Arctic Security Research Articles

Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change

Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change

The Inuit Circumpolar Council in an Era of Global and Local Change

For over 30 years, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) has represented and promoted the interests of Inuit peoples across the circumpolar north. This transnational organization has championed a number of political, cultural, and environmental causes that are important to the Inuit, and raised the profile of Arctic and Inuit issues in multilateral forums such as the Arctic Council and the United Nations. In the words of Poul Krarup, the editor of Sermitsiaq, a leading Greenlandic newspaper: At age 30, most organizations are still trying to define their goals, but the ICC. ..is already a success: it has accomplished everything that was on its original to-do list.' Krarup argues that the ICC is still needed and he seems to envision a role for it as a government watchdog and advocate for social justice. But he also argues that the ICC should focus on economic integration and using climate change as a means of achieving unity founded on a healthy economy.2Krarup is correct in his observations that the ICC has enjoyed considerable political success. These successes have been well documented in the scholarly literature.3 Indeed, the ICC has played a prominent and influential role in multilateral discussions around contentious issues such as climate change, persistent organic pollutants, Arctic security, and regional autonomy. It has also served as forum in which representatives from lnuit regions in four different states can share information, experiences, and best practices on a range of issues that affect their communities. As such, the ICC has become the collective voice of the lnuit in their interactions with each other and with the broader global community. This voice, we have argued elsewhere, has challenged the state-centric status quo and dominant economic ideologies that shape the current world order.4 The traditional knowledge that informs its discourse has also functioned to counter western scientific constructions of the world in which we live.That being said, it would be misleading to suggest that the ICC has not encountered divisions and problems along the way. For many years, the lnuit family was separated by the geopolitical divisions of the Cold War, with the Russian Inuit only becoming active in the organization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 2000s, an editorial in the Nunatsiaq News expressed concern about the rise of violent crime and suicides and criticized the ICC as an elite organization that is out of touch with the social realities of Inuit peoples.5 In the mid-2000s, the Inuit of Alaska, who were the driving force behind the creation of the ICC, seemed to lose interest in circumpolar collaboration once their goals of self-determination had been met. Most recently, the contentious issue of resource development has revealed a range of different opinions and perspectives within the organization on its future direction.6In light of these divisions, it is important that we continue to assess critically the activities and goals of this organization as it attempts to confront such new questions as resource development. In the past, the issues that the ICC has encountered have either been unifying (the threat posed by persistent organic pollutants to the Arctic), manageable (Alaska's temporary lack of interest in circumpolar collaboration), or outside its control (the Cold War). Some issues, such as the social disparities faced by Inuit peoples, have remained unresolved, but not because of a lack of effort by Inuit leaders to draw attention to them. Overall, the ICC was able to weather these issues and, in many cases, emerge stronger as a result. The question is whether the issue of resource development in an era of rapid and dramatic climate change represents a continuation of this trend or a wholly different set of problems that will be neither unifying nor manageable in the long term.Unlike previous issues, resource development is especially contentious because it reveals the tensions between, and the contested nature of, the values that inform this transnational organization. …

Submarines, Oil Tankers, and Icebreakers

Canadian policymakers, academics, and the general public have long had a fascination with the Arctic. It resonates in Canada's culture and in its national identity, and it can even be found in the English version of the Canadian national anthem. There is little doubt that Canadians see themselves as a northern people - even if the vast majority live along a narrow band along its southernmost border. The harsh climate and resulting ice conditions have meant that Canadians have been able to believe that few have challenged Canadian claims to have its secure and sovereign Arctic. As climate change begins to open the Arctic to the international community, Canadian policymakers and academics are wrestling with new requirements, and there is a tendency to look to the past to determine the response to the future.1 Both the academic discourse and the existing policy framework are based on the twin assumptions that the main international issue facing Canada is with regard to challenges to its sovereignty and that these are generally from the US.But what if this narrative has missed significant elements of the full picture? What if important events, actions, or realities simply were missed or ignored by the government, academics, and the general public? Could such omissions skew Canadian understanding of this important issue? Could they undermine the existing framework that now exists?This article contends that there has been such an omission. From the early 1960s onward, American (and possibly French and British) and Soviet submarines played deadly games of cat and mouse in and around the Arctic Ocean.2 Both the maintenance of nuclear deterrence and the conduct of war if deterrence failed depended heavily on what happened within the Arctic maritime regions.3 Although fundamentally important to Canadian security and welfare, very little of this seems to have entered the deliberations of Canadian policymakers. If the government could not see it, it did not exist. This omission is also notable in the academic discourse on the Arctic. Very few studies have attempted to integrate the actions of submarines into the greater understanding of Canadian policy.4However, any effort to better understand the impact that this element of the Cold War had on Canada is shrouded in secrecy. Very little is known publicly. Therefore it is impossible to know with any degree of certainty what did happen (and what may still be happening). While this issue seems to be relevant only for the past, the current efforts of those who have developed and built nuclear-powered submarines - the US, Russia, UK, France, and China, and those who plan to bund nuclear-power submarines, like India - suggest that Canadian officials must not become complacent. The commitment of these states to dedicate substantial resources to retaining this capability points to the perceived utility of nuclear-powered submarines. Given the geographic position of the Arctic Ocean it is unlikely that some or all of these nations will forsake the opportunity to send their submarines into this region. This is not just a historical issue but one that will continue to challenge Canada.The article examines four possible scenarios. Each of these scenarios makes certain assumptions about the conduct of submarine activity in the Arctic and the Canadian government's response to it. Each of these will then be assessed for their impact on Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security in terms of policy and academic understanding. It is first necessary to discuss what is meant by Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security. The next step is to review the dominant understanding and policy framework.CANADIAN CONCEPTS OF ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITYOne of the greatest challenges for any discussion of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security is understanding these concepts.5 Efforts to have policy reflect the terms Arctic sovereignty and Arctic security have often been frustrated by the tendency of Canadian policymakers, media, and academics to treat the two terms as separate and distinct concepts. …

The Other Sovereignties

Since 2004, the Canadian government has been rediscovering the Arctic. The Canadian forces, absent from this region for almost two decades, are now back regularly, conducting exercises or buuding new infrastructure, whue a good deal of the equipment acquisition programs are designed to sustain military operations in the north.The north is prominent in official government discourse, as well as in policy. This discourse emphasizes three interconnected elements. First, the north is ours, a part of Canadian territory, establishing a clear distinction between us and others. Second, Canadian sou in the north is under siege, both in terms of sovereignty and security. Other Arctic powers (such as the United States and Russia), non- Arctic powers (such as China), and nonstate actors (private corporations, criminal organizations, and terrorists) are staring at the Canadian north and wul exploit any weakness in the Canadian determination to protect it. The list of threats is long and challenging for the Canadian forces. Third, the north is a land of opportunity for new development and resource exploitation, and it is the responsibility of Canadians to harvest the bounty of this territory. One of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's favourite slogans is it or lose it; a phrase he coined in 2007 in relation to Arctic sovereignty.1Many reasons could explain this sudden rush to the north in Ottawa, the first possibility being the need to manage the consequences of global warming and to face an anticipated and significant increase in human activity in a region with a great reduction in ice cover. But such motives are not inconsistent with others, such as the instrumentalization of the north for domestic political objectives. These objectives are connected to recurrent themes in Canada's national and external identity, in which the Arctic plays a prominent role. As we will see later, the vast majority of Canadians identify with this region, even if very few of them ever travel to the Arctic. The image of vast, cold, and pure spaces, as well as the presence of indigenous communities, are associated with the history and definition of Canadian national identity, especially since the last quarter of the 20th century. The polar bear and the inukchuk, rather than the beaver, are today Canada's national and international symbols. Officiai discourse reinforces this characterization of Canadian identity. It paints Canada as an Arctic power or an energy superpower with vast reserves of oil and gas in the north, and implicitly depicts the defence of sovereignty in the region as a counterweight to a deeper North American integration which might weaken or undermine Canada's national identity2 From this perspective, these discourses could be conceived as a part of a nation-building effort.Precisely because the Arctic is a part of Canadian identity, any external threat or challenge in this region could trigger an emotional reaction, as is usually the case when issues such as Canada- U S border delimitation in the Beaufort Sea or the legal status of the Northwest Passage make their way to the front pages of major Canadian newspapers. In all fairness, we must recall that this is the first time that Canadian territorial integrity has been challenged since the Alaska crisis of 1903. But even purely symbolic quarrels can prompt visceral reactions, as the reaction to the Danish challenge over tiny Hans Island has demonstrated regularly in the past.3 For this reason, security and sovereignty issues in the Canadian Arctic, usually benign in and of themselves, can be deployed as national symbols to generate a consensus or to make people rally around the flag.4It is precisely because issues of Arctic security and sovereignty have become so sensitive to Canadians that they can be exploited as the external causes par excellence for a political party searching for a popular electoral warhorse that fits an ideological agenda focused on law and order, resource exploitation, and the use of force against international delinquents. …

The Implications of Ice Melt on Arctic Security

The Implications of Ice Melt on Arctic Security

Russia: The Greatest Arctic Power?

This assessment of Russia as an Arctic power derives from an analysis of structural and ideological factors. It looks at the following indicators: Russia's domestic political system, Russia's foreign policy, and an assessment of Russian economic and military power, primarily in the context of Arctic circumpolar affairs. This assessment also rests on the assumption that Arctic security issues cannot be separated from the larger context of global security. As a result, Russia's behavior in the Arctic over the next decade and beyond will be shaped by its great power aspirations, its relationship with other great powers both in the Arctic and outside of it and the resources available to the Russian state to support its Arctic ambitions.

The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the Legacy of Fear – or Reproducing It?

Drawing on the constructivist concept of ‘securitisation’, this article analyses Russia's perceptions of, and responses to, Norway's Svalbard policy in the 1990s and 2000s. The analysis focuses on three policy issues which have figured prominently on Russia's arctic security agenda in recent years: (1) the establishment and use of civilian radars and satellite ground stations on the archipelago, (2) the adoption of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act, and (3) the Norwegian Coast Guard's fishery enforcement measures in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. The article concludes that despite the changes that have taken place in the Euro-Arctic region after the Cold War, Svalbard has not ceased to be a security concern for Russia.

The Shipping News Part II

CLIMATE CHANGE IS CAUSING FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES in the Canadian north. net effect is an overall warming process that is now beginning a transformation with the potential to change almost all aspects of life in the region. These range from the way in which the northern aboriginal peoples hunt and fish on the land to the Canadian Arctic's position in the international system. With regards to the latter, the changing physical environment has the potential to accelerate a wide host of challenges to Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security. A warming Arctic will become a more accessible Arctic for the international community. It is this greater accessibility that will test Canada's ability to ensure that this region remains protected and promoted for all Canadians, including those that call it home.Not everyone believes, however, that Canada is facing such challenges. In the spring 2003 issue of International Journal, Dr. Franklyn Griffiths offered an extensive and compelling article on why he believes such concerns about Canadian Arctic sovereignty are either overstated or so far into the future that they should be of limited concern to Canadians today. I disagree with this assessment.Dr. Griffiths is one of Canada's top experts on the international elements of the Canadian north. His academic work has stood out as the leading literature on the subject,(1) but he has not limited his northern studies to the academic community alone. His op-eds in the national media have often played an integral role in prodding the government to actually something in the north.(2) His work has been both a principle source of information and inspiration for all who wish to understand Canadian northern foreign policy. It is, therefore, with a strong sense of trepidation and challenge that I offer a critique of his recent article The Shipping News: Canada's Arctic sovereignty not on thinning ice.What complicates this task is that, while I consider his core arguments to be wrong, I do agree with some of his conclusions. What is the nature of this seeming paradox? In part, this is a direct result of Dr. Griffiths' ability to challenge accepted orthodoxies. One of the hallmarks of his highly successful academic career has been his ability to challenge accepted wisdoms. Accordingly, he disputes the argument that climate change is creating an environment that will challenge Canadian northern sovereignty, contending that it is not substantiated in fact. On this point, I disagree. As this article will make clear, my reading of recent scientific evidence is that the melting of the ice cover is, indeed, occurring at a rate that warrants concern now, rather than later. Furthermore, I believe that there are numerous threats to Canadian sovereignty that will also occur sooner rather than later. As he proceeds through his argument, however, he still returns to the point that the Canadian Government is not doing enough to protect northern Canadian's interests. He is particularly critical of the government's continued reluctance to involve the Canadian northern peoples in the northern foreign policy process in a meaningful fashion, and it is on these points that I agree with him. Likewise, he calls for the creation of a consultative body that would combine the federal and territorial governments with northern aboriginal organizations to develop Canadian policy regarding the Arctic Archipelago, including issues related to security and sovereignty. On the need for such a body, I also agree. While the Canadian Government has taken important steps to consult with northerners and their leaders on foreign policy issues, there has been little evidence of these consultations leading to new and expanded funding to deal with the large number of international issues facing the Canadian north.Where Dr. Griffiths and I part company, however, is on the urgency of the problem of melting ice. In his article, I believe he has created a straw man in which he has developed a series of arguments that, ultimately, depend on extreme circumstances in order to hold strong. …

Canadian Arctic Security Issues

THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH IS undergoing unprecedented transformation. Changes at both local and international levels are altering the very fabric of all northern societies. Much of the change can be attributed to the end of the cold war, which had frozen international relations among the circumpolar antagonists - the United States, the USSR, Canada, Iceland, Denmark (Greenland), and Norway - the two northern neutrals - Finland and Sweden - and the northern societies within each. In particular, security concerns prevented the development of any meaningful international co-operation, except, for some, as military allies. With the fall of the Soviet empire, northern areas have attained greater political, if not economic, control over their future. Likewise, the possibility of nuclear war has greatly diminished. However, while there has been a marked decrease in the perception of the military threat, little, if any, attention has been given to the evolving nature of security in the circumpolar world. Although there is a growing consensus that the states in the Arctic region are moving away from a traditional understanding of security, few attempts have been made to conceptualize a more comprehensive variant.The issue is further complicated by the fact that neither the United States nor Russia has abandoned all of their traditional security concerns in the north, and neither has indicated a willingness to do so in the foreseeable future. For example, the Americans agreed to join the recently formed Arctic Council only if the agreement specifically omitted any security issues. Likewise, the Russians are still testing missiles from their nuclear-powered and armed submarines uncomfortably close to Canadian waters (500 kilometers off Ellesmere Island).The changing conceptualization of security in the post-cold war era adds further complexity. While some experts contend that traditional military issues are still the core concerns among states,(f.1) others seek to expand both the understanding of the nature of security and the issues associated with it.(f.2) Even before the cold war ended, some argued that it was necessary to look beyond military threats to such issues as terrorism, illegal immigration, resource based conflict, and environmental degradation in the context of national security.(f.3) Others thought that it was also necessary to eliminate traditional military rivalries by developing comprehensive security. While there is no consensus on what constitutes comprehensive security, its general elements include an expanded concept of threats to the national security concerns of a state and its peoples and a belief that the best means of reducing those threats is through co-operative international behaviour.The Canadian government has expressed a desire for an Arctic foreign policy that emphasizes comprehensive security over traditional military security.(f.4) In particular, it would like to use concerns about transboundary environmental threats in the Arctic to develop stronger international co-operation. Yet, there continues to be a more subtle recognition that traditional military issues remain. My purpose here is to assess how Canadian circumpolar activity in the post-cold war era has reacted to the opportunities, tensions, and problems posed by international environmental transboundary problems and traditional military requirements.CIRCUMPOLAR SECURITYThe cold warThe Arctic became one of the most militarized regions during the cold war, in the early days of which both sides developed long-range bombers as their main delivery system for nuclear weapons. This meant that both sides also placed defensive measures such as radar surveillance and interceptors as far into their northern territories as possible. As technology advanced, the preferred means of delivery became inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). While the speed and range of ICBMs were fundamentally better than the bomber, the shortest path of delivery was still over the Arctic. …

Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era

Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era

The northern sea route: A new era in soviet policy?

Abstract Ever since the speech delivered by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on October 1, 1987, in Murmansk, indications have multiplied to suggest that he was serious in his offer to open up the Northern Sea Route for international shipping. If this is the case, a dramatic shift in the thinking on Arctic security has taken place in the Kremlin. This article evaluates the relationship between various interests in Soviet policy concerning the utilization of the Northern Sea Route during the period 1917–1991. The aim is to discuss to what degree, and how, security‐political, economic, and legal interests have influenced official Soviet evaluations of the right of other states to make use of the “shortcut”; between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Four main questions are addressed: (1) What are the geopolitical realities and visions connected with economic and military use of the route? (2) How have these realities and visions been translated into practical policy? (3) How did cold war security‐political ten...

Soviet Foreign Policy: New Dynamics, New Themes

Part 1 Domestic foreign policy determinants - new realites, new perspectives: the domestic politics of foreign policy, Jerry Hough Gorbachev's Thinking about East-West relations - causes and consequences, Paul Marantz domestic and economic aspects of Gorbachev's foreign policy, David R.Jones. Part 2 New arms control initiatives: doctrinal change - the Ogarkov revolution, the scissors phenomenon, defensive defence, C.G.Jacobsen Gorbachev's arms control offensive - unilateral, bilateral and multilateral initiatives - CT, INF, START, CB, Zones, Roy Allison. Part 3 New economic initiatives: Gorbachev's foreign economic policy, Carl McMillan the Soviet Union and GATT - gesture, metaphor or serious trade policy?, William Diebold. Part 4 New regional dynamics: the impact of Gorbachev's agenda on relations with other socialist states, Jacques Levesque Sino-soviet normalization, C.G.Jacobsen soviet policy towards the Iran-Iraq war, M.Mesbahi arctic security - the Murmansk initiative and its impact, Ron Purver.