Skeptical Arguments Research Articles

Defense of Integrative Pluralism in the Cognitive Sciences

This article considers the opposition between the pluralist and unificationist stances in the philosophy of cognitive sciences. The choice between pluralism and unificationism is important both in terms of discussing the current methodological practices and with respect to the debates about the future of the cognitive studies. As a starting point, the author takes his own idea of theoretical complexes. One of its most significant normative consequences is theoretical pluralism. There have been a number of skeptical arguments against pluralism, including the fear of generating many useless theories and dissipating of efforts, as well as the doubts about the differences between pluralism and relativism. One of the most recent objections states that integrative pluralism implies a tension, an instability, if one prioritizes the epistemic quality of explanatory depth. The author addresses each of these objections in turn. The constructive variety of pluralism is distinguished from unbridled pluralism and relativism by its commitment to the idea of improving explanatory, predictive, and other characteristics of a theory through the presence of alternatives and their collisions, mutual criticisms. Integrative pluralism does not entail instability, since the values of unification and explanatory depth cannot be prescribed to the cognitive sciences ex cathedra, without taking into account the character of the cognitive process revealed in empirical studies. The pluralist stance appears to be incompatible with radical projects of unification of the cognitive studies, though there are many opportunities for more moderate integrative initiatives. One such initiative is the recent idea of integrative experiment design, which involves constructing a space of experiments for a particular problem. Testing theories by selectively sampling points in this space and then updating them accordingly may be a key to the integration of experimental observations.

An anthropological critique of psychiatric rating scales

SUMMARY This article discusses sceptical arguments about measurement scales. Measurement scales are part of a promising agenda of openness, transparency and patient and public involvement (PPI) in medical research, but have received critical, sometimes hostile attention from anthropologists. This is because scales repackage localised cultural assumptions about distress as something universal and pan-human and have the capacity to reshape people's interior lives in unhelpful, possibly harmful ways. We take as an example the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9). Use of the PHQ-9 is currently mandated by major funders. But its history suggests flawed PPI and a lack of openness. The article suggests a constructive role for anthropology in mental health research, using ethnographic evidence and theory to show how, although they have their uses, mental health scales should not be regarded as inert or harmless.

How sceptics teach us to know

The purpose of this paper is to show (1) that scepticism, in both its traditional forms and contemporary forms, poses no real threat to obtaining inferential empirical knowledge, even if such knowledge requires certainty and (2) that there are some significant lessons to be learned from the traditional sceptics about what constitutes a plausible argument for scepticism and how to obtain knowledge while avoiding dogmatism and (3) that contemporary scepticism is based on several serious mistakes about what is required to obtain empirical knowledge because it both conflates knowing with being dogmatic and inflates the requirements for obtaining empirical knowledge. I will focus on inferential empirical knowledge, rather than knowledge in general, in order to eliminate the necessity of defending one of the various responses to the problem of the regress of reasons. I will limit the discussion to inferential empirical knowledge because it has been the primary target of contemporary arguments for scepticism. I aim to show that we are justified in rejecting the sceptic’s arguments but that we should not be certain that the sceptic is wrong. I hope that it will become obvious that such a seemingly incoherent set of beliefs is part of the correct description of our epistemic position.

Climate change denial theories, skeptical arguments, and the role of science communication

Climate change denial theories, skeptical arguments, and the role of science communication

Categorial versus naturalized epistemology

AbstractHow do we know what kinds of things constitute knowledge or justified belief? Naturalized epistemology is committed to denying a priori insight into the kinds of kinds that are and are not knowledge or justification makers. By contrast, it is argued here that knowledge of these matters is a priori knowledge of a special kind. Such knowledge may be called “categorial.” The dialectical give and take between categorial and naturalized epistemology is pursued, before endorsing an argument that breaks the standoff in favor of categorial epistemology. In particular, an argument is given for a certain kind of mathematical skepticism that is entirely a priori. The skeptical argument turns on categorial claims about actuality. Responses are considered before defending a method of categorial dumbfounding in certain circumstances. This yields a positive argument for the categoriality of fundamental epistemic principles. The categorial rationalist conclusions are embraced and some consequences noted.

