About the Meaning of the Legal Aspect of Practical Semantics in Estonian Legal Order

Abstract

This article is aimed at regarding, from the author’s viewpoint, one possible jurisprudential theory for rational understanding of legal order – the structuring theory of law. It is very important that cognition of a legal order should be based on the rules which could be designated as “laws of jurisprudence”. Naturally, this does not mean legislation within the concept of objective law. Rather, these laws can be referred to as certain regularities, ignorance of which would, however, either impossibly or substantially complicate the legal process of decision-making, both in law-making (as the so-called decisional function is contained in law itself1) or the practical legal process of making decisions (the application of law). In recent years, a conception involving cooperation between linguists and jurists has emerged in the discussion of jurisprudential methodology. This constitutes an interdisciplinary approach to motivation of legal decision-making and involves, on the one hand, “practical semantics” and researchers thereof,2 and on the other hand, representatives of the so-called structuring theory of law.3 In specialist literature, the structuring theory of law has also been referred to as the Muller Schoo1.4 The role of language and linguistic arguments in the discussion and practice of legal working methods serves as a connective principle in such interdisciplinary approach (co-operation).