Argument For Fatalism Research Articles

Equimodalidade e Hôs Epi To Poly no De Interpretatione 9

In the first part of De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle introduces an argument for fatalism that he obviously does not subscribe to. Readers of the chapter wonder how Aristotle replies to that argument. In this paper I claim that the main basis of his reply is the principle of equimodality stated in 19a33 (“statements are true in the same way as the actual things are”). I defend that this principle should be interpreted in the most straightforward way, as saying that the modality with which any statement is true is the same as the modality with which the actual things referred to in the statement are what they are. This entails that something is (or will be) necessarily such and such only if the statement saying that it is (or will be) such and such is necessarily true. By applying this principle to Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of non-necessary things – those that happen as chance has it and those that happen for the most part (hôs epi to poly) in one way rather than another –, one should conclude that, because these things are contingent, statements about them can only be contingently true.

Едвардс про несумісність Божого передзнання і людської свободи волі

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

Fatalism and Truth at a Time

In this paper, I will examine an argument for fatalism. I will offer a formalized version of the argument and analyze one of the argument’s most controversial assumptions. Then, I will argue that one ought to reject the assumption that propositions about the future are true facts of the past, even if no one makes reference to such propositions.

Fatalism and Truth at a Time

In this paper, I will examine an argument for fatalism. I will offer a formalized version of the argument and analyze one of the argument's most controversial assumptions. Then, I will argue that one ought to reject the assumption that propositions about the future are true facts of the past, even if no one makes reference to such propositions.

Logical Determinateness, Fixity, and the Symmetry of Time

In this paper, I investigate the purported dilemma between a symmetrical conception of time and the denial of what I call Universal Logical Determinateness (ULD). According to the dilemma, the timeless and universal application of logical laws to all propositions necessitates either the view that the past and future are both open, or that they are both closed. My investigation proceeds by way of an assessment of Taylor's argument for fatalism, then of Dummet's presentation and refutation of the fatalistic argument, and finally of Dummet's analogous argument which attempts to prove the possibility of an open past. In all cases, we find that the arguments implicitly rely upon the assumption that there exists a necessary connection between the truth aptness of propositions and the fixity (or non-fixity) of events. I question this assumption and conclude that any argument for the symmetry of time which relies upon it begs the question against the asymmetry of time.

Another difficulty in Taylor's argument for fatalism

Several attempts to criticize Taylor's argument in support of fatalism have followed its appearance in the first edition of his Metaphysics. 1 But the dust of battle has now settled, and the general consensus is that Taylor's argument suffers from a misplaced modal operator. I wish to show that, whether that is indeed the case or not, Taylor's argument fails on yet another count. Taylor's strategy consists in transposing, mutatis mutandis, the reasons we have for being fatalists about the past on to our relationships to future events. This should enable us to see why we should also assent to fatalism about the future. Of course, this strategy does not embody the argument itself; it is merely a didactic device intended to achieve several goals, one of which is to make it perfectly clear that temporal considerations have no role to play in the demonstration. The gist of the argument is that the relations obtaining between events at t and events at t + dt are such that if the first are the sufficient condition of the second, there result constraints upon the first which make it impossible for them to have been any different. And if the first were human actions, then they could not have been any different either. It is this very strategy which reveals the difficulty in Taylor's argument, for the argument regarding fatalism about the past fails to capture the essential reason why we view the past as irrevocable. Hence, it should suffice for us to find the corresponding flaw in the argument concerning fatalism about the future to see why we should not accept its conclusion either.