Getting back in shape: Persistence, shape, and relativity

AbstractIn this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the “Region Argument”) that objects do not have frame‐independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers' argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four‐dimensionalist assumptions entail that nothing in a relativistic world has any shape, not even stages or the regions occupied by them. We also argue that endurantists have viable ways of preserving shape despite the Region Argument. The upshot of these arguments is that contrary to conventional wisdom, considerations about shape in relativity support endurantism rather than four‐dimensionalism. We conclude by examining the implications of our discussion for the debate over Edenic shapes, noting that endurantists have a satisfying response to skeptical arguments about Edenic shapes similar to the one they have against the Region Argument.

Beyond reasonable doubt: reconsidering Neanderthal aesthetic capacity

AbstractAn aesthetic sense—a taste for the creation and/or appreciation of that which strikes one as, e.g., attractive or awesome—is often assumed to be a distinctively H. sapiens phenomenon. However, recent paleoanthropological research is revealing its archaeologically visible, deeper roots. The sensorimotor/perceptual and cognitive capacities underpinning aesthetic activities are a major focus of evolutionary aesthetics. Here we take a diachronic, evolutionary perspective and assess ongoing scepticism regarding whether, and to what extent, aesthetic capacity extends to our evolutionary cousins, the Neanderthals. The goal of this article is twofold. First, it serves as a defence of the attribution of Neanderthal aesthetic capacity by marshalling archaeological data best explained by positing a Neanderthal aesthetic sense. Second, it offers an opportunity to make progress on understanding some epistemically relevant features of the wider debate in evolutionary aesthetics. First, we outline and analyse a range of distinct ‘sceptical arguments’ derived from attitudes and claims found in the literature and broader debate that aim to dial down the case for Neanderthal aesthetic capacity. We show that these arguments not only miss their target, they divert the debate away from more compelling questions. We then consider the case for protoaesthetic capacities and sensitivities in the Acheulean stone tool industry and argue that Neanderthals likely inherited the protoaesthetic package from ancient ancestors that they shared with H. sapiens. Finally, we sketch and defend a research agenda for framing Neanderthal aesthetic niche(s) beyond H. sapiens-derived standards, which we see as a priority for future archaeological, cognitive, and philosophical research. While we resist sceptical arguments and the often-implied inferiority of Neanderthals to humans, we also deny that Neanderthals and ancient humans were indistinguishable. Understanding the differences is an important goal of interpretation, and we apply this line of reasoning to the case of aesthetics.

Biased Suspension of Judgment

Abstract According to Thomas Kelly, traditional skeptical arguments can be conceived in terms of bias. The main aim of this paper is not to challenge Kelly’s conclusions, but rather to draw some interesting consequences from them. Specifically, in addition to cases of biased judgments, which draw the ire of the skeptic, there are also cases of biased suspension of judgment. By examining cases of racially biased suspension of judgment and comparing them to cases of skepticism, I argue that we can help to uncover the mechanism that underlies the skeptic’s accusation of bias. In particular, I aim to show that it is the conclusiveness of one’s evidence, rather than the likelihood of the possibility at issue, that matters to the skeptic.

X-Phi within its proper bounds

ABSTRACT Using two decades worth of experimental philosophy (aka x-phi), Edouard Machery argues in Philosophy within its Proper Bounds (2017) that philosophers’ use of the “method of cases” is unreliable because it has a strong tendency to elicit different intuitive responses from non-philosophers. And because, as Machery argues, appealing to such cases is usually the only way for philosophers to acquire the kind of knowledge they seek, an extensive philosophical skepticism follows. I argue that Machery’s “Unreliability” argument fails because, once its premises are percisified, they are either self-defeating or without justification. This is a significant result because Machery’s arguments are the most widely cited and discussed x-phi arguments for philosophical skepticism and many hold that Machery provides the most empirically informed, convincing, and thus best case for this kind of skepticism. So, if my arguments are sound, then the best x-phi argument for philosophical skepticism fails. I further argue that this result provides strong reason to believe the more general conclusion that “negative” x-phi is likely doomed: x-phi likely can never support a substantive philosophical skepticism. Ultimately, I argue for the broad conclusion that all empirically minded arguments for philosophical skepticism are likely to fail for the same reasons that Machery’s does, i.e. they are (likely) self-defeating.

