are there, in fact, any generally-accepted defenses of position? Perhaps one of most telling is that there can be no absolute distinction between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism. Rollins says: One may be allowed conclusion, perhaps, that particular advocacies of knowledge solipsism do not differ from one another in having or not having resemblance to reality solipsism, but rather in degree of that resemblance. (Rollins, 1967, 490; my emphasis) This point is important, because, as mentioned above, epistemological solipsism has been almost as overwhelmingly endorsed as metaphysical solipsism has been overwhelmingly condemned. …

Le rôle du lexique dans la théorie des stéréotypes

The aim of this article is to develop the claim made in earlier papers that the standard form (±P, ±Q) of the topoï at work in the Theory of Argumentation in Language are in fact contrary to the basic claims this theory relies on. After examining several objections, an alternative theory will then be suggested, namely the Theory of Stereotypes, based on ideas adapted from Putnam, Kripke, and others. This theory, apart from evading the above mentioned objections, is consistent with the basic hypothesis of the Theory of Argumentation in Language, and moreover, provides a more satisfactory explanation for a wide range of facts. Key words: Argumentation, Stereotypes.

Les connecteurs espagnols encima / además : argumentation transgressive et argumentation normative

This paper describes the discourse function of two additive connectives in Spanish: encima [moreover] and además [furthermore]. The study aims to demonstrate that the difference in signification between these two additive connectives can be explained appealing to normative and transgressive argumentations, following the notions defined by the Theory of Argumentation in Language and, more specifically, by the Theory of Semantic Blocks. Thus, we can explain that when using además we have to interpret the first of the connected segments as evoking normative argumentations with therefore [fr.: done] and the occurrence of encima in an enunciation as imposing a transgressive interpretation with nevertheless [fr.: pourtant]. Key words: Connectives, Argumentation, Semantic Block, Normative,

Ideation and Appropriation: Wittgenstein on Intellectual Property

This paper provides a critique of the contemporary notion of intellectual property based on the consequences of Wittgenstein's “private language argument”. The reticence commonly felt toward recent applications of patent law, e.g., sports moves, is held to expose erroneous metaphysical assumptions inherent in the spirit of current IP legislation. It is argued that the modern conception of intellectual property as a kind of natural right, stems from the mistaken internalist or Augustinian picture of language that Wittgenstein attempted to diffuse. This view becomes persuasive once it is shown that a complete understanding of the argument against private language must include Wittgenstein's investigation of the role of the will in the creative process. It is argued that original thought is not born by decree of the will, but engendered by a public context of meaning and value. What marks a person as a genius is, therefore, according to Wittgenstein, not some sovereign capacity of conceptual world-making, but merely a propitious dose of intellectual courage.

Communication and Writing: A Public Language Argument

Arguments directed against conceptions of communication which ‘privatise’ content are familiar. But such arguments tend not to explore the more general idea that communication involves the attempt by one subject to transmit a sense to another subject. In this paper I argue that there is a distinctive misinterpretation of this more general idea which, in a certain way, belongs to philosophy, and concerning which the ‘privacy’ interpretation is only an inflection. The paper develops an argument against that interpretation and the attempt is made to draw the full implications of the ‘publicness’ of the structure of language.

Where's ellipsis? Whether and why there are missing arguments in Hebrew child language

This paper concerns subject and object ellipsis in Hebrew child language from two perspectives: the conditions that govern subject versus object ellipsis and the distinction between early and late omissions. We propose that in Hebrew child language (and possibly in early child language in general), subject ellipsis is initially motivated mainly by pragmatic factors, which are subsequently supplemented by morphosyntactic rules of the grammar. Object ellipsis, in contrast, is motivated only by pragmatic or semantic factors, not grammatically. It is a robust phenomenon, but far less widespread than subject ellipsis in both child and adult Hebrew.