Arctic Nations Research Articles

China and the World

Britain is no longer an Arctic nation, but it has a unique Arctic role.

Showing the Flag

Britain is no longer an Arctic nation, but it has a unique Arctic role.

北极争端的症结及中国的北极战略定位 / The Sticking Point of the Arctic Dispute and China's Strategic Positioning

李诗隽 【摘要】 全球气候变暖导致北极冰川融化，这使得北极的价值突显。近年来，沿岸各国乃至圈外国围绕北极海洋主权、海域边界、资源开采、航道控制等海洋权益的地缘政治竞争愈演愈烈，而北极争端的症结则集中体现在能源、航道和地缘政治这三个问题上。面对美国、俄罗斯和加拿大各有侧重的北极战略，中国应以能源安全为战略基点，积极开展与北欧国家的多边合作，以经济合作为主，扩大北极非军事区域范围，从而能够在错综复杂地北极争端中最大限度地谋求国家利益。 Global climate warming results in Arctic sea ice melting which increases the value of the Arctic. In recent years, the competition among Arctic coastal nations and nations outside the Arctic has become increasingly fierce for sovereignty over the Arctic Ocean, sea borders, resource extraction, channel control, and other marine interests. The crux of the Arctic dispute focuses on energy, control of the waterways, and geopolitics. To face up to the United States, Russia and Canada’s Arctic strategies, China should focus on energy security strategy. China should actively carry out multilateral cooperation with the Nordic countries, mainly on economic cooperation, and expand the scope of the demilitarized zone, thus becoming able to maximize the interests of the Chinese state.

Arctic state, Arctic nation? Arctic national identity among the post-Cold War generation in Norway

In Norway, the Arctic has taken centre stage as a primary political priority. Claiming status as an ‘Arctic state’ may not be controversial based on formal geographical and legal definitions; however, the way in which the Arctic has thus been incorporated in the public's sense of Norwegian national identity is less clear. Against the background of the Norwegian government's discursive construction of a national Arctic identity in its High North strategy, this study assesses the reception this official identity has received. Over 200 young Norwegians, having largely grown up in a post-Cold War world marked by rapidly changing Arctic climate and geopolitics, were asked about their sense of Arctic identity. Contrary to governmental efforts to frame the Arctic as a fundamentally national matter, the respondents' insights highlight the multifaceted nature of identities, as a sense of Arctic identity contextually shifts between sub-national, national and supranational scales. This study thus suggests a balancing act faced by states across the region as they seek to legitimize state-level primacy and national unity in the circumpolar North.

Canada and the Asian Observers to the Arctic Council: Anxiety and Opportunity

Canada is an Arctic nation, although deep-seated anxieties about sovereignty and control belie its self-proclaimed status as an Arctic superpower.1 More than 40% of the country's landmass and 162,000 kilometers (approximately 101,000 miles) of its coastline lie north of sixty, spanning approximately one-quarter of the global Arctic. Popular imagery has long cast the Arctic as a resource-rich of destiny, a homeland for indigenous peoples, a fragile environment in need of protection, and a source of national inspiration. Through these various lenses, Canadian commentators watch intently as Asian states' interests grow in Arctic science, environmental issues, resource development, shipping opportunities, and regional governance. For a country with a history of limited investment in northern transportation and economic development, the entrance of new players resurrects old anxieties about national interests, sovereignty, and practical control. While Canada seeks Asian investment to help drive its economic growth, commentators worry about the long-term implications of the rise of Asia, China's grand strategic interests more generally, and the growing footprint and influence of state-owned enterprises in a sparsely populated region. Accordingly, Canada's ongoing challenge lies in balancing the emerging opportunities associated with the opening of the Arctic as a resource and transportation frontier with the security and stewardship issues associated with protecting part of the Canadian homeland.This essay begins with an overview of Canada's Arctic strategy and how this frames its approach to circumpolar affairs and the Arctic Council, followed by a discussion of Canada's concerns about the admission of new observers to the council. The next section notes emerging opportunities for enhanced Canada-Asia engagement, despite persistent anxiety about increasing Asian interest in Arctic science, governance, resources, and maritime routes. This essay concludes that by working through existing mechanisms and ensuring that Asian states' participation does not erode Arctic state sovereignty, Canada and the other Arctic states can realize their national goals, maintain their leadership roles in regional governance, and accommodate growing international interest in the circumpolar north.Canada's Arctic StrategyCanada's priorities for the Arctic are laid out in its 2009 white paper Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, which promotes an overriding agenda of seeking to develop a healthy, prosperous, and secure region within a strong and sovereign Canada.2 This strategy contains four main pillars: exercising Canada's Arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting Canada's environmental heritage, and improving and devolving governance. The Conservative Party government of Stephen Harper considers the sovereignty pillar to be its foremost priority, an approach that capitalizes on Canadian nationalism and primordial anxieties about the country's control over its share of the Arctic. Despite official assurances that Canadian sovereignty is well established in legal terms and that boundary or status-of-water disputes with neighboring countries are well managed, threat narratives that imagine foreign challenges to Canada's Arctic lands and seas continue to resonate with Canadians. Nevertheless, the country works closely with other Arctic states to promote and protect its international interests and cooperate on a broader vision for the region.Official statements confirm that Canada considers the Arctic Council to be the preeminent intergovernmental forum for cooperation between the eight Arctic member states and the international indigenous peoples' organizations that partake in the council as permanent participants. Among these organizations are the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, and Inuit Circumpolar Council, all of which have Canadian constituents. …

The Nordic Embrace: Why the Nordic Countries Welcome Asia to the Arctic Table

A range of Asian countries-China, India, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea-were welcomed by the Arctic countries as observers to the Arctic Council in May 2013. This was a controversial decision long resisted by Arctic powers Russia and Canada, with the United States undecided until right before the final decision. The Nordic countries, on the other hand, led by Norway, emphasized the positive aspects of Asia's interest and saw the region's greater participation in Arctic affairs as strengthening governance and making the Arctic Council a more relevant and future-oriented forum.This essay examines the Nordic countries-Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden-as Arctic nations and describes their Arctic geography, identity, and economic, political, and security interests. It then seeks to explain the Nordic countries' basically positive attitude toward Asian involvement in the Arctic, while also identifying the limits and elements of skepticism that still exist. In concluding, the essay looks into the future and discusses challenges and opportunities for the Nordic countries arising from increased Asian ventures into Arctic lands and waters.Nordic Arctic InterestsThere are commonalities as well as differences in the Nordic countries' Arctic interests. The commonalities among the Nordic states are most striking: history, geography, culture, trade, and politics today knit them closely together such that they cooperate intimately in Nordic as well as international institutions. Sweden and Norway fought a brief war in 1814 and were on the verge of war as recently as 1905. Yet despite this history, as well as their different experiences during World War II and varying security alliances to date, the Nordic countries enjoy strong and peaceful cooperation along virtually every thinkable dimension.Yet one of the surprises meeting the Asian countries in their quest for Nordic support for their participation in the Arctic Council was the relative lack of a formal Arctic identity in the Nordic region. Arctic politics is decided in the capitals located far south of the Arctic, and there are no Arctic budgets or regional planning units in national ministries. Even the small minority of indigenous peoples in the high north (mainly the Saami people) pay their taxes to the national governments, and the majority of the Arctic Nordic populations view themselves primarily as national citizens rather than Arctic citizens in any significant sense.Nevertheless, the Arctic matters a lot to the Nordic countries, and increasingly so in the wake of growing global attention to the region's affairs. A potentially important difference between these states stems from Norway and Iceland not being members of the European Union (EU). Back in May 2013, for example, the admittance of the five Asian countries to the Arctic Council hung in the balance partly due to a spat between the EU (also an applicant for a formal observer role) and Canada over seal hunting. Canada is furious at the EU for boycotting Canadian sealskin production, which is seen as a traditional custom and important business opportunity in Canada's Arctic region. Although the Nordic EU members found this spat frustratingly difficult and were skeptical of some of the EU's reasoning, they had to align with Brussels. For this and other reasons, Norway became a major broker in Kiruna, ensuring that a decision was made. The Asian countries, along with Italy, were accepted as formal observers, while the EU still must wait in the wings for some hard-won concessions from intransigent Canada-the current Arctic Council president.The differences among the Nordic countries-which again are moderate and should be seen in a holistic context-are mainly due to three factors:* Geography. Some Nordic countries are Arctic coastal states, while others are not.* Economy. The level of economic activity and interest in the Arctic differs significantly among the Nordic countries. …

The impacts of recent permafrost thaw on land–atmosphere greenhouse gas exchange

Permafrost thaw and the subsequent mobilization of carbon (C) stored in previously frozen soil organic matter (SOM) have the potential to be a strong positive feedback to climate. As the northern permafrost region experiences as much as a doubling of the rate of warming as the rest of the Earth, the vast amount of C in permafrost soils is vulnerable to thaw, decomposition and release as atmospheric greenhouse gases. Diagnostic and predictive estimates of high-latitude terrestrial C fluxes vary widely among different models depending on how dynamics in permafrost, and the seasonally thawed ‘active layer’ above it, are represented. Here, we employ a process-based model simulation experiment to assess the net effect of active layer dynamics on this ‘permafrost carbon feedback’ in recent decades, from 1970 to 2006, over the circumpolar domain of continuous and discontinuous permafrost. Over this time period, the model estimates a mean increase of 6.8 cm in active layer thickness across the domain, which exposes a total of 11.6 Pg C of thawed SOM to decomposition. According to our simulation experiment, mobilization of this previously frozen C results in an estimated cumulative net source of 3.7 Pg C to the atmosphere since 1970 directly tied to active layer dynamics. Enhanced decomposition from the newly exposed SOM accounts for the release of both CO2 (4.0 Pg C) and CH4 (0.03 Pg C), but is partially compensated by CO2 uptake (0.3 Pg C) associated with enhanced net primary production of vegetation. This estimated net C transfer to the atmosphere from permafrost thaw represents a significant factor in the overall ecosystem carbon budget of the Pan-Arctic, and a non-trivial additional contribution on top of the combined fossil fuel emissions from the eight Arctic nations over this time period.

“The US is an Arctic Nation”: policy, implementation and US icebreaking capabilities in a changing Arctic

This paper summarizes research on US Arctic policy implementation; specifically, the US Coast Guard’s implementation of security and environment-related goals that require polar icebreaking capacity. Although the US has relatively clearly stated its objectives in the region, resources have not been provided to enable the realization of those goals, particularly in the case of the Coast Guard. The discrepancy between stated US policy goals and implementation action in the case at hand raises broader questions about Arctic foreign policy. This article will examine various influences shaping Arctic policy implementation by using Graham Allison’s model of cognitive lenses. It will strive to identify the factors that have impeded successful implementation and suggest pathways for the US to move forward in strengthening its ability to respond to the changing dynamics of the Arctic. As access increases in the polar region, rhetoric about presence will have to be translated into action, and in the current budget climate the costs of polar operations challenge many nations, including the US.

A history of the Arctic: nature, exploration and exploitation

Cold and isolated, yet home to some 4 million people; harsh and unyielding, yet receding dramatically every year: the Arctic is an area that defies definition. No landscape has stood out in the modern mind as so quintessentially timeless: imagined and described as a realm of crystalline purity, as a grey kingdom of frozen death, eternal and unchanging. Possessing a unique ecosystem, and home to some of the world's most robust peoples, the Arctic has both fascinated and unsettled outsiders throughout history. Today it stands at the epicentre of an unprecedented environmental crisis. Yet for all its renown the Arctic remains far from perfectly understood. In A History of the Arctic, award-winning polar historian John McCannon provides a far-reaching overview from the Stone Age to the present, examining all major aspects of this vital region from a global perspective. Covering the history of each Arctic nation, McCannon discusses many topics, including polar exploration and science, nation-building and diplomacy, environmental issues and climate change, and the role of indigenous populations in Arctic history. With Arctic territorial claims and resource- extraction assuming ever greater importance in the twenty-first century, this book includes a timely assessment of current diplomatic and environmental realities, along with the increasingly dire risks the region is likely to face in the near future.

Rebirth of Indigenous Arctic Nations and polar resource management: critical perspectives from Siberia and Sámi areas of Finland

This paper recommends a potentially ambitious, reformative view of engagement with the Indigenous societies of the Eurasian North in the context of biodiversity loss and climate change. The Eurasian North enters this new era still in a social and economic context that sees few guarantees for the rights of Indigenous peoples. Yet the Eurasian North contains the last nomads of the Arctic – Nenets, Chukchi and Even peoples who have been able to maintain their cultures and civilisations under many economic and climate pressures. This paper argues that we need a revised understanding of biological and climate assessments in the Arctic – a comprehensive one that positions Indigenous communities as a part of their homelands. Using oral histories from the Sámi of Finland and Murmansk, Russia, as well as two nomadic communities in the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia, Siberia, Russia, this paper discusses the notion of ‘rebirth of Indigenous nations on the land’. By juxtaposing the theoretical framework of Even indigenous scholar Vasilii Robbek (2007) with these case studies a potentially new view emerges. This challenges the disappearance and loss of Indigenous cultures of the Arctic, and instead develops pathways that centre on hope and healing. It indicates the link between preservation of traditional human systems and climate and biodiversity assessment. People of the land are returning to their land with knowledge and histories intact. A key engine for this is the establishment of Indigenous nomadic schools across the region to preserve Indigenous knowledge.

Arktisk politik og regimedannelse i 2010'erne

Recent developments have placed the High North on the international agenda. These include global warming, the prospects of major oil and gas finds, the opening of the Arctic Ocean to international shipping and the ongoing partition of its outer continental shelf between the five coastal states. In the so-called Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 these "Arctic Five" promised to play according to the UNCLOS rules and to shoulder their responsibility as coastal states. Despite this, the future may see both cooperation and conflict in the Arctic. The aim of the article is to discuss the possibilities of cooperative schemes, regimes, to regulate the problems which increasing shipping and extraction industries and fisheries may cause. First, a survey of future Arctic actors and fora is presented. While Arctic politics isstill dominated by the eight members of the Arctic Council, other actors, most clearly China, South Korea, Japan and the European Commission, are pressuring for influence. Furthermore, the Arctic Council is pressured by the "Arctic Five" and has reacted by establishing a secretariat and by adopting its first binding decision, anagreement on cooperation in search and rescue operations. Other relevant fora are the IMO, the WMO and UNCLOS. Next, an inventory of future "tasks" facing the Arctic nations is presented. They include defence tasks, sovereignty tasks, national authority tasks, and tasks, which can only (or best) be handled in regimes. Such regimes seem most needed with respect to international shipping. In the final section the discussion on possible regimes gets more concrete. Many tasks can best be handled by the IMO, but the Arctic Council, the WMO and UNCLOS have also roles to play. In particular, the five Arctic costal states have acrucial role as providers of specific regime services. Without their participation Arctic regime-formation is a non-starter,

The Arctic Is Now: Economic and National Security in the Last Frontier

ABSTRACT With an estimated 30 billion barrels of oil, 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy resources, the economic potential of the Alaskan Arctic can be measured in the trillions of dollars. Although the other Arctic nations are parties to the Law of the Sea Convention and are already developing their nations’ Arctic resources, the United States has failed to ratify the convention or develop a plan for the region. Now is the time for the Obama administration to advance a comprehensive Arctic strategy that addresses both governance and acquisition requirements, or it risks further harm to the nation's economic and national security.

The (Arctic) Show Must Go On

With climate change radically transforming the geopolitics at the top of the world, the Arctic has entered the global limelight, and the media periodically put issues front and centre. This interest, it was said some years ago, was novel - a product of the rapid melting of the Arctic icecap, the uncovering of resources, and the opening of the Arctic waters. And yet media and scholars keep conveying more or less the same information and address the same issues year after year. Every so often, a great deal of words and ink flow on the hand depict the rising tensions between Arctic nations, and on the other debunk what many now call the myth of a new cold war.With the rapid melting of the Arctic icecap, great confusion has arisen with regard the politics of the north. A plethora of statements has been provided by political actors and the media the effect that the north is rapidly becoming a battleground - an issue many believe be directly linked the resource craze - as the result of an assumed vast, even fabulous, amount of resources buried there. The notion that the Arctic is a potential battleground seems at times have detracted from the numerous diplomatic efforts and the rather well-developed cooperation among the Arctic nations.The contradictory messages targeting national audiences may have achieved their objective of bringing the Arctic the attention of Canadians and the top of their country's foreign But in the surfacing of a nationalistic sentiment of nordicity,1 citizens may have lost track of the real challenges brought about by resource development in the north, of what kind of resources hide in the circumpolar region, and how issues are currently being managed, politically and legally, beyond the great diplomatic showdown. This article aims clear the confusion over resources exploitation in the Arctic region and explores how this dimension of the Arctic has been integrated into the political discourse.NATURAL RESOURCES: THE GREAT OPPORTUNITYIn 2000, the Canadian government released a policy paper on the northern dimension of Canada's foreign policy. Among the objectives pursued by the policy was to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians. After stressing the sense of northernness as a central aspect of Canadian identity, the policy asserts that [Canadian] future security and prosperity are closely linked with our ability manage complex issues.2In July 2009, Chris Neider asked in Business Insider, How much oil is in the Arctic?3 Numbers have been put before investors, politicians, and academics, often accompanied by a waterfall of words referring a hypothetical yet impressive amount of resources lying beneath the seabed. The amount and quality of resources is highly uncertain and the numbers change from year year. The amount of resources remains hypothetical, although it is enthusiastically propounded in speeches.In 2009, a study conducted by the United States Geological Survey confirmed that the Arctic holds an important resource potential. The Arctic is estimated hold 30 percent of the world's undiscovered gas and 13 percent of the world's undiscovered ou. Geological Survey scientists explain that these estimates were arrived at using a probabilistic geologybased methodology. The Arctic continental shelves are assessed as one of the world's largest remaining prospective areas. The authors of the study insist that undiscovered natural gas is largely concentrated in Russia and hence does not fall within a contested region.4 Though the numbers are impressive, the authors doubt that a major shift in oil and gas production is likely occur. Frederic Lasserre argues that no more than five percent of the resources are be found outside of the exclusive economic zones already under the control of or another Arctic state. …

Russian Arctic Petroleum Resources

The Arctic continental shelf is believed to be the area with the highest unexplored potential for oil and gas as well as for unconventional hydrocarbon resources such as gas hydrates. Despite a common view that the Arctic has plentiful of hydrocarbon resources, there are ongoing debates regarding the potential of this region as a future energy supply base. Driving forces for such discussions are geopolitics, environmental concern, assessment and delineation of Arctic resources, technology available for their successful development and the market demand for energy supply.The Russian part is recognized to be the largest among oil and gas resources owned by Arctic nations. However, scarce information and available geological data create uncertainty regarding a future role of the Russian Arctic as main base of energy supply in the second part of the XXI century. A further uncertainty is the pace at which production from northern areas including the Arctic will be brought onstream – either because of national policy, infrastructure development or investment by the state and the oil companies. These areas embrace those where development has already been started (Offshore Sakhalin, northern Timan Pechora) and those awaiting future involvement, like Barents and Pechora seas, East Siberia, Yamal, Kara Sea and Kamchatka.Offhore production levels are likely to be very important to Russia in mid and long terms, especially as most (if not all) production will go for export and, in the process, open doors to new markets. In this way, offshore production will introduce a new and very significant component to Russia’s export strategy. However, active involvement of the Russian Arctic resources in the global energy supply process needs a detailed analysis and clear understanding of the market potential for Russian gas and oil (required volumes, time frame, transportations routes) and requires close attention of the government to the most important issues that should be in place, like national standards and guidelines for Arctic resources development, stable, transparent and predictable law as a necessary precondition for massive investments in exploration and production and, not least, active involvement of foreign companies in development of Arctic resources that could bring along with investments an indispensible competence and experience, available technology and Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) principles.Development of oil and gas fields in the arctic seas located few hundreds miles from shore is according to expert opinion the most challenging project in the world. Without international cooperation, coordination of all activities and use of modern and proven technologies for production of hydrocarbons, their transport, efficient safety and environmental protection tools the realization of such a project would be questionable.

United States and Other Arctic Nations Conclude First International Agreement Under Arctic Council Auspices

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This Must Be the Place: Underrepresentation of Identity and Meaning in Climate Change Decision-Making

The dangers that future climate change poses to physical, biological, and economic systems are accounted for in analyses of risk and increasingly figure in decision-making about responses to climate change. Yet the potential cultural and social impacts of climate change have scarcely been considered. In this article we bring the risks climate change poses to cultures and social systems into consideration through a focus on places—those local material and symbolic contexts that give meaning and value to peoples' lives. By way of examples, the article reviews evidence on the observed and projected impacts of climate change on the Arctic and Pacific island atoll nations. It shows that impacts may result in the loss of many unique natural and cultural components of these places. We then argue that the risk of irreversible loss of places needs to be factored into decision-making on climate change. The article then suggests ways forward in decision-making that recognizes these non-market and non-instrumental metrics of risk, based on principles of justice and recognition of individual and community identity.

Multilateral Efforts to Reduce Black Carbon Emissions: A Lifeline for the Warming Arctic?

Rapid reductions in emissions of the short‐lived climate forcers black carbon, tropospheric ozone and methane have been identified as an effective strategy to slow rapid warming and melting in the Arctic and other glaciated areas in the near‐term, and avert abrupt, irreversible changes while strategies to reduce emissions of CO2 are implemented to limit long‐term consequences. Black carbon is a component of fine particulate matter, a traditional air pollutant with significant health impacts; it has a short atmospheric residence time of about a week, thus emissions reductions provide rapid climate benefit. This article analyses the mitigation approaches that are being discussed in multilateral fora including the Arctic Council, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution and the International Maritime Organization. Arctic climate dynamics will affect climate globally, which calls for leadership from Arctic nations to spur faster action to abate emissions.

Chapter 9 Oil and gas resource potential north of the Arctic Circle

Abstract The US Geological Survey recently assessed the potential for undiscovered conventional petroleum in the Arctic. Using a new map compilation of sedimentary elements, the area north of the Arctic Circle was subdivided into 70 assessment units, 48 of which were quantitatively assessed. The Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA) was a geologically based, probabilistic study that relied mainly on burial history analysis and analogue modelling to estimate sizes and numbers of undiscovered oil and gas accumulations. The results of the CARA suggest the Arctic is gas-prone with an estimated 770–2990 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered conventional natural gas, most of which is in Russian territory. On an energy-equivalent basis, the quantity of natural gas is more than three times the quantity of oil and the largest undiscovered gas field is expected to be about 10 times the size of the largest undiscovered oil field. In addition to gas, the gas accumulations may contain an estimated 39 billion barrels of liquids. The South Kara Sea is the most prospective gas assessment unit, but giant gas fields containing more than 6 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas are possible at a 50% chance in 10 assessment units. Sixty per cent of the estimated undiscovered oil resource is in just six assessment units, of which the Alaska Platform, with 31% of the resource, is the most prospective. Overall, the Arctic is estimated to contain between 44 and 157 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Billion barrel oil fields are possible at a 50% chance in seven assessment units. Undiscovered oil resources could be significant to the Arctic nations, but are probably not sufficient to shift the world oil balance away from the Middle East.

Challenges and Accomplishments: A Celebration of the Arctic Institute of North America

IN THE 1930S, EXPLORER VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON, northern scientists (particularly geologists), and developers such as Gilbert LaBine recognized the strategic nature and economic potential of the Arctic regions. The Second World War brought this potential into focus with various projects, especially the Northeast and Northwest Staging Routes for air traffic, the Alaska Highway, and the Canol Pipeline from Norman Wells, as well as the weather stations and the voyage of the St. Roch through the Northwest Passage. In 1942, a group of Canadians held private discussions about how Canada could increase her administrative, scientific, and technical competence in the Arctic to match that of other Arctic nations, such as the Soviet Union. These discussions about Arctic competence and Canadian sovereignty took place against a backdrop of disinterest and ignorance shared by the Canadian government and the public. Through personal contact with the Canadian Trevor Lloyd, American military people and scientists became aware of these discussions: the military was preoccupied with the strategic importance of the Arctic, while the scientists were interested in preserving and making accessible “a remarkable collection of hitherto unassembled information,” bequeathing it to an institution at war’s end (Parkin, 1966:8). By March 1944, Canadian initiatives had led to the realization that some objectives could best be achieved by an international organization. Accordingly, in May 1944, nine Americans and eleven Canadians met in New York: though they were there as individuals, they included senior bureaucrats and university people on the Canadian side and scientists and government Arctic specialists on the American side. Individual relations between these people were important dynamics in the formative stages. Despite differing perspectives, they established a private binational organization, with room for Greenland and Newfoundland and Labrador, and appointed Raleigh Parkin as pro tem secretary. This meeting also stressed the need for a headquarters close to an important library and other facilities, with good access to the capital cities. After a vigorous debate, an American-sponsored motion selected Montreal, with its well-equipped university libraries. In September 1944, at Montreal, the proposal for the new institute was approved. Its board of governors would include not only scientists, but also members with broad experience in financial management and administration. The proposal identified a need for independent scientific research: basic general research, studies on the problems of Arctic living, and an examination of the Arctic’s relationship to the physical, social, and economic problems of the world. The new institute would strive to coordinate its research with other ongoing research and to cooperate with government bodies and other research institutes. Geophysicist Laurence Gould became acting director in 1944, and Lincoln Washburn replaced him in October 1945. Offices were established at McGill University and in December 1945, by Act of Parliament, the Arctic Institute of North America was chartered. Its stated purposes were the following:

Has Canada Shown its Arcticness?

Canada is commonly seen as an Arctic nation. While this is certainly accurate from a geographical perspective, there remains a question as to whether the nation genuinely is committed to its “Arcticness,” or whether it simply evokes the image for political purposes. Another serious concern is Canada’s dependence on the United States in meeting her economic and security needs, which is seen as drawing Canada’s focus away from her Far North. Consequently, the Inuit (indigenous people in Canada’s northern provinces) and the region as a whole lack the requisite tools and nancial support indicative of a nation with signi cant Arctic aspirations. With Canada’s attention focused primarily on its economic and security relations, particularly with the U.S., Canada’s drive to fully become an Arctic nation appears greatly diminished. Is Canada willing to balance the demands of the Canada/U.S. economic and security relationship with a commitment to developments that would be bene cial to the Inuit and the region as a whole? What are the risks and bene ts associated with changing the nation’s strategic vision of the Far North? This article will attempt to address these questions. It will rst examine InuitCanada relations in historical context in order to better understand a dynamic that is still struggling to overcome its colonial past. Now focused on a return to self-reliance, Inuit strategy supports community development as well as Canada’s assertion of Arcticness. Second, I will examine the bond between Canada and the United States in both the security and economic realms.