Dealing with the Quiet Opposition? News Coverage of Climate Skepticism in Two Finnish Newspapers 1990–2021

ABSTRACT This article examines news coverage of climate skepticism in two Finnish newspapers between 1990 and 2021. It approaches climate skepticism as a professional problem that involves a tension between conventional professional ideals that underscore balanced coverage of conflicts and emerging ideals that stress communicating climate change responsibly. Content analysis focused on two core forms of climate skepticism that have remained relatively stable throughout the 31-year research period: evidence and process skepticism. The presence of all kinds of skeptical contents (skeptical arguments, arguments against skepticism, and descriptions of skepticism) was examined to evalutate the overall media visibility of climate skepticism. The analysis then focused specifically on the coverage of skeptical arguments. The role of sources as well as the use of journalistic voice in the presentation of skeptical contents was examined. This study elaborates earlier anecdotal accounts concerning the limited public role of climate skepticism in Finland. Four per cent of news articles included sources who were quoted presenting their own skeptical views. Skeptical arguments were mainly presented by quoting foreign sources whereas arguments against skepticism were presented by quoting domestic climate scientists. “Climategate” caused the most notable increase in the volume of skeptical contents during the research period.

The global development of value orientations, political support and democracy since the 1990s

This article analyzes the global development of democracy since the 1990s. The theoretical introduction is followed by a descriptive analysis of several indices of political support based on survey results for 89 countries that participated at least twice in the World Values Survey (WVS) or the European Values Study (EVS). The analysis focuses on emancipative value orientations measured by Welzel's Choice Index and several indicators of political support. The scores of these indicators are broken down by five regime types and seven world regions. The results confirm that the global decline of democratic quality since the mid-2000s has not been as dramatic as the pessimistic analyses of Freedom House and the V-Dem project have claimed. It has primarily taken place in a limited number of populous countries on which these publications have focused. When countries are treated equally, the quality of democracy has remained remarkably stable since the early 1990s. Emancipative values are globally on the rise, but their increase has been considerably higher in the established democracies. This supports the skeptical argument that they cannot be considered as the major cause of the third wave of democratization. The descriptive analysis is complemented by regression analyses for confidence in regime institutions and support for democracy as dependent variables. The evaluation of democratic regime performance is the strongest predictor of confidence in regime institutions. An intrinsic conception of democracy and the importance assigned to living in a democracy have the strongest influence on support for democracy. Emancipative value orientations have a minor influence on political support even in consolidated democracies. Finally, the analysis does not confirm the suspected relationship between the different levels of political support. Easton's theory of political support assumed that they mutually influence each other via a generalization of experiences or an overflow of values. Instead, it seems that confidence in regime institutions and support for democracy follow different cognitive logics.

Moral Vagueness: Does Mathematics Have a Practical Solution?

If one favors Moral Intuitivism in order to deal with Skeptical argument, then thinking by analogy with mathematical knowledge is of use. A major objection to the mathematical analogy in Moral epistemology is the threat of moral relativism in practical applications of moral pluralism if we employ mathematical pluralism as a vector to proceed. Thus, the advocacy for moral pluralism faces an obstacle which should be addressed: a problem of moral «vague» predicates. This article addresses moral vagueness and considers objections toward several treatments of related Sorties series through possibility of deepening a proper mathematical intuition. However, the issue of human moral competency cannot be erased from the picture. It is a critical question for morality which very likely falls beyond the scope of Moral epistemology.

The Debasing Demon Resurrected

Abstract The aim of this paper is to strike a blow for the relevance of the debasing demon originally summoned by Jonathan Schaffer. I do so by, first, defending this skeptical hypothesis against critics and, second, by noting important similarities between the workings of this demon and implicit bias. Along the way, I elucidate the structure of this skeptical argument by comparing it to other better-known skeptical arguments. I also clarify the kinds of access the debasing skeptical scenario, as well as some of the replies, operate with. Apart from being interesting in its own right as a different skeptical challenge, the debasing demon raises important issues regarding bias, as I will show by using an example from epistemic decolonialization.

Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers

Abstract In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the skeptic’s challenge to be that our anti-skeptical beliefs are based on what we know to be biased reasons. Kelly has not shown that this sort of bias is compatible with knowledge. Second, Kelly’s approach to the problem of skepticism is an example of what I have called “unambitious epistemology.” And, for that reason, it is not a satisfactory answer to skepticism.

Scepticism, evidential holism and the logic of demonic deception

AbstractSceptical arguments in epistemology typically employ sceptical hypotheses, which are rivals to our everyday beliefs so constructed that they fit exactly the evidence on which those beliefs are based. There are two ways of using a sceptical hypothesis to undermine an everyday belief, giving rise to two distinct sorts of sceptical argument: underdetermination‐based and closure‐based. However, both sorts of argument, as usually formulated in the literature, fall foul of evidential holism, for they ignore the crucial role of background beliefs. An analogy with the philosophy of science makes this point explicit. There is no simple way to “holism proof” the two sceptical arguments.

“This is Not a Slippery Slope” Versus “The Queer Sex Panic is Just Beginning”: Discourse About FOSTA-SESTA in Ideologically Diverse U.S. Mass media, 2017–2023

This research analyzes mass media coverage of The Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) and Stop Enabling Online Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA), two landmark 2018 bills that changed how sexual content is moderated by internet service providers in the United States. Using critical discourse analysis, I compare the framing of 101 news stories about FOSTA-SESTA published in mainstream U.S. newspapers, feminist media, and LGBTQ magazines over the course of 7 years. Findings describe coverage of online sex work, online child sexual exploitation, and free speech concerns that preceded and followed the landmark ruling from 2017 to 2023. I show FOSTA-SESTA's progression as a topic of discourse during the 2020 presidential election and compare differences between coverage in ideologically diverse U.S. media. While mainstream news originally supported FOSTA-SESTA's efforts to restrict the tech industry and prevent online child sexual exploitation, alternative media tended to present skeptical arguments that supported sex workers and other marginalized communities. Journalism industry interventions are discussed.

Systematicity and Skepticism

Abstract The fact that philosophy is systematic—that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected—was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism.

Эвиденциализм, тезис Фантла-Макграта и аргумент от ошибки

The paper aims to show that the example given by J. Fantl and M. McGrath (2002) that pragmatic considerations regarding the risk of attributing the desired epistemic status to a given belief in a given situation affect the very concept of «epistemic fact» and as a consequence, we must abandon evidentialism, as a general concept that the necessary and sufficient conditions of justification are determined solely by the available epistemic data, does not achieve its goals. Taking into account J. Kvanvig's position that the problem of «pragmatic encroachment» could be reduced to the notion of «the false presupposition about the value of knowledge» (2011), we may say that this is not a problem of epistemic rationality, but a problem of the sufficiency of epistemic justification in situations where the risk of making a mistake is just another factor that emphasizes the fundamentally subjective nature of epistemic status attribution to a belief. As a consequence, we see the J. Fantl’s and M. McGrath’s argument as a form of the skeptical argument «from error», which is solved by pointing out on the fundamental difference in the «volumes» of epistemic data within situations that the person introspectively draws for himself, assuming whether he knows or not. Such an interpretation does not threaten evidentialism at all.

Margaret Macdonald on the Argument from Dreaming

Abstract In this article, I offer a detailed examination of Margaret Macdonald's response to the Cartesian sceptical argument from dreaming. I show that Macdonald's views were not well understood by her contemporaries, and I suggest that this misunderstanding has led to her omission from subsequent discussions of this subject. I end with a brief demonstration of the fact that Macdonald's central claims have re-emerged in contemporary epistemology.

Veridicalism and Scepticism

Abstract According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies.